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 This dissertation focuses on Thucydides’ deployment of characterization (both of cities 
and of individuals) to problematize the political systems of his time. I argue that Thucydides’ 
narrative guides readers to the conclusion that both the Athenian and Spartan political systems 
are flawed (each in its own, particular way), and that each therefore requires the intervention of 
leaders capable of moderating its weaknesses and excesses. At the same time, however, by 
presenting the vast majority of Athenian and Spartan leaders as failing to meet these standards, 
Thucydides makes clear that the emergence of such individuals cannot actually be relied upon. 
Readers, therefore, are presented with an untenable situation: Athens and Sparta need great 
leaders, but cannot expect them. This incongruity leaves one looking for a middle way: a system 
of government that does not require the intervention of exceptional individuals, but is instead 
capable of self-moderation. Such a system, I argue, he briefly proposes in his praise of the 
government of the Five Thousand at Athens (8.97.2), which he depicts as a moderate alternative 
to the bipolar model of democracy or oligarchy. I then conclude by discussing the relationship 
between Thucydides’ political thought and that of other ancient Greek authors, demonstrating 
that there are a number of similarities between his conception of governmental moderation and 






When I first came to Thucydides’ text, I was, as many other students before me, looking 
to it primarily as a source of historical information on the Peloponnesian War. Upon reading his 
work, however, I was immediately struck by its artistry.1 Numerous episodes left me feeling 
invested in the action of the text, hoping for a particular outcome or dreading the result of a 
decision that seemed poorly made. I found myself in deep suspense after the Mytilenean debate 
as one Athenian ship chased another to save the Mytileneans from total destruction,2 alternately 
horrified and fascinated by the arguments made in the Melian Dialogue, and feeling sorrow at the 
pitiable fate of the Athenian forces—and of Demosthenes and Nicias in particular—at the end of 
the Sicilian Expedition. 
The more I became aware of this artistry, the more interested I became in both the work, 
and in Thucydides as an author. Indeed, Thucydides’ text offers something for everyone, and the 
body of scholarship on Thucydides reflects this fact: it has value to both ancient historians and 
classical philologists, as well as to political scientists and students of international relations 
theory (where he is often viewed as the father of Realism).  
The interests of such scholars have, however, not been stagnant. Indeed, recognition of 
and research into Thucydides’ literary artistry is a relatively recent development in modern 
scholarship. I thus turn briefly to an examination of the history of Thucydidean scholarship in the 
modern era, and the trends that have, over time, come to dominate. 
                                                 
1 It must be noted, however, that Thucydides never calls his work a history (ἱστορία), and thus, as Hornblower 
argues, “we have no easy clue as to the kind of enterprise he thought he was engaged in” (1987: 7–8). 
2 Grant (1974: 86) argues this account likely exaggerates the drama and danger of the situation. 
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History of Scholarship, Position of this Dissertation3 
 In the 19th and early 20th centuries, two discussions dominated Thucydidean scholarship 
(with the notable exception of Cornford and his book Thucydides Mythistoricus, to which I will 
return later). The first went hand in hand with attempts to define the broader field of history as a 
precise and scientific discipline, along the lines of von Ranke’s call for history to be written “wie 
es eigentlich gewesen.” In looking back at the origins of their field, many scholars of this school 
identified Thucydides as the progenitor of such “objective” history (Connor 1977: 289; Forsdyke 
2017: 19), and thus often described him as an unbiased historian who was, to the exclusion of 
literary ornament, recording facts accurately for posterity.  
The second discussion of this period centered on what is now often referred to as the 
“Thucydidean Question,” which concerns the stages of composition of the work. Indeed, the 
incompleteness of several of the books (certainly Book 8, and many argue book 5 as well), as 
well as the presence of his famous “second introduction” at 5.26, have led multiple scholars to 
posit that Thucydides wrote and revised various sections of the text at different times (Hunter 
1977: 269–70). Based on these observations, a great and lively debate developed between the 
“Analysts” (or “Separatists,” according to Connor 1984b: 10) such as Ullrich (1846) and 
Schwartz (1919), who ran with this idea but proposed competing models for the stages of the 
work’s composition, and “Unitarians” such as Meyer (1899: 269–436), who maintained the 
overall unity of the work. 
 This debate reached a critical point by the mid-20th century, as an abundance of answers 
to this “Thucydidean Question” were proposed, but none was accepted as the consensus solution. 
It was at this time that unitarian scholars such as de Romilly and Finley acquired the upper hand 
                                                 
3 Many previous scholars have undertaken reviews of the scholarship on Thucydides. For more detailed 
examinations of this topic, see de Ste. Croix (1972: 295–6) and Hunter (1977: 269–74). 
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in this debate.4 In looking at the state of scholarly attempts to determine the stages of 
composition of the work, these unitarians argued that researchers of Thucydides were faced with 
a problem with no solution. Indeed, de Romilly stated that, “All that remained of so many efforts 
was a confused tangle of all kinds of hypotheses, contested opinions and arguments twisted in 
every conceivable sense” (1963: 6), and went on to argue that this project “does not necessarily 
admit of an exact answer” (1963: 154). They instead proposed viewing the work as a unity 
instead, with Finley, for example, writing an essay titled “The Unity of Thucydides’ History,” 
and arguing that Thucydides worked in one, sustained period of composition (1967, esp. p. 121; 
see Hunter 1977: 272–4). 
The strength of these and other unitarian scholars’ arguments effectively ended 
discussion of the compositional question, save for a few exceptions (Hunter 1977: 274).5 Two 
related developments followed the resolution of this debate in Thucydidean scholarship: the 
rejection of the idea of pure Thucydidean historical “objectivity,”6 and a new focus on the 
literary aspects of Thucydides’ history,7 including, for example, his use of vividness and 
emotionality to impart not just facts, but experiences to readers (Connor 1977: 289, 1984b: 6; 
Greenwood 2006: 19–41; Grethlein 2010: 248–52; Forsdyke 2017: 20, 31).8 Observers of the 
                                                 
4 Hunter describes these scholars as follows: “If de Romilly can be described as a cautious and rather embarrassed 
unitarian, Finley is a bold and assertive one” (1977: 274). 
5 Connor also states that “it was clear by the 1950s that this effort had bogged down and was unlikely ever to fulfill 
its promise,” and that it “seemed, if not dead, at least moribund” (1984b: 4). 
6 “Few these days will regard Thucydides as a ‘scientific’ historian, …” (Gribble 1998: 70). See also Grethlein, who 
states that, “… by and large, in the last decades interest has shifted from Thucydides historicus to Thucydides 
narrator” (2013: 91). 
7 Connor ties this questioning of authority among Anglophone scholars to the Vietnam War (1977: 289). 
8 The ancient commentators appear to have been fully aware of many of the literary qualities of Thucydides’ history, 
and found commenting on them totally unproblematic. For example, Dover (2009: 49) notes that Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus questions Thucydides’ placement of the Pericles’ Funeral Oration in Book 2 (Th. 18), and appears not 
to have considered the answer, “because that is when it occurred” satisfactory, and Grethlein (2013: 92) points out 
that Plutarch directly refers to Thucydides’ “vividness” (ἐνάργειαν), as well as his desire to make the reader a 
spectator (θεατὴν; De glor. Ath. 347a5–9). 
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literary aspects of the work now recognize the influence these aspects of the work have on 
readers’ interpretations (Connor 1984b: 7–8).9 
This trend in scholarship led to many new and insightful works on Thucydides and his 
historical method, with individuals such as Cornford (1907; obviously writing well before the 
more literary approach to Thucydides had been widely accepted), Hunter (1973), Macleod 
(1983), Connor (1984b), Rood (1998), and Greenwood (2006), to name only a few, offering new 
perspectives on the various ways in which Thucydides’ use of selection, characterization, or 
narrative shapes his history for his audience.10 In addition, his role in and contribution to political 
or international relations theory has been readdressed by scholars such as Orwin (1994), 
Ahrensdorf (1997), Lebow (2003), Balot (2006, 2017), Mara (2009), and Jaffe (2017a, 2017b). 
This new and exciting research has certainly answered a number of lingering questions, but it has 
likely introduced just as many new ones. It is within this relatively new scholarly tradition that 
the current work places itself, and I turn now to a more specific discussion of my own approach 
to the text. 
 
Approach to the Text, Methodology 
 A useful place to begin in orienting myself within the body of scholarship is with 
Thucydides’ statement concerning his methodology in recording speeches. Scholars’ arguments 
concerning this passage have varied greatly, with some maintaining that he is claiming a much 
higher level of fidelity and accuracy than others. I find that individual positions on this specific 
issue often seem to reflect their larger approach to the text as a whole. To review, Thucydides 
here states: καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἕκαστοι ἢ μέλλοντες πολεμήσειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη ὄντες, 
                                                 
9 See also Hunter, who argues that the reader of Thucydides experiences “subliminal persuasion” (1973: 115). 
10 For a more thorough discussion of modern scholarly approaches to Thucydides, see Forsdyke 2017. 
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χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεῦσαι ἦν ἐμοί τε ὧν αὐτὸς ἤκουσα καὶ 
τοῖς ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν· ὡς δ’ ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων 
τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ’ εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, 
οὕτως εἴρηται (“and however many things each person said either when they were about to make 
war or when they were already in it, it was difficult both for me to remember precisely the things 
that were said which I myself heard, and for those reporting things to me from elsewhere. As it 
seemed to me each would have said what was necessary concerning their present circumstances, 
holding as closely as possible to the whole idea of what was truly said, thus it has been 
reported”; 1.22.1). 
 The meaning of this passage, and especially of τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης, has been 
extensively debated in scholarship. Is Thucydides claiming that his account of speeches in the 
text is as close to the exact truth as humanly possible, or is he allowing himself freedom for 
independent composition? Again, one’s stance on this passage is often indicative of one’s 
perception of Thucydides as an author in general. Those who saw Thucydides as a scientific, 
objective, and unbiased recorder of past events were generally inclined to emphasize his rigor 
even in something as hard as discovering and reporting the exact words which individuals used. 
Most scholars since the second half of the twentieth century, however, have accepted to some 
degree that Thucydides is here stating his willingness to add to, subtract from, or alter speeches. 
This is not to say that most scholars now view them entirely as free compositions and insertions, 
but simply that he was working within an intellectual movement that saw no need for exact, 
word-for-word transcription. 11 
                                                 
11 For a discussion of 1.22.1, see Gomme (1959: 140–1), de Ste. Croix (1972: 10–11), and Marincola (2007: 120–2). 
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 My own interpretation of this passage may already be clear from my rendering of the 
Greek into English, but to be clear, I take the latter approach, and agree largely with de Ste. 
Croix (1972: 10–11), who argues that when Thucydides says that he held to τῆς ξυμπάσης 
γνώμης of what was really said, he meant that he tried to maintain “the main thesis” of the 
argument. Thus, he felt free to include any information relevant to reader understanding of this 
thesis, or to omit points he found extraneous to it, but was largely unwilling to deviate entirely 
from what a speaker actually wished to argue. 
 I approach the text more generally in this way, seeing it as reporting a reality which 
Thucydides has not fundamentally altered, but which he has subtly shaped to fit the argument 
which he wishes to express. My position is greatly influenced by Connor’s (1984b) approach to 
the text, as well as by Pelling’s more general discussion of ancient historiography, in which he 
argues that the simple act of constructing a narrative, and of selecting what information to 
include, exclude, emphasize, or gloss over, necessarily involves the author imposing their own 
interpretation on events, and then trying to persuade readers of the correctness of that 
interpretation (2000:1–2, 6–7). Indeed, such an approach to Thucydides is largely in agreement 
with Hobbes, who provides an oft-quoted discussion of this methodology in his introduction to 
his translation of Thucydides: “the narrative doth secretly instruct the reader, and more 
effectually than can possibly be done by precept” (1843: xxii).12  
Based on these influences, I approach Thucydides as both history and literature, and, as 
my own emphasis lies on his use of characterization, regularly address the historical individuals 
                                                 
12 See Taylor 2002: 91–2 for this citation. Forde also makes the following note: “That is what Thomas Hobbes, who 
translated and admired Thucydides, meant when he said that Thucydides is ‘accounted the most politic 
historiographer that ever writ’; for ‘he filleth his narrations with that choice of matter, and ordereth them with that 
judgment’ that the reader is allowed, indeed compelled, to ‘draw out lessons to himself’” (Forde 1989: 3; quoting 
Hobbes 1975: 7). 
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whose lives and actions he records as “characters.” This is because, as just noted, his process of 
selecting what information to include, emphasize or omit inevitably demonstrates his own 
interpretation of that figure. Thus, just as Forde states that he does not discuss the historical 
Alcibiades, but rather “Thucydides’ Alcibiades” in his book The Ambition to Rule (1989: 1), I 
will focus not on the historical Pericles, Cleon, Brasidas, or Alcibiades, but rather on the portrait 
of them which Thucydides creates.13 
 This process of characterization, however, is often very subtle, often relying not on 
periodic direct authorial interventions (though these do exist and will certainly be discussed), but 
instead on indirect elements of the narrative, such as verbal or thematic repetition, or an authorial 
emphasis on repetitious patterns of behavior. Thus, in an attempt to capture the full force of this 
long process, and influenced in no small part by Connor (1984b), I adopt an approach derived 
from reader response theory, treating the text as it exists as a unified whole, and tracing what, at 
any given moment, readers making their way linearly through the text could be expected to 
know, and how this information may shape their reading of a given passage. Through this 
analysis, I hope to make a series of important observations concerning Thucydides’ discussion of 
the large-scale, collective behavioral dynamics of Athens and Sparta, the roles and requirements 
of individual leaders within these poleis, and what in turn this may tell us about Thucydides’ 
outlook on the dominant governmental systems of his time: democracy and oligarchy.14 
 
 
                                                 
13 When appropriate, however, I will discuss observable discrepencies between Thucydides’ portrayal of individuals 
and historical reality as a means of identifying the author’s methods of shaping his narrative. 
14 On this opposition, see, for example, Thucydides’ comments at 3.82.1, and Finley (1967: 143). See also Jaffe, 
who claims that “The issue of domestic politics goes to the heart of Thucydides’ ambitions as an analyst of political 
life” (2017a: 405), Johnson Bagby, who states that the Peloponnesian War was when the “Greeks started thinking in 
terms of democracy versus oligarchy, that is, in ideological terms” (2011: 117), and Balot, who states that the 
caused strong polarization between oligarchs and democrats (2006: 89). For more on this point, see Chapter 1. 
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Argument and Organization 
 In the scholarship on both Thucydides’ treatment of individuals and of politics, I believe 
there have been several oversights and key oversimplifications. For example, debate concerning 
Thucydides’ politics have variously identified him as a supporter of democracy, oligarchy, a 
mixed constitution, or even kingship,15 though a great many have adopted a binary choice, 
attempting to identify him as either a supporter democracy or of oligarchy. While these are, as 
scholars have noted, the primary two systems of government which readers may observe at work 
in his history,16 this merely reflects the reality of his time and of the political environment in 
Greece during the Peloponnesian War. As such, we need not interpret this emphasis on 
democracy and oligarchy as limiting Thucydides himself to a choice between these two 
constitutional types. In fact, the ongoing nature of this debate results largely from the fact that 
Thucydides both praises and faults each form of government at different points in his text. Rather 
than weighing the author’s negative statements against his positive ones in order to take a strong, 
absolute position in favor of one form of government or the other, I propose that it is more 
productive to view Thucydides as presenting both political organizations as possessing their 
own, unique sets of strengths and weaknesses, and thus both as imperfect.17 This complication in 
Thucydides’ discussion of politics must be addressed, and is, I argue, somewhat clarified when 
placed in conversation with his use of characterization. 
                                                 
15 On this variability of opinion, see Connor 1984b: 237–8, Ober 1998: 52 n. 1 and Raaflaub 2006: 220. Finley 
(1942: 237) identifies him as a democrat, McGregor (1956: 102) calls him an oligarch, Balot (2006: 91) sees him as 
a critic of democracy, de Romilly (1976: 94) and von Fritz (1975: 77–8) posit that he was a supporter of a sort of 
mixed constitution, and Hobbes (1975: 13) argues that he favored monarchy. 
16 See, for example, Finley (1967: 143) and Johnson Bagby (2011: 116–17). 
17 In fact, there appears to have been a recognition that all “pure” forms of government were flawed at least as early 
as the constitutional debate in Herodotus (3.80–3), and an awareness of the possibility of finding a “middle path” 
(von Fritz 1975: 77) between the various conflicting interests within the polis dates back at least to Solon (see Sol. 
Fr. 5 for his claim to have favored neither the demos nor the wealthy; Szegedy-Maszak 1993: 207; Balot 2006: 41–
6, 258; Hahm 2009: 179). 
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Turning from political systems to Thucydides’ treatment of individual leaders, many 
scholars have focused on universal skills and attributes (such as rhetorical ability and moral 
uprightness) which he attributes to successful leaders in the text, seemingly looking at his history 
as a sort of a treatise on leadership.18 While these attributes may be identifiable, I do not believe 
they tell the whole story of positive leadership in Thucydides’ History. Instead, as I will argue, 
such attributes represent a baseline set of requirements for an individual to lead, but it is the 
interaction of an individual’s character with that of his polis that determines whether he will lead 
effectively. 
In an attempt to remedy these gaps in scholarship, I examine Thucydides’ use of 
characterization (both of cities and of individuals) to problematize the political systems of his 
time. I argue that Thucydides’ narrative guides readers to the conclusion that both the Athenian 
and Spartan political systems are flawed (each in its own, unique way), and that each therefore 
requires the intervention of leaders capable of moderating its weaknesses and excesses, while 
simultaneously maintaining its strengths. At the same time, however, by presenting the vast 
majority of Athenian and Spartan leaders as failing to meet these standards, Thucydides makes it 
clear that the emergence of such individuals cannot actually be relied upon. Readers therefore are 
presented with an untenable situation: Athens and Sparta need great leaders, but cannot expect 
them. In presenting this incongruity as existing in both systems of governance, Thucydides 
leaves readers looking for a middle way: a system of government that does not require the 
                                                 
18 See for example the lists of Periclean attributes provided by Luginbill (1999: 190) and Finley (1942: 203). While 
not specifically referring to leaders, Ober sees 1.22.4 as suggesting that the work is a “political systems user’s 
manual” (2006: 132). Stahl argues against the view that Thucydides’ History may be treated as a handbook for 
statesman, arguing instead that the historian is attempting to demonstrate the limitations on human agency in 
determining the outcomes of history (2003: 16). 
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intervention of exceptional individuals, but is instead capable of self-moderation. This, I argue, 
he briefly gives readers in his praise of the government of the Five Thousand at Athens (8.97.2). 
In order to make these points, I divide my dissertation into five chapters, which will be 
organized as follows. In Chapter One, I discuss the role of “national character” in Thucydides’ 
History. I argue that Thucydides maintains a high level of consistency in describing the large-
scale, collective behavioral patterns of Athens and Sparta. In so doing, I push back against the 
recently proposed view that the distinction between Athenian and Spartan character breaks down 
over the course of the work,19 positing instead that episodes in which the poleis appear to act 
contrary to established behavioral patterns result not from fundamental changes in character at 
the collective level, but from the intervention of prominent leaders whose individual characters 
differ from those of their poleis, and who thus drive their populace to temporarily alter its 
behavior. Indeed, upon removal of such prominent individuals, both Athens and Sparta quickly 
revert to their previous patterns of behavior. 
In addition, in this chapter I examine Thucydides’ presentation of the origin of national 
character. Through this analysis, I conclude that Thucydides sees political environment (much as 
Hippocrates sees physical environment) as the primary determinant of collective character. 
Finally, I demonstrate that Thucydides clearly identifies the national characters of both 
Athens and Sparta as fundamentally flawed: the former because of its propensity for rash, 
excessively risky action, and the latter because of its extreme hesitancy, often to its own 
detriment. I then argue that, since Thucydides proposes political structure as the source of these 
behavioral traits, he implicitly indicts both Athenian democracy and the oligarchic system which 
he identifies with Sparta. Thus, the flawed characters of these two city-states are tied to their 
                                                 
19 See, for example Debnar 2001 and Connor 1984b: 41. 
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flawed political systems. Moreover, his portrayal of this reality leads readers to recognize these 
poleis’ need for the intervention of prominent individuals, who must contend with, and attempt 
to remedy, these inherent weaknesses.20 
After this discussion of national character, I turn in Chapter Two to an analysis of 
Thucydides’ portrayal of effective leadership. Before discussing these historical individuals as 
Thucydidean characters, however, using Pericles as a case study I argue that we may observe the 
author, by emphasizing and selecting key passages related to this Athenian general, creating his 
own, unique portrait of him. 
I then go on to discuss Pericles and Brasidas, the two leaders from Athens and Sparta 
whom I believe Thucydides portrays as providing the type of corrective leadership that their 
poleis need, given their flawed collective characters. I then examine what specifically makes 
these leaders successful, and posit that it is not a set of universally attainable skills or qualities, 
but rather the way in which their individual characters (which are notably different from one 
another) interact with those of their home city-states. Thus, while, upon examination, these two 
leaders are very different from one another, each possesses the correct combination of 
traditionally “Athenian” and “Spartan” attributes for the specific context in which they operate, 
therefore allowing each to serve as a moderative, corrective force. Based on this conclusion, I 
make one final point to close this second chapter: the likelihood of Athens and Sparta obtaining 
multiple such leaders, possessing just the right, context-determined combination of character 
traits, appears exceedingly small. 
In Chapter Three I turn to an examination of other prominent Athenian and Spartan 
leaders, and demonstrate that Thucydides portrays each as failing to live up to the examples of 
                                                 
20 Raaflaub (2006: 208) notes the Athenian democracy’s need for strong leadership in order to maintain good 
policies and restrain the demos. 
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Pericles and Brasidas, and instead possessing individual characters which do not successfully 
complement those of their poleis. I then argue that Thucydides’ presentation of this set of 
ineffective leaders, representing the vast majority of influential individuals in his work, 
ultimately confirms for readers that he does not think that Athens and Sparta can actually expect 
the regular emergence of leaders of this mold. 
In making these points, I begin with a discussion of Demosthenes, the Athenian general 
known best for his role in the Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria, and for his death 
alongside Nicias at the end of the Sicilian Expedition. I argue that Thucydides strongly 
associates him with Athenian daring and risk-tolerance, resulting in his participation in one 
resounding success, but also in several overly-ambitious and ultimately failed undertakings. Due 
to this characterization, Thucydides identifies him as ill-fitted to provide the leadership required 
in his model. 
I then shift the lens of my examination to Cleon, whom I argue Thucydides also portrays 
as far too “Athenian” to provide the leadership which his Athenian context required. Indeed, he 
is ambitious, bold, and often impatiently rash, attributes that ultimately cost him dearly in his 
defeat at Amphipolis. 
The final Athenian leader addressed in this chapter is Nicias, whom I argue Thucydides 
portrays as, in many cases, possessing a character that is strikingly similar to that associated with 
Sparta. He is hesitant and lacks daring, primarily preferring military undertakings with a highly 
limited scope and which, even when successful, accomplish little of lasting significance to the 
Athenian war effort. At the same time, however, I note that Thucydides does not hesitate to make 
clear that there are times when Nicias does in fact take risks. In all of these instances, however, 
Nicias’ risk-taking backfires, thus identifying the successful utilization of calculated risks as 
13 
 
outside of his repertoire. Thucydides’ treatment of Nicias, then, makes it clear that, despite 
Athens’ often excessive boldness, a Spartan commander is not what the city needs to correct its 
weaknesses. Instead, such a commander temporarily instills his countrymen with the excessive 
hesitancy of their enemy, while simultaneously eliminating the benefits afforded by the well-
timed utilization of daring. 
In the final section of this chapter on ineffective leadership, I undertake an analysis of 
Thucydides’ portrayal of the Spartans Archidamus, Alcidas, Cnemus, and Agis II. In so doing, I 
demonstrate that these leaders share much in common with Nicias, including their crippling 
hesitancy, and their general preference for low-risk engagements with little possibility for 
effecting meaningful shifts in the war’s balance of power. Moreover, when these leaders do 
appear to break with traditional Spartan character and take risks, these endeavors ultimately fail. 
Thus, they display the same inability as Nicias to successfully use Athenian risk-taking to their 
advantage. As such, I argue that this shared attribute is yet another aspect of Spartan character, 
and thus that these generals are all portrayed as possessing characters that are too similar to the 
collective character of the city-state they represent to eliminate its inherent excesses. 
Finally, in Chapter Four I turn to an analysis of Alcibiades, arguing that Thucydides 
characterizes him as the most unrestrainedly “Athenian” character in the work, especially in his 
extreme ambition and daring. As a result, just like his home city of Athens, he is capable of great 
accomplishments, but also of disastrous failures. Additionally, Thucydides identifies Alcibiades’ 
ambition as directed primarily toward his own, private gain, a reversal of the supposed 
subordination of the individual good to the public good which Pericles espoused. While 
Alcibiades attempts to justify this reversal, Thucydides makes clear that the high value which he 
placed on his own, private good eventually turned the Athenian demos against him. Based on 
14 
 
these observations, I argue that Thucydides ultimately identifies Alcibiades as incapable of 
providing the leadership needed in any of the contexts in which he operates, because he is both 
too Athenian to act as a corrective force, and too concerned with his private profit to maintain the 
people’s trust, or a leadership position. 
Finally, in Chapter Five I review all that has been discussed up to this point, and remind 
readers that Thucydides has presented readers with a far greater number of ineffective leaders 
than effective ones, thus implicitly demonstrating that Athens and Sparta, though standing in dire 
need of corrective leadership, cannot actually rely upon finding it. I then turn to an analysis of 
whether Thucydides provides a solution to this problem, in which flawed political environments 
consistently fail to receive needed correction. I argue that, while Thucydides certainly is not 
writing a work of systematic political theory, he does briefly discuss what he sees as a possible 
solution to this problem: the moderate government of the Five Thousand, which he describes as 
existing somewhere between democracy and oligarchy (8.97.2). After making this claim, I turn 
to a brief analysis of where Thucydides’ political thought lies in reference to the poets and 
philosophers of the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries BCE, and I conclude by pointing out that 
many of the points which Thucydides makes appear to be in conversation with those expressed 
by these other authors, and that thus these ideas appear to have been “in the air” at the time he 
was writing, even if they were not systematized until the fourth century. 
Through this analysis, I hope to drive readers to rethink some of their assumptions about 
Thucydides, and to adopt a more nuanced view of his use of characterization, and of his politics. 
This historian continues to hold great interest for me, and I hope this fascination is passed on to 






CHAPTER I.  
Athens and Sparta 
While Thucydides is generally not recognized for his character development (Herodotus 
has historically received greater praise in this category), his portrayal of Athenian and Spartan 
polis-wide behavioral tendencies (commonly known as “national character”) has received a 
significant amount of scholarly attention.21 Discussion of this topic has centered largely on 
determining three things: the explanatory value of national character in the History, whether this 
characterization is consistent throughout the work, and what to make of episodes where 
individual Spartans or Athenians behave in a way that is significantly different from their home-
poleis’ tendencies. Connor, for example, argues that, after the Corinthian ambassador’s 
discussion of national character in Book 1, the reader is left to assess the validity of this 
description on his or her own until Thucydides’ direct agreement with it in Book 8. In the 
meantime, however, the reader has seen individual leaders (like Pausanias, Brasidas, and Nicias) 
who differ significantly from their poleis’ national characters, and who thus force readers to 
acknowledge that the Corinthian’s analysis is a generalization, and that their own understanding 
of national character in the work must be adjusted (1984b: 41). 
 Pelling, on the other hand, sees the representation of national character as largely 
unchanged at the end of Thucydides’ work: the Athenians are still enterprising, while the 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Marincola 2001: 91–3. Orwin goes so far as to claim that, “The primary actors in Thucydides 




Spartans are still sluggish. At the same time, however, he believes that events over the course of 
the text (such as the appearance of the thoroughly un-Spartan Brasidas) have complicated these 
categories (1997: 65). Debnar, meanwhile, argues that the Spartans undergo a major shift during 
the Peloponnesian War, especially in their use of rhetoric (2001: 233). Thus, she believes that the 
strict antithesis between the Athenians and the Spartans breaks down over the course of the 
History (2001: 234). At the same time, however, she admits that Thucydides reiterates the 
opposition between the two groups throughout the text, and that national character is therefore 
persistent as a feature (2001: 3, 234). 
 Additionally, Cartledge and Debnar (in a collaborative chapter) assert that, while some of 
what the Corinthian says in Book 1 is borne out by the narrative (or directly affirmed by 
Thucydides at 8.96.5), the Athenian/Spartan antithesis in Thucydides must be treated with 
caution (2006: 561). They go on to note several complicating factors, such as the fact that some 
Spartans (like Brasidas) are actually rather Athenian in their characterization and some 
Athenians (like Nicias) rather Spartan, and that both groups demonstrate the ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances over the course of the work (Cartledge and Debnar 2006: 562). 
Still further, Marincola believes that Thucydides’ use of national character is essential to the 
work, and calls attention to the fact that the Corinthian perspective is largely endorsed by 
Thucydides himself in Book 8 (2001: 92). He recognizes, however, that individual characters 
may differ significantly from the Athenian/Spartan antithesis set up in Book 1, and argues that 
national character provides the backdrop against which individuals must be viewed (2001: 94–7). 
Marincola also notes that, at times, groups may act in a way that is contrary to their national 
character, but claims that this is always due to the intervention of an extraordinary individual, 




Finally, Luginbill directly claims that, “in Thucydides’ opinion, the causes and the 
courses of human conflict are directly linked to the behavioral tendencies of these large, national 
collectives” (1999: 5). Thus, for him national character is integral to Thucydides’ explanation of 
both the causes and the course of the Peloponnesian War, and the behavior of the Spartans and 
Athenians remains largely consistent throughout the History (1999: 15–16). He then goes on to 
see national character as determined by historical experience, which predisposes groups of 
people to either hope (as is the case with the Athenians) or fear (as with the Spartans) (1999: 70, 
75). 
Thus, most scholars view national character as an integral and persistent part of 
Thucydides’ project, but at the same time recognize numerous features of the text that 
complicate the Athenian/Spartan antithesis (for example, individual leaders who clearly deviate 
from their home-city’s national character, and who thus direct their polis to act outside of its 
defined collective norms). While recognition of such complexity is important to the development 
of our understanding of Thucydides’ work, I believe that many previous analyses of national 
character have placed too much emphasis on the examination of individual leaders and their 
consistency or inconsistency with the national character of the polis they represent.22 I would 
argue that national character should be interpreted collectively; that is to say, every individual 
Athenian or Spartan need not exactly match the Corinthian’s description of his or her polis’ 
behavioral tendencies. Instead, the idea of national (or collective) character is meant to represent 
a general, strong habit of group behavior that may be temporarily altered, but which will always 
trend back to its default state.23 Based on this distinction, I believe that portraits of leaders in the 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Luginbill’s regular analysis of the behavior of Spartan leaders (such as Archidamus, Cnemus, 
and Astyochus) when discussing Spartan national character (1999: 105–26). 
23 As an example, Marincola notes that after the death of Brasidas and the departure of Alcibiades the Spartans 




History do not so much help us to confirm or deny representations of a polis’ national character 
as they do help us to understand what happens when a leader of a certain character (individual 
character) interacts with a people of particular behavioral tendencies (national character). Thus, 
we may separate individual and collective (or “national”) character, while at the same time 
recognizing that the relationship between the two carries important explanatory power in the text. 
With these points in mind, I will in this chapter examine Spartan and Athenian national 
character in Thucydides’ History, giving preference to episodes that specifically illustrate group 
behavioral dynamics (without the intervention of prominent leaders, whose influence may bring 
about temporary alterations in collective behavior).24 Through this analysis, this chapter will 
establish three points. First, close examination of the text demonstrates that the collective 
characters of Athens and Sparta are surprisingly consistent throughout the work. Indeed, as will 
be shown, the Spartans are repeatedly depicted as slow to action, while the Athenians are restive 
and acquisitive. Second, while scholars have largely focused on the advantages of Athenian 
character over Spartan as presented by Thucydides, it will be shown that the national characters 
of both Athens and Sparta contain weaknesses as well as strengths: the Athenian desire to 
acquire more—the very desire that led them to acquire their empire—also leads them to 
overreach dangerously, while the same attributes of Spartan character that prevent them from 
pressing the advantage when they have it also drive them to avoid the excesses of the 
Athenians.25 Finally, these collective characterizations, established and reaffirmed throughout the 
text (together with their strengths and weaknesses), stand as a backdrop against which the 
                                                 
24 Both Marincola (2001: 92) and Luginbill (1999: 105) acknowledge that individual, exceptional leaders may 
temporarily alter Spartan or Athenian behavioral tendencies. 
25 See, for example, Connor’s note that the Corinthian’s analysis of national character focuses heavily on the 
advantages of Athenian character (1984b: 40). On the potential for Spartan character to be advantageous, see 




behavior, character, and success or failure of leading individuals, as they interact with their polis, 
may be viewed.26 
In order to demonstrate these points, this chapter will begin with an examination of the 
first in-depth discussion of national character in Thucydides’ History: that of the Corinthian 
speaker in Book 1. It will then briefly address the background of national character in the text, 
noting the important role that political environment plays in the formation of collective 
behavioral tendencies. After this digression, the remainder of the chapter will move on to analyze 
episodes displaying the Athenian, and then the Spartan, national character in action. 
 
The Corinthian Comparison 
 In Book 1 of Thucydides’ History, the Corinthians, tired of the harm they claim to have 
received at the hands of the Athenians, present a speech designed to spur the Spartans to action 
on their behalf. In the course of this speech, the Corinthian speaker presents a comparison of the 
opposing national (collective) characters of Athens and Sparta. This passage provides us with a 
critical starting point for this study, because it is the first extended expression of national 
character in the text.27 It must be noted, however, that this speech is not presented in Thucydides’ 
own voice, and that its speaker has a specific persuasive aim (to drive the Spartans to invade 
Attica) (Debnar 2001: 3). As a result, it has been noted that the Corinthian does not provide an 
impartial analysis of each city-state, but instead emphasizes how Athenian attributes are likely to 
bring success, and how those of Sparta are old-fashioned (Connor 1984b: 40, Marincola 2001: 
                                                 
26 It is interesting to note the importance Ober has placed on the interaction of the masses and elite leadership in the 
functioning of the Athenian democracy (while focusing on the orators of the fourth century), and the important role 
Thucydides has left for leaders of both Athens and Sparta in his history. See Ober 1989: passim. 
27 Debnar points out, however, that the Athenian/Spartan antithesis originally occurs in the Archaeology at 1.6.3–4, 
when Thucydides claims that the Athenians adopted a more luxurious lifestyle while the Spartans pursued more 
egalitarian practices, and at 1.10.2 when he discusses the different impressions of power Athenian and Spartan ruins 




92). Readers therefore must be careful not to accept the Corinthian’s words prima facie as a 
systematic account of Thucydides’ own views concerning each city-state’s character. At the 
same time, however, we cannot simply reject this passage as purely rhetorical with little 
importance to the rest of the text, because it introduces a theme that any reader will recognize as 
recurring throughout the work. Let us, then, carefully examine the main points presented in the 
Corinthian’s speech, so that, when we move on to an examination of later passages in which 
national character plays a prominent role, we may use them as a basis for comparison in order to 
analyze the consistency of collective behavior in the text. 
The Corinthian ambassador sets up his comparison by first focusing on Spartan 
weaknesses. He states, ... σωφροσύνην μὲν ἔχετε, ἀμαθίᾳ δὲ πλέονι πρὸς τὰ ἔξω πράγματα 
χρῆσθε (“… you have prudence, but you enjoy more ignorance with respect to external 
matters”; 1.68.1).28 This Spartan ignorance, in the Corinthian’s eyes, is manifested in their 
inability to recognize the need for military action against the Athenians. The speaker expresses 
anger that the Spartans have allowed the Corinthians to actively suffer at the hands of the 
Athenians without taking any action to aid them (1.68.2). Moreover, he blames Sparta for the 
current state of affairs—καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι (“And you are the cause of these things”; 
1.69.1)—because, as he claims, Sparta’s inaction allowed Athens to build and consolidate its 
power in Greece. This Spartan passivity is further censured, as the Corinthian asserts that the 
Athenians believe they can encroach on their neighbors with impunity because of Spartan 
indifference (1.69.3). Finally, in wrapping up his diatribe against Spartan inaction, the Corinthian 
bemoans the fact that the Spartans are attempting to ward off attack from Athens through 
hesitation rather than through an actual show of force (1.69.4). 
                                                 




 Up to this point, then, the Spartans have been characterized as prudent but inactive (a 
characterization that, as will be shown, persists throughout the text), and the Athenians, through 
implicit comparison, are depicted as active pursuers of their own benefit who regularly take 
advantage of Spartan lethargy. The Corinthian ambassador then goes on, after noting that he does 
not believe the Spartans have considered just how different the Athenians are from themselves 
(1.70.2), to make his comparison of the two poleis explicit. 
 In this juxtaposition of the opposing powers, the speaker claims: οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ 
καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σῴζειν καὶ 
ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι (“They are innovators and swift to invent 
and to bring about by their action those things which they decide, but you are accustomed to 
preserve what exists and to recognize nothing and not to accomplish what is necessary by 
your action”; 1.70.2). As in his earlier implicit comparison, the Corinthian now comes out and 
directly describes Athens as swift in deliberation and action, and Sparta as mired in inaction and 
defensive preservation of the status quo. He then continues, αὖθις δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν 
τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον τῆς τε 
δυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ πρᾶξαι τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε 
οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι (“And again they are daring beyond their strength and run risk 
beyond [good] judgment and are hopeful in dire straits, but it is your nature both to act short 
of your power and not to trust the certainties of your judgment and to think that you will 
not ever be released from dire straits”; 1.70.3). 
 Until this comparison, a reader may have assumed that Athenian daring was being 
presented solely in a positive light, whereas Spartan inaction was its negative counterpart. 




attributes as likely to bring success, and those of the Spartans as old fashioned (1984b: 40). At 
this point, however, it becomes clear that the character of both city-states is potentially harmful. 
Indeed, the same daring that drives the Athenians to expand their polis’ power also makes them 
παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ (“daring beyond their strength”), and παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ (“run 
risks contrary to [good] judgment”).29 The Spartans, on the other hand, are defined by a lack of 
trust in their own judgment (τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι) and an inability to live 
up the potential that their military strength affords them (τῆς τε δυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ πρᾶξαι). Acting 
quickly is not always a good thing in the Corinthian ambassador’s eyes. Equally damaging, 
however, is refusing to act in a timely manner and deliberating for too long. 
 The Corinthian ambassador’s discussion of Spartan and Athenian tendencies then 
continues, with the speaker further emphasizing Athenian speed and daring, and the Spartan 
tendency to hesitate and remain at home: καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ 
ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους· οἴονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἄν τι κτᾶσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ 
ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι (“And in fact they also are unhesitating in comparison to you 
who are delayers, and they go abroad whereas you are most likely to stay at home; for they 
think that they could acquire something by their absence, but you think that you could harm 
what is readily at hand by going somewhere”; 1.70.4). Thus, Athenian daring leads them 
always to seek gain, while the Spartans remain at home, intent on protecting what they already 
have. This is because, as the speaker has expressed, the Athenians begin with positive 
expectations of gain (hope), while the Spartans, because of their fear of loss, are entirely risk-
averse (Luginbill 1999: 94–6). These divergent attitudes help to explain the internal mechanisms 
                                                 
29 While Luginbill does not discuss the danger inherent in the Athenian national character when examining this 
passage, he does make note of it in later passages where Athenian daring (though often of individual generals) leads 




by which Athenian power has increased so rapidly, and the reasons why the Spartans fear their 
ascension (1.23.6, reiterated at 1.88.1), but have failed to take action against them (1.118.2).  
Immediately following this point, the Corinthian continues: κρατοῦντές τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν 
ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξέρχονται καὶ νικώμενοι ἐπ᾽ ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτουσιν (“When they prevail over 
their enemies they pursue their advantages to the utmost, and when they are defeated they 
give ground least of all”; 1.70.5). While the Spartans are not mentioned here, the implicit 
comparison is that, while the Athenians press their advantage when they are successful, the 
Spartans do not; moreover, while the Athenians do not give ground when they are defeated, the 
Spartans do. Thus will it happen throughout the work that the Spartans will fail to take advantage 
of opportunities, especially at moments of key importance, such as when the Spartans fail to 
follow up on a bold plan to sail into the Piraeus, despite the fact that Thucydides claims it could 
easily have been accomplished (2.93.1–94.1); when, despite Athenian fears, the Spartans and 
their allies fail to move against the Athenians after the Sicilian expedition (8.1.2); and again 
when the Spartans fail to capitalize on Athenian weakness after their defeat at Eretria (8.96.1–4). 
 Following this discussion, the Corinthian speaker notes the Athenian willingness to 
sacrifice their bodies for their polis (1.70.6), and then goes on to further address the Athenian 
love of acquisition: 
καὶ ἃ μὲν ἂν ἐπινοήσαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων στέρεσθαι ἡγοῦνται, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν 
ἐπελθόντες κτήσωνται, ὀλίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες. ἢν δ᾽ ἄρα του 
καὶ πείρᾳ σφαλῶσιν, ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρείαν· μόνοι γὰρ 
ἔχουσί τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν ἃ ἂν ἐπινοήσωσι διὰ τὸ ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν 
ποιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν γνῶσιν (1.70.7). 
 
And if they think of anything but do not carry it out, they believe they are 
deprived of their own possessions; but whatever they go out and acquire, they 
believe that they happen to have done little in comparison to the things to 
come. And even if they stumble in an attempt on something, hoping instead for 
other things they make good their loss. For they alone both have and expect [to 




whatever they decide. 
 
In making these comments, the Corinthian ambassador reemphasizes both the rapidity with 
which the Athenians act and their hope for acquisition, but also goes on to introduce a new 
feature of the Athenian psyche: a sense of entitlement. Indeed, the moment the Athenians decide 
to make an attempt on something, they immediately consider the target of that attempt their 
possession.  
In his next statement, the Corinthian then goes on to argue that the Athenian 
acquisitiveness with which he has familiarized his audience is insatiable and neverending: καὶ 
ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα 
τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι 
ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον (“And among labors and 
dangers they work hard at all these things through their whole life, and least of all do they enjoy 
what they already have because of their constant engagement in acquisition, and because 
they consider a holiday nothing other than doing what is necessary, and easy-going rest no 
less a disaster than toilsome activity”; 1.70.8). This characterization places the Athenian 
condition in an interesting light: while their constant activity can (and often does) lead them to 
increase their power and wealth, it also renders them incapable of ever being satisfied with what 
they accomplish. Thus, there will never come a point when the Athenians consider putting an 
end to their exertions, and making it nearly impossible for them to make peace. This behavioral 
trait exerts itself multiple times in the History, as the Athenians, in their moments of success 
(such as after Sphacteria), will continually shun the peace process in the hope that they may 




 Wrapping up his comments on national character, the Corinthian ambassador attempts to 
succinctly state his take on the Athenians: ὡστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ 
μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι (“With the result 
that if someone speaking concisely should say that they are naturally inclined neither 
themselves to be at rest nor to allow other people to, he would speak rightly”; 1.70.9). Thus, 
in summing up his position on Athenian collective character, he centers his view on the Athenian 
distaste for inactivity (mentioned just one sentence earlier). This time, however, he goes even 
further than before, directly pointing out that the Athenians as a collective group not only view 
rest as a bad thing, but are also by nature unable to maintain a state of inactivity.30 These 
Athenian traits become critically important over the course of the work, particularly in displaying 
why the Periclean strategy cannot succeed without Pericles himself there to lead.31 
 To summarize, then, the contrast between these two national characters may be defined at 
its most basic level as an antithesis between Spartan hesitancy and Athenian inventiveness, 
activity, and speed.32 Before concluding this analysis, however, it is worth noting that, while the 
Corinthian speaker does emphasize the advantages of the Athenian character over that of the 
Spartans, he nevertheless also demonstrates that both have weaknesses. The Spartans are prudent 
but inexperienced in foreign affairs and generally slow and hesitant to act. The Athenians, on the 
other hand, are driven (or even compelled) to expand their power and possessions, but have a 
                                                 
30 Carter (1986: 42–3) points out, however, points out that many other authors, especially poets, present ἡσυχία in a 
positive light. For example, Pindar praises it (O. 4.16, P. 1.70) and says that it punishes hubris (P. 8.1), and 
Theognis (43–7) and Aeschylus (Pers. 820–2, 840–2; Ag. 750ff) identify it as the opposite of hubris. 
31 For more on the role of ἡσυχία in Pericles’ strategy, see this chapter pp. 40-1 and the next chapter pp. 89–92. 
32 Debnar summarizes the contrast as between “the Spartans’ sluggish conservatism” and “the Athenians intelligence 
and innovation” (2001: 3), while Marincola tells us, “the Athenians are daring, resourceful, acquisitive, resilient, and 
energetic; the Spartans are slow, hesitant, defensively minded” (2001: 92). Luginbill, on the other hand, notes that, 
“… the Spartans avoid risks and proceed slowly, while the Athenians rush into them” (1999: 96). Carter (1986: 44–
5), meanwhile, argues that the Spartan preference for conflict-avoidance and ἡσυχία (and thus subscription to the 




tendency to act rashly and are incapable of enjoying peace. Thus, while it does appear that the 
speaker, in attempting to persuade the Spartans to go to war, portrays the Athenians as having a 
comparatively advantageous national character, he nevertheless makes it clear that both 
characters are immoderate, and that the two exist on opposite ends of a spectrum between 
hesitation and rash, swift action. Thus, while Athens may appear to have the advantage at the 
outset of the war (Connor 1984b: 40–1), we as readers are nevertheless set up to expect both the 
Athenians and the Spartans to make mistakes in its course. This expectation forms a crucial 
explanatory background for readers as later events unfold. 
 Before moving on to an examination of the passages displaying Athenian and Spartan 
collective tendencies (and their respective strengths and weaknesses) in action, however, it is 
worthwhile to further explore Thucydides’ conception of the background of national character. 
Indeed, before we may observe the expression of national character, we must understand where it 
comes from, and the factors that form it in Thucydides’ History. 
 
The Background of National Character 
Numerous ancient Greek texts of varying genres (literary, historical, and technical) 
propose, in some form, the idea that environment plays a decisive role in the formation of 
individual or collective character. Authors like Herodotus utilize this relationship to help explain 
differences between East and West, Asian and Greek, and subject and free peoples. Indeed, the 
Persian King Cyrus famously discusses environment as a determinant of national character at the 
very end of the work, when ne notes that soft lands breed soft people (Hdt. 9.122.3). Scholars 
such as Lateiner (1989: 158) and Thomas (2000: 32, 97) have recognized the importance of 




ethnic character in Herodotus’ text, particularly that found in the Airs, Waters, Places of the 
Hippocratic corpus. 
 I argue here that Thucydides’ understanding of national character and its determinant 
forces, much like Herodotus’ schema, bears a strong resemblance to contemporary ancient 
medical theory. Rather than interpreting character, however, as influenced by the entirety of 
one’s environment (both physical and political, as is the case in the Airs, Waters, Places and in 
Herodotus’ text), he instead focuses entirely on the role of one’s political environment as a 
determinant of character. To demonstrate these points, I will briefly discuss the Airs, Waters, 
Places and Herodotus’ History, and the importance of physical and political environment in the 
development of collective character in those texts. I will then compare these texts with 
Thucydides’ presentation of the relationship between environment and national character, and in 
doing so will demonstrate that he utilizes political environment as the primary determinant of 
national character in his History.33 
 In the Airs, Waters, Places (hereafter referred to as Aër.), there is a regular differentiation 
between Asians and Europeans, with the Asians commonly described as softer than their western 
counterparts. For example, it is stated about the Asians that τὰ ἤθεα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἠπιώτερα καὶ 
εὐοργητότερα (“The characters of their men are gentler and better-tempered”; Hp. Aër. 12). 
Moreover, it is claimed that τὸ δὲ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον καὶ τὸ ἔμπονον καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς 
οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἐν τοιαύτῃ φύσει ἐγγίνεσθαι οὔτε ὁμοφύλου οὔτε ἀλλοφύλου, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν 
ἀνάγκη κρατεῖν (“Bravery and hardihood and laboriousness and passion would not be able to 
                                                 
33 Luginbill (1999: 15–16, 75), on the other hand, argues that historical experience and the resultant ingrained 
psychological attitudes of a people determine their national character. I do not necessarily disagree with this point, 




exist in such a nature, whether of someone of the same race or of a foreigner, but it is necessary 
that pleasure rule”; Hp. Aër. 12). 
 This difference in character between inhabitants of the East and West is first attributed in 
the text to features of their natural environment, such as weather patterns: 
περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀθυμίης τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς ἀνανδρείης, ὅτι ἀπολεμώτεροί εἰσι 
τῶν Εὐρωπαίων οἱ Ἀσιηνοὶ, καὶ ἡμερώτεροι τὰ ἤθεα, αἱ ὧραι αἴτιαι μάλιστα, οὐ 
μεγάλας τὰς μεταβολὰς ποιεύμεναι, οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ θερμὸν, οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν, ἀλλὰ 
παραπλησίως. οὐ γὰρ γίνονται ἐκπλήξιες τῆς γνώμης οὔτε μετάστασις ἰσχυρὴ τοῦ 
σώματος, ἀφ᾿ ὅτων εἰκὸς τὴν ὀργὴν ἀγριοῦσθαί τε καὶ τοῦ ἀγνώμονος καὶ 
θυμοειδέος μετέχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ ἐόντα. αἱ γὰρ μεταβολαί εἰσι τῶν 
πάντων αἱ ἐπεγείρουσαι τὴν γνώμην τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ οὐκ ἐῶσαι ἀτρεμίζειν 
(Hp. Aër. 16). 
 
But concerning the lack of spirit of the people and their cowardice, that the Asians 
are less warlike than the Europeans, and tamer in their character, the seasons 
especially are to blame, because they don’t change greatly (neither toward heat, 
nor toward cold), but evenly. For neither consternations of the will nor strong 
changes in the body occur, from which it is likely that the temper becomes wild 
and has a share of the senseless and high-spirited rather than always being in the 
same state. For changes of all things arouse the will of men and do not allow them 
to keep still. 
 
Thus, physical environment is mentioned first as a major determinant of group character. More 
specifically, according to this text, the easy weather of the east makes inhabitants of Asia soft 
and even-tempered, whereas inhabitants of the western world tend to be more aggressive. One 
may note the similarity of this understanding of national character and the aforementioned 
assertion by King Cyrus in Herodotus that soft lands breed soft people.34 
 Shortly after this discussion of the importance of natural environment in determining 
character, however, the text goes on to state that νόμοι (which W. H. S. Johnson translates as 
“institutions”) also play a prominent role in developing the behavior of an area’s denizens. 
                                                 




Indeed, while discussing the character of Asia and its inhabitants, the author directly alleges that 
the preponderance of kingship in the region makes the inhabitants weak and unwarlike: 
διὰ ταύτας ἐμοὶ δοκέει τὰς προφάσιας ἄναλκες εἶναι τὸ γένος τὸ Ἀσιηνόν· καὶ 
προσέτι διὰ τοὺς νόμους. τῆς γὰρ Ἀσίης τὰ πολλὰ βασιλεύεται. ὅκου δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ 
ἑωυτέων εἰσὶ καρτεροὶ ἄνθρωποι μηδὲ αὐτόνομοι, ἀλλὰ δεσπόζονται, οὐ περὶ 
τουτέου αὐτέοισιν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν, ὅκως τὰ πολέμια ἀσκήσωσιν, ἀλλ' ὅκως μὴ 
δόξωσι μάχιμοι εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ κίνδυνοι οὐχ ὅμοιοι εἰσίν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ 
στρατεύεσθαι εἰκὸς καὶ ταλαιπωρέειν καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπὲρ τῶν 
δεσποτέων, ἄπο τε παιδίων καὶ γυναικὸς ἐόντας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν φίλων· καὶ ὁκόσα 
μὲν ἂν χρηστὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα ἐργάσωνται, οἱ δεσπόται ἀπ' αὐτέων αὔξονταί τε καὶ 
ἐκφύονται· τοὺς δὲ κινδύνους καὶ θανάτους αὐτοὶ καρποῦνται· ἔτι δὲ πρὸς 
τούτοισι τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκη ἐρημοῦσθαι τὴν γῆν ὑπό τε πολεμίων 
καὶ ἀργίης· ὥστε, καὶ εἴ τις φύσει πέφυκεν ἀνδρεῖος καὶ εὔψυχος, ἀποτρέπεσθαι 
τὴν γνώμην ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων. μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον τουτέων· ὁκόσοι γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ 
Ἕλληνες ἢ βάρβαροι μὴ δεσπόζονται, ἀλλ' αὐτόνομοί εἰσι καὶ ἑωυτέοισι 
ταλαιπωρεῦσιν, οὗτοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσι πάντων· τοὺς γὰρ κινδύνους ἑωυτέων 
πέρι κινδυνεύουσιν, καὶ τῆς ἀνδρείης αὐτέοι τὰ ἆθλα φέρονται, καὶ τῆς δειλίης 
τὴν ζημίην ὡσαύτως. εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀσιηνοὺς διαφέροντας αὐτοὺς 
ἑωυτέων, τοὺς μὲν βελτίονας, τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτέρους ἐόντας (Hp. Aër. 16). 
 
On account of these causes the Asian race seems to me to be feeble, and also 
because of their laws; for many parts of Asia are ruled by kingship. Wherever 
men do not have power over themselves and are not independent, but are ruled by 
masters, there is no value for them concerning this: to train in matters of war; but 
[there is instead concern] to not seem to be warlike. For the dangers are not the 
same: it is likely that they be forced to serve in the army and suffer hardship and 
die for the sake of their masters, away from their children and wife and the rest of 
their loved ones. And however many good and brave things they do, their masters 
are both supported by them and increased, but they themselves [the soldiers] reap 
the dangers and death. But still, in addition to these things it is necessary that the 
land of such men be stripped bare by both their enemies and laziness, with the 
result that, even if someone is born brave and courageous by nature, his 
disposition is altered by the laws. There is a great proof of these things: for 
however many Greeks in Asia are not ruled by masters, but are independent and 
suffer hardship for themselves, these are the most warlike of all. For they run risks 
for themselves, and they themselves carry off the prizes of their bravery, and 
likewise the penalty for their cowardice. But you will also find the Asians 





As can be seen here, the author has shifted approaches and now addresses the effects of 
manmade political institutions on character. His opinion is clear: when men fight for another and 
not for themselves, this situation will negatively impact their martial ability and morale. 
In the above passage Hippocrates’ focus was on the character of the Asians. Later in the 
text, when his emphasis has shifted to the Europeans, he largely echoes his earlier sentiments: 
διὰ τοῦτό εἰσι μαχιμώτεροι οἱ τὴν Εὐρώπην οἰκέοντες καὶ διὰ τοὺς νόμους, ὅτι οὐ 
βασιλεύονται ὥσπερ οἱ Ἀσιηνοί. ὅκου γὰρ βασιλεύονται, ἐκεῖ ἀνάγκη 
δειλοτάτους εἶναι. εἴρηται δέ μοι καὶ πρότερον. αἱ γὰρ ψυχαὶ δεδούλωνται καὶ οὐ 
βούλονται παρακινδυνεύειν ἑκόντες εἰκῇ ὑπὲρ ἀλλοτρίης δυνάμιος. ὅσοι δὲ 
αὐτόνομοι—ὑπὲρ ἑωυτῶν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους αἱρεῦνται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλων—
προθυμεῦνται ἑκόντες καὶ ἐς τὸ δεινὸν ἔρχονται. τὰ γὰρ ἀριστεῖα τῆς νίκης αὐτοὶ 
φέρονται. οὕτως οἱ νόμοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τὴν εὐψυχίην ἐργάζονται (Hp. Aër. 23). 
 
On account of this those inhabiting Europe are more warlike, and because of the 
laws, because they are not ruled by kings like the Asians. For wherever men are 
ruled by kings, there it is necessary that they be most cowardly (and I have said 
this also earlier). For their spirits have been enslaved and do not wish to undergo 
risk willingly or at random for the sake of another’s power. But however many 
[people] are independent—for they take up dangers for themselves and not for 
others—zealously and willingly enter into dire circumstances. For they 
themselves carry off the prizes of the victory. Thus the laws not least of all create 
good courage. 
 
Once again Hippocrates asserts that Asians, due to their common utilization of kingship, are 
simply less courageous in warfare than their European counterparts. In both places the argument 
boils down to the following: because kings and despots generally rule Asian peoples, and 
because the citizens therefore do not run risks for their own benefit, but instead on behalf of their 
kings, they are necessarily less warlike than free peoples. While the author does admit the 
possibility of variation among the inhabitants of Asia (Aër. 16), he nevertheless presents his 
assessment as generally true when the condition he proposes (rule by a king/despot) is met. Thus, 
in arguing for the importance of governmental system in determining character, the author 




kingship and a slave (and resultantly less warlike), or one is autonomous and free (and therefore 
superior in warfare). These two political environments, then, produce citizens of vastly different 
characters. 
 This division in behavioral patterns between slaves living under a tyrannical government 
and autonomous free peoples can be observed in Herodotus as well.35 One of the clearest 
examples occurs when, in his own voice, Herodotus discusses the effects that the establishment 
of democracy had on the Athenians, who became much more successful as soon as they began 
fighting for themselves: 
δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ' ἓν μοῦνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἐστὶ χρῆμα σπουδαῖον, εἰ 
καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ 
πολέμια ἀμείνονες, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο. δηλοῖ 
ὦν ταῦτα ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκάκεον ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι, 
ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωυτῷ προεθυμέετο κατεργάζεσθαι (Hdt. 
5.78). 
 
But it is clear, not just from one thing alone, but in every way, that political 
equality is an excellent thing, if the Athenians, when they were ruled by tyrants, 
were stronger in war than none of those living around them, but when they were 
freed from the tyrants they became the greatest by far. And so these things make it 
clear that when they were being held down they intentionally did not do their best 
because they were working for a master, but when they had been freed each man 
was zealous to work on his own behalf. 
 
The differentiation Herodotus makes in this passage is largely the same as that made in the Airs, 
Waters, Places: individuals living under a tyranny (τυραννευόμενοι) are not great warriors 
because they labor for a master (δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι), but free men (ἀπαλλαχθέντες; 
ἐλευθερωθέντων) become greater (μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο) because they toil for their own 
                                                 
35 Lichtenthaeler (1965: 153) argues, however, that while parallels may be observed between the Airs, Waters, 
Places and particular episodes in Herodotus’ text, it is impossible that the former directly influenced the latter, 




benefit (αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωυτῷ προεθυμέετο κατεργάζεσθαι). Thus, the Athenian political 
environment determines its residents’ attitude toward, and behavior in, conflict. 
 We may also see many of these same ideas echoed in Demaratus’ conversation with the 
Persian King Xerxes in Book 7 of Herodotus (though Demaratus speaks specifically about the 
Spartans, rather than the Greeks as a whole). After Demaratus’ opening comments, in which he 
claims that the Spartans intend to stay and fight regardless of the odds against them, Xerxes 
responds in disbelief, first questioning how free men with no single, unifying leader could be 
expected to fight against an army as large as his: κῶς ἂν δυναίατο χίλιοι ἢ καὶ μύριοι ἢ καὶ 
πεντακισμύριοι, ἐόντες γε ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἑνὸς ἀρχόμενοι, στρατῷ τοσῷδε 
ἀντιστῆναι; (“How would a thousand or ten thousand or even fifty thousand—all alike being free 
and not ruled by one man—be able to stand against so great an army?”; 7.103.3). He then goes 
on to claim that only men compelled by the whip would dare such a thing, presenting kingship 
and fear as forces that improve soldiers’ bravery: ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς ἀρχόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον τὸν 
ἡμέτερον γενοίατ' ἂν δειμαίνοντες τοῦτον καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἑωυτῶν φύσιν ἀμείνονες, καὶ ἴοιεν 
ἀναγκαζόμενοι μάστιγι ἐς πλέονας ἐλάσσονες ἐόντες· ἀνειμένοι δὲ ἐς τὸ ἐλεύθερον οὐκ ἂν 
ποιοῖεν τούτων οὐδέτερα (“For if they were ruled by one man in our way, fearing this man they 
would both become better, contrary to their natures, and forced by the whip they would go 
against greater numbers, though they are fewer. But released to freedom they would do neither of 
these things”; 7.103.4). 
 Xerxes’ presentation of the effects of kingship and freedom on martial ability contrasts 
strongly with that in the Airs, Waters, Places. Indeed, the Persian king here asserts a directly 
inverted version of the effects of despotic rule on its subjects’ military prowess: he claims that 




their morale because they risk life and limb with little to no chance to gain anything personally 
by their efforts. 
The Spartan exile Demaratus, however, famously counters Xerxes’ position by 
explaining that the Lacedaemonians are not fully free, and that they fear their law much more 
than Xerxes’ subjects fear him (7.104.4–5). The validity of Demaratus’ position is then 
demonstrated by the fact that the Spartans do indeed stay and fight, and in doing so display 
incredible effectiveness and valor against their eastern adversaries. Thus readers may take away 
from this passage that the Spartan combination of freedom and law does, in fact, make them 
better warriors, a conclusion much closer to the Airs, Waters, Places than Xerxes’ position.  
It must be admitted, however, that the discussion in this passage specifically pits 
Lacedaemonian government and character against Persian systems of rule and warfare (in which 
the ruler exercises unrestricted and despotic power, and subjects must bend to his arbitrary will), 
rather than the more general opposition of western and eastern νόμοι in the Aër.36 While this 
difference is certainly worth keeping in mind, it is nevertheless the case that the principle 
underlying the juxtaposition of peoples presented in this exchange bears a strong similarity to the 
Airs, Waters, Places: a population’s governmental system has a profound effect on its behavioral 
tendencies. The only element that has changed is the level of the comparison; that is to say, 
Herodotus here compares more specific and restricted groups of people, rather than discussing 
Easterners and Westerners in general terms. 
In both the Airs, Waters, Places and Herodotus’ Histories, then, there exists the assertion 
that the environment, both natural and political, has a profound effect on the behavior of those 
who live in it. Both of these texts also primarily delineate their comparison as between West and 
                                                 




East, and, moreover, as between free or autonomous peoples and those living under despotic or 
tyrannical forms of government.  
What if, however, an author intends to examine the interactions of different groups from 
within the same region, and, more importantly, two poleis that are both considered free and 
autonomous, thus eliminating the highest-level regional and governmental distinctions drawn 
upon in the Airs, Waters, Places (and to some extent in Herodotus as well)? The possibility for 
more nuanced and granular intra-regional distinctions is actually alluded to in the Airs, Waters, 
Places: εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀσιηνοὺς διαφέροντας αὐτοὺς ἑωυτέων, τοὺς μὲν βελτίονας, τοὺς 
δὲ φαυλοτέρους ἐόντας (“But you will also find the Asians themselves differ amongst 
themselves, some being better, others worse”; Aër. 16).37 The author, however, never undertakes 
a systematic treatment of the differences he mentions. It is in fact Thucydides who takes up this 
perspective when he, in establishing the national characters of Athens and Sparta, compares not 
eastern and western peoples, and not a slave population to a free one, but rather two autonomous, 
free Greek poleis, thus focusing on intra-regional differences. At the same time, however, he 
keeps in mind the ideas established in ancient medical thought concerning the formation of 
national character, and especially the role of governmental systems in this process.38 
 I believe, therefore, that while Thucydides shifts his focus to the contrasting national 
characters of two free Greek city-states, building a new antithesis between oligarchy and 
democracy (the same antithesis around which he presents the entire war as revolving), he 
nevertheless sees these sets of collective tendencies as shaped by the political environments in 
                                                 
37 See p. 29 for the full quotation of this passage. 
38 Looking at Thucydides’ historical method as a whole, Luginbill (1999: 16–17) sees ancient medical thought as a 
key influence on the historian’s “empiricism.” Lichtenthaeler also notes a number of passages in Thucydides that he 
feels show a strong resemblance to Hippocratic treatises, but he focuses on specifically medical content, such as the 




which they exist.39 This argument may be most effectively made through an examination of 
Thucydides’ discussion of Syracusan character and its relationship to the behavioral patterns of 
the Athenians and Spartans. 
 Thucydides twice compares the characters of the Athenians and the Syracusans in his 
History: once at 7.55.2 and again at 8.96.5. Let us begin with the latter of these two passages. In 
leading up to this comparison, Thucydides has been discussing the differences between Spartan 
and Athenian behavioral patterns in the war, claiming that Spartan tendencies have consistently 
benefited the Athenians (8.96.5). To make this point the author turns to the Syracusans: ἔδειξαν 
δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμοιότροποι γενόμενοι ἄριστα καὶ προσεπολέμησαν (“And the 
Syracusans showed this, for being especially similar in character [to the Athenians] they fought 
against them best”; 8.96.5). Thus, Thucydides argues that the Syracusans were more successful 
in combatting the Athenians because they were behaviorally similar to them, unlike the Spartans. 
The reader will have, at this point in the text, a good idea of what it means to be similar to the 
Athenians (especially given the recapitulation of character immediately preceding the discussion 
of the Syracusans). The reader may wonder, however, what it is that makes the Syracusans so 
similar to the Athenians? 
 This question is answered by referring to the former passage (7.55.2), when Thucydides, 
after explaining that the Athenians have come to regret their expedition to Sicily (πολὺ δὲ μείζων 
                                                 
39 On Thucydides’ presentation of the conflict in Greece as centering on the opposition between democratic and 
oligarchic elements, see 3.82.1: οὕτως ὠμὴ <ἡ> στάσις προυχώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο, 
ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη, διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήμων 
προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους (So fierce was the discord, and it 
seemed greater because it was among the first, when later in fact almost the whole Greek world was stirred up, with 
disagreements occurring everywhere between the leaders of the people who were trying to bring in the Athenians, 
and the few who wanted to bring in the Spartans). On the importance of internal political forms in determining the 




ἔτι τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετάμελος; 7.55.1), enumerates for readers the reasons the Athenians have 
struggled against their enemy: 
πόλεσι γὰρ ταύταις μόναις ἤδη ὁμοιοτρόποις ἐπελθόντες, δημοκρατουμέναις τε, 
ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ ναῦς καὶ ἵππους καὶ μεγέθη ἐχούσαις, οὐ δυνάμενοι 
ἐπενεγκεῖν οὔτ᾽ ἐκ πολιτείας τι μεταβολῆς τὸ διάφορον αὐτοῖς, ᾧ προσήγοντο ἄν, 
οὔτ᾽ ἐκ παρασκευῆς πολλῷ κρείσσονος, σφαλλόμενοι δὲ τὰ πλείω, τά τε πρὸ 
αὐτῶν ἠπόρουν, καὶ ἐπειδή γε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκρατήθησαν, ὃ οὐκ ἂν ᾤοντο, 
πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἔτι (7.55.2). 
 
For having come upon these cities alone that were of similar character, both 
democratic (just as they themselves were), and possessing ships and horses and 
greatness of size, when they were unable to bring upon them either some discord 
from a constitutional change (by which they might bring them over to their side), 
or from a significantly greater armament, and being tripped up in the majority of 
things, they were both at a loss in matters before these things [their loss at sea], 
and when in fact also they were defeated at sea (which they would not have 
thought), yet even more [were they at a loss]. 
 
While some of the Greek in this passage is quite difficult and has merited a significant amount of 
commentary, one important element is quite clear: just as at 8.96.5 Thucydides identifies the 
inhabitants of Sicily as similar in character (ὁμοιοτρόποις; the exact same word) to the 
Athenians.40 Classen and Steup argue that the term ὁμοιοτρόποις is here looking to the political 
and social culture of Athens (1905: 138). Indeed, when Thucydides then goes on to explain the 
basis for this similarity, he gives preference of place to the fact that the Sicilians are democratic, 
just like the Athenians (δημοκρατουμέναις τε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοί).41 It would appear, then, from 
this passage that political structure is of primary importance in the formation of Syracusan (and 
therefore also Athenian) behavioral tendencies. More specifically, democracy has made them 
                                                 
40 The meaning of this passage, and especially of οὐ δυνάμενοι … πολλῷ κρείσσονος is discussed by Classen and 
Steup 1905: 138–9; Dover 1965: 46; and Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1970: 431. The interpretation of τι, τὸ 
διάφορον, and αὐτοῖς offer the greatest difficulty. 
41 Cartledge and Debnar point out that, despite their similarity to the Athenians, the Syracusans were actually Dorian 
colonists (2006: 562). Their implicit argument seems to be that these two groups’ shared character is problematic 
because of their differing ethnic origins, and that this passage therefore complicates reader understanding of national 





just as bold and swift as their enemies, while the other similarities listed (horses, ships, and 
greatness of size) provide them with the means to be competitive on the battlefield.42 Boldness 
by itself, after all, could never win a war.  
Based on this conclusion, if we look back to 8.96.5, we may conclude that, if 
governmental structure is the leading force driving the Syracusans to resemble the Athenians, 
then it is Spartan oligarchy that creates an environment encouraging the Spartan tendencies of 
hesitation and risk-aversion. 
 From these arguments it becomes clear that Thucydides looks primarily to poleis’ 
political structures, not to other factors such as ethnic identity, to explain the similarities and 
differences in their behaviors. Therefore, I argue that political environment serves as the basis of 
Thucydides’ formulation of national character.43 Sparta, operating under an oligarchic 
government, is hesitant and risk-averse, while democratic Athens is swift and willing to enter 
upon high-risk, high-reward undertakings. Syracuse, meanwhile, even though its inhabitants 
identify as Dorians (and thus as ethnically closer to Sparta), behaves in a way that is much more 
similar to the Athenians due to its democratic government. To summarize, it may be argued that, 




                                                 
42 “This Thucydidean confirmation which contrasts Athens and Sparta and strongly emphasizes the similarity 
between Athens and Syracuse, suggests that the History’s account of Athens is representative of democracy 
altogether” (Jaffe 2017a: 397). 
43 On the importance of regime type in determining the behavioral patterns of the war’s primary belligerents, see 
Johnson Bagby 2011: 110–12. See also Raaflaub on these two poleis representing their regime types: “The two 
‘superpowers’ came to be seen as representing two constitutional alternatives, two radically different ways of life 
and, at least initially, two different models of leadership and attitudes towards allies. Rightly or wrongly, in contrast 
to the often hated and feared Athenian democracy, Sparta was perceived as an antithetical ideal: the model of 




Consistency of Character 
 Having established political environment as the primary factor determining a city-state’s 
national character in Thucydides, it is now appropriate to discuss the consistency of national 
character in Thucydides’ History. While some scholars have questioned this consistency (as 
noted above), close examination of the text demonstrates that the key traits attributed to the 
Athenians and Spartans in Book I, and the resultant strengths and weaknesses particular to each 
polis, regularly express themselves over the course of the narrative.44 Indeed, time and again the 
Athenians are driven by their daring and acquisitiveness to undertake risky but potentially highly 
profitable enterprises (sometimes with disastrous results, the prime example being, of course, the 
Sicilian expedition), and the Spartans consistently act in a hesitant manner, regularly failing to 
act at opportune moments or to press their advantage and force a conclusion to the war. 
 The reader is first presented with a description of the Athenians and Spartans in 
agreement with the Corinthian’s assessment when Thucydides summarizes the fifty years after 
the Persian Wars by saying: ἐν οἷς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τήν τε ἀρχὴν ἐγκρατεστέραν κατεστήσαντο καὶ 
αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι οὔτε ἐκώλυον εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ 
βραχύ, ἡσύχαζόν τε τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου, ὄντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἰέναι ἐς τοὺς 
πολέμους, ἢν μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται … (“In which [years] the Athenians both made the empire 
stronger and themselves advanced to a great position of strength, but the Lacedaemonians, 
perceiving this, did not prevent it except for a short time, and they kept quiet most of the time, 
                                                 
44 It must be noted, however, that I am speaking at the collective level. What I mean by this is that, when 
Thucydides discusses the Athenians or the Spartans as a group, or when he implicitly makes a point about them, 
they consistently adhere to the most important points of the Corinthian characterization. Individuals, however, may 
(and often do) differ from these collective characterizations. This multi-level characterization provides readers with 
important interpretive information when judging the efficacy of leadership in Athens, and will be discussed further 




being even before this not swift to go to wars, unless compelled”; 1.118.2). A few points are 
worth noting here.  
First, the language of the first sentence makes it clear that Athenians actively advanced 
their own cause in enlarging and strengthening their empire (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τήν τε ἀρχὴν 
ἐγκρατεστέραν κατεστήσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως). This Athenian 
predilection toward continuous action and acquisition is a key component of the Corinthian 
characterization of their polis, as described at 1.70.4 (οἴονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἄν τι 
κτᾶσθαι), 1.70.7 (ἃ δ᾽ ἂν ἐπελθόντες κτήσωνται, ὀλίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες), and 
1.70.8 (καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι). 
The Spartans, on the other hand, are yet again portrayed as hesitant. Indeed, Thucydides 
here presents Spartan slowness in entering into wars as a general, habitual truth, noting both that 
they didn’t prevent the Athenian rise to power in the present circumstances, and that this 
hesitancy was a trait they possessed “even before this” (καὶ πρὸ τοῦ). Additionally, his 
description of the Spartans as “keeping quiet most of the time” (ἡσύχαζόν τε τὸ πλέον τοῦ 
χρόνου) appears to enter into a dialogue with the Corinthian’s earlier discussion of the two 
poleis. As noted above, the Athenians are specifically described as “naturally inclined neither 
themselves to be at rest nor to allow other people to” (πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν 
ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν; 1.70.9). This inability to have or enjoy inactivity 
(referenced also one sentence earlier at 1.70.8) is arguably the most important Athenian attribute, 
since it is the point around which the Corinthian speaker bases his summation of their national 
character. At 1.118.2, however, we are presented with the idea that the Spartans, on the other 
hand, can be (and often are) inactive. This inactivity, however, appears to be yet again presented 




hesitation and lethargy than any true state of peace.45 Thus, the characterizations of the two city-
states provided by the Corinthian speaker appear to be at least partially confirmed by this 
passage, and readers are reminded, at least in the case of the Spartans, that these 
characterizations carry with them possible negative consequences. 
 
Athens 
 Having seen the author discuss the Athenians and Spartans together, let us begin to focus 
on episodes that highlight the characterization of individual poleis, beginning with Athens. 
Numerous passages demonstrate the explanatory power of the Corinthian ambassador’s 
assessment of Athenian collective tendencies in Thucydides’ narrative. For instance, at 2.65.7 
Thucydides directly compares Pericles’ wartime strategy with the actions of his successors: ὁ μὲν 
γὰρ ἡσυχάζοντάς τε καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν θεραπεύοντας καὶ ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ 
μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἔφη περιέσεσθαι· οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τοὐναντίον ἔπραξαν … 
(“For he [Pericles] said that, if they kept quiet and saw to the fleet and did not acquire more 
empire during the war and did not endanger the city, they would succeed. But they [his 
successors] did all these things in the opposite way …”). While this quote may bear more 
importance in an analysis of Thucydides’ construction of the relationship between Pericles and 
his successors, it must be noted that the first condition for Athenian success presented here is 
ἡσυχάζοντας (“if they kept quiet”). As noted above, the Corinthian ambassador closes his speech 
by firmly stating that the Athenians have a distaste for inactivity, and can neither be at rest nor 
can allow others to (1.70.9). Then, at 1.118.2, keeping quiet (ἡσύχαζον) is associated with the 
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Spartans, who sat on the sidelines while the thoroughly active Athenians expanded their power. 
Thus, up to this point in Thucydides, ἡσυχία has been a thoroughly un-Athenian characteristic. It 
is, then, not insignificant that the success of Pericles’ strategy relies on Athenian tranquility, 
because for Pericles to enforce this strategy, he must drive the Athenians to consistently act in a 
way that is contrary to their defined character.46  
Indeed, that this strategy ran counter to Athenian character is made abundantly clear 
when Thucydides tells us that, after Pericles’ death, the Athenians, led by Pericles’ successors, 
did just the opposite of his recommendation.47 As such, they ceased to keep quiet, but instead 
pursued further gain. Moreover, Thucydides goes on to explicitly state that this shift back to their 
natural tendencies had a number of disastrous consequences for the Athenians (2.65.11). In 
Thucydides’ post-Periclean Athens, then, the state reverted back to its natural collective 
character as presented by the Corinthian ambassador in Book 1, including its potential for self-
inflicted harm (1.70.3). 
 The above passage is certainly not the only one where we see the Athenians live up to 
their established national character. Indeed, time and again in the History Thucydides 
emphasizes Athenian daring and speed to action. Moreover, in each case the narrative makes 
                                                 
46 Rood notes that the terms of this summary (primarily the use of ἡσυχάζοντας) suggest the impracticality of the 
advice (1998: 140). Gomme argues that this was “just what Athenians were incapable of doing” (note ad loc.). For a 
further discussion of the inherent problems of the Periclean war strategy because of its opposition to the Athenian 
national character, see chapter 2, p. 94. 
47 A key point in Thucydides’ juxtaposition of Pericles and later leaders is that Pericles led the demos rather than 
being led by it, and that he did not acquire power from saying what was pleasurable to hear (2.65.8), while later 
leaders entrusted matters to the demos in their competition for primacy (2.65.10). In Thucydides’ conception, then, 
the drive to revert to an active, acquisitive strategy originated from the masses, who in turn drove leaders seeking to 
curry favor with them to implement it. Thus, without a Pericles to lead them, the Athenians took back the reigns of 
government and began to live up to their collective characterization. Readers may here wonder about the historicity 
of Thucydides’ eulogy of Pericles, observing that some scholars have questioned both the significance often 
assigned to this passage (Rusten 1988: 212–13) and the truthfulness of such a strong opposition between Pericles 
and his successors (Azoulay 2010: 155–7). Whether or not this passage truly represents the differences between 
Pericles and his successors, however, the story the passage tells Thucydides’ readers remains the same: Pericles led 




clear whether this Athenian daring had positive or negative consequences.48 For example, at 
3.36.1–5 Thucydides discusses the original Mytilenaean decree, and puts a clearly identifiable 
emphasis on the rapidity and rashness with which it was passed. Indeed, he notes that the 
Athenians immediately (εὐθύς) put Salaethus to death (despite his promises to end the siege of 
Plataea; 3.36.1), and that they made their decision while still angry (ὑπὸ ὀργῆς; 3.36.2). 
Additionally, the message itself they send to Paches after reaching their decision emphasizes the 
rapidity with which he is to carry out their decree: κατὰ τάχος κελεύοντες διαχρήσασθαι 
Μυτιληναίους (“… bidding him to swiftly kill the Mytilenaeans; 3.36.3). Here, then, we see the 
Athenians acting with the rapidity readers have been conditioned to expect from them. Summary 
judgment has been passed and will be acted upon in short order. The potential rashness of this 
decision, however, also becomes immediately apparent both to readers and, in this case, to the 
Athenians themselves: as Thucydides relates: καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετάνοιά τις εὐθὺς ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ 
ἀναλογισμὸς ὠμὸν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγνῶσθαι (“and on the next day they immediately had 
some regret and reckoned they had pronounced a great and severe punishment”; 3.36.4). Once 
again Athenian speed is demonstrated, but in this instance Thucydides uses it to point out how 
quickly the populace realizes that they acted rashly.49 The Athenians’ speed, then, appears to 
have led them into acting in a way that is contrary to good judgment (παρὰ γνώμην).50 
 The sentiment that the Athenians’ original judgment was both rash and excesively harsh 
is carried over in Thucydides’ description of the two triremes headed to Mytilene. Here the 
author’s narrative emphasizes both the speed of the second trireme chasing after the first, and the 
slowness of the first because of its reservations about its task: 
                                                 
48 Cf. 1.70.3 for the Corinthian’s discussion of Athenian daring and its negative side. 
49 Connor notes that the Athenians become immediately aware that their decision was “inappropriate” (1984b: 85). 




καὶ τριήρη εὐθὺς ἄλλην ἀπέστελλον κατὰ σπουδήν, ὅπως μὴ φθασάσης τῆς 
προτέρας εὕρωσι διεφθαρμένην τὴν πόλιν· προεῖχε δὲ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ νυκτὶ μάλιστα. 
παρασκευασάντων δὲ τῶν Μυτιληναίων πρέσβεων τῇ νηὶ οἶνον καὶ ἄλφιτα καὶ 
μεγάλα ὑποσχομένων, εἰ φθάσειαν, ἐγένετο σπουδὴ τοῦ πλοῦ τοιαύτη ὥστε 
ἤσθιόν τε ἅμα ἐλαύνοντες οἴνῳ καὶ ἐλαίῳ ἄλφιτα πεφυραμένα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὕπνον 
ᾑροῦντο κατὰ μέρος, οἱ δὲ ἤλαυνον. κατὰ τύχην δὲ πνεύματος οὐδενὸς 
ἐναντιωθέντος καὶ τῆς μὲν προτέρας νεὼς οὐ σπουδῇ πλεούσης ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα 
ἀλλόκοτον, ταύτης δὲ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἐπειγομένης … (3.49.2–4) 
 
And immediately they hastily dispatched another trireme, so that they might not 
find the city destroyed because the earlier ship arrived before them; it was ahead 
by about a day and a night. But with the Mytilenaean ambassadors having 
provided wine and barley-groats and promising great things if they should get 
there first, there was such zeal for the voyage that they were eating barley-groats 
mixed with wine and oil at the same time as they rowed, and some got some sleep 
in turns, and others rowed. And, according to fortune, with no adverse wind and 
with the earlier ship not sailing with haste to an unwelcome deed, but with this 
[ship] hastening in such a way … 
 
Thus, we see Athenian speed highlighted yet again, but in this case they are attempting to correct 
their earlier wrong. This emphasis is apparent in Thucydides’ language, as the second ship sets 
out immediately (εὐθύς) and in haste (κατὰ σπουδήν). Then, in describing the progress of this 
ship, the author tells us of the zeal (σπουδή) its crew has for their task, and again notes the speed 
with which it drives on to its destination (ἐπειγομένης). At the same time, Thucydides ever so 
briefly focalizes on the feelings of the crew members of the first ship, pointing out that, while 
their countrymen sail as quickly as possible to catch them, they sail slowly (οὐ σπουδῇ) to an 
“unwelcome deed” (πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον). As noted by Connor, these two racing ships and the 
vividness with which they are portrayed “draw us into the action and direct our responses,” 
forcing readers to want the second ship to arrive in time to save the Mytilenaeans (1984b: 86).51 
Thucydides, then, through his presentation of the narrative makes it clear to readers that the 
original decision, though swift, was also rash and incorrect. While, in this case, Athenian 
                                                 




political discourse does actually succeed in avoiding what Thucydides makes clear was a rash 
decision, and the Mytilenaeans narrowly escape the severity of the original Athenian decree 
against them, they escape only by the thinnest of margins.52 This fact demonstrates clearly the 
potential danger in the swiftness with which the Athenians deliberate and act, a danger which 
will become all too real when the Athenians debate the Sicilian expedition.53 
 Athenian speed and activity exercised at the collective level continue to play an important 
role in Thucydides’ description of the Peloponnesian War in the fourth book of his history. For 
example, when a storm drives the Athenian fleet to Pylos, Demosthenes attempts to convince the 
other generals that they should fortify the spot, but fails to win them over (4.3.2–3). Unable to 
sail out due to bad weather, however, the soldiers themselves are seized by an urge to take up the 
task: ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν οὔτε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οὔτε τοὺς στρατιώτας, ὕστερον καὶ τοῖς 
ταξιάρχοις κοινώσας, ἡσύχαζεν ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας, μέχρι αὐτοῖς τοῖς στρατιώταις σχολάζουσιν ὁρμὴ 
ἐνέπεσε περιστᾶσιν ἐκτειχίσαι τὸ χωρίον (“But when he convinced neither the generals nor the 
soldiers, and later sharing [the plan] with the squadron commanders, he kept quiet because of 
the impossibility of sailing, until an impulse fell upon the soldiers themselves who were at 
leisure to encircle and fortify the place”; 4.4.1). Thus, despite the fact that it is originally 
Demosthenes who recognizes the advantages this location offers, it is the Athenian soldiers 
themselves who, unable to tolerate their inactivity and struck by a desire for work, take up the 
task.54  
                                                 
52 Balot argues that Thucydides includes this episode in his work to “illustrate certain problematic features of 
democratic discourse” (2004: 89). 
53 It has been pointed out, however, that despite the feeling that the Mytilenaeans are “saved” at this point, the actual 
punishment they receive is by no means light. See Connor 1984b: 86–8. 
54 It must be noted that it is during Demosthenes’ inactivity (ἡσύχαζεν) that the Athenians are overcome with a 




After the decision to fortify the spot has been reached, Thucydides then passes into a 
swift and vivid description of the Athenian soldiers carrying out their work: 
καὶ ἐγχειρήσαντες εἰργάζοντο, σιδήρια μὲν λιθουργὰ οὐκ ἔχοντες, λογάδην δὲ 
φέροντες λίθους, καὶ ξυνετίθεσαν ὡς ἕκαστόν τι ξυμβαίνοι· καὶ τὸν πηλόν, εἴ που 
δέοι χρῆσθαι, ἀγγείων ἀπορίᾳ ἐπὶ τοῦ νώτου ἔφερον, ἐγκεκυφότες τε, ὡς μάλιστα 
μέλλοι ἐπιμένειν, καὶ τὼ χεῖρε ἐς τοὐπίσω ξυμπλέκοντες, ὅπως μὴ ἀποπίπτοι. 
παντί τε τρόπῳ ἠπείγοντο φθῆναι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὰ ἐπιμαχώτατα 
ἐξεργασάμενοι πρὶν ἐπιβοηθῆσαι (4.4.2–3). 
 
And taking the task in hand they were working, on the one hand not having stone-
mason’s tools, but bringing picked-out stones, and they put them together as each 
thing went together. And the clay, if it should be necessary to use it somewhere, 
they were carrying on their backs because of the lack of vessels, both having 
stooped down, so that it was especially likely to stay there, and interlocking their 
hands behind them, so that it not fall off. And in every way they were hurrying 
to complete work on the most assailable places before the Lacedaemonians came 
against them. 
 
Here the historian emphasizes Athenian zeal for the task by noting the incredible amount of 
effort and ingenuity they showed in accomplishing their work. Indeed, rather than simply noting 
that the soldiers worked hard and quickly completed the fortification and then moving on with 
the narrative, he includes a detailed description of the project, and highlights for readers the fact 
that the Athenians, lacking tools and resources, voluntarily undertook intense physical labor. It is 
particularly interesting to note, however, that Thucydides nowhere hints that the Athenians did 
this work because they changed their minds and saw the value in Demosthenes’ plan; rather, they 
simply were delayed for so long that their restlessness got the better of them, and they were 
struck with a desire to fortify the place.55  
 Thucydides’ depiction here of the Athenian soldiers closely echoes the Corinthian’s 
description of the Athenians as a whole at 1.70.8, where he points out: … μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι 
                                                 




ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν 
ἐπίπονον (“… they consider a holiday nothing other than doing what is necessary, and easy-
going rest no less a disaster than troublesome business”). As noted above, the Athenians are 
portrayed as viewing rest and inactivity in a negative light, equating ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα and 
ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον. In the buildup to Pylos, we see Demosthenes keeping quiet (ἡσύχαζεν) 
because of the impossibility of sailing, but this may be just as easily be said of the Athenian 
soldiers who are delayed there with him. Indeed, shortly after his description of Demsothenes, 
Thucydides describes the Athenian soldiers as at leisure (σχολάζουσιν) when the desire falls 
upon them to fortify the spot. Thus, the vocabulary of rest/leisure is common to the two 
passages, and, more importantly, the Athenian aversion to it. 
 In this passage, Thucydides provides no direct authorial intervention openly that the 
Athenians lived up to their previously defined collective national character. Through his 
construction of the narrative, however, and his emphasis on the fact that an inability to stay still 
drove the Athenians to carry out this task, Thucydides implicitly leads readers to see the 
Athenians in the same light as in the Corinthian’s speech in Book 1: active, and unable to keep 
still. Once again, the Athenians, when acting as a group, show a strong tendency to behave in a 
way that is actually fairly consistent with the Corinthian definition of Athenian group dynamics. 
 In Book IV yet another echo may be found of the Corinthian’s comments on Athenian 
collective tendencies. At 4.55 Thucydides discusses Spartan morale after their defeat at 
Sphacteria, noting that they are uncomfortable with the current naval struggle in which they are 
engaged, and that they are especially fearful of their enemies the Athenians. To explain the 
Spartans’ reasoning for this, Thucydides’ adds, … καὶ τούτῳ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, οἷς τὸ μὴ 




whom not to attempt a thing was always to fall short of their expectations of achievement”; 
4.55.2).56  This point, emphasizing the Athenian inability to overlook an opportunity, is 
reminiscent of the Corinthian speaker’s portrayal of Athenian character in Book 1. Indeed, in 
their commentaries both Hornblower (1996: 218) and Gomme (1956: 511) note the similarity 
between this passage and 1.70.7: μόνοι γὰρ ἔχουσί τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν ἃ ἂν ἐπινοήσωσι 
διὰ τὸ ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν γνῶσιν (“For they alone both have and expect [to 
have] alike whatever they set their mind on, because they quickly attempt whatever they 
decide”). While 4.55.2 is negatively defined (in that it discusses inaction as a failure to live up to 
expectations) and 1.70.7 positively (in that it notes Athenian expectations in the case of 
successful action), both of these passages remind us of the Athenian inability to keep quiet, and, 
what is more, they both point out that not only do the Athenians feel compelled to act whenever 
presented with an opportunity, they always expect that activity to result in success and 
acquisition. It must be noted, however, that each of these passages is placed in the mouth (or 
mind) of a different, non-Athenian group (the Corinthians and then the Spartans), and not of the 
author.57 The agreement between them, however, leads one to conclude that this assessment of 
Athenian collective behavior may be in the text more than a rhetorical construction by the 
Corinthian ambassador. Moreover, as noted by Hornblower (and as will be discussed shortly), at 
8.96.5 Thucydides expresses a sentiment very similar to the comments at 1.70.7 and 4.55.2 in his 
own authorial voice, making it appear to readers that this characterization of the Athenians is the 
author’s own (Hornblower 1996: 218). 
                                                 
56 Gomme (1956: 511), Hornblower (1996: 218), and Graves (1982: 201) all take τι πράξειν to mean either 
“achievement” or “success.” I have adopted this interpretation in my translation. For more on the Spartan mental 
condition after their defeat at Sphacteria, see pp. 66–8. 




 In Book 6—and more specifically in the speeches leading up to the Sicilian expedition—
yet another passage may be found that illustrates the consistency of Athenian collective 
characterization in Thucydides. Indeed, while these speeches and the argumentative techniques 
deployed in them tell us a great deal about Nicias’ and Alcibiades’ individual characterizations (a 
point that will be addressed in the next chapter), what is more important to this chapter is that 
both speakers directly address what appears to be a well-known Athenian collective character 
defined by a distaste for inaction.  
Nicias is the first to reference the Athenian collective character in his remarks at 6.9.3, 
where he admits, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἀσθενὴς ἄν μου ὁ λόγος εἴη, εἰ τά 
τε ὑπάρχοντα σῴζειν παραινοίην καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἑτοίμοις περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ μελλόντων 
κινδυνεύειν (“And against your customs my argument would be weak, if I should advise you to 
preserve what you already have and not to run risks with what is at hand for uncertain future 
things”).58 In this quotation, Nicias defines what τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς ὑμετέρους means negatively, 
admitting that, if he calls upon his countrymen to be inactive (the opposite of their custom), he 
will be unsuccessful. As Nicias understands it, then, the native Athenian tendency is toward 
activity and acquisition. His discussion of inaction, however, is strikingly similar to the language 
used at 1.70.2 (ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σῴζειν) and at 1.70.4 (ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ 
ἑτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι) to describe Spartan tendencies. Thus, not only does Nicias appear to 
recognize an Athenian character in this speech, but he also understands that asking the Athenians 
to act like Spartans would be an unsuccessful rhetorical strategy. 
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1.70.2, 4, and this fact’s ramifications for our understanding of Nicias’ individual character, are discussed in more 




Following Nicias’ speech, Alcibiades, while arguing that the Athenians should not 
abandon the Sicilian expedition, references this same Athenian inability to preserve what it has 
and be inactive: καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑμῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἥσυχον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ 
ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐς τὸ ὁμοῖον μεταλήψεσθε (“And you must not consider keeping quiet from the 
same perspective as others, unless you also change your customs to be the same”; 6.18.3). Here 
he defines keeping quiet (τὸ ἥσυχον) as something for people of other cities, and insinuates that 
it is contrary to Athenian custom. He then goes on to tell the Athenians to make the journey to 
Sicily, … ἵνα Πελοποννησίων τε στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα, εἰ δόξομεν ὑπεριδόντες τὴν ἐν τῷ 
παρόντι ἡσυχίαν καὶ ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεῦσαι (“… so that we lay low the pride of the 
Peloponnesians, if we seem, despising the present quiet, to sail to Sicily”; 6.18.4). Alcibiades’ 
proposition (for the Athenians to show the Spartans that they have no regard for their present 
peace) hearkens back to the Corinthian ambassador’s claims at 1.70.8, namely that the Athenians 
are unable to enjoy what they already have (ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων), and that 
they “consider … easy-going rest no less a disaster than troublesome business” (ἡγεῖσθαι … 
ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον). Thus, Alcibiades’ appeal to 
the Athenians to send an expedition to Sicily directly references their inability to ever be at rest.  
The similarity between these two passages becomes even clearer as Alcibiades’ speech 
continues: παράπαν τε γιγνώσκω πόλιν μὴ ἀπράγμονα τάχιστἀ ἄν μοι δοκεῖν ἀπραγμοσύνης 
μεταβολῇ διαφθαρῆναι, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσφαλέστατα τούτους οἰκεῖν οἳ ἂν τοῖς παροῦσιν 
ἤθεσι καὶ νόμοις, ἢν καὶ χείρω ᾖ, ἥκιστα διαφόρως πολιτεύωσιν (“And I recognize absolutely 
that a city that is not inactive would seem to me most quickly to be ruined by a change to 




customs and laws, even if they are inferior”; 6.18.7).59 This characterization of Athens as “not 
inactive” (μὴ ἀπράγμονα) once again calls to mind the Corinthian’s assertion that the Athenians 
consider easy-going rest (ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα) no less a disaster than troublesome business, and 
his claim that the Athenians are constantly engaged in acquisition (1.70.8). Thus, Alcibiades 
(who is, of course, himself an Athenian) echoes earlier external characterizations of his own 
polis. Rather than admitting his powerlessness in the face of Athenian character as Nicias did, 
however, Alcibiades actually encourages his fellow citizens to be true to their expansionist and 
aggressive tendencies (Balot 2004: 90). 
 In these speeches, Nicias and Alcibiades appear to reference an accepted Athenian self-
characterization in which the polis feels a natural aversion to inactivity. Indeed, when Alcibiades 
characterizes the city as “not inactive” (μὴ ἀπράγμονα), and calls on his audience to manage the 
state according to their present customs and laws (παροῦσιν ἤθεσι καὶ νόμοις … ἥκιστα 
διαφόρως πολιτεύωσιν), we may note that this argument can only be persuasive if his listeners 
actually identify their customs as Alcibiades has defined them.60 If his listeners disagree with this 
characterization, they will feel no urge to action, because inactivity will, in their minds, not be 
contrary to their customs and laws. Thus, the reader of Thucydides can at this point add 
Athenians to the list of groups, together with the Corinthians and Spartans, identifying continual 
activity and restiveness as uniquely Athenian character traits. 
 Interestingly, Thucydides’ portrayal of the Athenian mindset after Nicias fails to dissuade 
them from sailing against Sicily continues to echo the characterization attributed to them by the 
                                                 
59 Alcibiades’ argument here that a city is safest if it lives according to its own character actually appears to run 
counter to the implicit argument I believe is present in Thucydides: that good leadership will temper a city’s 
weaknesses and bolster its strengths. Thus, it is my position that Thucydides does not speak through Alcibiades’ 
voice. These points will be discussed further in a later chapter dedicated to Alcibiades as a leader (see pp. 247–8). 
60 Thucydides does indeed present this speech as being persuasive and successful, as it leaves the Athenians even 




Corinthian ambassador in Book 1. Indeed, after Nicias argues that the Athenians will need an 
overwhelmingly large force for their expedition to Sicily, Thucydides tells us the following: 
οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν τοῦ πλοῦ οὐκ ἐξῃρέθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀχλώδους τῆς 
παρασκευῆς, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο, καὶ τοὐναντίον περιέστη αὐτῷ· εὖ τε γὰρ 
παραινέσαι ἔδοξε καὶ ἀσφάλεια νῦν δὴ καὶ πολλὴ ἔσεσθαι. καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς 
πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβυτέροις ὡς ἢ καταστρεψομένοις ἐφ’ 
ἃ ἔπλεον ἢ οὐδὲν ἂν σφαλεῖσαν μεγάλην δύναμιν, τοῖς δ’ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῆς τε 
ἀπούσης πόθῳ ὄψεως καὶ θεωρίας, καὶ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες σωθήσεσθαι· ὁ δὲ πολὺς 
ὅμιλος καὶ στρατιώτης ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι ἀργύριον οἴσειν καὶ προσκτήσεσθαι 
δύναμιν ὅθεν ἀίδιον μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξειν (6.24.2–3). 
 
But they [the Athenians] were not deprived of their zeal for the expedition by the 
troublesome preparation, but they were much more eager, and the opposite 
happened for him. For it both seemed that he had advised well and that now there 
would be great security [for the preparation]. And desire fell upon all equally to 
sail out. [It fell upon] the old because they thought that they would either overturn 
the things against which they were sailing or that the great force would in no way 
fail, and it fell upon those in the prime of life because of both their desire for far 
off sight and spectacle, and being hopeful that they would be kept safe. And the 
great crowd and soldiery thought that they would both carry off money in the 
present, and that they would acquire more power whence there would be never-
ending pay. 
 
The verbal and thematic correspondences between this passage and the Corinthian speaker’s 
description of Athenian national character in Book 1 are striking. More specifically, each passage 
places an emphasis on Athenian expectation and hopefulness, and on Athenian acquisitiveness. 
First, the Athenians are described as hopeful (εὐέλπιδες) in dire straits at 1.70.3. At 1.70.7 the 
Corinthian speaker tells us that, when they fail in an attempt, they hope instead (ἀντελπίσαντες) 
for other things, and that the Athenians, because of their speed to action, equally have and expect 
(ἐλπίζουσιν) to have whatever they set their mind to. Thus, the Athenians are depicted as 
consistently hopeful and full of expectations, whether they have just thought of an undertaking or 
even if they have just failed. Similarly, at 6.24.3 it is made implicitly obvious that the older 




for far-off sights, explicitly feel hopeful (εὐέλπιδες) that, due to the greatness of the expedition, 
they will return safely. The Athenian people, then, convinced to act, feel hopeful for the 
expedition whether it succeeds or not: either they will achieve something, or they will at least 
remain safe because of the greatness of their force (6.24.3). 
 Athenian acquisitiveness, on the other hand, is highlighted at 1.70.4, when the Corinthian 
ambassador argues that the Athenians are unhesitating and go abroad, thinking that they could 
acquire (κτᾶσθαι) something by their absence. Again at 1.70.7 Athenian acquisition is discussed, 
this time to point out that the Athenians think whatever they acquire (κτήσωνται) is little in 
comparison to future acquisitions. Finally, in 1.70.8 the speaker discusses Athenian 
acquisitiveness in his strongest terms, claiming they do not enjoy what they already have because 
of their constant acquisition (τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι). This constant desire for acquisition is reflected in 
the Athenian attitude at the end of 6.24.3, when Thucydides tells us, ὁ δὲ πολὺς ὅμιλος καὶ 
στρατιώτης ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι ἀργύριον οἴσειν καὶ προσκτήσεσθαι δύναμιν ὅθεν ἀίδιον 
μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξειν (“And the great crowd and soldiery thought that they would both carry off 
money in the present, and that they would acquire more power whence there would be never-
ending pay”). Acquisition, both of money and of power, is a key contributor to the Athenian 
excitement for this expedition.61 
 Other verbal correspondences are notable as well. For example, when Thucydides tells 
readers that the older generation thought that the great force would in no way fail (οὐδὲν ἂν 
σφαλεῖσαν μεγάλην δύναμιν) (6.24.3), one may recall that at 1.70.7 this verb (σφαλῶσιν) is used 
in the protasis of a condition expressing the idea that the Athenians retain their hopefulness even 
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when they fail. Additionally, when readers see that the Athenian youth falls in love with the 
expedition because of “desire for far off sight and spectacle” (τῆς τε ἀπούσης πόθῳ ὄψεως καὶ 
θεωρίας; 6.24.3), one calls to mind the Corinthian ambassador’s argument that they can acquire 
something by their absence (τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ; 1.70.4). 
The linguistic and thematic reflections between this passage and earlier descriptions of 
Athenian character, as well as Alcibiades’ appeal to the Athenians to live up to their national 
character (which itself seems to assume Athenian self-identification with a characterization that 
is remarkably similar to that in Book 1) come together to leave us feeling that the deliberation 
leading up to the Sicilian expedition displays a moment in which Athens, in many ways, behaved 
at its most “Athenian.”62 
 Of course, as any reader of Thucydides (or student of ancient history, for that matter) 
knows, the Sicilian expedition, despite all the Athenian confidence and excitement at its outset, 
ends as an unmitigated disaster. Thucydides himself argues that poor Athenian leadership at later 
stages of the Peloponnesian War led to a number of mistakes being made, and specifically notes 
the Sicilian expedition as an example (2.65.11). Moreover, Thucydides’ narrative description at 
the end of Book 7 drives home the magnitude of the disaster and the greatness of the suffering it 
caused to those involved in it. Indeed, we learn that Nicias was least deserving of the death he 
suffered after his capture (7.86.5), we see the Athenian prisoners serving as forced labor in 
quarries and eventually being sold into slavery (7.87.1–4), and Thucydides finally closes the 
book, so to speak, on the Sicilian expedition by telling his readers: 
ξυνέβη τε ἔργον τοῦτο [Ἑλληνικὸν] τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε μέγιστον 
γενέσθαι, δοκεῖν δ᾽ ἔμοιγε καὶ ὧν ἀκοῇ Ἑλληνικῶν ἴσμεν, καὶ τοῖς τε κρατήσασι 
λαμπρότατον καὶ τοῖς διαφθαρεῖσι δυστυχέστατον· κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως 
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νικηθέντες καὶ οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδὲν κακοπαθήσαντες πανωλεθρίᾳ δὴ τὸ 
λεγόμενον καὶ πεζὸς καὶ νῆες καὶ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν 
ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀπενόστησαν. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Σικελίαν γενόμενα (7.87.5–6). 
 
And this Hellenic undertaking happened to be the greatest of those during this 
war, and it seems to me also [to be the greatest] of those Hellenic [undertakings] 
we know by report, both the most illustrious for the victors and most unfortunate 
for the vanquished. For conquered entirely in all things and having suffered 
greatly in every matter, in utter ruin, as the saying goes, the army and the ships 
and everything else was destroyed, and few out of the many [who went] returned 
home. These were the things that happened around Sicily. 
 
The disaster described here is so great, in fact, that the Athenians originally don’t believe that it 
could have happened (8.1.1). When they finally do accept the news, however, Thucydides 
represents the Athenians as truly despondent: πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει τε καὶ 
περιειστήκει ἐπὶ τῷ γεγενημένῳ φόβος τε καὶ κατάπληξις μεγίστη δή (“Everything was grieving 
them from all quarters and after what had happened fear encircled them as well as the greatest 
consternation”), and they even lose hope (… ἀνέλπιστοι ἦσαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι σωθήσεσθαι; 8.1.2). 
The Athenians are shocked and vulnerable, and all appears lost. 
 At this moment, however, defeated and shaken, they resolve not to give in (μὴ ἐνδιδόναι), 
and instead formulate a plan to recover. Thucydides takes this opportunity of Athenian 
perseverance to tell readers, πάντα τε πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεές, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, 
ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν (“And they were ready to put everything in good order because of their 
present fear, which very thing the people tend to do”; 8.1.5). This direct authorial intervention 
presents us with a Thucydidean view of Athenian collective character, since it deals with the 
proclivities of the δῆμος. What it actually tells us, however, is remarkably consistent with the 
Corinthian ambassador’s statement that the Athenians, when victorious, pursue their advantage 
to the utmost, but when defeated, give ground least of all (κρατοῦντές τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ 




passages do not share any particular linguistic similarities, the thematic correspondence is clear: 
Athenians don’t give up. Despite suffering their greatest disaster up to this point in the war, 
brought on by the previously discussed Athenian tendency to take extreme risks, the Athenians 
do not become despondent and give up. Instead, they attempt to put their affairs in order and 
persevere.  
 Finally, near the end of Book 8 Thucydides describes the difference between the 
Athenians and the Spartans in his own voice. This occurs immediately after the Athenian loss at 
Euboea (8.95), and despite Athenian fears, the Spartans fail once again to sail into the Piraeus 
(8.96.3–4). In this passage, Thucydides notes the following: 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίοις πάντων δὴ ξυμφορῶτατοι 
προσπολεμῆσαι ἐγένοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς· διάφοροι γὰρ πλεῖστον 
ὄντες τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀξεῖς, οἱ δὲ βραδεῖς, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπιχειρηταί, οἱ δὲ 
ἄτολμοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ναυτικῇ πλεῖστα ὠφέλουν. ἔδειξαν δὲ οἱ 
Συρακόσιοι· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμοιότροποι γενόμενοι ἄριστα καὶ προσεπολέμησαν 
(8.96.5). 
 
But not in this alone were the Lacedaemonians the best of all for the Athenians to 
fight against, but also in many other things. For being extremely different in 
character, the one hasty, the other slow, the one enterprising, the other lacking 
daring, both otherwise and especially in a nautical empire they helped [the 
Athenians]. And the Syracusans showed this. For being especially similar in 
character they fought against [the Athenians] best. 
 
This passage, given in Thucydides’ own authorial voice, bears a number of similarities to the 
Corinthian comparison of Athenian and Spartan character. First, his emphasis on Athenian speed 
(describing them as ὀξεῖς) directly echoes 1.70.2, where they are also ὀξεῖς, and it thematically 
matches 1.70.4, where the Athenians are described as ἄοκνοι.63 Additionally, when Thucydides 
describes the Athenians as ἐπιχειρηταί in this juxtaposition of Spartan and Athenian character, 
                                                 





one may recall that earlier in Book 1 the Corinthian speaker identified the Athenians as 
simultaneously having and expecting to have whatever they set their mind to, attributing this to 
the speed with which they attempt whatever they decide (διὰ τὸ ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν 
ποιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν γνῶσιν; 1.70.7). Moreover, at 8.96.5 the Spartans are contrasted with the 
ἐπιχειρηταί Athenians as being ἄτολμοι. Compare this description to that of the Athenians at 
1.70.3, where they are the opposite: τολμηταί. The agreement between this later statement in the 
author’s own voice and the Corinthian speaker’s claims in Book 1 are notable, and multiple 
scholars have admitted to varying degrees the correspondence between the two passages.64  Once 
again Thucydides echoes the collective characterization of the Spartans and Athenians, this time 
(much as the Corinthian speaker did) emphasizing the advantages of the Athenian character in a 
direct conflict with the Spartans. 
 Thus, the Athenians as a group once again behave in a way that is strikingly similar to 
how they were defined at the outset of Thucydides’ text by the Corinthian speaker. It would 
appear after all of these examples, then, that the Athenians, when viewed and discussed as a 
collective and without the intervention of a prominent individual leader, behave in a very 
consistent way. Even when Alcibiades persuades the Athenians to send out the Sicilian 
                                                 
64 Cartledge and Debnar, while approaching the idea of “national character” in a cautious and somewhat skeptical 
way (see 2006: 561–2), do admit that some of what the Corinthian says is borne out in the narrative, specifically 
pointing to 8.96.5 (2006: 561). Hornblower approaches this passage much more firmly, stating that this passage 
shows Thucydides endorsing the picture painted by the Corinthian speaker in Book 1 (2008: 1031). Connor also 
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readers to recognize that the Corinthian judgment is a generalization (1984b: 41). It is my argument, however, that 
such conflict between individual and collective character is not necessarily a complication, but that instead the 




expedition, he attempts not to change Athenian behavior, but instead entreats his audience to live 
up to their normal character.65  
 As has been shown, this consistency of group behavior applies in the text whether 
Thucydides puts his analysis in the voice of the Corinthians, Spartans, Athenians, or even in his 
own authorial voice. This suggests that this characterization is meant to be taken as more than a 
passing sophistic antithesis, and I argue that we may view it instead as an important analytical 
tool in the work for understanding the relationships between both leaders and the populations of 
their cities, and between governmental systems and group behavior. Thus, the strengths and 
weaknesses in this collective characterization that were clear beginning with the Corinthian’s 
description of Athenian group behavior are consistent as well. Indeed, Athenian acquisitiveness, 
risk-taking, and activity all lead the city to achieve great things, but also to overreach and suffer 
disastrous reversals. They consistently press the advantage when they succeed (possibly to their 
own detriment, in that they fail to make peace with the Spartans immediately after their victory 
at Sphacteria, when they most likely could have obtained the most favorable terms), but when 
defeated, as at Sicily, they refuse to give way to their enemies. And most of all, the Athenians 
simply cannot keep themselves from action. This Athenian group characterization is consistent 
both in its portrayal throughout the work, and in its positive and negative consequences for the 
polis. As we will now see, this is true of the Spartans as well. 
 
Sparta 
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 The characterization of the Spartans presented in Book 1 by the Corinthian ambassador 
has been discussed above at length.66 The question now becomes, as it was for the Athenians, 
whether this collective characterization is merely a rhetorical stance taken by the Corinthian 
speaker to convince his Spartan audience that they must go to war against the Athenians, or 
whether it is the reader’s first introduction to a character that will be consistent throughout the 
work, serving an explanatory purpose. It is necessary, therefore, to examine passages in the text 
that either implicitly illustrate or explicitly discuss Spartan collective characterization in order to 
demonstrate that this attribution of particular tendencies and traits to the Spartans as a group is in 
fact consistent. 
 The passage at 1.118.2—which compares Athenian and Spartan activity in the years 
leading up to the Peloponnesian War—has already been discussed above, but it is here 
appropriate to examine it again, shifting our emphasis to the characterization of Sparta. To 
review, in this passage Thucydides discussed the growth of Athenian power and Sparta’s 
response to it, saying, ἐν οἷς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τήν τε ἀρχὴν ἐγκρατεστέραν κατεστήσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ 
ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι οὔτε ἐκώλυον εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ βραχύ, 
ἡσύχαζόν τε τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου, ὄντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἰέναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, ἢν μὴ 
ἀναγκάζωνται … (“In which [years] the Athenians both made the empire stronger and 
themselves advanced to a great position of strength, but the Lacedaemonians perceiving this did 
not prevent it except for a moment, and they kept quiet most of the time, being even before this 
not swift to go to wars, unless compelled”; 1.118.2). 
 Thucydides here identifies the Spartans as slow to action even before the outbreak of the 
war, thus corroborating the Corinthian description earlier in Book 1. Indeed, Spartan inaction and 
                                                 




its perceived role in the growth of Athenian daring is specifically lambasted by the Corinthian 
speaker, who claims that the Spartans themselves are to blame for the current state of affairs 
(1.69.1–4). In this verbal condemnation of Spartan lethargy, the Corinthian speaker accuses the 
Spartans of being the only Greeks to keep quiet (ἡσυχάζετε; 1.69.4), the very same language 
with which Thucydides describes their behavior (ἡσύχαζόν) during Athens’ rise to prominence 
(1.118.2). Moreover, Thucydides’ use of this word sets the Spartans, who habitually do nothing, 
at direct odds with the Athenians, who, as discussed above, are described as naturally incapable 
of keeping peaceful (1.70.9).  
 This theme of Spartan conservatism and inaction, especially as compared to Athenian 
ingenuity and action, is apparent throughout the Corinthian comparison. For example, the 
Corinthian speaker says of the Spartans, … ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σῴζειν καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι 
μηδὲν καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι (“… but you are accustomed to preserve what exists 
and to think of nothing new and not to accomplish what is necessary by your action”; 1.70.2). He 
then goes on two sections later to identify the Spartans as delayers (μελλητὰς) and as preferring 
to stay at home (ἐνδημοτάτους) rather than go abroad, finally finishing by telling the Spartans, 
ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι (“but you [think that] you could harm what is 
readily at hand by going somewhere”; 1.70.4). Thus, the growth of Athenian power before the 
war is attributed by Thucydides to Spartan characteristics strikingly similar to those for which 
the Corinthian speaker faults his Lacedaemonian listeners. At this point in the text, then, we have 
now seen that the major characteristics of Spartan collective behavior before the war (as 





 This emphasis on Spartan collective hesitancy and their inability to undertake risky but 
potentially rewarding enterprises continues in Book 2. At the behest of the Megarians, a group of 
Peloponnesian captains, including Cnemus and Brasidas, form a plan to seize the Piraeus, which 
has been left unguarded (2.93.1). The language of the plan emphasizes the speed with which it 
must be carried out to be successful, pointing out that they must drag the ships down to Megara 
quickly (κατὰ τάχος), and then sail straightaway (εὐθύς) against the Piraeus (2.93.2). The plan, 
therefore, requires the Peloponnesians—and in particular the Spartans—to act in a way that is 
drastically different from the characterization that has been attributed to them up to this point in 
the work. Thucydides also emphasizes to readers how unguarded the Piraeus was at the time and 
how unexpected such an attack would have been: οὔτε γὰρ ναυτικὸν ἦν προφυλάσσον ἐν αὐτῷ 
οὐδὲν οὔτε προσδοκία οὐδεμία μὴ ἄν ποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐξαπιναίως οὕτως ἐπιπλεύσειαν, ἐπεὶ οὐδ᾽ 
ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς τολμῆσαι ἂν καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν, οὐδ᾽ εἰ διενοοῦντο, μὴ οὐκ ἂν προαισθέσθαι (“for 
there was neither any fleet standing guard in it, nor was there any expectation that their enemies 
would ever sail against it so suddenly, since they did not [think that] they would dare [to sail 
against it] openly [when they were] at leisure [i.e. when they had plenty of time to prepare], nor 
if they decided to do it [was there any expectation] that it would not be perceived beforehand”; 
2.93.3).67  
This description speaks volumes about Athenian perceptions of their enemies’ 
characteristic tendencies in Thucydides’ text. First, it is noteworthy that the Athenians fully do 
not expect the Spartans to mount an attack so suddenly (ἐξαπιναίως οὕτως). This expectation (or 
lack thereof) appears to betray an Athenian-held belief that their enemies were consistently slow 
to operate and were incapable of mounting a surprise attack against them. This impression is 
                                                 





strengthened when Thucydides gives the Athenians’ reasoning for not expecting an attack of this 
sort. Indeed, when he notes that the Peloponnesians would not dare to attack even if operating 
καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν—a phrase which, as mentioned, Rusten interprets to mean “even with considerable 
time for preparation” (1989: 238)—readers are forced to recognize just how great a departure 
from normal Spartan tendencies the actions planned by Cnemus and Brasidas are. Implicit in this 
passage is the idea that the Athenians believe that their enemies would never attack suddenly, 
because they wouldn’t even do it if they had taken the time for preparation. Moreover, the use of 
the word ἡσυχία calls to mind the juxtaposition of Spartan and Athenian given by the Corinthian 
speaker at 1.70. Indeed, it was the Athenians who despised leisure and were incapable of being 
quiet at 1.70.8 and 1.70.9, with the implicit comparison identifying the Spartans with this 
concept. As noted above, Thucydides then directly associates the Spartans with leisure and 
slowness (ἡσύχαζόν τε τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου) at 1.118.2. It would appear, then, that in his 
description of Athenian unpreparedness and the reasons for this unpreparedness, Thucydides 
expresses an Athenian perception of Spartan hesitancy and slowness that coincides with earlier 
Corinthian criticism of their collective character. In doing this, however, Thucydides also subtly 
directs his readers to conclude that this attack, since everything about it was so contrary to 
Athenian expectations, had every reason to be successful. 
 When the crucial moment arrives, however, the Peloponnesians do not sail directly to 
Athens, but instead to Salamis. This is because, as Thucydides tells us, they feared the danger of 
their original plan (καταδείσαντες τὸν κίνδυνον; 2.93.4). This hesitation gives the Athenians time 
to light the fire signals, warning their fellow-citizens of the Peloponnesian threat. Thucydides 
then emphasizes for a second time how successful this attempt could have been by noting the 




city, because everyone believes the Piraeus has already been taken or will shortly. Thucydides 
then directly and openly claims, ὅπερ ἄν, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν μὴ κατοκνῆσαι, ῥᾳδίως ἐγένετο … 
(“Which very thing, if they had been willing not to hesitate, would easily have happened …”; 
2.94.1). 
 This episode, then, puts two things on display for readers: the overwhelming Spartan 
tendency toward hesitation in action, and the possibility for effective action through the 
intervention of leadership. Indeed, as Thucydides presents it, it is the leaders Cnemus and 
Brasidas who introduce what he identifies as a plan that very likely would have succeeded. We 
will further discuss the temporary influence of individuals on collective character later, but its 
possibility can be felt here, just as it was temporarily for the Athenians under Pericles.68 What is 
more important to note here, however, is that, despite excellent planning, the collective character 
of the Spartans wins out. Indeed, the language of swiftness and suddenness noted earlier 
disappears, and instead we see the language of fear (καταδείσαντες; 2.93.4) and of hesitation 
(κατοκνῆσαι; 2.94.1). Thucydides’ verbal choices at this point return us to the Corinthian 
description of Spartan behavior, where they are identified as delayers (μελλητὰς), while the 
Athenians are unhesitating (ἄοκνοι; 1.70.4). This reversion to their earlier defined character 
allows the Athenians to seize the initiative, and indeed they drag down and man their ships in 
haste (κατὰ σπουδὴν), leaving the Spartans able to do only one thing with any speed (κατὰ 
τάχος): sail away (2.94.2–3). 
 Thus, despite the attempted intervention of the leaders Cnemus and Brasidas, the 
Spartans fail to carry out their planned attack, and instead live up to their collective character as 
defined by the Corinthian speaker in Book 1. Moreover, while this episode very nearly results in 
                                                 




disaster for the Athenians, the Spartans live up to Athenian expectations, which in fact are shown 
to be consistent with the Corinthian’s viewpoint. 
 Spartan collective character can also be observed in Thucydides’ description of the 
Lacedaemonian reaction to the Athenian occupation of Pylos. As discussed above, the Athenian 
soldiers themselves, struck with an urge to act, quickly fortify the location, demonstrating their 
inability to exist in a state of inaction.69 The Spartans, however, are originally slow to react to the 
Athenians’ presence, underestimating the threat it presents and being unwilling to step away 
from the festival they are currently observing: οἱ δὲ ἑορτήν τινα ἔτυχον ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα 
πυνθανόμενοι ἐν ὀλιγωρίᾳ ἐποιοῦντο, ὡς, ὅταν ἐξέλθωσιν, ἢ οὐχ ὑπομενοῦντας σφᾶς ἢ ῥᾳδίως 
ληψόμενοι βίᾳ (“But they happened to be conducting a certain festival and at the moment they 
heard about it they made little of it, believing that, whenever they went out, either they [the 
Athenians] would not stand up to them or they would easily take it by force”; 4.5.1). Such 
slowness to battle caused by a festival is certainly not unheard of for the Spartans, and, as Parker 
notes, “it is well known how determined they were to hold the traditional festivals at the 
traditional times, even at the risk of military disadvantage” (2002: 170).70 Indeed, while Spartan 
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70 For earlier examples we need only look to Herodotus. The Spartans cannot immediately come to the aid of the 
Athenians at Marathon, because they need to wait until there is a full moon (Hdt. 6.106.3), and arrive too late and 
simply go home (Hdt. 6.120). Again at Thermopylae they must wait to send the rest of their forces until after they 
complete observance of the Carneia (7.206.1). As we will see later in Thucydides, there are other instances of 
religious observance causing military delays, such as when the Spartans on three separate occasions (5.54.1, 55.3, 
116.1) turn back from expeditions into the Argolid because of unpropitious border-crossing sacrifices. Parker, while 
admitting that the alteration of military plans by divination was common to all Greeks, argues that border-crossing 
sacrifices, as an obstacle to overcome during military expeditions, appear have been unique to the Spartans (2002: 
165). Jameson, too, notes that, “Διαβατήρια are attested only for the Spartans, with the single exception of a 
reference to the legendary Heraclidae attacking Sparta (ὑπερβατήρια, Polyaenus Strat. 1.10)” (2014: 103 n.14). It is 
interesting to note, however, that while the Spartans turn back from expeditions into the Argolid three times due to 
unfavorable sacrifices, there is no evidence that such inauspicious divination ever turned them back from entering 




religion was not necessarily different from Greek religion in general, it appears in the sources as 
distinct in how seriously they took the sanctity of festivals (Parker 2002: 172).71  
 The description that follows, however, could lead one to question the consistency of 
Spartan character, because those currently out of the area devastating the countryside in Attica, 
hurry back to Sparta: οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὄντες Πελοποννήσιοι ὡς ἐπύθοντο τῆς Πύλου 
κατειλημμένης, ἀνεχώρουν κατὰ τάχος ἐπ᾽ οἴκου … (“But the Peloponnesians that were in Attica, 
when they heard that Pylos had been seized, quickly went back home”; 4.6.1). One notes the 
inclusion of κατὰ τάχος to emphasize the speed with which the Spartans return home. Moreover, 
in 4.8.1 Thucydides tells readers that the Spartiates came to help against Pylos immediately 
(εὐθύς). At first reading, this could lead a reader to say their group characterization is not 
consistent, and that they are, in fact, capable of acting with speed. There are numerous problems 
with such a conclusion, however, that must be discussed. 
 First, it is quite interesting to note that the Spartans whom Thucydides describes as acting 
quickly (κατὰ τάχος) are coming back from Attica for the protection of the Peloponnese. Earlier 
in the text the Spartans are specifically described as concerned primarily with preserving what 
they already have (ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σῴζειν; 1.70.2), and as most eager to stay at home 
(ἐνδημοτάτους; 1.70.4). This is because, according to the Corinthian speaker in Book 1, ὑμεῖς δὲ 
τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι (“you think that you could harm what is readily at hand by 
going somewhere”; 1.70.4). Thus, the speed with which the Spartans act is a defensive speed, 
rather than a proactive one. To explain more clearly, the Spartan soldiers’ fear of losing their 
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possessions and harming their polis by their absence, not any innate swiftness, appears to be 
what forces them to rush back from Attica to defend the Peloponnese. 
 Additionally, while Spartan collective slowness to action is obviously emphasized 
throughout the work, it is not unconditional. Indeed, at 1.118.2 (as discussed above) Thucydides 
describes the Spartans in his own voice as ὄντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἰέναι ἐς τοὺς 
πολέμους, ἢν μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται (“being even before this not swift to go into wars, if they are not 
forced”). While this passage deals specifically with Spartan hesitation to enter a war, the 
condition provided here, when combined with the passages just discussed at 1.70.2 and 1.70.4, 
allows for some Spartan speed. Indeed, while they are not swift to action, as emphasized 
throughout 1.69–70, they may be swift to reaction when their hand is forced, as appears to be the 
case in the Athenian fortification of Pylos. 
 As it would appear, then, there is some room in Spartan collective character for a reactive 
swiftness when they are forced to act. In the case of the Athenian fortification of Pylos, the 
Spartans were indeed compelled to respond, because Athenian actions threatened the security of 
their own territory. Such a threat played directly into Spartan fears, and thus had to be addressed. 
To conclude, then, the speed displayed by Sparta here is precisely in keeping with their collective 
character as established up to this point in the text, because the undertaking is not new or 
inventive, but is instead a response to Athenian provocation and a perceived direct and imminent 
danger to Spartan interests. 
 Again when the Spartans attempt to assault the Athenian position at Pylos we see them 
suffer from hesitation. Indeed, focalizing his narrative through Brasidas’ eyes, Thucydides tells 
us that this Spartan commander, ὁρῶν τοῦ χωρίου χαλεποῦ ὄντος τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ 




μὴ ξυντρίψωσιν, ἐβόα λέγων ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς εἴη ξύλων φειδομένους τοὺς πολεμίους ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ 
περιιδεῖν τεῖχος πεποιημένους ... (“seeing the trireme captains and the pilots, because of the place 
being difficult, even if somewhere should seem to be possible to hold, hesitating and being 
careful lest they break up the ships, he shouted out saying that it was not fitting for them, sparing 
wood, to overlook the enemies having built a fortification in their land …; 4.11.4). Thus, while 
the Athenians are being attacked from both sides (ἀμφοτέρωθεν) and those at sea are described 
as showing great zeal (προθυμίᾳ) (4.11.3), the attack at sea nevertheless stalls because the 
Spartan captains are hesitating (ἀποκνοῦντας) until Brasidas’ intervention (4.11.4). The role of 
Brasidas in changing Spartan behavior will be discussed further later, but it is important to note 
two things here: the persistence of the language of hesitation to describe collective Spartan 
behavior (see their description as μελλητὰς in comparison to the Athenians who are ἄοκνοι at 
1.70.4, for example), and the need for the intervention of a prominent, leading individual to alter 
this habitual and expected behavior. 
 Additionally, the Spartan collective character defined in Book 1 can be detected when 
Thucydides discusses Spartan morale after the Athenian capture of Cythera in 424: 
... φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσι νεώτερόν τι γένηται τῶν περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν,72 
γεγενημένου μὲν τοῦ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πάθους ἀνελπίστου καὶ μεγάλου, Πύλου δὲ 
ἐχομένης καὶ Κυθήρων καὶ πανταχόθεν σφᾶς περιεστῶτος πολέμου ταχέος καὶ 
ἀπροφυλάκτου, ... ἔς τε τὰ πολεμικά, εἴπερ ποτέ, μάλιστα δὴ ὀκνηρότεροι 
ἐγένοντο, ξυνεστῶτες παρὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν σφῶν ἰδέαν τῆς παρασκευῆς 
ναυτικῷ ἀγῶνι, καὶ τούτῳ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, οἷς τὸ μὴ ἐπιχερούμενον αἰεὶ ἐλλιπὲς 
ἦν τῆς δοκήσεώς τι πράξειν· καὶ ἅμα τὰ τῆς τύχης πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ ξυμβάντα 
παρὰ λόγον αὐτοῖς ἔκπληξιν μεγίστην παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐδέδισαν μή ποτε αὖθις 
ξυμφορά τις αὐτοῖς περιτύχῃ οἵα καὶ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ. ἀτολμότεροι δὲ δι᾽ αὐτὸ ἐς τὰς 
μάχας ἦσαν, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι κινήσειαν ᾤοντο ἁμαρτήσεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν γνώμην 
ἀνεχέγγυον γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῆς πρὶν ἀηθείας τοῦ κακοπραγεῖν (4.55.1–4). 
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… fearing lest some revolution come about, because of the great and unexpected 
suffering that had happened on the island, and because of Pylos and Cythera being 
held [by the Athenians] and because a swift and unpredictable war was 
surrounding them on all sides, … and toward matters of war, if ever [they were 
timid], they really became extremely timid, being involved in a nautical contest, 
contrary to the existing form of their preparation, and this against the Athenians, 
for whom not to attempt a thing was always to fall short of their expectations of 
achievement. And at the same time many matters of fortune having in a short span 
turned out contrary to reason presented them with the greatest consternation, and 
they feared that at some point some disaster would again befall them like that on 
the island. And they were less daring with respect to battles on account of this, 
and they thought that whatever they set in motion would fail, on account of their 
having become unsure in their judgment from their earlier inexperience in faring 
badly. 
 
This description of the Spartan state of mind after major setbacks at Pylos/Sphacteria and 
Cythera bears a number of striking resemblances to the description of Spartan collective 
character in Book 1. Proceeding through this passage, one first notes that one of the reasons for 
Spartan fearfulness is the speed of the war (πολέμου ταχέος; 4.55.1), and that their response to 
their current situation is to become more hesitant than ever (ὀκνηρότεροι; 4.55.2) and even less 
daring (ἀτολμότεροι; 4.55.4).73 With reference to 4.55.1, Gomme notes that, “strategically, as 
well as tactically, the Spartans for the moment fell short of Athenian initiative and courage” 
(1956: 510). While this low point in daring and initiative is temporary, this characterization of 
collective slowness and timidity has been largely consistent, and was first introduced in Book 1. 
Indeed, as has been noted multiple times the Corinthian speaker specifically attacks the Spartans 
for their hesitation and timidity throughout his speech.74 What is more, it is noteworthy that the 
comparative adjectives provided here (ὀκνηρότεροι, ἀτολμότεροι) are very close to being direct 
inversions of the adjectives used to describe the Athenians in Book 1 (ἄοκνοι; 1.70.4, τολμηταὶ; 
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1.70.3). Here, then, the Spartans actually appear to live up to the strict antithesis set up much 
earlier in the work, being discussed in a way that is not only consistent with earlier Spartan 
characteristics, but that is also the exact opposite of the Athenian character. 
 Additionally, Spartan fear of further disasters (4.55.3) and their belief that anything they 
undertake will be fouled up (4.55.4) recall passage from the Corinthian speech as well. 
Specifically, this Spartan fear to enter upon any new enterprise and accompanying fear of 
resultant disasters cannot but remind readers of two of the Corinthian speaker’s claims: that the 
Spartans feel as though they will never be released from dire straits (τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε 
οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι; 1.70.3), and that they think that by going abroad they will actually do 
harm to themselves (ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι; 1.70.4). 
Finally, again looking back to 1.70.3, it must be noted that the Spartans are there 
described as not trusting in the certainties of their judgments (τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις 
πιστεῦσαι). In the passage under current discussion we again see the Spartans losing faith in their 
judgment when Thucydides tells us … διὰ τὸ τὴν γνώμην ἀνεχέγγυον γεγενῆσθαι (“on account 
of their judgment becoming insecure”; 4.55.4). While this insecurity in judgment is presented as 
a new development in response to Spartan misfortune in the war, this mindset is actually not new 
to readers. In fact, is remarkably consistent with what has been defined as their general attitude 
earlier in the history. 
Upon examination, then, this passage at 4.55, depicting the low point for Spartan fortunes 
in the war, does not present readers with anything particularly new. Instead, it shows the Spartans 
taking their established collective character to a more extreme level. In doing this, they actually 
appear more “Spartan,” as defined in the Corinthian’s strict antithesis, than at any other point in 




reactive than innovative (as has been shown throughout this chapter), they now exist at the 
complete opposite end of the spectrum from the Athenians, temporarily losing any initiative and 
daring they may have previously had. In essence, then, at this point in the text readers see the 
Spartans, as a group, at their most Spartan. 
 While there is little discussion of Spartan group dynamics in Book 6–7 due to the text’s 
focus on the Athenian expedition to Sicily, Thucydides’ emphasis on the slowness and hesitancy 
of Spartan character appears again in Book 8. This comes through most clearly in a passage 
already discussed: 8.96.75 As a reminder, Thucydides here tells readers that the Peloponnesians, 
when the Athenians were weakened by their loss at Euboea, failed once again to seize the 
Piraeus. He then goes on to specifically note that they easily could have accomplished this goal if 
they were more daring (εἰ τολμηρότεροι ἦσαν; 8.96.4).76 Following this point, Thucydides 
claims, in his own authorial voice, that the Lacedaemonians were extremely convenient enemies 
for the Athenians (ξυμφορώτατοι προσπολεμῆσαι ἐγένοντο), and explains that this was due to 
the differences between the two groups (διάφοροι γὰρ πλεῖστον ὄντες τὸν τρόπον). In delineating 
these character differences, he identifies the Athenians as swift (ὀξεῖς) and enterprising 
(ἐπιχειρηταί), and the Spartans as slow (βραδεῖς) and lacking daring (ἄτολμοι) (8.96.5).  
The resonances between Thucydides’ statement here and the Corinthian speaker’s 
analysis of Spartan behavior in Book 1 are so striking that they led Connor to point to this 
passage as Thucydides’ first direct authorial agreement with the Corinthian’s analysis (1984b: 
41). The direct agreement is certainly demonstrable, as may be observed by comparison with the 
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juxtaposition between the Athenians, who are ἄοκνοι and the Spartans who are μελλητὰς in 
1.70.4.  
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, however, I would argue that between the 
Corinthian’s description of Spartan and Athenian characters and Thucydides’ discussion of the 
two patterns of behavior in 8.96.5, numerous passages bearing strong verbal and thematic 
similarities to the collective character introduced in Book 1 occur. Indeed, Spartan hesitancy is 
apparent, and even emphasized, on a repetitive basis in Thucydides’ history, and plays an 
important role, as it does at 8.96, in helping to explain why the war unfolded as it did, and why 
the Spartans failed numerous times to capitalize on Athenian weakness. Thus, the author’s use of 
national character has, as Raaflaub puts it, explanatory power in the text (2006: 196). We may, 
therefore, conclude that the representation of Spartan collective character, without the 
intervention of prominent individuals, is strikingly consistent throughout Thucydides’ history. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that Thucydides’ depiction of national (or 
collective) character is largely consistent. As has been shown, numerous passages spread 
throughout the text reaffirm time and again that the citizens of these two poleis, when left to their 
own devices and without the intervention of prominent, leading individuals, behave in a 
persistent way. 
 Moreover, each group’s collective character contains both strengths and weaknesses.77 In 
the case of the Athenians, their strength is their quickness, which played a role in their rise to 
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power (1.118.1), and can be baffling for the Spartans (4.55.1). Their weaknesses, however, are 
their constant acquisitiveness and their inability to be at rest even for a moment—tendencies that, 
at times, drive them to overreach and expose themselves to danger.78 Spartan strength, on the 
other hand, is based on their stability and their ability to avoid such overreaching, but their 
weaknesses are their slowness, hesitancy, and risk aversion. These faults lead them to fail to 
capitalize on Athenian weakness on multiple occasions during the war.79 
 This situation, then, in which both belligerents have strengths and weaknesses, leads 
readers to two conclusions that must be kept in mind. First, since these collective characters are 
derived from the political environments in which they exist, we may begin to suspect that, of the 
two systems in conflict in the text (democracy and oligarchy), neither is without flaw, and both 
possess weaknesses. Second (and dependent on the first point), this leaves a prominent role to be 
played by individual leaders, who may, as has been hinted at in this chapter, temporarily alter the 
behavior of the poleis they lead. Since, however, both poleis have flawed characters, we may 
begin to suspect that the most successful leaders will not be those whose individual traits most 
closely resemble the behavioral tendencies of their polis, but rather those with the proper balance 
of characteristics to guide their city-state away from its weaknesses and toward its strengths. This 
second idea will be explored further in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER II.  
Thucydides on Effective Leadership 
 In the previous chapter the role of national character in Thucydides’ History was 
discussed, and it was established that both Athens’ and Sparta’s collective characters have 
strengths as well as weaknesses. Additionally, it was shown that, in Thucydides’ presentation, 
political environment was the most important factor in determining the collective tendencies 
making up these poleis’ national characters. Therefore, the flaws existing in the national 
characters of Athens and Sparta—since they are collective expressions of character traits formed 
by democratic and oligarchic political environments—indicate to readers that the political 
systems from which they are derived are themselves flawed. 
 It is against this background of imperfect national characters and political environments 
that we must view the numerous leaders who play prominent roles in the History. These leaders, 
each with their own unique combination of attributes (variously similar to or different from their 
poleis’ collective character), can profoundly affect the fortunes of their poleis; this is because, as 
numerous scholars have noted, exceptional leaders are capable of temporarily shifting the 
behavior of their poleis away from their natural tendencies (Marincola 2001: 92, Luginbill 1999: 
99 n. 25; 105). 
 In examining Thucydides’ presentation of such leaders (especially Pericles), scholars 
have often focused on the specific skills or abilities that appear to make them successful. For 




perceptual, persuasive, and personal; that is to say, he plans prudently, he successfully persuades 
his audience to adopt his proposals, and he looks to the public benefit while remaining morally 
incorruptible and avoiding the influence of his personal passions (Luginbill 1999: 190).80 While I 
do not dispute that successful leaders in Thucydides’ History often possess these attributes, these 
criteria do not fully capture the complexity of positive leadership in the text. Instead, I would 
argue that Thucydides looks beyond absolute skills or personal qualities (such as rhetorical 
competence or moral incorruptibility), and places a great deal of emphasis on the interaction 
between leaders’ individual characters and those of the poleis they govern. As will be shown in 
this chapter, the proper formulation of this relationship requires that a leader’s personal qualities 
complement those of their polis. Thus, what makes a leader “good” is relative to the political 
structure and collective behavioral tendencies of the city-state in which he exists. 
 To expand on this point, because each of the primary actors in Thucydides’ History 
(Athens and Sparta) possesses a flawed collective character, we must recognize that leaders who 
represent individual expressions of this character will be equally flawed, as they will merely 
exacerbate their polis’ inherent weaknesses. By the same token, leaders whose individual 
characterizations stand in stark opposition to that of their polis (such as very “Spartan” 
Athenians) will also falter, because they will simply cause their city-state to temporarily adopt 
the weaknesses existing at the other end of the political spectrum. Therefore, only leaders whose 
behavioral tendencies complement those of their polis by correcting its weaknesses and 
enhancing its strengths—and thus driving it to some middle ground between the unbridled 
democratic acquisitiveness of Athens and the oligarchic hesitancy of Sparta—will bring about 
the greatest prosperity for their city and its people.  
                                                 




For Athens, then, on top of the previously mentioned (Periclean) attributes, we must look 
for a moderate leader who can channel and direct Athenian energy to productive ends, while 
concurrently checking the polis’ tendency to enter upon excessively bold and needlessly risky 
undertakings. Sparta, meanwhile, needs a leader who will not lead it too far from its general 
prudence, caution, and military acumen, but who will at the same time drive the city to be more 
active and to press the advantage when it has it. 
These traits may be most clearly observed in two individuals in the History: Pericles for 
Athens, and Brasidas for Sparta. Through an analysis of these two leaders, this chapter will 
demonstrate that, in Thucydides’ representation of history, absolute characteristics such as 
foresight, persuasive ability, and moral uprightness do not fully explain what makes particular 
leaders more effective than others. Instead, one must also examine the way their unique, 
individual characters interact with and moderate the national characters of their poleis. 
After examining these leaders, we will then move on to discuss a further point: Pericles 
and Brasidas, though each seemingly displays the requirements of good leadership specific to 
their polis, only play prominent roles in the text for relatively short periods of time. Indeed, 
Thucydides represents the deaths of both individuals as leaving their city-states, which had 
achieved relative success under their leadership, in the hands of inferior leaders.81 Indeed, while 
Thucydides’ History unfortunately ends in 411 BCE (well before the end of the war), in the text 
as it exists no other Athenian or Spartan leader appears who fully lives up to the examples of 
Pericles or Brasidas. As a result, the behavioral tendencies of these two poleis go unchecked for 
a majority of the work. Thus, Thucydides’ treatment of Pericles and Brasidas in his history 
demonstrates the following three things: his idea that the specific qualities required of a “good 
                                                 




leader” are relative to the polis in which he operates, the unlikelihood of the appearance of 
individuals who fully meet these requirements, and the inherently problematic nature of any 
system that requires the intervention of leaders on whose existence it cannot reasonably rely. 
 
Pericles and Good Governance 
 Let us begin our examination of good governance in Thucydides by turning to the 
author’s portrait of Pericles. It is difficult to read the presentation of Pericles in the early years of 
the Peloponnesian War—especially his eulogy at 2.65—without receiving the impression that 
Thucydides portrays him as an overwhelmingly positive figure.82 Before moving into an analysis 
of the reasons behind the effectiveness of Pericles as an Athenian leader, however, let us briefly 
discuss the historicity of Thucydides’ portrait of him in the History. 
 
Pericles as Historical Figure or Thucydidean Construct 
 While the authoritative tone of Thucydides’ writing makes it easy to accept his 
representation of Pericles as entirely accurate, scholars have for a long time recognized the 
difficulty in building a truly historical portrait of this Athenian statesman. This difficulty results 
from the fact that the Pericles described by Thucydides differs significantly from representations 
in other ancient authors. 
 For example, despite Thucydides’ seeming admiration for Pericles, both Ion of Chios 
(cited Plu. Per. 5.3) and Stesimbrotus of Thasos (cited Plu. Per. 13.16) criticize him harshly, and 
he is mocked repeatedly in Old Comedy by Aristophanes (Ar. Ach. 530–2) and Cratinus (fr. 73, 
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118, 258–9), primarily for what appears to be his tyrannical conduct (Azoulay 2010: 14; Storey 
2003: 123).83 Plato’s Socrates finds fault with Pericles, who claims that he was not a true 
statesman because he failed to make the people better (Pl. Grg. 502e–519d), and he is identified 
in the Constitution of the Athenians as corrupting the people by introducing pay to the 
democratic process (Arist. Ath. 27.3–4; Azoulay 2010: 16). Additionally, Plutarch casts him as 
deeply involved in the factional conflicts of Athens, whereas this is absent in Thucydides 
(Christodoulou 2013: 246–7).84 Thus, there are, to a large extent, two versions of Pericles that 
have been passed down to posterity: one negative and one positive. 
 These two versions of Pericles have alternated in occupying the dominant position in 
shaping our reception of him. Speaking generally, until the end of the 18th century the negative 
view of Pericles was the predominate one. Starting in the 19th century, however, (linked by 
Azoulay to the rise of parliamentary systems of governance) he regained a positive reception, 
with a return to prominence of Thucydides’ much rosier view of the politician. Thus, while many 
current students of Greek history may be familiar with the Thucydidean “idealized” version of 
Pericles, this appears to be largely a product of our time, and of the text in which we currently 
choose to put our trust. Indeed, as Azoulay notes, “Le mythe péricléen est une (re)création 
récente” (The Periclean myth is a recent (re)creation; 2010: 20).85 During this period in which 
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Thucydides’ version of Pericles was the dominant one, many scholars believed the historian 
portrayed the leader “in a factual way” (Vogt 2009: 220). 
 Relatively recently, however, a certain selectivity in Thucydides’ portrayal of Pericles 
has come to be recognized. For example, it has been pointed out that the historian appears largely 
to suppress Pericles’ role in Athenian policy prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (and 
especially during the Pentecontaetia) (Foster 2010: 111–12).86 While some scholars would 
respond to this observation by arguing that Thucydides’ regular practice is to bring characters in 
and out of the narrative as he feels they are relevant (Gribble 2006: 440–1), others see the 
removal of Pericles as dishonest, claiming that it is impossible to provide a balanced version of 
events while leaving out his role in Athenian policy in the prewar years (Badian 1993: 161; 
Foster 2010: 119). 
 Scholars’ complaints are not limited to the period before the outbreak of the 
Peloponnesian War. Indeed, some have also argued that Thucydides’ suppression of other 
prominent individuals and of political infighting during the height of Pericles’ influence may 
warp readers’ impression of the period. Saïd, for example, notes that during the period of 
Pericles’ leadership, the ongoing conflict between mass and elite (and their representatives) is 
hidden, and that readers only see the leader interacting with his citizen body (2012: 212). In fact, 
there is no real record in Thucydides of opposition to Pericles: we are sometimes told that other 
speeches were given before Pericles addressed the populace, but only Pericles’ words are 
actually reported. This practice leaves audiences with the impression that there were few policy 
                                                 




disputes in Athenian politics of this time, and that Pericles played an incontestably dominant 
leadership role (exactly the image Thucydides presents at 2.65.8) (Gribble 2006: 448–9).87 
 Additionally, some scholars have seen the stark difference that Thucydides develops 
between Pericles and his successors and the resulting deterioration in the quality of Athenian 
leadership as an exaggeration, arguing instead that Pericles was likely much more similar to his 
successors than Thucydides lets on (Raaflaub 2006: 205; Azoulay 2010: 155–7).88 Azoulay, for 
example, claims that Pericles was one part of a larger transition (to the domination of popular 
ideology) that had begun before his leadership, and that he was, in fact, not all that different from 
Cleon (2010: 157, 162). De Romilly’s echoes this sentiment when she claims that Thucydides 
was eager to defend the optimism that Pericles had at the beginning of the war, and thus wanted 
to show that he was essentially rational in his assessment of Athens’ capabilities, and that there 
was a stark contrast between him and later leaders (1965: 560–1). Hornblower also argues 
against a strong differentiation between Pericles and later politicians (1991: 346), going so far as 
to state that Thucydides is almost certainly incorrect in making this claim (1991: 340). 
 As a result of the seemingly selective nature of Thucydides’ portrait of Pericles, scholars 
have questioned its historicity, though to varying degrees. Foster, for example, claims that 
Thucydides’ portrait of Pericles is essentially historical, but that it is simply fragmentary (2010: 
133). Christodoulou, however, is more willing to accept that there is an element of literary 
invention in Thucydides’ portrayal of the Athenian leader, arguing that Thucydides is moving 
back and forth between the historical Pericles and a literary portrait of the ideal statesman, and 
                                                 
87 This point is echoed in Strauss 1964: 213 and Taylor 2010: 50. Gribble goes on to argue that Thucydides’ 
suppression of individuals in general is noteworthy, pointing out that (apart from the description at 8.73) there is no 
discussion of the ostracism of Hyperbolus, of the Athenian “demagogues” other than Cleon, or of the specific 
individuals who oppose Alcibiades other than Nicias (2006: 448). 
88 For more on this transition in leadership, see Azoulay 2010: 152–7. It is worth noting that, despite the numerous 
texts that appear to disagree with Thucydides’ presentation of this degradation in Athenian leadership, the 




that we may thus no longer identify the Thucydidean Pericles with the historical figure (2013: 
227–8).89 Finally, Connor feels that the work as a whole was, “polemical and revisionist,” and 
that Thucydides, “…knew that his treatment of almost every major figure, Pericles, Cleon, 
Demosthenes, Nicias, Alcibiades, would in his own day be controversial and would cut against 
conventional wisdom and judgments” (1984b: 233). Thus, we as readers are left to decide for 
ourselves between three options: either Thucydides is essentially providing us with an accurate 
representation of the historical Pericles (simply leaving out details he views as irrelevant), he is 
actively crafting a narrative that runs counter to conventional judgment, or he is doing something 
in between these two extremes. 
  Despite these difficulties in determining the “historical” character of Pericles, one key 
point saves us from this sense of aporia and allows us to move forward with this study: whether 
Thucydides is selectively reporting factual information or artfully crafting a new, unorthodox 
Pericles, he is still constructing a narrative. Indeed, as discussed earlier (and as specifically noted 
by Pelling 2000: 7), the presentation of pure “facts” with no interpretation whatsoever is 
impossible—the mere act of stringing events together into a narrative introduces authorial 
choice, and thus interpretation.90 Accepting this as true, we may argue that, regardless of whether 
Thucydides’ Pericles is historical, semi-historical, or fictional, he still presents us with his 
version of the Athenian politician. Therefore, while it is obviously important to keep in mind that 
we cannot blindly accept Thucydides’ presentation of Pericles (or other prominent individuals) 
as purely historical, we may in any case undertake a literary analysis of his use of 
characterization in the text, understanding that Thucydides’ authorial choices play a large role in 
                                                 
89 Interestingly, Christodoulou also sees Thucydides as responding in his text to Cratinus’ negative portrayal of 
Pericles (2013: 233). 




shaping the way in which we perceive Pericles, his effectiveness as a leader, and his relationship 
to his city.91 In this strain, we will first move on to discuss the characteristics attributed to 
Pericles in the work that contribute most to his success as an Athenian leader. 
 
The Qualities of Pericles 
Of the Athenian political leaders in Thucydides’ Histories, Pericles is often recognized as 
the most consistently successful, and as having the most positive influence on the polis and its 
policies.92 Vogt (2009: 224) and Raaflaub (2006: 204), for example, both argue that for 
Thucydides, Pericles represents the ideal democratic statesman.93 The grounds on which this is 
claimed are most clearly stated during Thucydides’ brief description of Pericles at 1.139.4, and 
especially during his eulogy of the leader at 2.65, in which Thucydides gives the most extended 
direct character evaluation in his text.94 In the former passage our author briefly introduces the 
                                                 
91 It is in this manner that I will approach all individuals in Thucydides’ text, examining their portrayal through 
Thucydides’ historiographical lens. 
92 This is not to argue that Pericles is necessarily a universally positive figure. Indeed, numerous scholars have 
undertaken to discuss possible flaws in his judgment in the work. For example, Foster is of the opinion that 
Thucydides, knowing that the war would turn out disastrously for Athens, implicitly blames Pericles for his role in 
the outbreak of the war by portraying him as the primary force driving his fellow citizens to into it (2010: 134, 149–
150). Moreover, she claims that Pericles is portrayed as both misrepresenting the Spartans to his Athenian audience 
in Book 1, and as either incorrectly or deceptively evaluating Athenian monetary resources before the war (2010: 
166). Connor also believes that there may in fact be a problem with Pericles’ arguments in favor of the war (1984b: 
41). Hornblower (1991: 341–2) and Taylor (2002: 92) echo the latter point, noting that Pericles’ spending in the 
early years of the war necessitated tribute increases, and that the text therefore questions his financial judgment. 
While these assessments are all valid, I believe that many of them are made with the benefit of hindsight; that is to 
say, scholars see that the war turned out contrary to the Athenians’ expectations, and thus conclude that Pericles’ 
judgment in forcing the city-state into the war was misguided. Such an approach largely ignores Thucydides’ own 
authorial statements concerning Pericles, which often directly contradict such a reading. Moreover, I believe it is not 
inaccurate to state that, even admitting that Pericles made some mistakes during his time as a leader (which he 
surely did), he is nevertheless portrayed consistently as the best, most positive, and most successful Athenian leader 
during the Peloponnesian War. Thus, Pericles does not have to be perfect to be the exemplar of positive leadership 
in the text. 
93 On Thucydides’ approval of Pericles and his leadership of the Athenian populace, see also Nichols, who states 
that “Pericles serves as Thucydides’ model of leadership for free government” 2017: 460), and Parry, who argues 
that Thucydides was very favorable toward Periclean Athens (Parry 1972: 48). 
94 It is interesting to note a further point that Thucydides brings up together with his praise of Pericles: the fickleness 
of the demos. While the people fine Pericles as a result of the harm they suffered from the plague, they elect him as 
general again shortly after. In relating this to us, Thucydides notes: ὕστερον δ᾽ αὖθις οὐ πολλῷ, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὅμιλος 




influence of Pericles, describing him as ἀνὴρ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν 
τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος (“a man who was at that time first of the Athenians, most capable 
both in speaking and acting”; 1.139.4), and in the latter he provides us with a lengthy catalogue 
of Pericles’ positive attributes, as well as a direct comparison with later Athenian leaders.95 
According to Raaflaub, we may identify the following qualities of good leadership from this 
passage: “moderation, intelligence, foresight and thorough knowledge, personal distinction and 
charisma, absolute integrity, respectful firmness in dealing with the demos, lack of excessive 
ambition and thus independence that makes it possible to contradict popular sentiment, courage 
even to provoke anger, disdain of flattery, and psychagogic skills to balance extreme popular 
emotions” (2006: 204–5). Luginbill combines all of these qualities into three categories: the 
perceptive (the ability to form a good plan), the persuasive (the ability to implement this plan by 
persuading others), and the personal (moral and ethical control over himself) (1999: 190). For 
clarity of discussion, I adopt this division for the remainder of this analysis. 
Let us begin with the first of these categories: his perceptive ability. Thucydides’ praise 
for Pericles’ perceptive capacity is most clearly apparent in his emphasis throughout the eulogy 
on the general’s foresight (πρόνοια; 2.65.6).96 It is specifically referenced twice near the 
beginning of the eulogy, when Thucydides tells readers, ἐπειδή τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ 
φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προγνοὺς τὴν δύναμιν. ἐπεβίω δὲ δύο ἔτη καὶ ἓξ μῆνας· καὶ ἐπειδὴ 
                                                 
the mass loves to do—they elected him general and turned all matters over to him …”; 2.65.4). This fickleness 
persists, as the people often become suspicious of leaders (such as Alcibiades) and change their plans under 
persuasion. Indeed, as note by Pelling, the demos is presented as irresponsible, and as requiring strong leadership 
(2000: 22). 
95 Raaflaub (2006: 204) notes that the ability in speaking and acting attributed to Pericles (1.139.4) recalls “the 
heroic ideal of being both a speaker of words and doer of deeds” (Iliad 9.443). 
96 Pericles’ foresight is hinted at even earlier in Book 2, when the Athenians are angry with him after seeing their 
countryside devastated for the second time, and are driven by their current suffering to send ambassadors to Sparta. 
At this point Thucydides tells readers: ὁ δὲ ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὰ παρόντα χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας ἅπερ 
αὐτὸς ἤλπιζε (“but he [Pericles], seeing that they were angry at the present state of affairs and that they were doing 




ἀπέθανεν, ἐπὶ πλέον ἔτι ἐγνώσθη ἡ πρόνοια αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον (“And when the war was 
established, he clearly foresaw the force in it. He lived after this for two years and six months; 
and when he died, still more was his foresight with respect to the war recognized”; 2.65.5–6). 
This foresight, then, was a key part of Pericles’ military wisdom (especially as related to the 
strategy he is said to have proposed) (Gomme 1956: 190).97  
It was also, however, a key element in his ability to maintain political control in Athens. 
During the first Spartan invasion of Attica, for example, the Athenians (and especially the 
Acharnians) desire to march out against the Lacedaemonians, and grow extremely angry at 
Pericles for hindering them: παντί τε τρόπῳ ἀνηρέθιστο ἡ πόλις, καὶ τὸν Περικλέα ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον, 
καὶ ὧν παρῄνεσε πρότερον ἐμέμνηντο οὐδέν, ἀλλ’ ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι, 
αἴτιόν τε σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον πάντων ὧν ἔπασχον (“And the city was stirred up in every way, and 
they held Pericles in anger, and they remembered none of the things he had advised earlier, but 
they censured him because, being a general, he didn’t lead them out [against the Spartans], and 
they considered him to blame for all of the things they were suffering”; 2.21.3). Pericles, 
however, is fully aware of this anger and, foreseeing its possible negative consequences, 
recognizes that the only way to prevent the Athenians from abandoning his plan is not to 
suppress debate of the topic entirely: Περικλῆς δὲ ὁρῶν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν 
χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ οὐ τὰ ἄριστα φρονοῦντας, πιστεύων δὲ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ 
ἐπεξιέναι, ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα, τοῦ μὴ ὀργῇ τι μᾶλλον ἢ 
γνώμῃ ξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν, τήν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε καὶ δι’ ἡσυχίας μάλιστα ὅσον ἐδύνατο 
εἶχεν (“But Pericles, seeing on the one hand that they were angry at the present circumstance and 
that they were not thinking well, and, on the other hand, trusting that he knew rightly concerning 
                                                 
97 Gomme also points out that readers are presented with the importance of foresight in military wisdom in the 




not going out [to meet the Spartans], he did not bring together any assembly of them nor any 
meeting, fearing that they, coming together in anger rather than in a state of good judgment, 
would make some mistake, and he guarded the city and he especially kept it at rest as much as he 
was able”; 2.22.1).98 In this case, then, Pericles’ foresight, though not directly referenced in the 
Greek, is apparent from his ability to recognize the current situation, and based on this 
information, to form a plan that, in the end, successfully allows him to maintain his political 
control and to enforce his military strategy. In essence, then, Thucydides’ Pericles has the 
foresight to realize the limitations of his own persuasive ability. 
This capacity for foresight, however, is not sufficient in and of itself for Pericles to direct 
his state to success. Indeed, as Cassandra teaches us (as well as Nicias later in Thucydides’ 
history), the ability to foresee is useless without the ability to persuade others to follow one’s 
advice. Leadership requires the persuasive capacity, which is the second major ability attributed 
to Pericles. This persuasive ability is first made clear in Book 1 when, before relating Pericles’ 
comments on the Spartan ultimatum shortly before the outbreak of the war, Thucydides tells us 
that the leader was, ἀνὴρ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν 
δυνατώτατος (“a man who was at that time first of the Athenians, most capable both in speaking 
and acting”; 1.139.4). While Pericles has appeared in the text before this, it was only to briefly 
mention his role in the events of the Pentecontaetia. At this point, when readers are introduced to 
the leader as a key player in the narrative, they are led to believe that Pericles was, in fact, the 
most persuasive leader at the time. 
                                                 
98 On the meaning of this passage in terms of Pericles’ (or other generals’) power to prevent assemblies, Classen and 
Steup posit that in dire circumstances (especially in the case of an invasion of Attica), assemblies could only be 
called by the strategoi (1914: 60–1). Rusten, however, states that generals possibly had the power to stop special 
assemblies from meeting and to delay previously scheduled ones, but goes on to say that the passage in question 
could be emphasizing that he refused to allow debate about the issue rather than specifically forbidding any 




The information that is omitted in this passage, however, is just as important to our 
impression of Pericles as Thucydides’ direct description of the leader. Indeed, the narrative 
immediately preceding the notation that Pericles was the most influential Athenian at the time 
very briefly mentions that other speakers addressed the assembly before Pericles: καὶ παριόντες 
ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ ἔλεγον ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα γιγνόμενοι ταῖς γνώμαις καὶ ὡς χρὴ πολεμεῖν καὶ ὡς μὴ 
ἐμπόδιον εἶναι τὸ ψήφισμα εἰρήνης, ἀλλὰ καθελεῖν (“and coming forward many others were 
speaking, being on both sides in their opinions, both [recommending] that it was necessary to 
make war, and that the decree should not be an impediment to peace, but to remove it”; 1.139.4). 
These individuals’ actual speeches are, however, omitted, and their speakers are relegated to 
obscurity by Thucydides’ single sweeping statement. As Gribble notes, this technique of 
suppressing the other speakers’ words and reporting only Pericles’ oration strengthens readers’ 
impression of the dominant role in Athenian policy played by Pericles (2006: 449). Thus, 
Thucydides’ construction of the narrative implicitly supports his direct claim that Pericles was at 
this time first of the Athenians (πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων). As a result, for readers of this passage there 
is never any real threat that Pericles’ advice may be passed over in favor of that given by another 
Athenian speaker: other individuals spoke, but then the speaker who mattered addressed the 
Athenians and the issue was decided. 
This persuasive ability is again on display after the second devastation of the Athenian 
countryside. As we have seen, when this first happened Pericles (apparently correctly) judged 
that the best course of action was to prevent meetings of the assembly from being held. After the 
second invasion, however, even though we see the Athenians yet again direct their anger towards 
Pericles personally, he decides to directly address his countrymen in an effort to convince them 




τοιαῦτα ὁ Περικλῆς λέγων ἐπειρᾶτο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς τε ἐς αὑτὸν ὀργῆς 
παραλύειν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἀπάγειν τὴν γνώμην. οἱ δὲ δημοσίᾳ μὲν 
τοῖς λόγοις ἀνεπείθοντο καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτι ἔπεμπον ἔς τε τὸν 
πόλεμον μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο (2.65.1–2). 
 
By saying such things Pericles tried to detach the Athenians from their anger 
toward him and to lead their thought away from the presently terrible 
circumstances, and publicly they obeyed his words and still did not send to the 
Lacedaemonians and they set themselves more to the war. 
 
Thus, by directly emphasizing the success of Pericles’ rhetoric, and describing the Athenians as 
obeying (ἀνεπείθοντο) him, Thucydides demonstrates that his persuasive ability as capable even 
of overcoming a hostile audience. This is, as we will see shortly, starkly different from 
Thucydides’ depiction of the mode of interaction between later leaders and the Athenian 
populace. 
Particular emphasis is placed on Pericles’ persuasive power in Thucydides’ famous 
eulogy of the leader at 2.65. Indeed, his considerable influence is described in three successive 
sentences with increasing force. First, Thucydides contrasts Pericles’ policy with the Athenians’ 
actions under his successors: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχάζοντάς τε καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν θεραπεύοντας καὶ ἀρχὴν 
μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἔφη περιέσεσθαι· οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε 
πάντα ἐς τοὐναντίον ἔπραξαν … (“For he [Pericles] said that, if they kept quiet and saw to the 
fleet and did not acquire more empire during the war and did not endanger the city, they would 
succeed. But they [his successors] did all these things in the opposite way …”; 2.65.7). As noted 
in the previous chapter, Pericles’ plan as it is characterized in this passage, predicated on 
Athenian restraint (ἡσυχάζοντάς), is not in keeping with the Athenian national character.99 Thus, 
the stark contrast between Pericles’ policy and the behavior of his successors (and the Athenians 
under their leadership) here claimed by Thucydides presents readers with the impression that 
                                                 




Pericles’ persuasive ability was the only thing restraining Athenian ambition, and maintaining 
their observance of his wartime policy. 
Immediately after this point, Thucydides goes on to further discuss the nature and power 
of Pericles’ persuasive ability, which is again sharply contrasted with other leaders of the period: 
αἴτιον δ’ ἦν ὅτι ἐκεῖνος μὲν δυνατὸς ὢν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ χρημάτων 
τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο 
μᾶλλον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὐ προσηκόντων τὴν 
δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονήν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἔχων ἐπ’ ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὀργήν τι ἀντειπεῖν 
(2.65.8). 
 
The reason was that he [Pericles], being powerful both in reputation and in 
judgment, and being clearly most incorruptible by money, held down the mass 
freely, and instead of being led by it he himself led, on account of his not saying 
anything with an eye towards pleasure, acquiring power from unfitting means, but 
being able, based upon his reputation, to say speak against [the mass] angrily. 
 
Yet again Pericles’ ability to persuade “angry” the populace is strongly emphasized.100 First, we 
see that he “held down the mass freely” (κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως). This is, of course, a 
fascinating turn of phrase because of the seemingly mutually exclusive connotations of the words 
κατεῖχε and ἐλευθέρως.101 Indeed, the former term plays a prominent role in the vocabulary of 
tyranny, while the latter plays an important role in the Athenian democratic ideology, as freedom 
is the basis for every citizen’s claim to a share in the polis’ governance.102  
                                                 
100 It is interesting to note that Rusten, in his commentary on Book 2, states that Thucydides’ speaking ability, as 
well as the inability of later politicians to live up to his example, became a commonplace in fourth century literature. 
He goes on, however, to argue that this commonplace pre-existed Thucydides, and that he took it and incorporated 
into his general explanation of Athens’ defeat (1988: 209–11). 
101 The language of this description of Pericles is worth comparing to that of Solon, who, in describing his work for 
Athens, says, κέντρον δ᾽ ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ λαβών, / κακοφραδής τε καὶ φιλοκτήμων ἀνήρ, / οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον (“If 
another man had taken up the goad as I did, both a foolish and greedy man, he would not have held down the 
demos”; fr. 36.20–2). The obvious implication in this quote is that Solon did manage to “hold down the demos.” 
Thus, there appears to be a precedent for describing great Athenian leaders who act with exceptional powers but 
with the consent of their peers in such terms. 
102 For the role of freedom in democratic ideology see, among other passages, Arist. Pol. 3.1280a9–31. Gomme and 
Andrewes (1956a: 192) attempt to resolve the paradoxical nature of this language by translating ἐλευθέρως “without 




The nature of Pericles’ influence, however, is here implicitly presented as different from 
other Athenian leaders. Indeed, Pericles is supremely persuasive, despite the fact that he does not 
gain the favor of the Athenian people by saying what they want to hear, but instead says what 
they need to hear. He is thus depicted as exercising a type of persuasive ability that is 
qualitatively different from that of later Athenian leaders.103 The specific differences underlying 
this comparison are then made explicit shortly after, when Thucydides tells us that οἱ δὲ ὕστερον 
ἴσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρῶτος ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι 
ἐτράποντο καθ’ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι (“but those later, being themselves 
more equal to one another, and each striving after primacy, began, according to pleasure, even to 
entrust matters to the people”; 2.65.10). 
Finally, Thucydides makes his strongest statement about Pericles’ influence and 
persuasive ability at 2.65.9, saying: ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου 
ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή (“And it became on the one hand a democracy in name, but in deed rule by the first 
man”). Thus, readers are left with the impression that Pericles exercises what effectively 
amounts to monarchical (or tyrannical) rule, although he holds this position over a group of free 
individuals who consent (except for one instance in the text, described at 2.65.3–4) to be led in 
such a way.104 In effect, then, this government is no longer a pure democracy, but temporarily 
combines elements of both individual rule and democracy.105 Within this hybrid system, Pericles 
                                                 
103 See, for example, Pericles’ tone in addressing the population after the outbreak of the plague, especially in telling 
them that, if they blame him for unforeseen disasters, they must also give him credit for unforeseen windfalls 
(2.64.1–2). 
104 McGregor (1956: 97) argues that this presentation of Pericles’ power is inconsistent with reality, pointing to the 
continued importance of the assembly in determining matters. This may very well be, but the point only serves to 
draw further attention to the image of the relationship between Pericles and Athens which Thucydides is trying to 
create. 
105 In his examination of the development of the idea of the “mixed constitution,” von Fritz (1975: 80–1) brings up 
Plato’s discussion in the Laws of the benefits of the middle ground between monarchy and democracy, in which an 
individual or small group leads with their wisdom, but the people exercise some control to avoid corruption 




leads by means of his foresight, and the people trust him to act for the good of the state (Balot 
2001: 143). 
This idea of trust brings us to the final category of Periclean attributes: his personal 
integrity. Luginbill (1999: 91) views this quality of Pericles as the most important in 
Thucydides’ estimation, because it differentiates him from all other Athenian leaders, even those 
who enjoy some success such as Themistocles. Indeed, Thucydides goes to great lengths to 
demonstrate the altruism of Pericles’ motivations and his willingness to put the good of the city 
above his own. As mentioned above, he is described by Thucydides as “clearly most 
incorruptible by money” (χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος), and as preferring to speak for the 
good of the city, rather than attempting to preserve his power by saying what his audience wants 
to hear (2.65.8). 
Moreover, Pericles is portrayed as actively endorsing the valuation of the communal 
good below individual advantage (Pelling 1990: 260). Indeed, he makes this position explicit in 
his speech to the Athenians after the plague, when he goes so far as to claim that an individual 
can only do well in a community that prospers:106 
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ καθ’ 
ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἁθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην. καλῶς μὲν γὰρ 
φερόμενος ἀνὴρ τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν διαφθειρομένης τῆς πατρίδος οὐδὲν ἧσσον 
ξυναπόλλυται, κακοτυχῶν δὲ ἐν εὐτυχούσῃ πολλῷ μᾶλλον διασῴζεται. ὁπότε οὖν 
πόλις μὲν τὰς ἰδίας ξυμφορὰς οἵα τε φέρειν, εἷς δ’ ἕκαστος τὰς ἐκείνης ἀδύνατος, 
πῶς οὐ χρὴ πάντας ἀμύνειν αὐτῇ, καὶ μὴ ὃ νῦν ὑμεῖς δρᾶτε (2.60.2–4). 
 
For I think that a whole city that is succeeding benefits the private citizens more 
than when it does well according to individual citizens, but all together is tripped 
up. For on the one hand a man while he is doing well in his own matters is no less 
ruined if the fatherland is ruined, but an unfortunate man in a fortunate city is 
                                                 
ground between oligarchy and democracy (2.1266a1–7). Thucydides’ picture of Athens under Periclean rule may 
prefigure this formulation of a middle ground between rule by a leading man and democracy. Aristotle does, 
however, refer to kingship by consent as a form of government in Book 3 of the Politics (1285a–b). 




much safer. And so since a city is able to provide private benefits, but each 
individual is not able to provide those of that city, how is it not necessary that all 
guard it, and do not do what you now do? 
 
As pointed out by Balot (2001: 142–3), self-sacrifice was key to Athenian success during 
the Persian Wars, and here Pericles calls upon the Athenians to continue to see their own good as 
dependent upon the good of the state. Ober argues that Pericles fully endorses this view, and 
recognizes that the individual can only flourish in a community that does as well (2006: 151). 
Thus, one of Pericles’ defining characteristics in Thucydides’ text is the motivation behind his 
actions: he truly appears to act with the best interests of the state in mind, not for his own 
advantage. 
We can, therefore conclude that Thucydides’ Pericles does possess attributes from the 
three qualities outlined by Luginbill: the perceptive, persuasive, and personal (1999: 150). These 
attributes are, however, very general; that is to say, they present a universally applicable set of 
characteristics for positive leadership. The question then becomes, what about Pericles makes 
him successful in his specifically Athenian context? How does his individual character positively 
impact the collective behavioral tendencies attributed to Athens? The result of such an inquiry 
becomes particularly interesting because, as I will now argue, it is the very fact that Pericles’ 
character does not match the Athenian national character that, in Thucydides’ estimation, makes 
Pericles such an effective leader. Indeed, as noted by Connor (1984b: 62), some Periclean 
attributes are actually at odds with the characterization of Athens; as a result, instead of 
exacerbating the negative behavioral tendencies of his polis, Pericles is portrayed as a 
moderating force. 
The fact that there is something markedly un-Athenian about Pericles’ influence on 




the work, once in a speech attributed to Pericles, and once by Thucydides in his eulogy of the 
politician. In the former instance, Pericles tells his fellow Athenians,  
σκέψασθε δέ· εἰ γὰρ ἦμεν νησιῶται, τίνες ἂν ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν; καὶ νῦν χρὴ ὅτι 
ἐγγύτατα τούτου διανοηθέντας τὴν μὲν γῆν καὶ οἰκίας ἀφεῖναι, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης 
καὶ πόλεως φυλακὴν ἔχειν, καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὀργισθέντας πολλῷ 
πλέοσι μὴ διαμάχεσθαι (1.143.5). 
 
But look, for if we were islanders, who could be harder to overcome? And now it 
is necessary that you, having in mind as near a thing to this as possible, abandon 
your land and homes, and hold guard over the sea and city, and that you not, 
becoming angry over these things [i.e. your land and homes], fight with the much 
more numerous Peloponnesians. 
 
In Pericles’ estimation, it is necessary that the Athenians give up some of the land they 
control to the Peloponnesians (Attica, no less), and to “hold guard” (φυλακὴν ἔχειν) over the city 
and the sea. As we will see, observance of this strategy, requiring the Athenians to hold 
themselves back from their acquisitive ways, requires his countrymen to act counter to their 
established collective behavioral tendencies. 
This disconnect becomes particularly apparent in the parallel Pericles builds between his 
own strategy and the Athenian abandonment of Attica during the Persian Wars. Indeed, he 
describes the previous generation as τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐκλιπόντες (“leaving behind their 
possessions”; 1.144.4).107 If we look back to the Corinthian speaker’s description of the 
Athenians, we note that he uses similar terms when pointing out that they are never happy with 
what they already have, and instead constantly desire more: ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν 
ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι (“least of all do they enjoy what they already have because of 
                                                 
107 Pericles also states that the earlier Athenians pushed back the Persians by their daring (τόλμῃ; 1.144.4), a trait 
also associated with the current generation by the Corinthian speaker (τολμηταὶ; 1.70.3); in the latter context, 
however, Athenian daring was related to their willingness to undertake risky endeavors for gain. Thus, Pericles 
associates a typically Athenian attribute (daring) with his strategy even though, upon examination, we may note that 




their constant engagement in acquisition”). Then again later in the text, Nicias, in his speech 
before the Sicilian expedition, acknowledges the fact that his arguments are unlikely to succeed, 
εἰ τά τε ὑπάρχοντα σῴζειν παραινοίην (“if I should advise you to preserve what you already 
have”; 6.9.3). In fact, the preservation of possessions as a habitual behavior is specifically 
attributed to the Spartans, who are described at 1.70.2 as accustomed τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σῴζειν 
(“to preserve what exists”). Pericles’ advice, then, is much more in line with Spartan national 
character, and thus will not come naturally to his audience.108 
The presentation of Pericles’ war strategy as Spartan in character continues when 
Thucydides restates it at 2.65.7: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχάζοντάς τε καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν θεραπεύοντας καὶ 
ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἔφη περιέσεσθαι (“For he 
said that, both keeping calm and looking after the fleet and not extending their empire nor 
running risks for the city in the war, they would succeed”; 2.65.7). As noted above, this strategy 
of preservation, while praised by Thucydides because for its foresight, fits rather better with the 
text’s characterization of Sparta than with that of Athens. It is Sparta with whom ἡσυχία is 
associated in the text (1.118.2). Athens, on the other hand, is characterized by acquisitiveness, a 
habitual tendency to encroach upon its neighbors (1.69.3), and a strong distaste for anything 
resembling inactivity (1.70.8–9).109 Thus, the first requirement of Pericles’ strategy actually 
relies on the Athenians consistently acting contrary to their collective behavioral tendencies. In 
other words, then, Pericles’ strategy, as depicted by Thucydides, involves the leader temporarily 
                                                 
108 Indeed, we see the Athenians grow angry at the sight of the Peloponnesians devastating their land and openly 
question Pericles’ leadership on multiple occasions (2.21.2–3, 2.59). Moreover, Thucydides explicitly states that his 
successors did the exact opposite of Pericles’ strategy (2.65.7), implying that this strategy was untenable without his 
leadership. Azoulay, however, while acknowledging that Pericles’ approach to the war was hotly contested (2010: 
48), argues that it was in fact observed even after his death, and must therefore have been roughly in line with the 
interests of the citizens (2010: 50). 




altering Athenian character, checking their acquisitiveness. As such, he acts as a moderating 
force.110 
While Pericles does regulate Athenian eagerness for gain, it is important to note that the 
leadership attributed to him is not fully un-Athenian. This point is made explicitly clear when 
Thucydides tells readers: ὁπότε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων 
κατέπλησσεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν 
(“consequently, when he perceived them [the populace] being, contrary to their advantage, 
hubristically overbold in something, by speaking he terrified them to the point of being afraid; 
and again when they were afraid unreasonably he put them back into a state of boldness”; 
2.65.9). While Pericles is capable of checking Athenian acquisitiveness, he is also portrayed as 
just as capable of restoring their spirits when they become overly hesitant. While Pericles’ 
willingness to forsake active conquest is markedly un-Athenian when compared to the polis’ 
collective behavioral tendencies elsewhere in the work, his ability to inspire boldness and action 
is, at the same time, markedly un-Spartan. Thus, Thucydides’ Pericles exists at neither end of the 
spectrum of character occupied by Athens and Sparta, but can instead be found somewhere in the 
middle. This point is of key importance: in Thucydides’ presentation, Pericles is neither too 
Athenian (as this would cause him to bring the weaknesses inherent in Athenian national 
character to the fore), nor too Spartan.111 Instead, he is in Thucydides’ characterization the leader 
that Athens needs because of its tendencies to overreach and to overreact, and the fact that 
Pericles is not fully “Athenian” in his characterization allows him to counterbalance these 
negative tendencies (Connor 1984b: 65). As noted by Balot, “Athens needs a Pericles to make its 
                                                 
110 Just as Thucydides notes about Pericles’ leadership role in peacetime: ὅσον τε γὰρ χρόνον προύστη τῆς πόλεως 
ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ, μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διεφύλαξεν αὐτήν (“And for as long as he was at the head of the city in 
peace, he led it moderately and maintained it safely”; 2.65.5). 




intelligence and courage work in unison” (2001: 147). In effect, then, the character and 
leadership of Pericles combine with the tendencies of democratic Athens to bring about a 
balanced, moderate, and effective system of governance (Pelling 2000: 22).112 
Thus, in Pericles, we may observe the attributes required for positive Athenian 
leadership. As we have seen, however, this combination of qualities and characteristics, which 
allows him to lead Athens away from its weaknesses and toward its strengths, is extremely 
specific in its requirements: the leader needs foresight, persuasive ability, and unselfish 
motivation, and can be neither too Athenian nor too Spartan. Upon examination, such quality of 
leadership appears to be too much to ask for, and is in fact shown in the text itself to be nigh 
unattainable.113 Indeed, as Thucydides explicitly tells readers (and as will be explored in more 
depth in the next two chapters), no Athenian leader after Pericles lives up to his example: οἱ δὲ 
ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τοὐναντίον ἔπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας 
φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἔς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπολίτευσαν, ἃ 
κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς ἰδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μᾶλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν 
πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο (“But they [his successors] did these things all in the opposite way, 
and in other matters that seemed to be extraneous to the war, looking to private ambition and 
private profit, they managed the city badly both for themselves and for their allies. These things, 
if they were successful, were more a source of honor and profit for private citizens, but, if 
unsuccessful, created harm for the city in the war”; 2.65.7).114 Thus, while Periclean leadership 
                                                 
112 See also Vogt (2009: 222), who argues that Thucydides sees in Pericles the harmonious coexistence of the 
Athenian democratic constitution and personal political leadership. 
113 As Johnson Bagby puts it, “Clearly, Thucydides sees Pericles as the exception to the rule in democracy” (2011: 
135). Macleod also argues that only Pericles “could restrain the self-destructive tendencies of a democracy, unreason 
in the people (ii 65.9), irresponsibility and dissension among the leaders (ii 65.8, 10–12)” (1983: 93). 
114 Some scholars, such as Raaflaub (2006: 205) and Azoulay (2010: 155–7) believe that the contrast between 
Pericles and later leaders is exaggerated. I argue, however, that, even if this is the case, Thucydides’ choice to 





represents the specific combination of attributes that Athens needs, the polis cannot actually rely 
on the emergence of such leaders.115 
This point leaves readers in a state of aporia. As was shown in Chapter 1 of this 
dissertation, Athenian national character (which is directly related to its democratic political 
environment) contains both strengths and dangerous weaknesses. This situation leaves room for 
the intervention of exceptional leaders, who can temporarily alter Athenian behavior, and thus 
act as a corrective force. Such leadership is then attributed to Pericles, whom Thucydides 
portrays as the most effective Athenian leader in the work due to his ability to moderate 
Athenian character, and to direct his polis away from its negative tendencies and toward its 
strengths. 
As was mentioned, however, the effect of such leadership is temporary. After Pericles is 
removed from the scene, therefore, the emergence of another such leader is necessary, or Athens 
will revert to its general behavioral tendency of rash acquisitiveness. In fact, we actually see this 
play out in the case of the Periclean war strategy. As mentioned above, this strategy requires that 
the Athenians act in a markedly un-Athenian way—namely, that they give up adding to their 
empire. As noted by Connor (1984b: 61, 63), Luginbill (1999: 138), and Rood (1998: 140–2), it 
thus relies on the intervention of an exceptional leader like Pericles for its observance. As 
Thucydides presents matters, however, Athenian leaders after Pericles abandon his advice 
(2.65.7, given above). Moreover, the narrative built by Thucydides reinforces this point: no 
leaders of Pericles’ quality actually do emerge to fulfill his role of moderating force.116 
                                                 
115 As observed by Orwin, “Rather than focus on the alleged ‘decline of Athens,’ it is probably more sensible to 
emphasize the exceptionality of Pericles” (1994: 28) 
116 This will be argued in the following two chapters. It is also interesting to note Pericles’ idealized view of the 
Athenian democracy—and especially of political deliberation and decision-making in it—presented in the Funeral 
Oration (2.35–46; esp. 2.40.2–5). While Pericles can claim that these processes work well under his leadership, as 




Thus, we are left viewing Athens as a system that relies on the emergence of positive 
leaders characterized by very specific attributes to correct the faults in its character. At the same 
time, however, through his presentation of events Thucydides makes it clear that the emergence 
of such leaders cannot actually be expected. Pericles is unique in his exceptionality, and thus the 
Athenian democracy will lack the presence of a truly moderating force, and will, in general, 
trend toward the behavioral tendencies discussed in Chapter One. 
 
Brasidas as a Force of Moderation 
 From antiquity to modernity, readers of Thucydides’ History have noted Brasidas’ 
exceptionality. He has often been recognized as a Spartan with universally Athenian 
characteristics—a sort of Alcibiades born in Sparta.117 Here I argue, however, that while 
Brasidas is certainly remarkable among Spartan leaders for his energy, daring, speed, and 
speaking ability, a number of passages demonstrate that he remains capable of deploying 
markedly Spartan behaviors, such as hesitation and prudence. Thus we may argue that, as in the 
case of Pericles, Brasidas actually acts as a moderating, corrective force. As such, he both 
corrects the weaknesses specific to his polis’ character, and at the same time maintains its 
strengths. 
 Before going on to discuss the specific combination of “Athenian” and “Spartan” 
qualities that renders Brasidas an effective Spartan leader, however, an important distinction 
must be made concerning what is meant by “good” or “effective” leadership. Scholarly 
discussions of Brasidas as a leader have generally followed two connected—but nevertheless 
different—approaches. First, there has been debate over whether Brasidas, as portrayed in 
                                                 




Thucydides, is a positive figure. This line of analysis is generally concerned with whether or not 
Thucydides presents Brasidas and his actions as praise-worthy, and whether or not he is meant to 
offer readers an imitable, didactic example.118 The second approach, however, is concerned only 
with whether Brasidas is an effective leader for Sparta; that is, whether or not he, as a character, 
is beneficial to his polis. The difference between these two approaches can, in large part, be 
summed up as follows: the first is primarily concerned with the justifiability of the means by 
which Brasidas acts, while the second focuses on the effectiveness of the results. This work’s 
analysis of Thucydides’ characterization of Brasidas will center on the second of these two 
approaches, as it is primarily concerned with how his character complements that of Sparta, and 
thus benefits his polis. Before undertaking this more specific analysis, however, it is appropriate 
to briefly review the debate over the general positivity of Brasidas’ character. 
Opinions on whether Brasidas is or is not an imitable “good leader” have varied widely. 
On the one hand, a great deal of praise and admiration has been heaped on this Spartan 
commander. For example, Thucydides reports that the Amphipolitans honored Brasidas as a hero 
after his death (5.11.1).119 In Plato’s Symposium, Alcibiades compares Brasidas to Achilles: οἷος 
γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐγένετο, ἀπεικάσειεν ἄν τις καὶ Βρασίδαν καὶ ἄλλους (“For such a man as Achilles 
was, one could compare Brasidas and others”; Pl. Smp. 221c). In more modern scholarship, it has 
been argued that, “Brasidas … excelled [all Spartans], if not other Greek generals … in grasp of 
military principles, in energy, enterprise, leadership, in military genius” (Harley 1942: 68; cited 
thus in Wylie 1992: 76). Palmer calls him the “most resplendent” Spartan and the most 
resplendent human being in Thucydides (2015: 65, 78), and goes on to point out that Orwin 
                                                 
118 This approach likely finds its origin in the long-held belief that Thucydides’ history could educate its readers in 
the proper exercise of power. For a response to this view, see Stahl 2003, passim. 




(1994: 79), Finley (1942: 198), and de Romilly (1963 [1942]: 43) all believed that Brasidas was 
the Spartan who best knew how to defeat the Athenians.120 Hornblower recognizes Brasidas as 
one of the war’s few outstanding heroes (1991: 39). Heilke, meanwhile, argues that, in terms of 
realist international relations theory (i.e., acting in a way that benefits his polis’ security 
interests), Brasidas is the best Spartan leader in Thucydides’ history (2004: 127). 
 Despite this positive trend in the historical reception of Brasidas, and the Thucydidean 
passages that appear to directly praise him (e.g. 4.81.2–3, 108.1–3), there is now some 
disagreement over the nature of his character, and whether he is truly a positive figure. One 
primary point of difficulty is the dishonesty that Thucydides directly attributes to Brasidas. 
Indeed, his willingness to lie to break allies away from Athens has been puzzled over a great deal 
in scholarship.121  This discussion is centered around (but not limited to) his (mis)representation 
of his confrontation with the Athenians at Nisaea: καίτοι στρατιᾷ γε τῇδ’ ἣν νῦν [ἐγὼ] ἔχω ἐπὶ 
Νίσαιαν ἐμοῦ βοηθήσαντος οὐκ ἠθέλησαν Ἀθηναῖοι πλέονες ὄντες προσμεῖξαι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς 
νηίτῃ γε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἐν Νισαίᾳ στρατῷ ἴσον πλῆθος ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς ἀποστεῖλαι (“And yet when I came 
to help at Nisaea with this army which I now have, the Athenians, though being more numerous, 
were not willing to engage me, with the result that it is not likely that they will send out a force 
by ship equal to the army in Nisaea”; 4.85.7).  
Brasidas’ version of events, then, has the Athenians declining battle despite 
outnumbering his army. Shortly before this speech, however, Thucydides actually provides an 
account of this confrontation in which he explicitly states that it was the Peloponnesians who 
enjoyed numerical superiority at Megara: λογιζόμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐκείνων στρατηγοὶ μὴ ἀντίπαλον 
                                                 
120 Palmer looks back to Orwin 1994: 79 for the phrase “most resplendent.” 
121 Palmer (2015: 79), Heilke (2004: 126), and Connor (1984b: 132) all bring up Brasidas’ willingness to lie in their 
discussion of his character. Hornblower (1991: 55) also points out that Connor (1984b: 131) isn’t convinced that 




εἶναι σφίσι τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πλείω αὐτοῖς προυκεχωρήκει, ἄρξασι μάχης πρὸς 
πλέονας αὐτῶν ἢ λαβεῖν νικήσαντας Μέγαρα ἢ σφαλέντας τῷ βελτίστῳ τοῦ ὁπλιτικοῦ 
βλαφθῆναι (“and their [the Athenians’] generals, reckoning that the danger was not equal for 
them—after the majority of things had gone favorably for them—if they entered battle against a 
greater number than themselves; either being victorious they would take Megara, or failing they 
would suffer harm to the best of their heavily armed forces …”; 4.73.4). Thus, Thucydides sets 
up a clear juxtaposition between his own version of events and the claims Brasidas makes in his 
speech shortly thereafter, and a reader could reasonably be expected to recognize that his claims 
at Acanthus about Athenian strength and resolve are false: the Athenians did not fail to attack an 
inferior force, but instead declined to engage a numerically superior enemy after having already 
accomplished most of the goals for which they had come. 
After leaving this point to inference, Thucydides later goes on to make the falsity of 
Brasidas’ claims explicit. First, he points out that the northern Greek allies had mistakenly 
underestimated Athenian power when they revolted (4.108.4),122 and then he directly attributes 
this underestimation, at least in part, to Brasidas’ misleading rhetoric: ἅμα δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν 
τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς νεωστὶ πεπληγμένων καὶ τοῦ Βρασίδου ἐφολκὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγοντος, ὡς αὐτῷ 
ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μόνῃ στρατιᾷ οὐκ ἠθέλησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξυμβαλεῖν, ἐθάρσουν καὶ 
ἐπίστευον μηδένα ἂν ἐπὶ σφᾶς βοηθῆσαι (“And at the same time, with the Athenians recently 
defeated in Boeotia, and with Brasidas saying enticing but untrue things, namely that the 
Athenians were not willing to enter battle with him at Nisaea with just his own army, they 
took heart and they believed that no one would come to help against them”; 4.108.5). Thucydides 
directly tells his readers that Brasidas’ claims were “enticing but untrue,” and indeed, as pointed 
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out by Connor, it becomes painfully clear to Athens’ revolted allies by the end of Book 4 that 
none of Brasidas’ claims (especially concerning the Athenians’ unwillingness to defend their 
interests in northern Greece) are true (1984b: 138). 
What to do, then, with a character who is at one point described as possessing virtue 
(4.81.2–3) but who also knowingly lies to get what he wants, is, undoubtedly, a difficult 
question. Scholars have offered numerous possible resolutions to this problem. First, in response 
to the position that all of Brasidas’ promises to the northern Greeks are shown to be false by the 
end of Book 4 (Connor 1984b: 138), Palmer comes to the Spartan general’s defense by arguing 
that this is the result of hindsight, and that Brasidas would not have allowed the northern Greek 
cities that came over to his side to be betrayed (2015: 79). This defense is somewhat conjectural, 
but the text does insinuate that Brasidas’ aims in northern Greece were, at least to some extent, 
different from those of the Spartan leadership at home. For example, Brasidas is portrayed as the 
primary opponent to peace among the Spartans, going so far as to accept the revolt of Mende in 
423 BCE, despite the fact that the Spartans and Athenians had already agreed to an armistice 
(4.123.1–2). This suggests that, had he survived the Battle of Amphipolis, he would likely have 
been unwilling to return control of these poleis to Athens.123  
Even if Brasidas was knowingly lying to the northern Greeks, however, it is unclear 
whether this point would in any way diminish the positivity of his role as a Spartan general. 
First, it must be pointed out that numerous mythic Greek heroes (especially Odysseus) possess a 
certain cunning deceitfulness, and that in such cases this quality is not treated as negative, but 
                                                 
123 On the tension between Brasidas and the Spartan leadership at home, see, for example, 4.108.7: οἱ δὲ 
Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ὑπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ καὶ βουλόμενοι μᾶλλον 
τούς τε ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομίσασθαι καὶ τὸν πόλεμον καταλῦσαι (“But the Lacedaemonians did not attend 
to him in some matters because of envy from the leading men, and in other matters because they preferred to get 
back the men from the island and to end the war”). In arguing for the independence of Brasidas’ plans for this 





rather as an asset. This point may also be applied to later Greek historical figures such as 
Themistocles, who famously uses his cleverness to force the Greeks into battle at Salamis before 
they can withdraw to the Isthmus of Corinth (Hdt. 8.75–6). Cleverness and deception, then, may 
be viewed as positive attributes, so long as they are used in the right context and for the right 
reasons (usually to help one’s friends and/or to hurt one’s enemies). Palmer explores this point in 
the case of Brasidas by referencing a discussion of deception in Plato, where three acceptable 
reasons for lying are given: 
τί δὲ δὴ τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις [ψεῦδος]; πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι 
μίσους; ἆρ᾽ οὐ πρός τε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων, ὅταν διὰ 
μανίαν ἤ τινα ἄνοιαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσιν πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς 
φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται; καὶ ἐν αἷς νυνδὴ [382δ] ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις, 
διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ 
ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν; (Pl. R. 382c). 
 
What about lying in words? When is it useful for someone, so that it is not worthy 
of hatred? Is it not [useful] both against enemies and as a means of prevention for 
those who are called friends, whenever on account of madness or some folly they 
try to do something bad, then does it become useful as a cure? And in the fictions 
we were just now talking about, because we do not know what the truth is 
concerning ancient times, by making the lie as similar to the truth as possible, thus 
do we make it useful? 
 
According to Palmer, the first two conditions of this assessment are met in Brasidas’ case, and 
thus there is not necessarily anything “unjust” about his lie (2015: 70). Indeed, these criteria 
correspond to both Odysseus and Themistocles as well, the former regularly deceiving his 
enemies, and the latter deceiving both his enemies and his friends (who plan to “do something 
bad” by abandoning their position at Salamis to retreat to the Isthmus). We may thus conclude 





 Brasidas’ individual excellence (especially as a general) has also been questioned. Wylie, 
for example, focusing primarily on Brasidas’ abilities as a general, claims that he delayed his 
final attack at Amphipolis too long (Thuc. 5.10), and that, had he faced a more experienced 
general than Cleon (such as Demosthenes), he likely would only have succeeded in getting 
himself killed, and would not have won the battle (1992: 93–5). Moreover, while it has been 
pointed out that Brasidas, in both temperament and martial ability, generally stands in stark 
opposition the Athenian Cleon (who is sent to curb his efforts in Thrace, the two are in fact 
grouped together after their death in their shared opposition to peace (though their individual 
reasons differ; Connor 1984b: 140).124  
The argument has also been made that Brasidas’ military career is not entirely 
outstanding. Indeed, Brasidas is actually involved in a number of unsuccessful Spartan military 
undertakings, such as the battle of Naupactus (where he served as an adviser to Cnemus; 2.85.1), 
the aborted Spartan attempt on the Piraeus (mentioned in the first chapter of this dissertation; 
2.93), and the failed forced landing at Pylos after the Athenians, led by Demosthenes, fortified 
the spot (4.11.4–12.1). In response to this point, however, it can be argued that in each of these 
instances Brasidas played a subordinate role, and thus lacked the autonomy required to fully 
influence Spartan action (Heilke 2004: 125). 
The point has also been made that the role of fortune is emphasized in a number of 
Brasidas’ successful military encounters. For example, he “happened” (ἔτυχε; 2.25.2) to be near 
Methone for his first victory in the war (Heilke 2004: 125). His presence at Megara later in the 
war is described in much the same way: Βρασίδας δὲ ὁ Τέλλιδος Λακεδαιμόνιος κατὰ τοῦτον 
                                                 
124 “Cleon and Brasidas are sharply defined opposites: the one a military man never presented in a political role, the 
other a politician who seems to stumble into military command; one the advocate of violence and terror, the other an 




τὸν χρόνον ἐτύγχανε περὶ Σικυῶνα καὶ Κόρινθον ὤν (“Brasidas son of Tellis, a Lacedaemonian, 
at this time happened to be around Sicyon and Corinth”; 4.70.1). While this emphasis on chance 
could be interpreted as detracting from his own excellence, the counter-argument has been 
proposed that Brasidas possesses the necessary qualities to seize the opportunity when it is 
presented to him.125 
From all of these points we may reasonably conclude that Thucydides makes no 
concerted effort to lead readers to a negative judgment of Brasidas: while his actions may cause 
problems for the Athenians, he is neither a bad person nor a negative exemplum. With that 
having been established, it is now appropriate to move on to a more specific analysis of 
Brasidas’ character and how it compares with that of his polis. 
 
Brasidas the Athenian? 
 That Thucydides’ Brasidas is portrayed as much more Athenian than Spartan has been 
emphasized and repeated a great deal in scholarship.126 Three Brasidean attributes have been the 
primary focus for scholars making this point: his un-Spartan speed, daring, and speaking 
ability.127 Thus, he has often been described as the Athenian Spartan, a man born in the wrong 
                                                 
125 “While his fame or glory may begin with the lucky occurrence of a military encounter, Brasidas possesses the 
necessary qualities for taking hold of happenstance and succeeding. His ‘daring exploit’ wins him the ‘thanks of 
Sparta,’ …” (Heilke 2004: 125). 
126 For instance, Palmer (2015: 65) argues that Thucydides uses key words and themes to portray Brasidas as more 
Athenian than Spartan, and refers back to J. B. Bury, who says both that Brasidas is, “a character more Athenian 
than Spartan, yet with the good qualities of Athens predominant” (1959: 445), and that, “Brasidas was a Spartan by 
mistake” (1958: 350). Connor refers to Brasidas as a “most untypical Spartan” (1984b: 129), and also gives him as a 
prime example (together with Nicias) of individuals whose characterization does not resemble that of their polis 
(1984b: 41). Heilke likens Brasidas to Nicias, in that both are characterized in a way that more closely resembles 
their opposing polis (2004: 124), Wylie calls his behavior un-Spartan (1992: 76), and Strauss calls him “the 
Athenian among the Spartans” (1964: 213). For others, see Luginbill (1999: 116) and Westlake (1968: 148). 
127 “Brasidas is the antithesis of the conventional Spartan leader. Wherever he appears in the narrative of 
Thucydides, there is action, energy and enterprise” (Westlake 1968: 148). Palmer calls him a man of motion from a 
city of rest (2015:77), and Heilke notes that his energy is always contrasted with conventional Spartan cautiousness 
and hesitancy (2004: 125), and goes on to list his peculiar attributes: “Brasidas’ virtues include an ability to speak, 




city whose character more closely resembles that of an Alcibiades than it does that of an 
Archidamus. It will be argued, however, that this position oversimplifies his characterization, 
and that Brasidas actually possesses the positive Athenian qualities, but none of the negative 
ones. Thus, he is not fully Athenian according to the schema applied to the group in Thucydides’ 
history, and serves instead as a figure that can lead the Spartans away from their negative 
tendencies (hesitancy and total risk-aversion), while avoiding the excesses of unchecked 
Athenian acquisitiveness. Before complicating our picture of Brasidas, however, let us briefly 
examine some of the passages that have led scholars to view him as an “Athenian” Spartan. 
 Brasidas’ “Athenian” speed and energy are on full display from his first appearance in the 
work, when he confronts an Athenian force that has landed in the Peloponnese and attacked 
Methone (2.25.1). As Thucydides tells it: 
ἔτυχε δὲ περὶ τοὺς χώρους τούτους Βρασίδας ὁ Τέλλιδος ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιάτης 
φρουρὰν ἔχων, καὶ αἰσθόμενος ἐβοήθει τοῖς ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ μετὰ ὁπλιτῶν ἑκατόν. 
διαδραμὼν δὲ τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον ἐσκεδασμένον κατὰ τὴν χώραν καὶ 
πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος τετραμμένον ἐσπίπτει ἐς τὴν Μεθώνην καὶ ὀλίγους τινὰς ἐν τῇ 
ἐσδρομῇ ἀπολέσας τῶν μεθ’ αὑτοῦ τήν τε πόλιν περιεποίησε καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ 
τολμήματος πρῶτος τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπῃνέθη ἐν Σπάρτῃ (2.25.2). 
 
But Brasidas the son of Tellis, a man who was a Spartiate, happened to be holding 
guard around these areas. And having perceived this he came to help those in the 
place with one hundred hoplites. Having run through the Athenians’ camp, 
which was scattered throughout the land and turned toward the wall, he rushed 
into Methone and, having lost a certain few of those with him in the attack, he 
both preserved the city and, because of this daring act, he first of those in the war 
was praised in Sparta. 
 
Brasidas thus acts with an urgency that would immediately strike readers as at odds with the 
characterization collectively applied to Spartans throughout the work. Indeed, the text 
emphasizes the speed with which Brasidas reacts after learning of what is happening in his 




to his actions the rather Athenian attribute of daring (τολμήματος).128 Indeed, as was extensively 
discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, the Athenians are regularly described as daring 
(τολμηταὶ; 1.70.3), while the Spartans are characterized as resting when they should be active 
(ἡσύχαζον; 1.118.2), and as inactive delayers (μελλητὰς; 1.70.4). We may see, therefore, why 
scholars such as Palmer refer to Brasidas as a man of motion from a city of rest (2015: 77). 
 This contrast between Brasidas and the established Spartan collective character is 
reinforced by the fact that his first appearance occurs shortly after Thucydides’ description of 
Archidamus’ slow march to Attica. In this passage it is revealed that the Peloponnesians wasted 
time (ἐνδιέτριψαν χρόνον) around Oenoe, and that they blamed Archidamus for this (2.18.2–3) 
because he had earned a reputation for slowness; this was due to of the army’s delay (ἐπιμονὴ) at 
the Isthmus and the leisureliness (σχολαιότης) of the march to Attica (2.18.3). Thucydides 
emphasizes the role this hesitation at Oenoe played in creating further antipathy towards 
Archidamus among the Peloponnesian allies, mentioning the delay two more times (ἐπίσχεσις, 
μέλλησιν; 2.18.3, 4). While Thucydides does give reasons for Archidamus holding up the army’s 
advance (he thought the Athenians would give in from the threat of seeing their land harmed; 
2.18.5), the fact remains that the Peloponnesian allies, just like the Corinthian ambassador in 
Book 1, are presented as quite prepared to see Archidamus as just another hesitant Spartan. Thus, 
readers are confronted in rapid succession with Archidamus, a commander who, in his hesitancy, 
seemingly embodies Spartan national character, and then Brasidas, whose speed and daring make 
                                                 
128 It could be argued that, at least in this section, Brasidas’ rapid action is the same reactive speed we have seen 
attributed to the Spartans elsewhere in the work, such as after the Athenians fortify Pylos (see p. 64). I believe, 
however, that the attribution of daring to Brasidas’ action indicates to readers his agency in developing and 
executing this plan, rather than that he was acting un-creatively under force of necessity. Additionally, Brasidas is 
consistently credited with speed, energy, and daring elsewhere in the work, making it clear that he actually possesses 




it immediately clear that he differs in several key ways from general Spartan behavioral 
tendencies.129 
After Brasidas’ victory at Methone, his next several appearances with the Spartan 
military are much less successful.130 For example, he is sent to Cnemus as an adviser before the 
Battle of Naupactus (2.85.1; 429 BCE), and he is present with the Peloponnesian forces that 
plan, but fail to carry out, a daring attack on the Piraeus (2.93.1–3). Throughout these episodes, 
however, it remains the case that Brasidas’ individual behavior stands in stark contrast to that 
associated with the Spartan collective, and to that of his commanding officers. What is more, 
Thucydides makes it clear that this singular Spartan’s characteristic speed would actually have 
had a positive impact on the result of these military undertakings. For example, during the 
revolution at Corcyra, the oligarchic party receives support from a Peloponnesian fleet 
commanded by Alcidas, who has Brasidas with him as an adviser (3.76.1). In the sea battle that 
ensues, the ships sent out by the Corcyraean democratic faction are bested by those of the 
Peloponnesians, and Thucydides tells us that, at this point, the Corcyraeans were afraid that the 
Peloponnesians would follow their victory up with further, more decisive action (3.79.1).131 As 
Thucydides tells us, however, the Peloponnesians did not dare to sail against the city, despite 
their victory at sea (οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν πλεῦσαι κρατοῦντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ; 
3.79.2). Thus, just as the Spartans decline to sail into the Piraeus at 2.93.1–3 and fail to capitalize 
                                                 
129 See Heilke (2004: 125) for more on this specific contrast. 
130 It has been argued that the cause of this reduced level of success is the fact that Brasidas is consistently 
subordinated to other Spartan leaders (Heilke 2004: 125; Palmer 2015: 66).  
131 καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι δείσαντες μὴ σφίσιν ἐπιπλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ὡς κρατοῦντες οἱ πολέμιοι ἢ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς 
νήσου ἀναλάβωσιν ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι νεωτερίσωσι, τούς τε ἐκ τῆς νήσου πάλιν ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον διεκόμισαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν 
ἐφύλασσον (“And the Corcyraeans, fearing that their enemies, since they were victorious, would sail against their 
city and either retrieve the men from the island or attempt some other political change, they brought the men back 




on their success at Euboea much later in the work (8.96.5), here we see the same occur: the 
Spartans lack the daring to press the advantage. 
At the same time, however, Brasidas’ behavior directly contrasts with this depiction of 
the Peloponnesians under the leadership of Alcidas. On the day after the battle, Thucydides tells 
readers that the Peloponnesian forces yet again failed to sail against the city, καίπερ ἐν πολλῇ 
ταραχῇ καὶ φόβῳ ὄντας καὶ Βρασίδου παραινοῦντος, ὡς λέγεται, Ἀλκίδᾳ, ἰσοψήφου δὲ οὐκ 
ὄντος (“although [the inhabitants] were in very great state of confusion and fear, and Brasidas, 
who did not have equal voting power, was advising it, as is said, to Alcidas”; 3.79.3). This 
Spartan delay gives the Athenian fleet that is en route to Corcyra time to arrive, and the 
Peloponnesians are forced to sail home. 
This episode is, then, demonstrative both of a typical pattern of Spartan behavior after 
being victorious, where they fail to turn victory on the battlefield into a decisive strategic victory 
in the war, and of Brasidas’ exceptional character. Indeed, the sole Peloponnesian voice in favor 
of taking immediate action is his, and he is therefore absolved of any guilt for the typical Spartan 
hesitancy and lack of daring that Alcidas here displays. Additonally, by noting that Brasidas did 
not have equal voting power with Alcidas, and was thus his subordinate, Thucydides further 
exonerates Brasidas of any blame for the result of this encounter. 
Brasidas’ energy and daring are next on full display during the failed Spartan attempt to 
force the Athenians from their fortification at Pylos. During this battle, Thucydides tells readers 
that the Spartans attacking from the sea were προθυμίᾳ τε πάσῃ χρώμενοι καὶ παρακελευσμῷ, εἴ 
πως ὠσάμενοι ἕλοιεν τὸ τείχισμα (“using both all eagerness and exhortation, in case somehow by 
pressing forward they could take the fort”; 4.11.3). Brasidas notices, however, that many of the 




Lacedaemonians and their allies, bidding them not to hesitate (ἀποκνῆσαι), and to break up their 
ships and force a landing in any way they can (ὀκείλαντας δὲ καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀποβάντας τῶν τε 
ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ χωρίου κρατῆσαι; 4.11.4). The specific language of delaying used in this passage 
is strongly associated with Spartan behavior in Thucydides, and Brasidas is thus depicted as 
calling upon his compatriots to act contrary to their character.132 He even goes so far as to force a 
landing with his own ship, which results in him being gravely wounded (4.12.1). 
After this defeat Brasidas is absent from the work until 4.70, when he appears near 
Megara and subsequently becomes the center of the narrative until his death. Indeed, Hornblower 
describes 4.70–5.24 as Brasidas’ “time of glory,” and, moreover, as his aristeia (1991: 41). 
Throughout this extended description of Brasidas’ exploits in northern Greece, Thucydides 
continues to emphasize his characteristic speed, daring, and speaking ability. Let us briefly 
examine some important passages that demonstrate the continued consistency of this 
characterization. 
For example, when Brasidas first sets out on his expedition to northern Greece, his path is 
blocked by a group of Thessalians who claim he is acting unjustly by passing through their 
territory without permission (4.78.3). Brasidas displays his speaking ability by persuading them 
that he means them no harm (4.78.4), and as soon as the Thessalians depart, Thucydides 
                                                 
132 Words based on this delaying root (ὄκνος) appear in the work most often to describe Spartan behavior, or in 
speeches given by others in which they advise Sparta not to delay: at 1.120.3–4 the Corinthian ambassador at the 
final council before the war advises the Spartans not to hesitate to go to war; at 1.142.9 Pericles claims the Spartans’ 
lack of naval experience will make them more hesitant to face the Athenians; at 3.30.4 an Elian speaker advises the 
Peloponnesian forces under Alcidas to sail to Mytilene as quickly as possible, and that they should not shrink 
(ἀποκνήσωμεν) from danger (but Alcidas doesn’t listen and simply sails back home); at 4.55.2 the Spartans are 
described as becoming “more hesitant” (ὀκνηρότεροι) after their loss at Pylos; at 6.92.5 Alcibiades advises the 
Spartans not to hesitate to go on campaigns to Attica and Sicily; and at 8.12.1 Alcibiades urges the Spartans not to 
hesitate after their loss at Spiraeum in 411 BCE. In a few other cases hesitation is given as a specifically un-
Athenian behavior: at 2.40.3, in his funeral oration, Pericles says that consideration of risk makes others delay, but 
not Athenians; and at 7.21.4 Hermocrates tells the Syracusans that the Athenians use their daring as a weapon and 
that they fare worse against opponents who use equal daring, and thus encourages his fellow Syracusans not to delay 
to engage them. Finally, it is interesting to note that at 7.49.4 Nicias (who will be discussed further in Chapter 3) is 




emphasizes Brasidas’ speed in proceeding on to meet Perdiccas: ἐχώρει οὐδὲν ἐπισχὼν δρόμῳ 
(“He went on at a run, delaying not at all”; 4.78.5).133  
We again hear of Brasidas’ energy and daring shortly after this exploit, when Thucydides 
describes him as the force behind this expedition and as an active Spartan: αὐτόν τε Βρασίδαν 
βουλόμενον μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπέστειλαν ... ἄνδρα ἔν τε τῇ Σπάρτῃ δοκοῦντα δραστήριον 
εἶναι ἐς τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐξῆλθε πλείστου ἄξιον Λακεδαιμονίοις γενόμενον (“The 
Lacedaemonians sent out Brasidas, who was himself especially wishing it … a man who in 
Sparta seemed to be active in all things, and who, when he went out, was of very great value to 
the Lacedaemonians”; 4.81.1). Brasidas is, then, according to Thucydides, the one who pushes 
the normally hesitant Spartans into undertaking this expedition, which requires significantly 
more daring than their usual invasions of Attica. Moreover, he is identified as the right man for 
the job, as he is explicitly described as active in all things (δραστήριον ... ἐς τὰ πάντα). As noted 
by Hornblower (1991: 46), the word δραστήριος only occurs one other time in Thucydides’ 
work, and that is in Pericles’ post-plague speech to the Athenians. In this passage, Pericles 
attempts to convince his audience not to give up the war effort or their empire, and advises 
against inaction: τὸ γὰρ ἄπραγμον οὐ σῴζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγμένον, οὐδὲ ἐν 
ἀρχούσῃ πόλει ξυμφέρει, ἀλλ’ ἐν ὑπηκόῳ, ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν (“For inaction is not preserved 
unless it is arranged with activity, nor is it beneficial in a ruling polis to serve safely, but it is 
[beneficial] in a subservient one”; 2.63.3).134 In a way, then, activity is given as the necessary 
counter to inactivity in both cases: Pericles calls for a necessary balancing of inaction with 
activity, while Brasidas, as an individual, counters traditional Spartan inactivity with his 
                                                 
133 See, for example, Heilke 2004: 126 on this episode. Hornblower (1996: 42) also mentions that this passage is full 
of the language of speed. 




energy.135 Thucydides further inserts a subtle point of judgment on the usefulness of Brasidas’ 
energy, noting that he was of very great value to the Lacedaemonians (πλείστου ἄξιον 
Λακεδαιμονίοις γενόμενον).136 And finally, we may note that it was when he went out (ἐπειδὴ 
ἐξῆλθε) that Brasidas fully demonstrated his value to his polis. Compare this to Book 1, in which 
the Corinthian speaker claims that the Spartans fear that they will harm their interests by being 
away from home (ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι; 1.70.4), an attitude that is 
confirmed time and again by leaders such as Alcidas who are always eager to get back to the 
safety of the Peloponnese (3.31). We may therefore conclude that Brasidas strongly contrasts 
with traditional Spartan character in this passage’s brief but significant description of his 
initiative, energy, and daring. 
These “Athenian” qualities of Brasidas continue to be highlighted as long as he remains 
as a character in the history. After reaching Thrace (and having a disagreement with Perdiccas), 
he sets out to Acanthus immediately (εὐθὺς; 4.84.1), and once there he gives a speech by which 
he convinces the Acanthians to come over to the Spartan side in the war. Indeed, it is at this point 
that Thucydides explicitly notes Brasidas’ speaking ability, saying that he “was not without skill 
                                                 
135 Just before his comments on the necessity of activity, Pericles warns his audience of the dangers of giving up 
their empire, and tells them not to listen to those who advise them to give it up in favor of inactivity (ἀπραγμοσύνῃ). 
In doing this, he states that such people, if they convince others to follow suit, would most swiftly ruin the city 
(τάχιστ’ ἄν τε πόλιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑτέρους τε πείσαντες ἀπολέσειαν; 2.63.3). The similarity of this statement to 
Alcibiades’ statements before the Sicilian expedition must be noted. There, Alcibiades makes the following claim: 
παράπαν τε γιγνώσκω πόλιν μὴ ἀπράγμονα τάχιστἀ ἄν μοι δοκεῖν ἀπραγμοσύνης μεταβολῇ διαφθαρῆναι, καὶ τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων ἀσφαλέστατα τούτους οἰκεῖν οἳ ἂν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἤθεσι καὶ νόμοις, ἢν καὶ χείρω ᾖ, ἥκιστα διαφόρως 
πολιτεύωσιν (“And I recognize absolutely that a city that is not inactive would seem to me most quickly to be ruined 
by a change to inactivity, and that, of men, they live most safely who govern least of all differently from their 
customs and laws, even if they are inferior”; 6.18.7). Thus, both leaders (using very similar terminology) advise the 
Athenians not to suddenly become inactive. At the same time, however, an important difference must be noted: 
while Alcibiades uses this argument to convince the Athenians to expand their reach into Sicily, and thus directs 
Athenian energy toward further acquisitiveness (exactly in line with their national character), Pericles’ rhetoric is 
focused on directing the Athenians not to give up what they already have. Moreover, Pericles nowhere attempts to 
identify inaction as patently un-Athenian, but instead simply proposes that it must be properly matched with activity. 
For more on this Alcibiades passage and its relationship to Athenian national character, see Chapter 1 (pp. 49–50) 
and Chapter 4 (pp. 247–8). 
136 Heilke argues that Brasidas is the best Spartan leader in terms of realist international relations theory (the leader 




in speaking, for a Lacedaemonian” (ἦν δὲ οὐδὲ ἀδύνατος, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιος, εἰπεῖν; 4.84.2). 
Then, his speed is on display when he rushes (ὥρμησε) up to Amphipolis (4.103.2), and yet 
again when he suddenly (ἄφνω) crosses a nearby bridge, throwing the Amphipolitans into a 
tumult (θόρυβον) (4.104.1). 
After Amphipolis, Brasidas’ journey to Eion is described as happening suddenly (ἄφνω), 
although this undertaking fails to take the city (4.107.2). Then, at 4.108, Thucydides relates the 
reaction of Athens’ northern allies to recent developments in Thrace: they are more willing to 
take risks, and thus to attempt to free themselves of Athenian rule, “because, for the first time, 
the Lacedaemonians were acting with urgency” (τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίων ὀργώντων; 4.108.6). 
The cause of this change in Spartan behavior, and thus of the allies’ newfound trust and 
confidence in the Spartans, is Brasidas.137  
The language of speed is present yet again in Thucydides’ description of Brasidas’ attack 
on Torone: when the he saw the gates were open, he “ran at a swift pace” (ἔθει δρόμῳ; 4.112.1) 
and, once inside, he immediately (εὐθὺς) made a move against the upper part of the city 
(4.112.3). After this Brasidas addresses the Toroneans, and by repeating many of the comments 
he made previously at Acanthus he convinces his audience to ally themselves with Sparta 
(4.114.3–5). This passage reinforces the strength of his speaking ability, mentioned earlier at 
4.84.2. Then, when Brasidas moves against the Athenian garrison on the outskirts of the city at 
Lecythus after the expiration of a two-day truce, he sees some of the Athenians start to abandon 
their posts, charges forward, and takes the place immediately (εὐθὺς; 4.116.1). 
                                                 
137 This contrast between Brasidas’ behavior and the general Spartan tendency to act with extreme caution is 
strengthened almost immediately afterwards, when Thucydides relates that Brasidas sent back to Sparta for 
reinforcements, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ὑπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ καὶ 
βουλόμενοι μᾶλλον τούς τε ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομίσασθαι καὶ τὸν πόλεμον καταλῦσαι (“but the 
Lacedaemonians paid him no mind, partly because of the envy of their chief men, and partly because they preferred 




Although a complete catalogue of the passages that display Brasidas’ Athenian qualities 
would be much longer, the episodes discussed above are sufficient to demonstrate that the 
language of speed, energy, and daring is routinely associated with Brasidas in Thucydides’ 
history. Observing the strength of this connection, we may easily understand why Brasidas has 
commonly been referred to as the “Athenian Spartan.” Yet there remains a further element of 
Brasidas’ characterization that must be discussed, and which is most apparent in the way 
scholars discuss Brasidas’ “Athenian” character. Palmer (2015: 65), for example, quotes Bury’s 
claim that Brasidas is “a character more Athenian than Spartan, yet with the good qualities of 
Athens predominant [emphasis added]” (1959 [1900]: 445). Palmer himself picks up on this 
point, arguing that, while Brasidas is Athenian rather than Spartan in character, he is actually 
among the most outstanding Athenians (2015: 77). These scholars’ observations, however, lead 
us to an important question: if an individual displays only the good qualities associated with 
Athens, is he actually purely Athenian? As I have demonstrated in this dissertation, the national 
character attributed to Athens in Thucydides’ history actually contains both positive and negative 
attributes.138 Brasidas, then, cannot be purely Athenian if, as these scholars argue, he embodies 
only the polis’ positive characteristics. In fact, while—as we just saw—Brasidas is certainly 
daring, speedy, and energetic (all Athenian qualities), there are also key episodes in the text 
where Thucydides demonstrates Brasidas’ more Spartan ability to control this energy, wait, and 
use inaction to his advantage. As a result, Brasidas’ energy and daring are restrained in a way 
that separates him from the Athenian model of uncontrolled (and possibly self-harming) 
acquisitiveness. 
                                                 




This Brasidean moderation appears prominently in a number of episodes in Thucydides’ 
history (often immediately preceding or following displays of his speed and daring). For 
example, he displays a unique combination of energy, daring, and caution in Thucydides’ 
description of the action around Megara and Nisaea in 424 BCE. Indeed, while the language of 
speed is associated with Brasidas in this passage (he bids the Euboeans to come κατὰ τάχος, 
“swiftly” (4.70.1); he moves up to the city πρὶν ἔκπυστος γενέσθαι, “before being discovered” 
(4.70.2)), when he actually lines his forces up against the Athenians he keeps still (ἡσύχαζον; 
4.73.1) and waits for his opponents to make the first move.139 Thucydides’ use of the verb 
ἡσυχάζω creates a link between Brasidas’ behavior in this passage and the established Spartan 
tendency to avoid combat wherever possible.140 Brasidas, then, after having leveraged his speed 
and daring to put him in a position of strength outside Megara, follows this up by using Spartan 
hesitation to his advantage. Indeed, his gambit is successful and the Athenians withdraw, 
granting him a bloodless victory.141 In this passage, then, Brasidas displays a restrained energy, 
which allows him to be in the right place at the right time and to seize the advantages and 
opportunities that are present, but which also allows him to avoid taking undue risks.142 
Brasidas’ restraint is addressed again shortly after this passage, at 4.81.2. There, 
immediately following a reference to Brasidas’ energy and its usefulness to normally hesitant 
Sparta (4.81.1), Thucydides turns around and discusses his moderation, and its important role in 
his effectiveness: τό τε γὰρ παραυτίκα ἑαυτὸν παρασχὼν δίκαιον καὶ μέτριον ἐς τὰς πόλεις 
                                                 
139 Thucydides reports that he does this because he recognizes that it is possible for him to be victorious without 
engaging the Athenians in battle (4.73.2). 
140 For example, at 1.118.2 the author accuses the Spartans of keeping quiet before the outbreak of the war 
(ἡσύχαζόν τε τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου) while the Athenians increased their power. See Ch. 1, pp. 38–40 and 58–9 for 
more on this passage and its relationship to Spartan national character. 
141 His combination of swift action and then rest in front of Megara so effectively shifts the burden of risk to the 
Athenians that they actually keep quiet (ἡσύχαζον; 4.73.4) in response, and then withdraw. 




ἀπέστησε τὰ πολλά, τὰ δὲ προδοσίᾳ εἷλε τῶν χωρίων (“For immediately, after presenting himself 
as just and moderate to the cities, he caused many places to revolt, and other places he took by 
betrayal; 4.81.2)”. Thucydides then goes on to cite Brasidas’ virtue (ἀρετὴ) and understanding 
(ξύνεσις) as creating a lasting pro-Spartan attitude among the Athenian allies (4.81.2–3). Thus 
readers are informed that Brasidas, despite his energy and personal desire to undertake this 
expedition, maintains at least the appearance of restraint, and that his moderation is just as much 
of an asset as his energy.143 Yet again, then, Brasidas deploys the best Athenian qualities 
(energy) alongside the best Spartan ones (restraint). 
At 4.83.2 we may observe Brasidas continuing in his role as a restraining figure: after his 
forces join those of Perdiccas in northern Greece and begin their march into the territory 
controlled by Arrhabaeus, Brasidas tries to engage the enemy diplomatically before initiating 
open hostilities: Βρασίδας λόγοις ἔφη βούλεσθαι πρῶτον ἐλθὼν πρὸ πολέμου Ἀρραβαῖον 
ξύμμαχον Λακεδαιμονίων, ἢν δύνηται, ποιῆσαι (“Brasidas said that, before war, he wished, if 
possible, to go and make Arrhabaeus an ally of the Lacedaemonians”; 4.83.2). He again chooses 
to leave open the possibility of accomplishing his goals without conflict, despite Perdiccas’ 
insistence that he invited Brasidas north as a destroyer (καθαιρέτην) of his enemies, not as a 
judge of their differences (δικαστὴν … τῶν σφετέρων διαφορῶν; 4.83.5).  
                                                 
143 As one might expect, this passage has been discussed a great deal. Connor (1984b: 131) claims that it is neither 
an encomium nor criticism of Brasidas, but rather that it simply stresses his importance. I disagree, and feel that it 
plays a primary role in establishing exactly how he was so useful to the Spartans as a leading figure. Palmer (2015: 
69), on the other hand, lends much more weight to this passage, and points out just how rarely virtue (ἀρετή) is 
attributed to someone in Thucydides: only Brasidas, the Peisitratids (6.64.5), Nicias (7.86.5), and Antiphon (8.68.1) 
are directly associated with this trait. Additionally, he emphasizes the importance of Thucydides’ description of 
Brasidas as μέτριον, which he says has the specific nuance of calculated moderation, and is generally reserved for 
Athenians. The term for virtuous moderation, he argues, is instead σωφροσύνη, which is attributed almost entirely to 
Spartans, with the exception of Nicias (4.28.5). Thus, he believes the terminology used here to describe Brasidas is 
key to understanding his character as an Athenian Spartan. I argue, however, that the direct attribution of virtue 
(ἀρετή) to Brasidas in this passage and the description of Pericles as governing moderately (μετρίως) in Book 2 




Then, at 4.103–5 (the capture of Amphipolis), Thucydides again returns to his technique 
of depicting Brasidas’ energy and speed right alongside his ability to restrain himself and use 
moderation. Let us briefly trace the sequence of events in this passage, and then move on to a 
discussion its implications. As noted above, his speed in rushing up to Amphipolis is emphasized 
(103.2), as well as the suddenness of his arrival and the confusion this caused in the city (104.1). 
When Brasidas actually gets right up to the city, however, he stops, and his troops plunder the 
countryside. Of this development, Thucydides reports the following: καὶ λέγεται Βρασίδαν, εἰ 
ἠθέλησε μὴ ἐφ’ ἁρπαγὴν τῷ στρατῷ τραπέσθαι, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς χωρῆσαι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, δοκεῖν ἂν 
ἑλεῖν (“And it is said that it seems like Brasidas, if he had been willing not to turn himself to 
plunder for his army, but [had been willing] to go straight to the city, would have taken it”; 
4.104.2). In fact, he had arranged with some in the city to betray it to him, but they are prevented 
from doing this, and therefore Brasidas remains outside (4.104.3). Then, afraid of the approach 
of Athenian support (led by Thucydides), he offers moderate terms (τὴν ξύμβασιν μετρίαν; 
4.105.2), and is received into the city before Athenian relief can arrive (4.106). 
This passage has offered some difficulty to scholars, as some have found fault with 
Brasidas’ hesitation outside of the city (noted above), considering it a blunder.144 If this is true, 
then this episode is actually an example of Spartan hesitancy expressing itself in Brasidas’ 
behavior. Others, however, have come up with various reasons why it made perfect sense for 
Brasidas and his men to stop and plunder, either arguing that they needed food after a rapid, long 
march to Amphipolis (Palmer 2015: 71; Gomme 1956: 577), or that this city, walled and 
opposing surrender, would not have been so easy to capture, especially by Spartans who were 
notoriously bad at siege-warfare (Wylie 1992: 82). 
                                                 




First, if Brasidas’ failure to immediately attack Amphipolis was in fact a blunder, we 
must note that it is not depicted as a very costly one: it costs no one their lives, and Brasidas is 
still able to break the city away from its alliance with Athens before the arrival of Thucydides 
and his relief forces. Moreover, his moderation is actually what allows him to win the favor of 
the Amphipolitans and thus to capture the city, leaving it difficult to actually condemn his 
restraint. Additionally, we must recognize that Thucydides takes no personal responsibility for 
the claim that Brasidas could have taken the city if he had acted immediately, but instead reports 
it only as something that “is said” (λέγεται). Even the actual claim he reports is not very strong: 
the people who take this position say only that, “it seems like Brasidas … would have taken it” 
(Βρασίδαν … δοκεῖν ἂν ἑλεῖν). Thucydides therefore does not present Brasidas’ hesitation as a 
blunder, but only reports that some people think that, because he marched so quickly and took 
Amphipolis by surprise, he could have taken it by force if he so chose.  
The narrative, however, makes it clear that his plan was never to assault the city; just as 
at Megara, Brasidas preferred, if possible, to achieve his goals while avoiding violence. Indeed, 
he had originally arranged for Amphipolis to be handed over to him by parties within the city. 
When this doesn’t work, he instead offers moderate terms and gains entry before Athenian 
reinforcements can arrive. Thus, he yet again achieves victory without any protracted struggle, 
utilizing instead his restraint and moderation. In this passage, then, we see Brasidas’ energy and 
speed in his march up to the city, his acquisitiveness in wanting to transfer another Athenian ally 
to the Peloponnesian camp, and yet, in the actual capture of Amphipolis, his willingness, when 
appropriate, to act with restraint and moderation. As such, while his conquest of Amphipolis is 
not strictly a military success, it is his greatest achievement, and causes a great deal of harm to 




with cities like Amphipolis actually bring him further success: his perceived fair treatment of the 
poleis that have already revolted causes others in northern Greece to want to come over to his 
side as well, and inspires fear in the Athenians.145 
As a final example, we may yet again observe Brasidas’ ability to restrain his energy and 
acquisitiveness in the campaign he undertakes with Perdiccas following Mende’s revolt. After an 
initial victory in Lyncus, Perdiccas and Brasidas disagree on the best course of action: ἔπειτα ὁ 
Περδίκκας ἐβούλετο προϊέναι ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ Ἀρραβαίου κώμας καὶ μὴ καθῆσθαι, Βρασίδας δὲ τῆς 
τε Μένδης περιορώμενος, μὴ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρότερον ἐπιπλευσάντων τι πάθῃ, καὶ ἅμα τῶν 
Ἰλλυριῶν οὐ παρόντων, οὐ πρόθυμος ἦν, ἀλλὰ ἀναχωρεῖν μᾶλλον (“Then Perdiccas wished to 
advance against the villages of Arrhabaeus and not to sit still, but Brasidas, anxiously 
considering Mende, [fearing] that it would suffer if the Athenians should sail against it before [he 
got back], and at the same time because the Illyrians were not present, was not eager [to 
advance], but instead to go back”; 4.124.4). 
In this passage (similar to 4.83.2) it is Perdiccas who pushes for relentless (and possibly 
reckless) conquest, while Brasidas worries about Mende, and wishes to go back and try to 
prevent its being retaken by the Athenians. He is therefore portrayed in this instance as wishing 
not to be away from the cities he has conquered, and to preserve what he already has. This 
description is remarkably similar to that of the Spartans discussed in Chapter One, who are 
                                                 
145 καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐφοβοῦντο μὴ ἀποστῶσιν. ὁ γὰρ Βρασίδας ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μέτριον ἑαυτὸν παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐν 
τοῖς λόγοις πανταχοῦ ἐδήλου ὡς ἐλευθερώσων τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐκπεμφθείη. καὶ αἱ πόλεις πυνθανόμεναι αἱ τῶν 
Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι τῆς τε Ἀμφιπόλεως τὴν ἅλωσιν καὶ ἃ παρέχεται, τήν τε ἐκείνου πραότητα, μάλιστα δὴ 
ἐπήρθησαν ἐς τὸ νεωτερίζειν, καὶ ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν κρύφα, ἐπιπαριέναι τε κελεύοντες καὶ βουλόμενοι 
αὐτοὶ ἕκαστοι πρῶτοι ἀποστῆναι (“And they [the Athenians] feared that the allies would revolt. For Brasidas both 
showed that he was moderate in other matters, and in his speeches everywhere he made it clear that he had been sent 
out to free Greece. And the cities that were subjects of the Athenians, learning of the capture of Amphipolis and the 
terms that were offered, and his mildness, were extremely stirred to revolt, and they secretly sent heralds to him, 





regularly identified as eager to preserve what they already have (ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε 
σῴζειν; 1.70.2). At the same time, Brasidas differs from the Athenian propensity for constant, 
uninterrupted acquisition (1.70.3–4, 7–9), leaving that role to Perdiccas. Thus, even though he 
fails to reach Mende in time to save it from the Athenians, Thucydides directly attributes a 
Spartan attitude to him here, as he is eager to preserve rather than to acquire.146 Moreover, even 
if we consider his decision to go on this expedition in the first place a mistake caused by reckless 
acquisitiveness, since he leaves Mende and Scione behind to be recaptured by Athens, there 
remains a key difference between Brasidas’ risk-taking and that associated with Athens: when 
Brasidas takes risks, it is either with his own life (his attack on Pylos at 4.12.1), or with the well-
being of former Athenian allies. As a result, Brasidas does not put Spartan interests at risk, but 
instead endangers himself or others in situations that could benefit his city-state. Athens, on the 
other hand, takes risks beyond her power (1.70.3), which sometimes results in great harm to 
Athens herself and her military forces.147 
From all of these passages, it becomes clear that Brasidas is not as easy to label as some 
have argued. While he certainly does prominently display “Athenian” qualities on a great many 
occasions, and is thus much more “Athenian” than any other Spartan figure in the work, there are 
also a number of instances in which he behaves in a markedly “Spartan” way. At the same time, 
however, Brasidas never exhibits the negative attributes associated with either polis. Thus, he is 
fast, energetic, and willing to take risks, but he never overextends himself to the point that he 
endangers Spartan interests; at the same time, he can be cautious, but is not so hesitant as to miss 
opportunities when they present themselves. Based on these observations, we may argue that 
                                                 
146 There is also a certain similarity between Brasidas’ attitude in this passage and Pericles’ strategy for the war, in 
which he encourages the Athenians to give up some of their possessions to preserve their empire (1.143.5, 144.4). 




Brasidas, while exceptionally Athenian in many ways, actually serves as a force of moderation: 
he drives the chronically hesitant and slow Spartans to act with speed and energy, but can, when 
appropriate, deploy Spartan judgment and hesitation to his advantage. 
As in the case of Pericles and Athens, however, Thucydides clearly takes the position that 
leaders possessing this Brasidean combination of qualities required to effectively lead Sparta are 
not easy to come by. While he is alive and playing a role in the work, Brasidas is directly or 
indirectly compared numerous times to Spartan leaders such as Archidamus, Alcidas, and 
Cnemus, all of whom lack his energy and daring. Moreover, after his death, the Spartans very 
quickly abandon Brasidas’ plans in the north and make peace. In fact, when the Spartan 
Ramphias—who had been leading reinforcements north—hears that Brasidas has died, he turns 
back because he thinks his opportunity has passed, and because he thinks he and his forces are 
not capable of doing what Brasidas had planned (5.13.1) It is not until the arrival in Sparta of an 
actual Athenian, Alcibiades, that the Lacedaemonians become active again.148 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have examined the characterizations of two prominent individuals in 
Thucydides’ history: Pericles and Brasidas. While certain abilities such as foresight and 
rhetorical skill are associated with both of them (and thus with effective leadership), I have 
argued that Thucydides implicitly expresses a much more complicated set of requirements for 
good leaders, one that depends on the collective behavioral tendencies of the polis in which said 
leader exists. Thus, the role of positive leadership in Thucydides’ history is not simply to be 
                                                 
148 This is not, of course, to argue that the Spartans cease all activity between the establishment of peace and the 
arrival in Sparta of Alcibiades; indeed, they win a key battle at Mantinea in 418 BCE (5.66–74). They do, however, 
become much more reactive, focusing on maintaining their own security in the Peloponnese in the face of shifting 




persuasive or to have generally good judgment, but to successfully utilize a city-state’s 
characteristic strengths while at the same time directing it away from its inherent weaknesses. 
Based on this model, a leader from a city such as Athens, which possesses the advantages of 
energy, innovation, and daring, but which also has a tendency to overreach and thus to do itself 
harm, must have just the right combination of energy and restraint in order to act as a moderating 
force. Enter Pericles, who attempts to channel (and even redefine) Athenian daring into 
preserving their empire in the face of Peloponnesian resistance, while at the same time 
restraining the Athenian urge to actively add to its empire. The requirements of a Spartan leader, 
on the other hand, are nearly the opposite, because the polis is shown throughout the work to be 
prudent but excessively hesitant, and cautious to the point of missing key opportunities.149 
Brasidas’ role, therefore, is to bring energy, speed, and daring to Sparta while maintaining an 
appropriate amount of cautiousness and prudence. 
The requirements for positive leadership, therefore, are quite specific: each polis, with its 
unique set of behavioral tendencies, requires a certain type of leader with the correct 
combination of “Athenian” and “Spartan” character traits to complement its strengths and correct 
its weaknesses. At the same time, however, by portraying the leadership that appears in Athens 
and Sparta after Pericles and Brasidas as consistently of an inferior quality (however ahistorical 
this image may be), Thucydides makes it clear that the emergence of such leaders cannot actually 
be relied upon.150 Therefore, he leaves readers with the following picture of the dominant Greek 
                                                 
149 See, for example, their aborted plan to sail into the Piraeus at 2.93.4, their failure to follow up their victory at 
Corcyra with further action (3.79.1–3), and Thucydides’ seemingly scathing critique of Spartan hesitancy after their 
victory at Euboea (8.96.4–5). 
150 For a discussion of whether Pericles was actually as different his Athenian successors as Thucydides claims, see 
Azoulay 2010: 157, 162. The next chapter will focus on Thucydides’ description of leaders who fail to live up to the 
Periclean and Brasidean examples. Speaking in general terms, however, we may note 2.65.10, where it is explicitly 
stated that the Athenian leaders after Pericles were not able to control the demos, and 5.13.1, where the Spartan 




city-states of his time: both Athens and Sparta need leaders such as Pericles and Brasidas to 
correct the flaws existing in their respective national characters, but neither of them can actually 
rely on the emergence of such leaders. It is the leaders who actually do emerge—those whose 






CHAPTER III.  
Thucydides on Ineffective Leadership 
 In this chapter I turn to an examination of several leaders who Thucydides portrays as 
failing to live up to the context-specific requirements of effective leadership established in the 
previous chapter. This is, however, not to say that all of these individuals are failed generals, or 
poor planners or public speakers, or even universally unsuccessful—indeed, all of them 
experience at least limited success during their careers. My commentary in this chapter, however, 
as in the last, focuses not on absolute skills or attributes, but rather on how a leader’s individual 
character and behavioral patterns interact with those of the polis he attempts to lead, and how he 
will thus affect its behavior in the long-term. 
 For this analysis, I will discuss Demosthenes, Cleon, and Nicias from Athens, and several 
Spartan kings and generals (such as Archidamus, Alcidas, Cnemus, and Agis II).151 In so doing, I 
will demonstrate that Thucydides portrays each in such a way as to demonstrate that his 
characteristic behaviors make him ill-suited to provide the sort of moderating force which his 
polis’ character actually requires. Thus, each of these leaders proves ineffective in the long run in 
accomplishing what I have argued Thucydides views as necessary for an effective leader: 
correcting his polis’ weaknesses while maintaining its strengths. 
 Additionally, in putting this parade of leaders on display, all of whom fail to live up to 
                                                 




the standards set by Pericles and Brasidas, Thucydides makes a further (and larger) point: 
Pericles and Brasidas were anomalies. While these two provided effective—yet individually 
distinct—leadership to their poleis, Thucydides’ portrayal of other Athenian and Spartan 
commanders makes it clear that such leadership, though these city-states require it to check their 
more damaging tendencies, cannot reasonably be expected to emerge with any consistency. It is 
with these notes in mind that we may begin with an examination of Demosthenes’ character. 
 
Demosthenes 
Whereas Thucydides’ depiction of Cleon (to be discussed in the next section of this 
chapter) primarily (though not exclusively) illustrates the effect on Athens of a political leader 
whose individual character directly reflects that of his polis, the historian’s portrait of 
Demosthenes provides a case study in unrestrained Athenian military leadership. Indeed, while 
this commander displays a great deal of martial skill and an ability to learn from military failures 
and adapt to new methods of warfare that has been noted and even praised in scholarship, he is 
largely absent from the Athenian political scene.152 Thus, given the limited scope of Thucydides’ 
dealings with Demosthenes, the historian never develops a fully fleshed out, personal picture of 
him the way he does with Brasidas, for example.153 Be that as it may, by analyzing the decision-
making and behavioral patterns that Thucydides emphasizes in his portrayal of Demosthenes, we 
may develop a picture of the character that the author implicitly attributes to him. He is, in 
essence, a truly Athenian figure: bold, energetic, and willing to take risks to the point of being 
reckless. He does not, therefore, act as a corrective force for Athenian national character, but 
                                                 
152 On Demosthenes’ military prowess and his adaptability, see Woodcock 1928: 107 and Wylie 1993: 28–9. For 
more on his political insignificance, see Woodcock 1928: 97, 103 and Westlake 1968: 98. 




instead encourages—and even at times relies upon—the polis’ collective behavioral tendencies, 
both good and bad. In fact, Demosthenes actually bears a number of striking similarities to 
Brasidas in his energy and military acumen, but lacks his Spartan counterpart’s military restraint. 
 In order to demonstrate these points, we will begin by examining Demosthenes’ first 
appearance in the work, and how Thucydides, by emphasizing the general’s acquisitiveness and 
magnifying the disaster that ensues, shapes our impression of the leader. We will then move on  
 
Demosthenes in Aetolia 
 Demosthenes’ first appearance plays a critically important role in the narrative of 
Thucydides’ history. Indeed, it is his intervention in Aetolia that marks the first clear Athenian 
divergence from Pericles’ strategy of caution, leading Woodcock to note, “It is significant that 
with the entry of Demosthenes the war took on a new and more vigorous character” (1928: 94).  
Indeed, it is Demosthenes who first openly and unabashedly returns the Athenians to their 
acquisitive and risk-tolerant ways, and in so doing seemingly reveals to readers a great deal 
about his individual character.154 
This dynamic entrance occurs in Book 3 of Thucydides’ history, when Demosthenes and 
Procles sail around the west coast of Greece to help the Acarnanians, who want the Athenians to 
assist them in walling off and capturing Leucas (3.91.1, 94.1).155 The Messenians appear, 
however, and request that Demosthenes instead carry out a much larger-scale attack on the 
                                                 
154 The “Athenian,” and therefore democratic character associated with Demosthenes makes his name—“strength of 
the demos”—remarkably appropriate. 
155 Thucydides specifically notes that the town was hard-pressed at the time and unable to react militarily: … τῆς τε 
ἔξω γῆς δῃουμένης καὶ τῆς ἐντὸς τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ, ἐν ᾗ Λευκάς ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος, πλήθει βιαζόμενοι 
ἡσύχαζον (“… although both the land outside and inside the isthmus—in which were Leucas and the temple of 
Apollo—was being ravaged, they kept quiet, compelled by the mass of enemies”; 3.94.2). The implication is that the 




Aetolians (3.94.3).156 In order to win him over, they make grand promises of further Athenian 
acquisition (… ἢν κρατήσῃ αὐτῶν, ῥᾳδίως καὶ τὸ ἀλλὸ Ἠπειρωτικὸν τὸ ταύτῃ Ἀθηναίοις 
προσποιήσειν: “… [saying that] if he overcomes them, he [Demosthenes] will also easily add for 
the Athenians the other part of Epirus there”; 3.94.3), and by claiming that the Aetolians will be 
subdued with little effort because they are disorganized and lightly armored (3.94.4).157 Thus, 
Demosthenes is given a choice between two options: a safe undertaking that is likely to succeed 
but offers limited rewards (helping the Acarnanians subdue Leucas), or a much larger-scale and 
riskier enterprise—although the Messenians significantly downplay the risk—with the potential 
for rapid, expansive conquest. The former plan is much more in keeping with Pericles’ strategy 
of limited engagement, while the latter is much more consistent with the ambition and daring 
characteristic of Athens’ unrestrained collective behavioral tendencies. 
 Demosthenes is seduced by the Messenians’ promises of easy conquest and agrees to 
their plan. His appetite for acquisition stretches beyond Aetolia, however, and Thucydides notes 
that he is already considering the conquest of Boeotia as well: ὁ δὲ τῶν Μεσσηνίων χάριτι 
πειθεὶς καὶ μάλιστα νομίσας ἄνευ τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως τοῖς ἠπειρώταις ξυμμάχοις μετὰ 
τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δύνασθαι ἂν κατὰ γῆν ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ Βοιωτοὺς … (“Persuaded by his goodwill toward 
the Messenians and especially believing that, accompanied by the mainland allies together with 
the Aetolians, he would be able to attack the Boeotians by land without Athenian forces …”; 
                                                 
156 The actual word here is ἀναπείθεται, so the sense may be not only that he was convinced, but that he was misled. 
The word is specifically associated with bribery in Aristophanes (Pax 622, Eq. 473). See LSJ ἀναπείθω 3. 
157 Note the similarity between the promises of the Messenians concerning the Aeotolians’ lack of organization and 
Alcibiades’ diminution of possible Sicilian resistance at 6.17.2–5. While there are, admittedly, differences in 
content, and Alcibiades’ speech goes into a great deal more detail, it is still interesting to note that this “minor” 
episode, eventually ending in disaster, appears to represent a sort of mini-Sicilian expedition in which the Athenians 
are again convinced to over-reach by false promises of easy acquisition. Interestingly, this is just the sort of rhetoric 




3.95.1).158 This description of Demosthenes as driven to undertake a risky expedition by the lure 
of even further conquest immediately calls to mind the reasons attributed to Alcibiades for 
pushing the Athenians to invade Sicily: ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι 
καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν (“hoping that through him both Sicily 
and Carthage would be conquered, and that, at the same time, by succeeding he would privately 
benefit himself in money and reputation”; 6.15.2). In the latter case Alcibiades looks beyond the 
expedition at hand to the further conquest of Carthage, even when he has yet to leave for Sicily. 
In much the same manner as Alcibiades, then, Demosthenes dreams big, even looking past his 
present expedition to what he may accomplish after its assumed success. 
Thucydides, however, does not appear to approve of Demosthenes’ plan. Westlake (1968: 
100), for example, argues that the author presents it unfavorably and as far too optimistic. 
Woodcock, meanwhile, states that, “Thucydides’ account of the Aetolian expedition on which he 
immediately embarked, is full of implied criticism,” and goes on to claim that the Boeotian goals 
attributed to Demosthenes paint him as “a reckless megalomaniac” (1928: 94–5). It is clear 
therefore that Thucydides’ description of this expedition paints it as ambitious and daring, but 
also as risky bordering on reckless. Thus, Thucydides’ depiction of Demosthenes’ decision-
making and risk-tolerance is comparable with the Corinthian speaker’s description of Athenian 
national character in Book1. For example, at 1.70.3 the Corinthian speaker describes the 
Athenians as “daring beyond their strength” and claims they “run risk beyond good judgment.” 
With his goals and decision-making on display, Demosthenes meets both of these criteria. 
Additionally, the fact that Demosthenes immediately looks past the Aetolian expedition to 
additional conquest, as if he assumes the invasion of Aetolia will be successful, is comparable to 
                                                 
158 Wylie (1993: 21) argues that there is no evidence apart from Thucydides that Demosthenes actually had the 




two further Corinthian assertions at 1.70.7: that “they alone both have and expect [to have] alike 
whatever they set their mind on,” and, “whatever they go out and acquire, they believe that they 
happen to have done little in comparison to the things to come.” In this circumstance 
Demosthenes certainly seems both to “expect to have” possession of Aetolia and to think this 
acquisition is not enough, since he is already considering an invasion of Boeotia. Thus, from the 
very first time readers are introduced to Demosthenes, and it immediately becomes clear just 
how much his approach to the war differs from the Periclean strategy, and that his individual 
tendencies very closely reflect those established in the work for Athens at the collective level. 
 After explaining the circumstances leading to this undertaking, Thucydides swiftly moves 
on to a narrative of the expedition’s progress. Demosthenes first sails out and attempts to recruit 
the Acarnanians at Sollium, who refuse to accompany him on the grounds that he refused to 
blockade Leucas. He then begins his march on Aetolia (3.95.1–2) and takes three cities in as 
many days: Potidania, Crocylium, and Tichium (3.96.2). The rapidity with which Demosthenes 
acts after he decides on his course of action is noteworthy, and it again calls to mind the 
Corinthian description of Athenian character. For instance, at 1.70.4 the Athenians are described 
as “unhesitating” (ἄοκνοι), and at 1.70.7 the Corinthian speaker emphasizes the speed with 
which the Athenians act after deciding on a policy. Thus, Demosthenes is yet again depicted as 
behaving in a very Athenian way, and his energy results in some early successes for the 
campaign. 
 Despite these early successes, however, Thucydides makes it clear that this expedition 
did not surprise the Aetolians, and that they were not as disjointed and disorganized as the 
Messenians originally led Demosthenes to believe: τοὺς δὲ Αἰτωλοὺς οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν αὕτη ἡ 




ἐπεβοήθουν πάντες … (“But this preparation did not escape the notice of the Aetolians, not even 
when it was first being plotted, and when the army had come into [their territory], they all came 
to help in a great body …”; 3.96.3). The Messenians, however, continue to promise 
Demosthenes an easy conquest of the region, and advise him to continue pushing forward as 
quickly as possible (ὅτι τάχιστα) and not to wait (μὴ μένειν; 3.97.1). This he does despite the fact 
that, according to Thucydides, much-needed reinforcements are on their way: 
ὁ δὲ τούτοις τε πεισθεὶς καὶ τῇ τύχῃ ἐλπίσας, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ ἠναντιοῦτο, τοὺς 
Λοκροὺς οὺκ ἀναμείνας οὓς αὐτῷ ἔδει προσβοηθῆσαι (ψιλῶν γὰρ ἀκοντιστῶν 
ἐνδεὴς ἦν μάλιστα) ἐχώρει ἐπὶ Αἰγιτίου … (3.97.2) 
 
And he, convinced by these things and putting his hope in fortune159 (because 
nothing was opposing him), not waiting for the Locrians whom he needed to 
come to his aid (for he was especially lacking in light-armed darters), he advanced 
against Aegitium … 
 
We may observe from this passage that Demosthenes displays none of the Brasidean restraint 
discussed in the previous chapter. Brasidas, when faced with a similar situation in northern 
Greece, preferred to wait for the arrival of his reinforcements.160 Demosthenes, on the other 
hand, is utterly consistent in his lack of hesitation and his display of Athenian speed. 
Unfortunately for him and his soldiers, it is at this point in the narrative that it becomes 
absolutely clear that Demosthenes has become “daring beyond [his] strength” and has “run risk 
contrary to good judgment” (1.70.3).161 Indeed, the attack on Aegitium results in defeat for the 
Athenians, whom the light-armed Aetolians attack repeatedly from the hills until they put them 
to flight (3.97.3–98.2).  
                                                 
159 For more on the significance of Thucydides’ mention of “fortune” here, see below, pp. 135–41. 
160 See pp. 147–50 for an expanded comparison of Demosthenes and Brasidas.  
161 Westlake argues that, “few passages in the History, except for those condemning demagogues, are so critical of 
an individual” (1968: 101). Woodcock refers to Demosthenes’ decision to proceed without Locrian reinforcements 
as “the only great blunder of his career” (1928: 95). I disagree with the latter position, and point readers to this 




In his description of the aftermath of this battle, Thucydides emphasizes the suffering that 
the Athenian soldiers experienced as a result of their defeat, as well as the difficulty of their 
withdrawal: πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη τῆς φυγῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀλέθρου τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, 
μόλις τε ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὸν Οἰνεῶνα τῆς Λοκρίδος, ὅθεν περ καὶ ὡρμήθησαν, οἱ 
περιγενόμενοι κατέφυγον (“And there was every form of flight and of destruction for the army of 
the Athenians, and scarcely did the survivors escape to the sea and Oeneon in Locris, the very 
place from which they had set out”; 3.98.3).162 After allowing readers this opportunity to vividly 
relive the suffering of the Athenian soldiers, Thucydides then steps back to directly address the 
broader implications of this defeat for the Athenian war effort. In so doing he states that the 
Athenians killed in this battle (one hundred and twenty in number) were the best men (βέλτιστοι 
δὴ ἄνδρες) who died in this war (3.98.4).163 Thus, Thucydides’ description of the encounter 
stresses the suffering the Athenian forces experienced in defeat, and the quality of the troops lost. 
Thucydides’ reason for so clearly emphasizing—and perhaps even magnifying—the 
damage this defeat inflicted on the Athenian cause has been questioned by some scholars. 
Woodcock, for example, simply states that it is a mystery why Thucydides dwells on the loss of 
these hoplites when so many more were lost elsewhere in other battles (1928: 95). Westlake, 
however, believes that Thucydides intentionally inflates the importance of the episode (which he 
                                                 
162 One cannot help but call to mind Thucydides’ description of the massacre at Mycalessus, in which he states ther 
was “every form of destruction” (ἰδέα πᾶσα ... ὀλέθρου; 7.29.5), or perhaps even the ending of the Sicilian 
expedition, with Thucydides’ vivid description of the Athenian attempt at withdrawal and of the immense suffering 
of their forces (7.75–87). Indeed, at the very end of Book 7 the Athenians are described as suffering a “total 
destruction” (πανωλεθρίᾳ; 7.87.6), which we may compare to his description here of the Athenians experiencing 
“every form … of destruction” (πᾶσά τε ἰδέα … τοῦ ὀλέθρου; 3.98.3). For further discussion of Thucydides’ such 
use of such language, see Flory (1988: passim) and Forsdyke (2017: 32–5). 
163 By “in this war,” Thucydides is most likely referring only to the Archidamian war (Gomme 1956b: 408). There is 
a stylistic similarity between Thucydides’ description of these events and others throughout the text, as he often 
emphasizes events as the greatest suffering of a people or the greatest loss of life in a single day. See 3.113.6, where 
Thucydides describes the Ambraciot double-defeat as the greatest suffering for one city in an equal number of days, 
and his note at 7.29.5 after the massacre at Mycalessus, where Thucydides tells us that the disaster this city suffered 




argues was not a huge disaster and did not seriously harm the Athenian war effort) because he 
saw Demosthenes as optimistic to the point of being irresponsible, and was therefore 
“determined to impress upon his readers that Demosthenes sustained a defeat through his own 
errors” (1968: 101–2). He therefore presents Demosthenes’ ambitious and enterprising behavior 
(yet again very Athenian) as excessively risky, and as resulting in an extremely costly disaster. 
In this passage, then, Thucydides depicts the combination of truly Athenian leadership 
with Athenian national character as resulting in unrestrained, risk-tolerant acquisitiveness, and 
therefore as inherently dangerous. This point is emphasized all the more by the fact that, as noted 
above, this episode represents the first Athenians divergence from the Periclean strategy of 
limited engagement and empire preservation. While, as argued in the previous chapter of this 
dissertation, Thucydides depicted Pericles and his leadership as successful largely because of his 
ability to restrain and redirect Athenian behavioral tendencies, in Book 3 the Athenians, led by 
the active and ambitious Demosthenes, fully revert to their actively acquisitive ways. The result 
of this restoration of unbridled Athenian behavior is, as Thucydides presents it, disaster.164 This 
narrative, therefore, is presented in a manner that emphasizes the danger of Athenian character 
when it is not tempered by appropriate restraint. 
Moreover, Thucydides’ description of the ill-advised and ill-fated expedition into Aetolia 
attributes a great deal of blame to Demosthenes. In fact, the author tells us that, after his defeat, 
Demosthenes stayed in the area of Naupactus because he was afraid to return to Athens: 
Δημοσθένης δὲ περὶ Ναύπακτον καὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα ὑπελείφθη, τοῖς πεπραγμένοις φοβούμενος 
                                                 
164 The reader has been conditioned to expect this outcome: Thucydides specifically claims in his eulogy of Pericles 
that the Athenian leaders who succeeded him failed to follow his strategy (2.65.7), and more generally failed to live 
up to his example of leadership (2.65.10), ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλά, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη 
καὶ ὁ ὲς Σικελίαν πλοῦς ... (“from which things, in a city that was great and had an empire, both many other errors 




τοὺς Ἀθηναίους (“Demosthenes remained behind around Naupactus and these places, fearing the 
Athenians because of what had happened”; 3.98.5). This description may leave readers with the 
impression that Demosthenes is a universal failure as an Athenian general; this is, of course, not 
the case. His level of success varies highly in his other appearances in the text: he saves 
Naupactus from a Peloponnesian attack and then achieves a double-victory in Amphilochia in 
426/5 BCE (3.102.3–5; 3.105–113), plans and defends the Athenian fortification at Pylos (4.2.4–
15.1), and plays a key role in the subsequent capture of 120 Spartiates trapped on the island of 
Sphacteria (4.26.1–9, 29–39); at the same time, however, his elaborate and ambitious plan to 
invade Boeotia in 424 BCE fails miserably (4.76–77, 89–101.4), and he is captured and executed 
at the end of the disastrous Sicilian expedition (4.85–86.3). While Demosthenes’ success as a 
general may vary in these episodes, it will be demonstrated that his behavior is largely 
consistent: he continues to be energetic, daring, and highly risk-tolerant. Thus, as I will now 
argue, while the outcomes of these episodes differ, Thucydides’ characterization of 
Demosthenes remains largely unchanged. 
 First, we see Demosthenes’ speed, decisiveness, and energy on display in his move to 
save Naupactus from capture. This passage begins by focusing on the progress of Eurylochus, 
whose march from Delphi to Naupactus seems inexorable: he manages to remove most of the 
Ozolian Locrians from their alliance with Athens (3.101), and captures two towns (Oeneon and 
Eupalium) that refused to join him (3.102.1); he is then reinforced by the Aetolian army, and 
upon his arrival in the area of Naupactus he devastates the countryside and captures the parts of 
the city lying outside its walls (3.102.2). 
 It is only at this point in the narrative, when Eurylochus’ capture of Naupactus seems 




Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος (ἔτι γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν μετὰ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας περὶ Ναύπακτον) 
προαισθόμενος τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ δείσας περὶ αὐτῆς, ἐλθὼν πείθει Ἀκαρνᾶνας, χαλεπῶς διὰ τὴν 
ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος ἀναχώρησιν, βοηθῆσαι Ναθπάκτῳ (“But Demosthenes the Athenian (for he 
still happened to be around Naupactus after the business in Aetolia), becoming aware of the army 
and fearing for it [Naupactus], went and convinced the Acarnanians—with difficulty on account 
of his withdrawal from Leucas—to come to Naupactus’ aid”; 3.102.3).165 He then takes the 
forces provided by the Acarnanians secures Naupactus, whose residents had worried their forces 
were insufficient to protect her long walls (3.102.4). After learning of the sudden arrival of these 
reinforcements, Eurylochus withdraws, leaving Naupactus securely under Athenian control 
(3.102.5). 
  In this passage, then, Thucydides’ narrative at first gives the impression that Naupactus’ 
capture as inevitable: Eurylochus and his forces continually march toward it, using diplomacy or 
military conquest to break each village they encounter away from Athens, until they even control 
the parts of Naupactus that lie outside its walls. The reader next expects to hear about Eurylochus 
besieging and capturing the polis (and the notion that he might have captured the city easily is 
reinforced by Thucydides’ note at 3.102.4 that its inhabitants themselves thought they had 
insufficient forces for its defense), but instead Demosthenes suddenly reappears, and in two 
sentences Thucydides shows him convince a group of Greeks whom he had recently alienated to 
allow him to use their military forces, and sail into and secure Naupactus before Eurylochus can 
move on the city proper. Thus, the author shows Demosthenes acting with the same Athenian 
                                                 
165 Westlake remarks on the diplomatic skill Demosthenes displays by convincing the Acarnanians (whom he had 
recently alienated by refusing to besiege Leucas and instead invading Aetolia with the Messenians) to come to his 
aid in defending Naupactus (1968: 102). Additionally, the language of chance utilized in this passage to describe 
Demosthenes’ presence in the area recalls that used to describe Brasidas’ opportune presence at Methone and 




decisiveness and swiftness to action as he did in Aetolia.166 In this instance, however, his speed 
is an asset, and results in the preservation of Athenian control over Naupactus. 
 
Demosthenes in Amphilochia 
 During the next winter Eurylochus and the Ambraciots go on the offensive again, 
marching into Amphilochia. Demosthenes takes up the defense of this region, and in so doing 
again displays much of the same behavior. While his speed is certainly still apparent in this 
episode—for example, he moves “immediately” (εὐθύς) to take a strong position after hearing 
that a second Ambraciot force is setting out (3.110.1–2)—it is Demosthenes’ risk-tolerance that 
is most prominently on display during his exploits in Amphilochia.167 
 This Demosthenean willingness to take risks is apparent in his first direct engagement 
with Eurylochus. After encamping across from each other, the two armies sit still for five days 
before drawing up in order of battle. At this point, Thucydides relates the following: μεῖζον γὰρ 
ἐγένετο καὶ περιέσχε τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων στρατόπεδον (“For the Peloponnesians’ army was 
larger and outflanked them”; 3.107.3). Demosthenes makes preparations to counter the 
Peloponnesian advantage, placing 400 soldiers in an ambush with instructions to attack their 
enemy from behind when the armies meet (3.107.3). 
 In the end this plan proves successful because the timing of the ambush is good and, just 
as the Peloponnesians begin to encircle Demosthenes’ forces, the soldiers lying in wait attack 
and rout their foes (3.108.1).168 Despite this victory, however, it must be noted that Demosthenes 
                                                 
166 Compare again the Corinthian description of the Athenians as “unhesitating” (ἄοκνοι) at 1.70.4, and as acting 
quickly on whatever they decide (διὰ τὸ ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν γνῶσιν) at 1.70.7. 
167 His speed and energy may also be observed in Thucydides’ description of the battle that follows, where he moves 
out when night falls, and attacks the Ambraciots just before dawn when they are still sleeping (3.112.2–4). 
168 Westlake argues that Thucydides gives credit for this victory (as well as for the secret alliance with the Spartans 




undertakes a great risk in willingly engaging in battle with an enemy that he knows outnumbers 
him and could encircle his army. While the historian does note that Demosthenes takes 
precautions to improve his situation, readers would likely recognize that, on numerous other 
occasions in Thucydides’ text (and even in other episodes where Demosthenes specifically 
appears), complicated plans that rely on multiple units working together with precise timing 
often go wrong.169 Therefore, in electing to engage in a decisive battle, Demosthenes accepts 
what is ultimately an extremely risky situation.170 
 Additionally, Thucydides provides a brief reminder that Demosthenes’ ambition, which 
defined his expedition into Aetolia (and which later defines his expedition into Boeotia), is a 
persistent feature of his character. After Demosthenes’ crushing victory over a second Ambraciot 
army, which had come to reinforce Eurylochus (unaware that this force had already been 
defeated), Thucydides tells us, Ἀμπρακίαν μέντοι οἶδα ὅτι, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν Ἀκαρνᾶνες καὶ 
Ἀμφίλοχοι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Δημοσθένει πειθόμενοι ἐξελεῖν, αὐτοβοεὶ ἂν εἷλον· νῦν δ’ ἔδεισαν μὴ 
οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔχοντες αὐτὴν χαλεπώτεροι σφίσι πάροικοι ὦσιν (“In fact I know that, if the 
Acarnanians and Amphilochians had been convinced by the Athenians and Demosthenes and had 
been willing to take Ambracia, they would have taken it without a blow. But at present they were 
afraid that the Athenians, if they held it, would be more troublesome neighbors for them”; 
3.113.6).  
 In this passage, Demosthenes’ voice is given a leading role in attempting to persuade the 
                                                 
the same patterns of behavior that caused his downfall in Aetolia (boldness and an unwillingness to delay) help him 
at Olpae (1999: 144–5). 
169 For more, see the discussion of Demosthenes’ failed invasion of Boeotia (pp. 141–4), and of his night attack on 
Epipolae in Sicily (pp. 144–5). 
170 A willingness to take risks is, of course, an important part of the Athenian national character in Thucydides (see 
pp. 19–26). Such behavior is presented as a double-edged sword in Thucydides’ text, playing an important role in 
the rapid expansion of Athenian power, while at the same time contributing directly to Athens’ costliest disasters. 
Thus, Athenian risk-tolerance does not always have negative results, but Thucydides makes it clear time and again 




Athenian allies to continue their campaign by attacking Ambracia, which had just lost two 
armies in rapid succession. In this short aside, then, Thucydides demonstrates that Demosthenes 
was not immediately satisfied with the substantial success he has experienced up to this point, 
and wishes to continue to push forward. While Thucydides actually attests to the fact that 
Ambracia could easily have been conquered at this point, we must, however, admit that 
Demosthenes’ behavior is yet again very Athenian. Indeed, referring back to the Corinthian 
comparison of Athenian and Spartan character in Book 1, we may observe that Demosthenes 
here behaves exactly in line with that description: when the Athenians succeed, “they believe 
that they happen to have done little in comparison to the things to come,” (ἡγοῦνται … ὀλίγα 
πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες; 1.70.7). Up to this point, he had simply been defending 
Athenian allies (and thus Athenian interests) in the region. These accomplishments, however, are 
not enough, and he desires to press his advantage and add Ambracia to Athens’ sphere of 
influence. This again is perfectly in line with descriptions of Athenian collective behavioral 
tendencies in the work: κρατοῦντές τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξέρχονται (“When they prevail 
over their enemies they pursue their advantages to the utmost”; 1.70.5). Thucydides thus 
emphasizes Demosthenes’ Athenian character yet again in his description of the campaign in 
Amphilochia, focusing on his risk-tolerance and his ambition. 
 
Demosthenes at Pylos 
 In the fourth book of Thucydides’ history, he provides a detailed description of the action 
that occurred at and around Pylos in 425 BCE. The occupation of this site and the subsequent 
capture of 120 Spartan citizens trapped on the nearby island of Sphacteria have often been 




of the Peloponnesian War.171 Indeed, this victory smashed previous conceptions of Spartan 
military virtue, allowed Athens to continually harass the Spartans from this position, and 
therefore put itself (at least temporarily) in a position of power for peace negotiations. 
At the same time, however, in his discussion of these events, Thucydides places a great 
deal of emphasis on the role of “fortune” (τύχη) and its contributions to Demosthenes’ success. 
Indeed, as Cornford notes, “There is hardly a sentence in the whole story which is not so turned 
and so disposed as to make us feel that design counted for nothing and luck for everything” 
(1907: 90).172 Let us turn to a few examples of the important role that chance plays in this 
passage. First, Thucydides gives readers the impression that this whole episode almost never 
took place, and that it was only a random confluence of events that brought it to pass: when 
Demosthenes sails with the Athenian fleet around western Greece, he fails in his attempts to 
convince the generals Eurymedon and Sophocles to land at Pylos. At this point, however, 
Thucydides relates, ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ κατὰ τύχην χειμὼν ἐπιγενόμενος κατήνεγκε τὰς ναῦς ἐς τὴν 
Πύλον (“but while they were opposing him by chance a storm came upon them and forced the 
ships into Pylos; 4.3.1). It is thus only due to a chance storm that the fleet even lands at this site 
in the first place. 
 Demosthenes’ struggles do not end when this fortuitous storm forces the Athenian ships 
to shore, however. Once at Pylos he attempts to persuade the Athenian generals to fortify the 
spot, but they once again turn him down (4.3.3). He then turns to the taxiarchs (squadron 
commanders), but fails to win them over as well (4.4.1). It seems at this point, then, that his plan 
is dead in the water. Stuck at Pylos and unable to sail because of the storm, however, a sudden 
urge to fortify the location falls upon the soldiers themselves, who then work tirelessly to 
                                                 
171 See Westlake 1968: 111, who also thinks Thucydides downplays Demosthenes’ contribution to this enterprise. 




accomplish this.173 Thus, Thucydides portrayal of events gives the impression that it was only 
due to the chance combination of an unexpected storm and a sudden whim of the soldiers that 
Demosthenes’ plan was ever put into effect. 
 Even after the soldiers finally fortify Pylos, fortune continues to play an important role in 
determining how events unfold. Indeed, despite the fact that Demosthenes had thought Pylos an 
ideal place to garrison because of its abundance of stone and wood (4.3.2), when the Spartans 
prepare to attack the fortification Thucydides relates that Demosthenes and his men were 
insufficiently armed: οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὅπλα ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ πορίσασθαι (“for it was not possible to 
procure arms in the deserted location”; 4.9.1). Thucydides goes on to note that even the weapons 
the Athenians did have—as well as a few much needed reinforcements—had been received from 
some Messenian ships that just happened to be in the area: ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκ λῃστρικῆς 
Μεσσηνίων τριακοντόρου καὶ κέλητος ἔλαβον, οἳ ἔτυχον παραγενόμενοι. ὁπλῖταί τε τῶν 
Μεσσηνίων τούτων ὡς τεσσαράκοντα ἐγένοντο, οἷς ἐχρῆτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων (“but even these 
[weapons] they received from a piratical Messenian triaconter and a light ship which happened to 
be there; and these Messenians had about forty hoplites whom they used with the others”; 4.9.1). 
This description of events gives readers the distinct impression that Demosthenes’ desire to 
fortify Pylos was in no way a well-developed plan.174 Instead, he fortified the site and, when 
confronted with a shortage of men and weapons, was aided by the sudden and unexpected arrival 
of these Messenian ships. Several scholars have, in fact, disputed Thucydides’ narrative here, 
arguing that the arrival of the Messenians at Pylos was not a chance occurrence, but instead that 
Demosthenes must have arranged it beforehand (Woodcock 1928: 108; Wylie 1993: 23–4). The 
                                                 
173 This passage is discussed in greater detail in Ch. 1, pp. 44–6. 




fact remains, however, that the version of events that Thucydides records give the distinct 
impression that Demosthenes was lucky. 
 Finally, fortune may again be observed intervening in favor of Demosthenes after Spartan 
forces become trapped on the island of Sphacteria. Thucydides notes that Demosthenes had 
previously been hesitant to make an attack on the island because it was heavily wooded, and he 
feared that his forces would be unable to see their enemies and would therefore be destroyed 
(4.29.3–4).175 Fortunately for Demosthenes, however, a fire breaks out on the island, clearing the 
forest and granting him visibility: τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν ἀναγκασθέντων διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν τῆς 
νήσου τοῖς ἐσχάτοις προσίσχοντας ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι διὰ προφυλακῆς καὶ ἐμπρήσαντός τινος κατὰ 
μικρὸν τῆς ὕλης ἄκοντος καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου πνεύματος ἐπιγενομένου τὸ πολὺ αὐτῆς ἔλαθε 
κατακαυθέν (“The soldiers were forced because of lack of space to put in at the edges of the 
island to have their breakfast (making use of guard-troops), and a certain person unintentionally 
set fire to a small part of the forest, and after this a wind came on and the whole of it [the forest] 
was unwittingly burnt down”; 4.30.2). Through his use of the words “unintentionally” (ἄκοντος) 
and “unwittingly” (ἔλαθε), Thucydides makes it clear that these were not deliberate acts, but 
rather the result of random happenstance.176 At the same time, however, the author emphasizes 
that this chance occurrence was exactly what the Athenian troops needed to happen for them to 
be able to make a successful attack on Sphacteria. Thus, Demosthenes once again benefits not 
from foresight and planning, but from fortune working to his advantage.177 
                                                 
175 Thucydides attributes Demosthenes’ hesitancy to attack the wooded island to his experiences in Aetolia (4.30.1). 
176 Woodcock (1928: 101) directly asserts that, despite Thucydides’ presentation of events, Demosthenes actually 
ordered the fire to be set. Wylie (1993: 24) hints at this same point. 
177 See Stahl 2003: 139–42 (who also mentions the Athenian good fortune that the Spartans happened (ἔτυχον; 
4.13.4) not to carry out their plan to blockade both entrances to the harbor) for an excellent description of the role of 




 As is clear, then, Thucydides’ emphasis on the role of “fortune” (τύχη) in this passage is 
undeniable. At the same time, however, there has been a considerable effort in scholarship to 
understand why Thucydides features this inhuman force so prominently in his narrative. 
Cornford, for example, argues that the historian saw “fortune” as having real agency in 
determining the outcome of these events, periodically intervening to override plans based on 
human judgment (γνώμη) (1907: 88–9, 97–8, 106).178 Woodcock, on the other hand, takes the 
position that Thucydides intentionally emphasizes the role of fortune to downplay Demosthenes’ 
achievement. This is because, as he argues, Demosthenes and Cleon were politically aligned, and 
Thucydides opposed them and wished to diminish their achievements (Woodcock 1928: 101–4). 
In much this same strain, Wylie refers to Thucydides’ description of this episode as “generally 
agreed to be seriously biased,” (1993: 22).179 As such, he revises Thucydides’ account by 
attributing to Demosthenean interventions events which Thucydides portrays as resulting from 
chance. For example, he claims “it is fairly obvious that the occupation of Pylos was no casual 
venture but brilliantly planned and conceived,” (1993: 23), and that the “accidental” fire that 
broke out on Sphacteria was actually intentionally set on orders from Demosthenes (1993: 24). 
Westlake, meanwhile, admits that there is the appearance of bias in this passage, and that 
Thucydides “seems determined to suggest that the situation leading eventually to a victory for 
which Cleon received most of the credit was to a large extent brought about by a series of 
accidents” (1968: 107–8). At the same time, however, he posits that the role of fortune in this 
passage has “perhaps been exaggerated by some modern scholars” (Westlake 1968: 107).180 
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While Connor sees Thucydidean shaping in this narrative, he argues that it does not result 
from political or personal bias, but instead that the historian is attempting to replicate for readers 
the emotional experience (primarily surprise) of the Greeks at the way matters turned out (1984b: 
113).181 While I agree that this passage does seem to convey a strong sense of surprise at the 
outcome of events, I find Stahl’s position (that this narrative falls into a Thucydidean pattern of 
presenting human agency as extremely limited in its ability to control the outcome of events) the 
most compelling (2003: 218–19).182 
 All of these proposals offer interesting answers to the question of why Thucydides 
stresses the influence of fortune on events at Pylos. At the same time, however, I propose that 
these explanations have been somewhat too narrow in their analysis of this event, taking it 
largely in isolation, and focusing primarily on the ramifications of Demosthenes’ possible 
political connection to Cleon. Because of this limitation, none of these previously mentioned 
explanations fully captures the significance of τύχη in this episode. When several other passages 
are taken into account, however, I believe that what Thucydides is doing with “fortune” in this 
passage becomes clear. 
 To begin, it must be noted that Thucydides in fact consistently attributes to Demosthenes 
a willingness to take risks, and a certain reliance on “fortune.” For example, in his ambitious, 
risky, and ultimately failed expedition into Aetolia he chooses to move forward and continue on 
his expedition without waiting for his Locrian allies. At this moment, Thucydides describes 
Demosthenes as “putting his hope in fortune” (τῇ τύχῃ ἐλπίσας; 3.97.2).183 While at Pylos 
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182 In addition, I believe that Thucydides’ clear distaste for high-risk, high-reward undertakings actually makes it 
likely he intends to demonstrate that, due to the uncertainties of war, Demosthenes’ undertaking could just as easily 
have ended in disaster. 




Demosthenes is never directly described as putting his hope in fortune, as discussed above, 
Thucydides’ narrative does rather strongly implicitly depict him as yet again dependent on 
chance for his success.184 Thus, in these two passages Thucydides demonstrates both that 
Demosthenes has a strong propensity to undertake risky enterprises, and that fortune plays an 
important role in determining his success or failure. 
This association between risk and fortune is, in fact, part of a larger pattern in the history. 
Indeed, chance is argued to play a key role in determining the outcome of large-scale 
undertakings very early in the text. For instance, before the commencement of hostilities, an 
Athenian ambassador warns the Spartans of the role chance plays in war: τοῦ δὲ πολέμου τὸν 
παράλογον, ὅσος ἐστί, πρὶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι προδιάγνωτε· μηκυνόμενος γὰρ φιλεῖ ἐς τύχας τὰ 
πολλὰ περιίστασθαι, ὧν ἴσον τε ἀπέχομεν καὶ ὁποτέρως ἔσται ἐν ἀδήλῳ κινδυνεύεται (“Consider 
how great is the unexpected element of war before you are in it! For when [war] grows long, it is 
accustomed to become dependent in many ways on fortune, over of which we equally no control, 
and we run the risk in the dark as to how things will turn out”; 1.78.2). While this earlier speaker 
discusses temporally long wars, a war that takes a long time will almost certainly also be so 
because it is also large in scale. Thus, the inclusion of this comment not only prompts readers to 
simply be on the lookout for the role of fortune in the war, but also lays the foundation for a 
model in which there is a direct relationship between the size and riskiness of an activity and the 
influence of random chance. 
Thus, in creating this association between risk and chance, the historian demonstrates that 
the riskier the enterprise, the more its success or failure is inevitably left up to chance. He 
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therefore shows the danger inherent in unchecked risk-tolerance (such as that ascribed to the 
Athenians at 1.70, and demonstrated by them throughout the text) by giving readers the 
impression that large, risky enterprises may just as easily fail as be successful. To bring this back 
to the level of Demosthenes, we may conclude by saying that this general, with his hyper-
Athenian behavior, demonstrates at the individual level the riskiness of such unchecked behavior 
in the Athenian national character. 
After having discussed this crucial and oft-cited passage, I turn now to one that has 
received somewhat less examination in scholarship, but which, upon examination, is equally 
telling about both Demosthenes’ individual character, and his influence on Athenian risk-
tolerance: his expedition to Boeotia. 
 
Demosthenes’ Expedition to Boeotia 
 In discussing Demosthenes’ military exploits, multiple scholars have emphasized his 
ability to learn from mistakes, and particularly his forward-thinking incorporation of light-armed 
troops and peltasts into his military repertoire.185 The development of his military acumen is 
noteworthy, as we see it deployed in his successes in Amphilochia and at Pylos. At the same 
time, however, Demosthenes’ description of his failed invasion of Boeotia in Book 4 
demonstrates that there is one lesson that he did not learn (or that he chooses to ignore): the 
danger of exceptionally ambitious plans. 
 As noted above, when Demosthenes began his earlier expedition into Aetolia, it was 
partly because the Messenians convinced him he would have an easy time conquering this area 
itself, and partly because, as Thucydides attests, he believed that conquering Aetolia would 
                                                 




provide him with a clear path to invade Boeotia (3.95.1). As noted above, it has largely been 
recognized that Thucydides presents Demosthenes as overly ambitious and his plan as ill-advised 
in this episode.186 Be that as it may, however, it is to this goal that he returns in Book 4 when he 
is apparently approached by Boeotians interested in overthrowing their governments and 
installing democratic regimes (4.76.2). He and his colleague Hippocrates then form an 
exceedingly ambitious, complicated plan that relies upon numerous events taking place on the 
same day, and on no one betraying any part of the plan to the Boeotians. In summary, the plan 
consisted of three parts: the betrayal of Siphae to the Athenians, the betrayal of Chaeronea to the 
Athenians, and Athenian forces marching across the border of Boeotia and occupying Delium 
(4.76.3–4). Moreover, for the plan called for each of these undertakings to occur at the same time 
on a prearranged day, so that the Boeotians forces would be divided and could not make use of 
their combined strength in any one place. Thucydides reports that the conspirators believe that, if 
their plan succeeds, they will eventually gain control of Boeotia (4.76.4–5). 
 That Thucydides seemingly disapproves of this plan and emphasizes its weakness in his 
description of its numerous requirements has been argued by Westlake (1968: 115–16). Indeed, 
both he and Woodcock before him note that this plan, being as large-scale as it was, took a 
significant amount of time to put into practice, and moreover depended on the cooperation of 
numerous Boeotians and Phocians to whom it had to be disclosed well ahead of time, thus 
making the chances of its being discovered very high (Westlake 1968: 116, Woodcock 1928: 
104).187 Unfortunately for Athens, this is precisely what happens, and when Demosthenes arrives 
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by ship he discovers that the plot has been betrayed and that the Boeotians have reinforced both 
Siphae and Chaeronea (4.89.1–2). 
 This was not the only thing to go wrong with this planned invasion of Boeotia, however. 
First, Thucydides reports that the timing of the operation failed, resulting in disjointed activity: 
Demosthenes sails to Siphae and Chaeronea first, and then later Hippocrates moves into Boeotia 
to occupy Delium (4.89.1–90.1). A battle ensues in which the Athenians are defeated and 
Hippocrates himself is killed (4.96.1–9, 101.2), and later the Thebans take back Delium 
(4.101.1). The last we hear of the expedition, Demosthenes attempts to make a landing at Sicyon, 
but his forces are routed and driven back without accomplishing anything (4.101.3–4). 
 This was the last major command for Demosthenes related in the work until 413 BCE in 
Sicily, and it appears that due to this major loss he was once again out of favor at Athnes 
(Westlake 1968: 118, Woodcock 1928: 105). While Demosthenes was not at Delium, and 
therefore bears no individual responsibility for the conduct or outcome of that specific battle, 
Westlake argues that “… there was every justification for holding him largely accountable for 
the unsoundness of the general scheme against Boeotia” (1968: 118–19). Indeed, just as in the 
case of his expedition into Aetolia (in which case Thucydides tells readers that Demosthenes was 
already looking toward the conquest of Boeotia), Demosthenes is convinced by the prospect of 
great, rapid success to undertake an extremely risky venture. Moreover, this approach yet again 
results in a major Athenian defeat, and in Demosthenes falling out of favor among the Athenians. 
As stated above, then, while the point may be argued that Demosthenes learns his lesson in terms 
of battlefield tactics, recognizing the importance of light-armed troops, he certainly does not 
learn to check his propensity to accept high-risk, high-reward scenarios. He thus demonstrates a 




ingenuity, but also a willingness to undertake risks and to be daring beyond his strength (cf. 
1.70.2), an unflinching willingness to go abroad and conquer (cf. 1.70.4), and a desire for 
constant Athenian acquisition (cf. 1.70.7). These attributes can be advantageous, leading to his 
convincing and damaging (to the Spartans) victories in Amphilochia and at Pylos. They can also, 
however, be detrimental, leading to disastrous military undertakings in Aetolia and Boeotia. 
 
Demosthenes in Sicily 
 After his defeat in Boeotia, Demosthenes does not play a major role in the history again 
until he is sent with Athenian troops to reinforce his polis’ ill-fated Sicilian expedition. In this 
episode, Demosthenes’ energy and daring are particularly apparent, as he offers a direct foil to 
Nicias’ indecisiveness and hesitancy.188 
 This contrast is apparent immediately after Demosthenes’ arrival in Sicily. The 
Syracusans had just come to think they had the upper hand over Athenian forces, and Thucydides 
notes that the arrival of a large force of reinforcements caused them extreme consternation 
(κατάπληξις; 7.42.2), while it renewed the Athenians’ confidence. Demosthenes recognizes this 
situation and wishes to act as quickly as possible (ὅτι τάχος; 7.42.3), and so rushes (ἠπείγετο; 
7.42.5) to put his plan—an attack on the fortified hill Epipolae—into action. Interestingly, 
Thucydides reports that Demosthenes himself contrasts his own plan to the hesitancy of Nicias 
when he first arrived in Sicily, whom Demosthenes believes squandered the fear his massive 
force originally inspired (7.42.3).189 Thus, Nicias’ hesitancy is immediately contrasted with 
Demosthenes’ speed, daring, and preference for decisive action. 
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 Thucydides’ description of the ensuing night attack on Epipolae emphasizes its speed and 
daring. For example, when the Syracusans first realize the attack is happening and respond in 
force they are routed and put to flight, and immediately (εὐθὺς) continues his advance.190 Then, 
during a second confrontation with the Syracusans, their allies, and the Spartan Gylippus, readers 
are informed that this attack had the following effects: καὶ ἀδοκήτου τοῦ τολμήματος σφίσιν ἐν 
νυκτὶ γενομένου προσέβαλόν τε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐκπεπληγμένοι καὶ βιασθέντες ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τὸ 
πρῶτον ὑπεχώρησαν (“and because their daring was not expected at night they were panic-
stricken when they attacked the Athenians, and at first they were forced back by them and 
withdrew”; 7.43.6). Thus, the plan’s daring catches the enemy by surprise, and they are at first 
unable to respond. 
 Demosthenes’ forces continue to press their advantage, believing they have already won 
and wishing to push through the remaining forces as quickly as possible (ὡς τάχιστα). This quick 
advance, however, puts them in a state of disorder (ἀταξίᾳ; 7.43.7), and when the Boeotians 
move up to attack, it is this time the Athenians who are put to flight. 
 At this point in his narrative, Thucydides makes it clear that, despite this plan’s initial 
success, its daring carried great risk. Indeed, because this operation occurred at night, the 
defeated Athenians fall into complete disarray, are unsure where to go, and have trouble 
differentiating between friend and foe. Thucydides spends the entirety of 7.44 describing the 
difficulty they faced as they attempted to withdraw, fighting amongst themselves, falling off the 
steep cliffs of the plain, or getting lost in the countryside, only to be cut down the next day by the 
Syracusan cavalry. Thus, just as in the case of his attacks on Aetolia and Boeotia, a daring and 
innovative Demosthenean plan yet again ends in disaster. Moreover, this unexpected victory 
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does away with the consternation the Syracusans had initially felt at Demosthenes’ arrival 
(7.46.1). 
 After this defeat, Demosthenes maintains his swift decisiveness, but directs it to a new 
end: withdrawing Athenian troops from Sicily. Indeed, at 7.47.3 Demosthenes advises that, now 
that his bold attempt has failed, the Athenians must not waste time (τρίβειν) in Sicily, but must 
return to Attica where they can face the Peloponnesians who have fortified Decelea. This push 
for immediate action is again contrasted with the hesitancy of Nicias, who orders that the army 
remain where it is and take no action because, according to Thucydides, he cannot decide what 
should be done (7.48.3).191  
 The Athenians come to directly regret their delay in Sicily (7.50.3), and this boldest of 
expeditions results in utter defeat, with Demosthenes suffering capture and execution. Be that as 
it may, from his arrival in Sicily in 413 BCE with reinforcements Demosthenes displays the 
same boldness, energy, and speed with which he is consistently associated in the work. 
Moreover, his plan for a nighttime attack against Epipolae is yet another elaborate act of daring, 
just as previously in Aetolia and Boeotia. Just as in those cases as well, this undertaking also 
unravels and leads to defeat. Thus, readers may yet again see the danger in such high-risk, high-
reward behavior. 
 This discussion of Demosthenes’ quickness to action and risk-tolerance may, in many 
ways, remind readers of another prominent leader previously discussed in this dissertation: 
Brasidas. I turn now to a comparison between these two leaders. 
 
 
                                                 




Demosthenes and Brasidas 
 Upon examination, one may note that Brasidas and Demosthenes appear to share a 
number of similarities. Thucydides emphasizes both men’s speed and energy, as well as their 
daring. The emphasis on fortune (τύχη) and its role in their enterprises is consistent as well: 
twice in the work Brasidas happens to be in the right place at the right time (2.25.2, 4.70.1), and 
his speed and skill allow him to take advantage of the opportunity; in the case of Demosthenes, 
fortune plays an extremely prominent role in Thucydides’ presentation of events at Pylos, since it 
is only after a storm forces the fleet ashore that he is able to fortify the spot (4.3.1), and only 
after a group of Messenians happen to sail in do the Athenians acquire desperately needed 
weapons (4.9.1).192 
 At the same time, however, there is one key difference between these two leaders. As I 
have argued, Brasidas shows an ability to restrain himself and his forces when appropriate. For 
example, he uses this technique to drive the Athenians (actually led by Demosthenes) away from 
Megara without risking battle (4.73), and on his second expedition with Perdiccas, Brasidas is 
hesitant to march on after an initial victory because, among other reasons, he does not think they 
should advance before the expected Illyrian reinforcements arrive (4.124.4). Brasidas, for all his 
energy and daring, finds ways to limit his exposure to risk. 
 This picture of Brasidas stands in stark contrast to Demosthenes, who is portrayed as 
regularly entering on extremely risky undertakings in Thucydides’ history, in some cases 
ignoring concerns that Brasidas is directly described as considering. For example, Demosthenes’ 
invasion of Aetolia (and his further plans to invade Boeotia) are described, as almost universally 
recognized in scholarship, in such a way as to prevent them as overly ambitious.193 Moreover, 
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during this invasion, his decision not to wait for light-armed Locrian reinforcements before the 
battle of Aegitium is given as the primary reason for the disastrous result of the expedition 
(3.97.2). Thus, Demosthenes’ impatience and inability to hesitate when necessary prove to be 
weaknesses. Furthermore, it is noted that he chooses not to wait for the Locrians on the advice of 
the Messenians, who continue to promise him an easy victory (3.97.1). We may compare this as 
well to the case of Brasidas, who resists Perdiccas’ call for him to march on. In the latter case, 
Brasidas demonstrates restraint in the face of Athenian-like zeal, while Demosthenes shows no 
such restraint, but instead is seduced by the rhetoric of easy acquisition. 
 Then in Book 4, Demosthenes’ second expedition against Boeotia proves too ambitious 
to succeed. Just as Brasidas is presented as the driving force behind the Spartan expedition to 
Thrace (4.81.1), this complex operation is identified as being arranged by Demosthenes and his 
colleague Hippocrates (4.76). This latter plan, however, ends in disaster for the Athenians, and 
Demosthenes therefore appears to take much of the blame for it, as he does not appear in a 
leading role again until the Sicilian expedition.194 
 It would appear, therefore, that the key difference between Brasidas and Demosthenes 
boils down to one thing: their approach to risk. Thucydides portrays Brasidas as willing to take 
appropriate risks, but at the same time as not endangering Spartan interests with moonshot 
operations. Demosthenes, on the other hand, demonstrates on multiple occasions that he is 
entirely willing to undergo extreme risks for a chance at high rewards. As such, he reaches the 
heights of success in his victories in Amphilochia (3.105–113) and at Pylos (4.2.4–15, 29–39), 
but also the devastating lows of his defeat in Aetolia (3.94.3–98.4) and the failure of the 
Athenian expedition into Boeotia (4.76–77, 89–97.1). We may reasonably conclude, therefore, 
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that Demosthenes is markedly more “Athenian” in his often overzealous boldness, and even 
recklessness, as compared with Brasidas’ appropriately restrained energy.195 
 We may note, however, that the exact opposite opinion has been expressed in 
scholarship. Wylie (1992: 75, 1993: 20) has argued that, of the two, Brasidas is the more reckless 
commander. This position, however, fails to recognize that there are different types of 
recklessness. While Brasidas may be more willing to take risks with his own person, forcing his 
pilot to land at Pylos and being wounded (4.12.1), and leading the key charge at Amphipolis that 
costs him his life (5.10.5–10), we may also note that he avoids taking unnecessary risks that 
endanger Spartan interests or the lives of his men. Indeed, time and again he shows a desire to 
avoid direct military engagement wherever possible, instead calling for diplomacy (e.g. on his 
first expedition with Perdiccas) or simply taking an advantageous position and waiting for his 
enemies to retire from the battlefield. Moreover, when he does endanger his own life, 
Thucydides presents his actions as directed toward the benefit of Spartan interests: at Pylos he 
attempts to encourage the Spartans who are hesitating offshore to land, and at Amphipolis he 
leads a charge to drive the Athenians into disarray. 
 Demosthenes, on the other hand, is more reckless with his development of overly 
ambitious goals, and in his use of Athenian resources and manpower. As noted above, he 
regularly takes risks that endanger Athenian forces, and which on two occasions (Aetolia and 
Boeotia) result in losses that Thucydides marks as significant. Thus, we may conclude that, in 
Thucydides’ estimation, Brasidas may be more reckless with his own life, but Demosthenes is 
more willing to take risks that may harm Athens at large. These qualities are consistent with 
Orwin’s estimation of Athenian and Spartan character, as he notes that the Athenians show a 
                                                 





distinct willingness to “expend rivers of Athenian blood,” while the Spartans consistently 
attempt to minimize their losses (1994: 76). Thus, we may note that Demosthenes subscribes to a 
much more Athenian approach to warfare, while Brasidas yet again shows, at times, a more 
restrained, Spartan approach. 
 
Conclusion 
 Scholars have often praised Demosthenes as a general, noting especially his willingness 
to use innovative tactics and his ability to adapt to his present circumstances.196 As discussed in 
this section, however, this perspective only takes into account Demosthenes’ low-level tactical 
decisions, and leaves aside his larger-scale behavioral trends, which remain remarkably 
consistent in each of his appearances in the text: he is bold, energetic, ambitious in a way that 
runs contrary to Pericles’ military strategy, and is highly risk-tolerant. This characterization is 
largely in line with the Athenian national character discussed in the first chapter of this 
dissertation. As such, Demosthenes represents an individual expression of Athenian national 
character, and fails to serve as a moderating force in the way Pericles does for Athens. Instead, 
he only has access to Athens’ inherent strengths (speed and daring), while exacerbating its 
customary weaknesses (primarily excessive risk-taking). The similarity of Demosthenes’ 
character to that of democratic Athens results in the strong ebbs and flows in fortune typical to 
unrestrained Athenian behavior: they reach the heights of success in their victory at 
Pylos/Sphacteria, but also the depths of failure in Demosthenes’ expeditions into Aetolia and 
Boeotia (at least as depicted by Thucydides, who, as noted above, may be overstating the cost of 
these losses). Moreover, he represents the first Athenian to fully depart from the Periclean war 
                                                 




strategy, and thus represents a return to unrestrained Athenian behavior.  
 While Thucydides never depicts Demosthenes as directly participating in the political 
decision-making process at Athens, he clearly exercised great influence in his polis (see, for 
example, his apparent ability to acquire special permission to establish a fort at Pylos; 4.2.4), and 
also made several decisions as a general that had far-reaching consequences for Athens’ fortunes 
in the war, and for its citizen-soldiers. Thus, he may be discussed as both a general and, more 
generally, an Athenian leader. In this leadership role, however, Thucydides’ Demosthenes does 
not provide the corrective, moderating force which the historian depicts his democratic context 
as requiring, but instead individually exhibits the chief elements of the Athenian, democratic 
collective character. As such, he represents the first evidence Thucydides provides in support of 
his position that Athenian leaders after Pericles failed to live up to his example, that the Athenian 
democracy from that point on failed to receive the corrective leadership it required, and that the 
regular emergence of leaders with the specific combination of character attributes needed to 
effectively lead at Athens is not something upon which the Athenians could rely. I turn now from 
the general Demosthenes to the politician Cleon, in whom we will observe largely the same 
pattern of behavior. 
 
Cleon 
A study of Cleon presents an interesting counterpoint to the previous discussion of 
Demosthenes. While the latter’s character was primarily on display in his military actions, Cleon 
is largely portrayed as a failed Athenian political leader, providing the ultimate foil to Pericles. 
Indeed, he embodies everything that Thucydides identifies as wrong with post-Periclean 




degenerating Athenian leadership (2.65.7, 10).197 In fact, Thucydides attributes nearly every 
unflattering, negative attribute at his disposal to Cleon. Woodhead notes, for example, when 
discussing Cleon’s overconfident behavior at Amphipolis, that, “All that is worst in a demagogue 
is somehow and somewhere packed into these two chapters …” (1960: 314). 
This overwhelmingly negative portrayal has led some scholars to propose that 
Thucydides bore personal enmity toward Cleon,198 and further to surmise that his version of the 
Athenian demagogue may not be historically accurate.199 Whether or not this is the case, it is 
certainly true that the version of Cleon which Thucydides leaves for his readers is not a positive 
one, and, as will be discussed shortly, it quickly becomes clear that the historian severely 
disapproved of Cleon and his positions. 
 From Cleon’s first appearance in the work, Thucydides is at pains to demonstrate the 
degree to which he fell short of the Periclean model of effective Athenian leadership. As we shall 
see, the historian does this by implicitly inviting the reader into a comparison between the two 
leaders, and making it clear that Cleon uses his influence for entirely different purposes: to 
encourage his countrymen to act without restraint and in accordance with their national 
character, rather than to moderate them. 
 
 
                                                 
197 See Westlake (1968: 8–9) for Cleon as a “successor” to Pericles. 
198 Pearson states concerning Cleon that, “… one usually finds Thucydides less violent in his prejudice” (1947: 53). 
199 Finley (1962), for example, argues in favor of the rehabilitation of “demagogues.” Azoulay, meanwhile, directly 
claims that the difference between Pericles and his successors (especially Cleon) was most likely not as strong as 
Thucydides portrays it (2010: 154–7). Westlake states that Thucydides shows an obvious bias against Cleon (1968: 
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 Cleon’s first appearance in Thucydides’ history occurs during the Mytilenean debate, and 
it represents an important moment in the text: of all the Athenians who appear after Pericles, he 
most strongly parallels (and even, perhaps, directly embodies) the historian’s description at 
2.65.7 and 10 of post-Periclean leaders who lack the capacity to check the negative behavioral 
tendencies of their countrymen.200 
Thucydides cleverly elucidates the differences between these two Athenian politicians by 
creating surface-level similarities between their abilities and rhetorical techniques that invite 
deeper comparison.201 These similarities include, for example, Thucydides’ description of Cleon 
as ὤν … τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος (“being by far the most persuasive to 
the demos at that time”; 3.36.6). This comment recalls Thucydides’ introduction to Pericles, 
whom he identifies as ἀνὴρ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν 
δυνατώτατος (“a man who was at that time first among the Athenians, most capable in both 
speaking and acting”; 1.139.4).  
Additionally, in his speech in favor of destroying Mytilene, Cleon famously chastises his 
Athenian audience for acting like spectators rather than members of the assembly, for being 
more interested in pleasing speech than good plans, and for being unable, as a democracy, to rule 
                                                 
200 For a discussion of Pericles, see Chapter 2. 
201 See Hornblower 1991: 334–5 and 425, Connor 1984b: 79, Macleod 1983: 93 n.20, and Zahn 1934: 65. De 
Romilly (1963: 165–7) disputes this connection, however, as she believes the resonances between the two speeches 
reflect a shared vocabulary of empire, rather than an attempt by Thucydides to create a connection between the 
specific characters of Pericles and Cleon. She bases this position on a belief that no clear distinction is drawn 
between the positions of the two politicians, and that readers are unable to easily see what makes Pericles right and 
Cleon wrong. I agree with Andrewes, however, when he states that, “In Thucydides’ careful style such echoes 
cannot be accidental,” (1962: 75), and I believe, moreover, that the resemblances between the two speeches extend 
too far beyond simply the vocabulary of empire for readers not to be drawn into a comparison. What is more, as I 
argue below, Thucydides actually does make the difference between the two individuals clear: one uses these 
arguments and rhetorical positions to moderate Athenian collective behavioral tendencies, while the other 




an empire (3.38.4, 7).202 Cleon’s seemingly direct reproach of his audience appears to closely 
mirror Pericles’ ability to avoid pandering and to speak to his audience angrily (2.65.8).  
Additionally, throughout his speech Cleon calls on his audience to stand by their previous 
decision, saying, ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι τῇ γνώμῃ … (“And so I am the same in my opinion 
…”; 3.38.1).203 This call for consistency is reminiscent of Pericles, who at the beginning of the 
war calls on the Athenians to maintain and enforce the Megarian decree: τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὦ 
Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι, μὴ εἴκειν Πελοποννησίοις (“Athenians, I always hold on to the 
same opinion, not to yield to the Peloponnesians”; 1.140.1), and after the plague says, with 
regards to his position on the war: καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι (“I am both the 
same and I have not changed”; 2.61.2).204  
Finally, the terms in which both leaders describe Athenian control of the Aegean are 
extremely similar. Cleon tells the Athenians to remember … ὅτι τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ 
πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄκοντας ἀρχομένους (“… that you have an empire that is a 
tyranny and over individuals who are plotting against you and are ruled unwillingly”; 3.37.2), 
while Pericles earlier states, ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν (“For you now hold it [your 
empire] like a tyranny”; 2.63.2).205 
                                                 
202 Westlake (1968: 63 n.1) reminds readers that despite Cleon’s comments, he is himself a skilled speaker, and 
Pelling (2000: 5) points out that at this very moment Cleon is in the act of presenting a highly bombastic speech, 
rendering this statement more of a rhetorical flourish than a serious accusation. 
203 See 3.37.4–38.1, 40.2 for the full extent of this rhetoric. 
204 On Cleon’s words at 3.38.1, see Zahn 1934: 65. Gomme (1956a: 302) and Classen and Steup (1892: 68) both 
note the similarity between 3.38.1 and 2.61.2. See also 2.13.2, when the Peloponnesians are preparing for their first 
invasion of Attica, and Thucydides reports that Pericles παρῄνει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἅπερ καὶ πρότερον 
(“Advised concerning the present matters just what he had earlier”; 2.13.2), and 2.60.1, when Pericles tells his 
audience that he has called an assembly after the plague ὅπως ὑπομνήσω … (“in order to remind you …”; 2.60.1).  
205 See Hornblower 1987: 56 n.40, 172. An important distinction may be drawn here, however: while Pericles uses a 
simile to describes the empire as being “like a tyranny” (ὡς τυραννίδα), and thus identifies the two as comparable, 
Cleon directly equates the two through his use of apposition (τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν). Hornblower (1987: 46 




These elements of Cleon’s first appearance cause Thucydides’ portrayal of Pericles to re-
enter readers’ minds, and therefore implicitly lead to a direct comparison between the two 
Athenian politicians. These surface-level similarities, however, quickly break down upon 
examination, and it becomes clear that Cleon, despite his similar rhetorical tactics, is an anti-
Pericles: while he shares Pericles’ persuasive ability, he uses it not to moderate the 
impulsiveness attributed to Athenian national character, but instead to attempt to unleash it.206 
Indeed, throughout his speech Cleon diminishes the usefulness of deliberation, and instead 
encourages the Athenians to act quickly, based on their emotions.  
Numerous examples of this point appear in Cleon’s speech from the Mytilenean debate, 
but two make this distinction most clear. First, returning to Thucydides’ introduction to Cleon, 
while the historian describes him as “most persuasive to the demos at that time” (3.36.6), which 
reminds readers of Pericles’ dominant rhetorical influence, he also provides the following 
description: Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ὅσπερ καὶ τὴν προτέραν ἐνενικήκει ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ὢν καὶ 
ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν (“Cleon the son of Cleaenetus, who also had won the 
previous judgment to kill [them], being with respect to other things the most violent of the 
citizens …; 3.36.6). While Pericles’ ability in speaking had been paired with his ability in acting 
(1.139.4), and elsewhere with his foresight, integrity, and ability to moderate the demos (2.65.8), 
Cleon’s speaking ability is linked solely with violence.207 The first introduction to this leader in 
the text, therefore, conditions readers to see Cleon as anything but a positive influence. 
                                                 
206 Connor (1971: 120) notes that Cleon often appears as a distorted version of Pericles, and Balot mentions that 
speakers like Cleon are regularly shown as manipulating the Athenian character “to produce devastating practical 
effects” (2004: 89). See also De Romilly 1963: 163–66 and Cairns 1982: 203, the second of whom argues that in 
Greek literature, who says something makes just as much difference as what it is that they say. 
207 This theme continues, as Thucydides makes it clear after the end of the Mytilenean debate (in his description of 
the second Athenian ship chasing the first to cancel its orders) that he found the original judgment abhorrent. See 




Furthermore, in the speech itself that follows this introduction, Cleon directly disparages 
aspects of the Athenian democracy which Pericles portrays in a positive light. Indeed, whereas 
Pericles in his funeral oration identifies Athenian deliberation as an integral and praiseworthy 
part of democratic decision-making (2.40.2), and elsewhere directly discourages the Athenians 
from acting based on their emotions (2.59.2–62.1), Cleon lambasts his audience for their 
deliberation, calling it a source of delay (διατριβὴν), and encourages them not to act with duller 
anger (ἀμβλυτέρᾳ τῇ ὀργῇ) (3.38.1). Thus, instead of moderating the Athenians’ collective 
tendency to act quickly and rashly (1.70.3, 7), he drives them to make (or in this case, to adhere 
to) a rapidly made, emotional decision (Pelling 2000: 9–10).208 
In combination with his description of Cleon as βιαιότατος, then, Thucydides 
demonstrates that this leader lacks a key component of Periclean governance: his moderate 
management of public matters, and especially of the demos.209 Cleon therefore comes off as an 
imitator of Pericles, and, as Andrewes argues, adopts Pericles’ rhetoric “for violent and (in 
comparison) trivial purposes” (1962: 75). In Thucydides’ presentation of leadership, however, 





                                                 
208 See Finley (1963: 172), who argues that “… Cleon attacks not only debate but the whole faith in reason and 
education that underlies it.” The growth of the emotional and subjective in speeches has been noted by Immerwahr 
(1973: 31). See also Grant (1974: 93), who states that while Thucydides admired Pericles’ ability to suppress the 
violent tendencies of the Athenian demos, he portrays Cleon as actually encouraging such behavior. We also see 
such emotion-based decision making in the Athenian response to the proposed expedition to Sicily, which Raaflaub 
(2006: 203-4) identifies as entirely consistent with their collective character. 
209 See Macleod’s remark, “Only the older man’s [Pericles’] unobtrusive rule could restrain the self-destructive 
tendencies of a democracy, unreason in the people (ii 65.9), irresponsibility and dissension among the leaders (ii 




Cleon and Pylos/Sphacteria 
 In the events leading up to the Athenian victory at Sphacteria, Thucydides yet again 
presents Cleon as a problematic Athenian leader and a typical Athenian demagogue. Most 
importantly, he is seen encouraging Athenian ambition, convincing his countrymen not to make 
peace with Sparta, and making promises that are so bold they drive his audience to laugh at him. 
 Cleon first appears in this episode after the Athenian forces, led by Demosthenes, have 
trapped a Spartan contingent on the island of Sphacteria. The Spartans send ambassadors to 
Athens to sue for peace, who call on the Athenians not to grasp at further successes (4.17.4), but 
instead to see their gains as provisional and liable to reversal (4.18.4).210 The Athenians are in a 
state of extreme confidence, however, and believe this offer of peace will be there for them any 
time they may want it. Thucydides closes his description of this Athenian attitude by noting, τοῦ 
δὲ πλέονος ὠρέγοντο (“and they were grasping at more”; 4.21.2). This verb is repeated from the 
Spartan speech above, and as such identifies the Athenians as directly ignoring the Spartans’ 
advice.211 The Athenians, despite (or perhaps because of) their present success, refuse to stop 
engaging in acquisition. This places the current Athenian behavior perfectly in line with previous 
descriptions of their national character, as they grasp for ever more, never satisfied with what 
they currently have (1.70.8).212  
                                                 
210 These entreaties seem directed at the established Athenian collective character (specifically their tendencies to 
constantly press for more and to never be happy with their present successes; 1.70.5, 7–8), and therefore serve as a 
Spartan request that the Athenians temporarily suspend their national character. The language used by the Spartans 
at 4.17.4 is particularly striking: αἰεὶ γὰρ τοῦ πλέονος ἐλπίδι ὀρέγονται διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰ παρόντα ἀδοκήτως εὐτυχῆσαι 
(“For because of their hope they always grasp at more, on account of also being unexpectedly successful in present 
matters”). 
211 Mynott points out that the verb ὠρέγοντο is repeated from 4.17.4, and states that this is a reminder that Athenian 
overreach contributed to their downfall (2013: 247 n.3). 
212 καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι (“and least of all do they enjoy what they already 




On this occasion, however, the Athenian collective is not identified as acting on its own 
devices; instead, Thucydides squarely places the blame for this Athenian disposition at Cleon’s 
feet: μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνῆγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον 
ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος (“and Cleon the son of Cleaenetus especially drove them on, a 
man who was a popular leader and at that time most persuasive to the multitude”; 4.21.3). Just as 
before in the Mytilenean debate, Cleon uses his influence to drive the Athenians to act on their 
emotions and desires and, moreover, to live up to their national character. In this instance, 
however, he succeeds. 
 Since the Athenians feel no urgent need to establish peace, Cleon convinces them to 
demand extremely harsh terms. When the Spartan ambassadors ask to speak with a smaller group 
of Athenians, Cleon then proceeds to lambast them, claiming that, if they refuse to speak openly 
before the entire Athenian populace, they must have insidious motives. The Spartans therefore 
withdraw without accomplishing anything, and the opportunity to make peace is lost. While 
scholars have questioned whether a peace established at this point in the war would actually have 
accomplished anything meaningful for Athens, it is clear from the text that Thucydides presents 
this as a squandered opportunity.213 He does this not only by quickly moving from the 
Athenians’ success at Pylos to the series of reversals they suffer at the hands of Brasidas, but also 
                                                 
213 Woodhead, for example, argues that the Spartan peace offer was worth little and would have resolved none of the 
underlying forces that led to war in the first place, and that Cleon therefore may not have been completely 
unreasonable for opposing it (1960: 311). While that may be an accurate portrayal of the historical reality of the 
situation, it does not change the fact that Thucydides presents this decision as a blunder, a point which Woodhead 
admits (1960: 311). Westlake agrees that Thucydides clearly believes that the Athenian refusal of peace was a major 
error in judgment, and blames Cleon for this result (1968: 68–9). Raaflaub states that the peace terms offered by 
Sparta were equivalent to a victory based on the Periclean strategy, and that Cleon squanders the opportunity (2006: 
206). Indeed, such a peace would have forced the Spartans to recognize the validity and extent of the relatively 
young Athenian empire, and would have amounted to a cessation of hostilities without giving up territory and 




by continuing to discredit Cleon, to whom he attributes all responsibility for the Athenian 
decision to spurn peace.214 
 For example, when the Athenian finds it difficult to make inroads against the Spartans 
trapped on Sphacteria, they begin to regret their decision to reject peace (4.27.2). Cleon disputes 
reports of these difficulties, but when the Athenians elect to send him with a party to investigate, 
Cleon realizes that his approach has backfired: 
καὶ γνοὺς ὅτι ἀναγκασθήσεται ἢ ταὐτὰ λέγειν οἷς διέβαλλεν ἢ τἀναντία εἰπὼν 
ψευδὴς φανήσεσθαι, παρῄνει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ ὡρμημένους τι τὸ 
πλέον τῇ γνώμῃ στρατεύειν, ὡς χρὴ κατασκόπους μὲν μὴ πέμπειν μηδὲ 
διαμέλλειν καιρὸν παριέντας, εἰ δὲ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα, 
πλεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας (4.27.4). 
 
And knowing that he would either be forced to say the same things as those whom 
he was attacking, or, saying the opposite, be revealed as a liar, he advised the 
Athenians, seeing that they were also eager in their judgment to make another 
expedition, that it was necessary neither to send scouts nor to delay and let their 
opportunity pass; but if the things being announced seemed to be true to them, [he 
advised them] to sail against the men. 
 
While Cleon deftly talks his way out of this corner, Debnar points out that the insertion of the 
terms διέβαλλεν and ψευδής into Cleon’s own, internal thought process appears to reveal a point 
of authorial judgment, and allows him to implicitly inform readers that Cleon knew that what he 
had said was not true (2013: 277–8). 
 In addition, when Cleon personally attacks the current general Nicias and claims that, 
given the opportunity, he could easily overcome the Spartans on Sphacteria, Thucydides makes 
him look thoroughly ridiculous. Nicias baits Cleon into accepting command when he thinks the 
offer is not serious, but then tries to backpedal when he realizes that it is (4.28.2). Thucydides 
relates that Cleon is “frightened” (δεδιὼς), but nevertheless the Athenians press him into 
                                                 
214 See Thucydides’ note at 5.14.1 on the Athenians’ loss of confidence after their defeats at Delium and 




accepting command (4.28.2–3). Cleon then publicly claims to be unafraid (despite having just 
been described as frightened), and promises to overcome the Spartans on Sphacteria within 
twenty days (4.28.4).  
Thucydides reports the Athenian response to this boast as follows:  
τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε μέν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῇ κουφολογίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ἀσμένοις δ’ ὅμως 
ἐγίγνετο τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, λογιζομένοις δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου τεύξεσθαι, 
ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι, ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον, ἢ σφαλεῖσι γνώμης Λακεδαιμονίους 
σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι (4.28.5). 
 
And on the one hand laughter fell upon the Athenians because of his empty speech, but 
nevertheless it happened that the prudent men were happy, reckoning that they would 
obtain one of two good things: either they would be rid of Cleon (which they rather 
expected), or if they erred in their opinion he would subdue the Lacedaemonians for 
them. 
  
This description, identifying Cleon’s claims as “empty speech” (κουφολογίᾳ) and mentioning 
that the Athenians laugh at him, seems designed to paint Cleon as a joke. Moreover, the fact that 
Thucydides identifies those who wish to be rid of Cleon as “prudent” (σώφροσι) appears to 
convey a further authorial judgment: those in Athens with sense do not approve of Cleon.215 
Thus, the author intentionally directs readers to see him as a blowhard and a braggart. 
 Even after Cleon takes command of the expedition, Thucydides grants him very little 
credit for the Athenians’ success. While he is mentioned as present for some negotiations 
(4.38.1, e.g.), most of the planning and leadership of the operation is attributed to Demosthenes 
(4.29.2–30.1). Moreover, the prominent role of luck in determining the outcome of this 
confrontation has often been discussed, and although scholars have proposed various 
                                                 
215 Said (2012: 199) believes the “wise” who laugh at Cleon are the elite. This sentence may also serve the rhetorical 




interpretations for this feature of the text,216 I argue that, at least in part, it serves to deprive 
Cleon of credit for the operation’s success.217 
Finally, when the Athenians shock the world by forcing the Spartans to surrender, 
Thucydides mentions that Cleon fulfilled his promise to the Athenians. He does this, however, in 
the following terms: καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος καίπερ μανιώδης οὖσα ἡ ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη (“And Cleon’s 
promise, although being crazy, came to pass”; 4.39.3). The author’s insertion of a concessive 
with a negative value judgment serves to diminish Cleon’s accomplishment in keeping this 
promise. It also neatly bookends the actual battle narrative—in which, as Westlake notes, Cleon 
actually does not come off badly (1968: 74–5)—with statements that are openly hostile toward 
Cleon and his promises to the Athenians.218  
In this way, Thucydides consistently portrays Cleon as a dishonest rabble-rouser and an 
object of derision. These points, when combined with the string of reversals in Books 4 and 5 
that drive the Athenians from their acme, lead readers to conclude that the Athenians made a dire 
mistake by listening to Cleon and rejecting peace. Yet again Cleon is highly persuasive among 
the Athenians, and yet again he uses this influence to encourage the Athenians to act on their 
natural proclivities, rather than attempting to restrain them. 
                                                 
216 See above during my discussion of Demosthenes for a summary of the different interpretations of this passage 
held by scholars such as Cornford (1907), Woodhead (1960), Connor (1984b), and Stahl (2003). See the following 
note for the current author’s interpretation of the passage. 
217 I have never thought it necessary to confine Thucydides to one reason for emphasizing the role fortune plays 
during events at Pylos/Sphacteria. I find it wholly reasonable that Thucydides is, at least in part, attempting to 
replicate for readers the genuine surprise that the Athenians felt at their success at Pylos (Connor 1984b: 118, 
Debnar 2013: 277). At the same time, however, we must note that Thucydides has directly portrayed the Athenians 
as laughing at Cleon when he promises victory over the Spartans, has described the promise itself as empty speech 
(4.28.5) and later as mad (4.39.3), and has stated that the “prudent” Athenians do not expect him to succeed and 
hope to be rid of him (4.28.5). Thus, while the role of fortune certainly may help readers experience the Athenians’ 
surprise at their success, part of this surprise hinges on the fact that Cleon, whom Thucydides has portrayed as a 
violent braggart, helps bring it about. Readers are then both generally surprised at the Athenians’ success, and at the 
same time get the impression that Cleon must not have played a very large role in making this success happen—
events simply resolved themselves in his favor. 
218 Westlake sums this up nicely: “Yet, as soon as Thucydides has completed his account of the military operations, 




Cleon in Northern Greece (the Death of Cleon) 
 In this episode—the last one in which Cleon appears—Thucydides gives readers a final, 
unfavorable view of him as an Athenian leader. The negativity of this portrayal does not center 
solely on his military failure, but extends to his personal character and his ability as a leader. 
This portrait is in many ways consistent with the character established for him in the previous 
episodes discussed in this chapter (and with that attributed to Pericles’ successors at 2.65.5–13): 
he is violent, brashly overconfident, and forced to act in accordance with the will of those whom 
he is meant to lead (cf. 2.65.8). 
 Cleon reappears near the end of Book 4, when Thucydides mentions that the Athenians 
pass a motion to recapture Scione and put its inhabitants to death, Κλέωνος γνώμῃ πεισθέντες 
(“persuaded by Cleon’s opinion”; 4.122.6). Thus, upon his reintroduction Cleon’s persuasiveness 
is immediately highlighted, in addition to his tendency to use it for violent ends.219 
 Next, after swiftly reporting Cleon’s actions at Torone, Stagirus, and Galepsus (two of 
which are successful), Thucydides moves on to describe the Athenians’ journey to 
Amphipolis.220 Cleon temporarily establishes himself at Eion to await reinforcements from 
Perdiccas and Thrace (5.6.2), but his soldiers become restless: 
ὁ δὲ Κλέων τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζεν, ἔπειτα ἠναγκάσθη ποιῆσαι ὅπερ ὁ Βρασίδας 
προσεδέχετο. τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ἀχθομένων μὲν τῇ ἕδρᾳ, ἀναλογιζομένων δὲ 
τὴν ἐκείνου ἡγεμονίαν πρὸς οἵαν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τόλμαν μετὰ οἵας 
ἀνεπιστημοσύνης καὶ μαλακίας γενήσοιτο καὶ οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ 
ξυνῆλθον, αἰσθόμενος τὸν θροῦν καὶ οὐ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ 
καθημένους βαρύνεσθαι, ἀναλαβὼν ἦγεν (5.7.1–2). 
 
And during that time Cleon was keeping quiet, but then he was forced to do what 
Brasidas expected. For with the soldiers upset because of their inactivity, and 
                                                 
219 See this chapter, p. 155, and compare Thucydides’ description of Cleon as βιαιότατος at 3.36.6. 
220 Scholars have noted that Thucydides’ account of Cleon’s campaign in northern Greece may be truncated, and that 
Cleon likely recovered numerous other Athenian allies before engaging in battle with Brasidas. See Westlake 1968: 




reflecting on the leadership of that man, against what sort of experience and 
daring [the contest] would be, and in comparison with what incompetence and 
cowardliness, and that they unwillingly came with him from home—hearing this 
murmur and not wishing them to be distressed on account of sitting in the same 
place, he led them with him. 
 
Though comprising only two sentences, this passage imparts to readers a wealth of interpretive 
material. First, the Athenian soldiers’ inability to keep still in this episode is both consistent with 
their continually active collective characterization (cf. 1.70.8–9), and strikingly similar to their 
previous actions at Pylos in 425 BCE. There, despite Demosthenes’ failure to convince the 
Athenian commanders to fortify the spot, the soldiers, chafing at remaining idle, took the task 
upon themselves (4.4.1). Here again the Athenian soldiers are depicted as simply incapable of 
keeping still, but with no constructive task at hand with which to busy themselves, they simply 
complain about their leadership. 
Next, the terms in which the Athenian soldiers describe Cleon and Brasidas further shape 
reader interpretation of these leaders. Thucydides makes it abundantly clear that Cleon lacks the 
respect of his soldiers, as they describe him as “inexperienced” and “cowardly” (attributes that 
Cleon’s behavior in the ensuing battle will confirm), and leads readers to expect blundering and 
failure, despite his previous success at Pylos.221 Due to the similarity of this negative treatment 
of Cleon to previous passages, this description may represent yet another instance of the author 
placing his own disapproval in the mouths and minds of others.222 
                                                 
221 “Das Urteil über Brasidas, wie über Kleon bleibt sich gleich, auch nach des letzteren Erfolg bei Pylos” (“The 
judgment concerning Brasidas, and that concerning Cleon, remains the same, even after the last success at Pylos”; 
Classen and Steup 1911: 11). 
222 Compare the Pylos episode, in which the Athenians laugh at Cleon and hope to be rid of him. Gomme (1956b: 
637) notes at length that the Athenians would have no reason (at least from episodes reported in the text up to this 
point) to be particularly afraid of Brasidas, having previously faced him in battle with success at Pylos, nor to 
suspect Cleon’s leadership ability. Thus Hornblower’s conclusion, “the opinions and comparisons are offered as the 




Additionally, Thucydides further guides readers to interpret Cleon’s leadership ability 
(and character) through his ultimate decision (though apparently “forced”—more on this 
momentarily) not to wait for reinforcements. Indeed, whether a commander has the patience to 
wait for reinforcements has played an important role in understanding the character of military 
commanders elsewhere in Thucydides, as in the cases of both Brasidas and Demosthenes. When 
on campaign with Perdiccas in northern Greece, Brasidas chooses to wait for reinforcements 
rather than press on, demonstrating his ability to restrain himself (and his men). Demosthenes, on 
the other hand, chooses not to wait for reinforcements during his expedition in Aetolia, and 
suffers a defeat, the severity of which Thucydides heavily emphasizes (3.98.3–4).223 Cleon’s 
ultimate decision to move forward before the arrival of auxiliaries thus paints him as similar to 
Demosthenes: a commander lacking the ability to avoid rash action. 
 Lastly, the fact that Thucydides describes Cleon as being “forced” by his soldiers to 
move to Amphipolis provides the final damning blow against him in this short passage. By 
depicting him as easily moved by the whisperings of his men, Thucydides portrays Cleon as 
lacking the ability to control the impulses of those whom he is meant to lead. This attribute 
firmly aligns Cleon with the later, inferior Athenian leaders described in Thucydides’ eulogy of 
Pericles. Indeed, one of the author’s key differentiators between Pericles and his successors is his 
ability to lead rather than be led: καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε (“and he was not 
lead by it [the plethos] more than he led it”; 2.65.8).224 Cleon directly fails this test, as he 
immediately gives in to the will of those he is meant to lead when he perceives that they do not 
                                                 
223 On Brasidas, see Ch. 2; on Demosthenes, see this chapter’s previous discussion, pp. 122–51. 
224 See also 2.65.9, where Thucydides attributes to Pericles the ability to check the Athenians when they grow 




approve of his decision.225 He therefore lacks a key requirement of positive Athenian leadership: 
the ability to check the impulses of the people.226 
 In his narrative of the battle that follows, Thucydides largely confirms the impression of 
Cleon readers have just received.227 His inexperience costs his troops dearly as he exposes their 
unshielded side during their withdrawal (5.10.4; Luginbill (1999: 150) blames this mistake on 
Cleon being “unnecessarily bold”, while Wylie (1992: 91) simply refers to him as “impatient”), 
and his death is particularly ignoble and cowardly. Indeed, despite the fact that the soldiers with 
him on the right wing stand their ground and fight, Thucydides vividly describes Cleon being 
struck down as he flees: τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔμενέ [τε] μᾶλλον, καὶ ὁ μὲν Κλέων, ὡς τὸ 
πρῶτον οὐ διενοεῖτο μένειν, εὐθὺς φεύγων καὶ καταληφθεὶς ὑπὸ Μυρκινίου πελταστοῦ 
ἀποθνῄσκει (“The right of the Athenians stood its ground more, and Cleon, since from the 
beginning he did not have in mind to stand his ground, immediately took flight and, caught by a 
Myrkinian peltast, died” (5.10.9). This description stands in direct contrast to the bravery of 
Brasidas, who leads the charge against the Athenian center, and eventually succumbs to wounds 
he suffers after he turns to attack the right wing, though not until he learns of his victory (5.10.6–
8, 11). 
 Thus, Cleon’s final actions are characterized by ineptitude and cowardice, and leave a 
lasting impression on the reader. As Woodhead mentions, however, this is not the only account 
of the Battle of Amphipolis, with Diodorus Siculus’ being much friendlier to Cleon and his 
conduct (D.S. 12.74; Woodhead 1960: 309–10). While this later account is sometimes 
                                                 
225 As described in Gomme’s note, he “was compelled to a reconnaissance by unrest among his men which he had 
not the character to control” (1956b: 637), and “his first failure (as far as we know) was his inability to withstand the 
restlessness of his soldiers, and, even more clearly, to inspire confidence in them” (1956b: 638). 
226 Brasidas’ extreme confidence that he will not be attacked when he moves closer to Amphipolis (5.7.3–5) is also 
very much in line with Athenian national character (esp. 1.70.3–5). 
227 See Westlake (1968: 78), who argues the account of the battle shows that Thucydides most likely agrees with the 




disregarded as conventional battle narrative (Gomme 1956b: 653), we may question whether 
Thucydides’ version, or at least his description of its commanders, is entirely trustworthy. 
Whether or not it is, however, the effect of the passage on the reader of Thucydides is the same: 
to find Cleon entirely lacking as a leader. 
Cleon is mentioned only one other time in Thucydides’ history, when the author 
famously notes that he and Brasidas had been the primary opponents to peace in their respective 
poleis: … ἐτεθνήκει Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδας, οἵπερ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μάλιστα ἠναντιοῦντο τῇ 
εἰρήνῃ, ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ὁ δὲ γενομένης ἡσυχίας 
καταφανέστερος νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων (“… both Cleon and 
Brasidas had died, who on either side were especially opposed to peace, the one both on account 
of his success and his receiving honor from making war, the other thinking that, if a period of 
rest were established, he would be more clear as a wicked man and less trustworthy in his 
attacks”; 5.16.1). Scholars have commented extensively on this passage, and particularly on the 
relationship they perceive Thucydides as creating between these two leaders by identifying both 
as opponents of peace. It is important to recognize, however, that Thucydides’ statement, 
equating the positions of the two leaders with regards to the war, does not necessarily equate the 
two leaders themselves. Indeed, as I have argued in this dissertation, leadership is relative in 
Thucydides, because what is positive for one city is not necessarily so for another. These two 
individuals both opposed peace, but two key differences must be accounted for: their 
motivations, and the effect of their opposition on their polis’ fortunes in the war. 
 Let us start with the latter concern—how Thucydides portrays the delay of peace from 
425 to 421 BCE as affecting Athens’ and Sparta’s respective positions in the war. When the 




point in the war: the Athenians had trapped a group of Spartan soldiers on the island of 
Sphacteria, and the Lacedaemonians were extremely afraid their men would be killed or captured 
(4.15.1–2). This left the Athenians in an extremely advantageous position, with the opportunity 
to offer peace terms favorable to themselves.228 
After the Athenians refused peace (at Cleon’s urging) and were victorious at Pylos, 
however, the Spartans, led by Brasidas, went on the offensive, capturing or luring to the 
Peloponnesian side a number of cities in northern Greece previously allied with Athens. These 
successes brought Sparta back to a position of relative parity with Athens at the negotiating table. 
Brasidas and Cleon’s opposition to peace, therefore, produce drastically different results: 
whereas Cleon’s is presented as a massive error in judgment and a missed opportunity, Brasidas’ 
results in the Spartans acquiring important bargaining chips. Thus, by opposing peace, Brasidas 
benefitted Sparta, while Cleon, by encouraging his Athenian audience’s urge to strive for ever 
more, significantly diminished Athens’ bargaining power. 
Finally, we may consider the motivations attributed to these two leaders for opposing 
peace. As noted above, Brasidas is identified as opposing peace “on account of his success and 
his receiving honor from making war” (διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμεῖν), while 
Cleon was “thinking that, if a period of rest were established, he would be more clear as a 
wicked man and less trustworthy in his attacks” (γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος νομίζων ἂν 
εἶναι κακουργῶν καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων; 5.16.2). While scholars have often noted that 
Thucydides attributes markedly personal motivations to both leaders, many, such as Gomme 
(1956b: 660) and Westlake (1968: 82), identify Cleon’s motives as much less honorable than 
                                                 
228 See above (p. 158 n. 213) for my response to the historical argument that a peace established at this point in time 




those of Brasidas.229 These deeply problematic reasons for opposing peace (which very closely 
resemble the reasons he opposes sending an embassy to appraise the situation at Pylos at 4.27.4) 
yet again cast him in an intensely negative light.230 
This description is the final portrait Thucydides provides of Cleon, and his pairing with 
Brasidas is not accidental; just as the author implicitly juxtaposes Cleon and Pericles in his first 
appearance, here he directly invites readers to compare Cleon and Brasidas.231 The narrative of 
the history has just made clear to readers that Brasidas’ opposition to the war, even if for 
personal reasons, benefitted Sparta and brought it out of its low point in the war. At the same 
time, they have followed Thucydides’ description of Cleon’s career, in which he has encouraged 
the Athenians to forego reason and act on their emotions and acquisitiveness (and thus to 
continue the war despite their accomplishments at Pylos and Sphacteria; 3.38.1, 4.21.3), 
knowingly misled his countrymen in order to maintain his influence (4.27.4), and (most recently) 
proved drastically inferior to Brasidas in both military acumen and bravery (5.10.4, 9). Thus, 
while the policy of these two leaders may be similar, it produced drastically different results for 
their two cities. In terms of characterization, Brasidas’ Athenian qualities are depicted as leading 
Sparta out of its nadir, while Cleon encourages the Athenians’ pre-existing tendency to never be 
                                                 
229 For more on the personal nature of Brasidas and Cleon’s motivations, see Gomme (1956b: 660), de Ste. Croix 
(1972: 153), Kallet-Marx (1993: 179–80), and Hornblower (1996: 462). At the same time, however, Brasidas’ 
motivations closely resemble those of Nicias for supporting peace (5.16.1), and for opposing the Sicilian expedition 
(6.9.2). What is more, seeking honor was originally a Homeric virtue, but was alive and well in the fifth century 
(Carter 1986: 17), and was not mutually exclusive to benefitting one’s state (Palmer 2015: 76). For more on 
Brasidas’ motivations see Ch. 2, where I argue that his motivations are markedly Athenian, and that he therefore 
again provides an impetus the Spartans are identified as generally lacking, whereas here, as will be argued, Cleon is 
described as providing nothing of the sort. 
230 “Notoriously, not the most objective-sounding sentence in all Th[ucydides]” (Hornblower 1996: 462). Westlake 
argues that Thucydides develops these motivations based on his assessment of Cleon’s character (1968: 82). 




satisfied with its accomplishments, and therefore causes them miss their most favorable 
opportunity for peace.232 
 
Conclusion 
 Cleon is not an easy leader to assess; arguments can be made that history has been unfair 
to him, and that Athens actually achieved a great deal under his leadership. While these points 
must be acknowledged, when one is specifically discussing Thucydides, it becomes extremely 
difficult to conclude anything other than that Cleon appears as an extremely negative leader for 
Athens: he openly disparages reason and debate in favor of emotional responses, leads the 
Athenians to miss what Thucydides portrays as their best opportunity for peace, and does all of 
this based not only on personal, but deeply problematic motivations. Even when he is associated 
with an Athenian accomplishment, Thucydides downplays his role or rapidly moves past it.233 
The question, then, ceases to be whether Cleon is a failed Athenian leader, and instead becomes, 
in Thucydides’ model, what makes him one. I argue that, while he also lacks some key Periclean 
traits (particularly Pericles’ moral uprightness; cf. 2.65.8), Cleon’s failure ultimately stems from 
the fact that he is simply too Athenian in character to be a positive Athenian leader. As such, he 
is incapable of providing the moderating force that Thucydides portrays Athens as needing (and 
only Pericles as truly providing), and instead drives his city to act on the excesses inherent in its 
national character. There may have been a context in which Cleon could have been a successful 
and even positive leader, but Athens was not it. 
                                                 
232 Connor sums up the differentiation between Cleon and Brasidas nicely: “While Cleon carries to an extreme the 
restless vigor of the Athenians, Brasidas, in his vigor, persuasiveness, decisiveness, and boldness, is a most 
untypical Spartan and seems to possess the qualities badly needed if his city is to succeed against Athens” (1984b: 
129). 
233 See my discussions of Cleon’s role at Pylos/Sphacteria (pp. 157–61) and his activities in northern Greece before 





It is a somewhat difficult task to discuss the character of Nicias. His status as “Spartan” 
and “un-Athenian” in character has often been discussed, with scholars emphasizing the 
hesitation and self-doubt he displays during the Sicilian Expedition, as well as these behaviors’ 
disastrous consequences for the Athenians.234 Such an approach, however, overemphasizes one 
(albeit important) passage of the text, and overlooks the many other episodes in which Nicias 
participates. Indeed, presenting Nicias as synonymous with failure ignores the relative success 
with which he operates in multiple episodes prior to the ill-fated Sicilian Expedition. In fact, 
Alcibiades, Nicias’ political rival, cites this very reputation for success in his speech encouraging 
the Athenians to sail against Sicily (6.17.1). We must therefore develop a fuller portrait of 
Nicias, accounting for his actions and behavior throughout the entire work, not simply during the 
Sicilian Expedition. This chapter will, therefore, be divided into three sections: an analysis of 
Nicias’ actions in the war before the establishment of the peace bearing his name, a discussion of 
his motivations and behaviors during the establishment and observance of this peace, and finally 
an in-depth examination of his role in the buildup to and prosecution of the Sicilian Expedition. I 
argue that Thucydides’ depiction of Nicias before this doomed military undertaking allows 
readers to become acquainted with the Athenian politician and general’s individual character and 
tendencies, and to observe his risk-aversion, hesitancy, old-fashioned style of leadership, and 
desire to preserve the status quo; in essence, then, they become familiar with his generally 
“Spartan” tendencies. In Books 6 and 7, readers may then observe the result when such 
leadership is combined with the most “Athenian” of undertakings: the Sicilian expedition. This 
result is, of course, less than optimal, and demonstrates that Nicias’ leadership, rather than 
                                                 
234 Strauss (1964: 213) and Connor (1984: 41), for example, both identify Nicias as possessing a character that is 




successfully moderating the Athenian tendency to swift, rash action (as I have argued that 
Pericles’ leadership did), temporarily pushes it too far to the other extreme, resulting in a 
hesitancy and aversion to decisive action reminiscent of Spartan conduct in the first half of the 
war. This observation demonstrates that, just as leaders whose individual character is too close to 
that of their own polis cannot moderate its weaknesses, likewise a leader who possesses a 
character too close to that of his enemy will not provide the necessary, moderating corrective 
force, but will simply replace one set of flaws with another. 
 
Nicias before Peace 
 Nicias’ role in the work is relatively limited until his disagreement with Cleon concerning 
the Spartan soldiers trapped on Sphacteria in Book 4. He is mentioned numerous times as a 
general, but apart from seeing him listed as a commander, readers learn little about him. Unlike 
the other Athenians discussed in this chapter, he rarely seems interested in adding territory to the 
Athenian empire, and his only decisive action in the first half of the war is the establishment of 
the peace bearing his name (which Cleon prevents until his death).  The military undertakings he 
leads are often successful (hence his reputation for good luck), but they are conducted in an 
entirely conventional way and rarely make any significant change in the power balance of the 
war. For example, he either leads the fortification of strategic positions, walls off an enemy, or 
raids the countryside. For example, at 3.51 he attacks the island of Minoa, off the coast of 
Megara, capturing the towers there and fortifying it with an Athenian garrison. Later in Book 3 
he leads an expedition against Melos which fails to capture the city, and so ravages their land and 
departs (3.91.1–3). He joins the full Athenian army at Tanagra (commanded by Hipponicus and 




5).235 The rest of the army departs, but Nicias and his forces sail to Locri, lay waste to the coastal 
areas, and then return to Athens (3.91.5–6). 
 In all of these episodes Nicias is largely successful, and readers may understand the 
source of his reputation for good fortune. At the same time, however, all of his successes are 
extremely limited in their scope, and in their effect on the course of the war as a whole.236 His 
tactics are extremely conventional, and look strikingly similar to how Spartans like Archidamus 
conduct the war: devastate the countryside or establish a small garrison and go home.237 
Moreover, when Nicias does score a victory in battle, he does not follow it up by pressing his 
advantage. He lacks the larger goals attributed to Demosthenes, Cleon, or Alcibiades, all of 
whom Thucydides describes as looking beyond the present to larger future goals—for 
Demosthenes, the capture of Aetolia leading to the conquest of Boeotia (3.94.3–95.1); for Cleon, 
turning the advantageous situation at Sphacteria into a total Athenian victory (4.21.3, 22.2–3); 
and for Alcibiades, seeking the conquest of Sicily while simultaneously looking past it to Italy 
and Carthage (6.15.2). 
 Thus, despite Nicias’ limited role early in the work, readers have the opportunity to begin 
forming an impression of him. His lack of daring, and his marked inability to press the advantage 
contrast sharply with other Athenian leaders, as well as with the Corinthian depiction of 
                                                 
235 This begins a theme to which I will return in this chapter: Nicias’ greatest successes almost always occur when he 
shares the command with other Athenian generals. One may, for example, cite his fortification of Cythera and 
harassment of the Spartan countryside together with Nicostratus and Autocles (4.53–7), or his recapture of Mende 
and Scione with Nicostratus (4.129.2–133.4). This trend places him in sharp contrast with Brasidas, for whom 
cooperation with or service under other Spartan generals consistently results in failure. 
236 On this point, see Westlake, who argues that Nicias’ undertakings produced victories of no real import, going on 
to say, “… while he escaped defeat, his half-successes afforded small compensation for the outlay involved” (1941: 
59–60). 
237 On the conventionality of the devastation of an opponent’s countryside, see Hanson, who points outs that 
“ravaging of cropland was central to warfare of most societies of the past,” and that “for nearly 300 years war in 
Greece was inaugurated and often defined by a struggle to destroy, or protect, grain, vines, and olive trees” (1998: 





Athenian national character.238 The first impressions of Nicias which Thucydides provides, 
therefore, lead readers to suspect that his leadership differs significantly from other Athenian 
generals and politicians, such as Demosthenes and Cleon. The question then becomes, does 
Nicias represent a return to Thucydides’ depiction of Periclean leadership, or is he something 
entirely new? 
 It is in Books 4 and 5 where the character of Nicias begins to come into focus, especially 
in his personal and political conflict with Cleon concerning the Spartans trapped on Sphacteria, 
and in his role in establishing peace. In the former episode Nicias appears relatively briefly, but 
Thucydides’ portrayal of him confirms his conservatism in comparison to other Athenian 
leaders, and demonstrates his tendency to employ ineffective (and often counter-productive) 
rhetorical stratagems.239 
 When Nicias enters the narrative, Cleon has begun to fear that the Athenians blame him 
for the difficulties the army is facing, since he played the most important role in turning away the 
Spartans’ previous overtures for peace (4.27.3). In an attempt to redirect the animus of the 
Athenian demos, he faults the current generals, referring directly to Nicias: καὶ ἐς Νικίαν τὸν 
Νικηράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἀπεσήμαινεν, ἐχθρὸς ὢν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν, ῥᾴδιον εἶναι παρασκευῇ, εἰ 
ἄνδρες εἶεν οἱ στρατηγοί, πλεύσαντας λαβεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, καὶ αὐτός γ’ ἄν, εἰ ἦρχε, ποιῆσαι 
τοῦτο (“And to Nicias the son of Niceratus, a general, he pointed, being his personal enemy and 
censuring him, [he said that] it was easy by preparation, if the generals were men, having sailed 
there to capture those on the island, and he himself would do this, if he were in command”; 
4.27.5). 
                                                 
238 Compare Nicias’ behavior to the description of the Athenians at 1.70.3–9. 




 Having previously been introduced to the character of Cleon (especially during the 
Mytilenean debate), readers here learn that Nicias is his personal enemy and political opponent, 
and may therefore see the latter’s conservatism set in stark relief with Cleon’s energetic yet 
bombastic demands for immediate success.240 
 In what follows, Thucydides sets up and then undermines reader expectations, a literary 
technique which seems designed to mirror the experience of the Athenians (at least as the author 
presents it) and, more importantly, that of Nicias.241 Indeed, when Nicias sees that the Athenians, 
instead of turning on him, are challenging Cleon to sail if he feels so confident, he offers to cede 
his position as general to his opponent (4.28.1). At this point, as discussed previously in this 
chapter, Thucydides’ text makes it clear that Cleon is caught off guard and goes on the defensive. 
Moreover, he looks quite ridiculous, to the point that many scholars have noted the visibility of 
the historian’s bias against him in this passage.242 Nicias’ gambit appears to have paid off, as 
Cleon finds himself in the seemingly impossible position of accepting a difficult command or 
withdrawing his objections and looking like a coward. 
 Two points must be noted, however. First and most obvious is the fact that, contrary to 
reader expectations, operations at Sphacteria result in a resounding victory for the Athenians 
(including the famously shocking capture of the Spartiates on the island) after Cleon assumes 
command.243 Thus, Nicias’ risky rhetorical and political maneuver produces a result completely 
antithetical to its intention: rather than discrediting Cleon (or even removing him entirely from 
the political scene by his death), it ends with his opponent being bathed in glory. It appears, then, 
                                                 
240 See this chapter, pp. 151–79, for a more thorough examination of the character of Cleon. 
241 Connor (1984: 113) argues that Thucydides shapes the entire narrative surrounding the events at Pylos and 
Sphacteria to replicate the emotions (primarily surprise) experienced by the Athenians at the time. 
242 See, for example, Westlake 1941: 60. For a discussion of this passage focusing on Cleon, see this chapter, pp. 
159–60. 
243 See this chapter, pp. 157–61, for an in-depth discussion of Thucydides’ construction of Cleon’s role in the 




that when Nicias puts aside his normally conservative behavior and attempts bold action, it 
results in absolute failure. 
 The second point in need of consideration is that while Thucydides certainly portrays 
Cleon negatively in his account of this confrontation, many scholars have noted that Nicias does 
not come away much better: he appears willing to allow the city and his fellow citizens to suffer 
in order to harm his political opponent, behavior that Westlake calls “not at all creditable” (1968: 
60; see also Hornblower 1996: 188, Westlake 1941: 60, Woodhead 1960: 313–14, Gomme 
1956b: 469, Henderson 1927: 216–17).244 The oft-proposed explanation for this passage is that 
Thucydides’ focus is on Cleon, not Nicias, and that as a result he passes over Nicias’ behavior 
without explicitly judging it.245  
 While the focus of this passage does indeed seem to be on Cleon, the modern reader is 
nevertheless likely to be struck by Nicias’ seemingly callous lack of concern for the suffering he 
and the “prudent men” (τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων; 4.28.5) at Athens reserve for their soldiers 
serving at Pylos. Nicias appears to be more concerned with maintaining his own τιμή—and with 
politically damaging the man who has attacked him—than with the general well-being of his 
polis’ citizens. This appears to fly in the face of longstanding associations of Nicias with civic-
                                                 
244 Plutarch (Nic. 8.1–2) states that public opinion deemed Nicias a coward for his willingness to give up command, 
citing Aristophanes Av. 639–40 and fr. 102 (in the first of which Aristophanes appears to chide Nicias’ characteristic 
hesitancy by deploying the clever verb μελλονικιάω). In addition, Plutarch claims that Alcibiades used Nicias’ 
behavior during the Pylos episode as a means to verbally attack him (Alc. 14.4–6). 
245 Gomme, for example, argues that, “the light-hearted dereliction of duty by Nikias, though not concealed, is not 
explicitly condemned,” though he later states that Thucydides surely realized that Nicias’ decision contributed 
directly to the (disastrous) rise of Cleon (1956b: 469). Westlake takes a slightly softer view, simply stating that, 
“Thucydides neither condemns nor defends the attitude of Nicias; he ignores it. He is following his normal practice 
of directing the attention of the reader to the most significant aspect of an episode—in this instance the mixture of 




mindedness,246 and, moreover, turns on its head Pericles’ claim that the individual citizen cannot 
prosper without first securing the success of his polis (2.60.2–4).247 
 It is at this point, then, that it first becomes truly clear that Nicias, although maintaining 
some of the policies and positions of Pericles, differs significantly from his predecessor.248 
Passing over the fact that Nicias’ political maneuver eventually backfires (which in and of itself 
appears entirely un-Periclean), this passage makes two related points clear. First, that Nicias’ 
public position on the proper relationship between the individual and the state differs greatly 
from that which Pericles is portrayed as directly espousing. Indeed, while Pericles had claimed as 
a defining Athenian feature the placement of the community’s well-being above personal gain 
(2.40.1–2, 42.4), and that individual citizens cannot prosper without the success of the polis 
(2.60.2–4), Nicias is visibly concerned with his own τιμή,249 to the apparently likely detriment of 
numerous Athenians.250 
 Second, this passage provides evidence that Nicias subscribes to what may be termed and 
“old-fashioned” idea of leadership, at least for Athens. This is because his emphasis lies on 
maintaining and defending his own honor when insulted by an opposing leader, Cleon (2.27.5, 
                                                 
246 See, for example, Rood (1998: 185–6), who claims that Nicias successfully combines the civic and the personal. 
Gribble (2006: 460), however, sees Nicias as regularly putting the personal before the civic, and identifies this as a 
flaw in his character. 
247 Alcibiades in Book 6 (6.16.2–4) proposes his own version of the relationship between the individual and the city-
state, arguing (it seems shockingly) that the individual’s achievements can bring both glory and success to the polis. 
For more on this reversal, see De Bakker 2013: 35). 
248 Nicias’ position as being either a follower of Pericles or an opponent of his policies has been debated. West 
(1924: 125–34), for example, argues essentially that Nicias was “following in the footsteps of Pericles” (1924: 134). 
Müller-Strübing (1873: 390–6) and Burns (2012: 221), on the other hand, each argues that Nicias represented a 
departure from both the Periclean model of leadership and his approach to the war. 
249 Thucydides uses the participle ἐπιτιμῶν to describe Cleon’s rebuke of Nicias (2.27.5), and then repeats the same 
word when he describes Nicias’ response: ὁ δὲ Νικίας … ὁρῶν αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμῶντα … (“And Nicias … seeing [Cleon] 
rebuking him …”; 2.28.1). 
250 Whether or not Pericles’ claims are meant to reflect the reality of Athens or, as I think more likely, were instead 
statements of democratic ideology is highly debatable. The behavior attributed to virtually all Athenian leaders after 




28.1).251 Nicias’ concern with honor and identification with the older ways of his city-state are 
both consistent in Thucydides: one of Nicias’ reasons for supporting the establishment of peace 
in 421 BCE is to maintain his position of honor (5.16.1); in trying to stop the Sicilian expedition, 
he appeals to the older generation to help him (6.13.1); after the failed raid on Epipolae in Sicily 
(7.48) he states his preference for an honorable death rather than returning to Athens and being 
blamed for the failure of the expedition; and he displays consistent religious reverence to an 
extent unobserved in most other Athenian leaders.252 Focusing specifically on Nicias’ concern 
for defending his individual honor, even if it means his fellow Athenians must suffer, such 
behavior is thematically reminiscent of Achilles’ withdrawal from the Trojan War in the Iliad. 
After warning Agamemnon that he would regret his actions because without him many Greeks 
would die (Hom. Il. 1.239–44), and then complaining to his mother Thetis that he is not 
receiving the honor that is his due (Hom. Il. 1.352–6), Achilles goes so far as to send her to Zeus 
with the following request: 
τῶν νῦν μιν μνήσασα παρέζεο καὶ λαβὲ γούνων 
αἴ κέν πως ἐθέλῃσιν ἐπὶ Τρώεσσιν ἀρῆξαι, 
τοὺς δὲ κατὰ πρύμνας τε καὶ ἀμφ᾽ ἅλα ἔλσαι Ἀχαιοὺς 
κτεινομένους, ἵνα πάντες ἐπαύρωνται βασιλῆος, 
γνῷ δὲ καὶ Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων 
ἣν ἄτην ὅ τ᾽ ἄριστον Ἀχαιῶν οὐδὲν ἔτισεν (Hom. Il. 1.407–12). 
 
Sit by him, remind him of the things happening now, and take him by the knees 
If somehow he is willing to give help to the Trojans, 
And to hem in the Achaeans at their ships and around the sea 
Dying, in order that all may enjoy their king, 
And the son of Atreus wide-ruling Agamemnon may know 
His folly, because he did not honor the best of the Achaeans at all. 
                                                 
251 Indeed, Carter argues that the Homeric drive to fame and honor were as strong at the end of the fifth century as 
they were earlier (1986: 17). 
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Achilles moves from claiming that Greeks will die to actively requesting that Zeus cause this to 
happen, all in the name of his own honor. This may strike modern readers as completely 
inappropriate behavior, but we must remember the regard in which the Iliad, and particularly the 
hero Achilles, were held in the ancient world.253 Just as Gomme (1956b: 459) and Westlake 
(1968: 88) argued, then, Thucydides is not necessarily passing moral judgment on Nicias. I argue 
that he is instead offering readers their first clear glimpse at the “old-fashioned” nature of his 
leadership, in an Athens that had largely moved past this model.254 He is, therefore, out of step 
both with Pericles, and with the other leaders of his day. What is more, this model of leadership 
identifies him as much more Spartan than Athenian. Indeed, one should not forget that in the 
Republic, Plato’s Socrates identifies Sparta as a timocracy inhabited by timocratic men (544c1–
3, 545a2–3, 545b3–7). 
 At this point in the narrative, then, Thucydides has made clear to readers that Nicias 
maintains a cautious conservativism in war which insulates him from failure but limits the 
impact of his successes, and that he observes an outdated and (according to Pericles) un-
Athenian model of leadership. In addition, readers have seen that Nicias can at times be 
associated with larger successes, but only when he shares command with other Athenian 
generals. The episodes that follow serve to strengthen and confirm this impression.  
 Such is the case in Thucydides’ description of events at and around Corinth in 425 BCE 
(4.42.1–45.2). With Nicias in command (4.42.1), the Athenians score an initial, hard-fought 
victory over the Corinthians (4.43.1–44.3), but withdraw when they learn of the imminent arrival 
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of enemy reinforcements (4.44.4–6). They then sail to the neighborhood of Crommyon and 
proceed to lay waste to its countryside. Next, they wall off Methana’s isthmus and establish a 
garrison, plunder the areas of Troezen, Halieis, and Epidaurus, and finally sail home.  
Nicias does not serve as sole commander of this expedition, however. Indeed, the 
historian introduces this episode by stating that Nicias serves as general together with two others: 
ἐστρατήγει δὲ Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου τρίτος αὐτός (“And Nicias the son of Niceratus was general, 
with two others”; 4.42.1). Thus, while the historian focuses the narrative on Nicias by naming 
him alone, readers may also note that Nicias again finds success while serving with other 
Athenian generals, just as earlier when he and the combined Athenian army defeated the 
Tanagrans and Thebans (3.91.4–5).  
In addition, apart from the initial Athenian victory in direct battle with the Corinthians, 
Athenian forces exhibit largely conventional, risk-averse military behavior: they withdraw when 
faced with the arrival of reinforcements, and they then focus on devastation and investment of 
other territory. Thus, this expedition results in no decisive shifts in the balance of power in the 
war; in fact, it actually seems much more in line with the restrained Periclean strategy of ongoing 
military harassment.  
Finally, Thucydides even appears to minimize Nicias’ role in this passage. After the 
historian identifies him as general at 4.42.1, he does not mention him again in this episode, 
whether by name or position. Instead, in his narrative of the battle and of the subsequent 
devastation of enemy territory, Thucydides simply attributes actions to “the Athenians” (4.42.3–




to the success of this operation—Thucydides is not untruthful, in that he mentions Nicias’ 
command, but he then quickly allows him to disappear into the background.255  
The next passage in which Nicias appears—his expedition against Cythera (4.53.1–57.4), 
in which he and the Athenians capture and garrison the island of Cythera and attack the Laconian 
seaboard—shares many of these features as well. Indeed, this expedition is highly successful, as 
well as extremely effective in psychologically rattling the Spartans, coming as it does on the 
heels of the Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria. Thucydides is explicit in stating the 
importance of Cythera to the Spartans, describing the consistent presence of a Spartan garrison 
there, the attention they paid to the island, and its role as both their primary port for merchant 
traffic and as a buffer against piracy in Laconia (4.53.2–3). In addition, Thucydides includes a 
lengthy description of Spartan morale after the Athenian capture of Cythera in which he makes it 
abundantly clear that they felt—at least temporarily—overwhelmed by seemingly endless 
Athenian (naval) aggression and good fortune: 
ὥστε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς ἱππέας τετρακοσίους κατεστήσαντο καὶ τοξότας, ἔς τε τὰ 
πολεμικά, εἴπερ ποτέ, μάλιστα δὴ ὀκνηρότεροι ἐγένοντο, ξυνεστῶτες παρὰ τὴν 
ὑπάρχουσαν σφῶν ἰδέαν τῆς παρασκευῆς ναυτικῷ ἀγῶνι, καὶ τούτῳ πρὸς 
Ἀθηναίους, οἷς τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρούμενον αἰεὶ ἐλλιπὲς ἦν τῆς δοκήσεώς τι πράξειν· 
καὶ ἅμα τὰ τῆς τύχης πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ ξυμβάντα παρὰ λόγον αὐτοῖς ἔκπληξιν 
μεγίστην παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐδέδισαν μή ποτε αὖθις ξυμφορά τις αὐτοῖς περιτύχῃ οἵα 
καὶ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ. ἀτολμότεροι δὲ δι’ αὐτὸ ἐς τὰς μάχας ἦσαν, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι κινήσειαν 
ᾤοντο ἁμαρτήσεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν γνώμην ἀνεχέγγυον γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῆς πρὶν 
ἀηθείας τοῦ κακοπραγεῖν. τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις τότε τὴν παραθαλάσσιον δῃοῦσι τὰ 
μὲν πολλὰ ἡσύχασαν … (4.55.1–56.1). 
 
The result was that, contrary to their custom, they raised 400 horsemen and 
archers, and they became even more hesitant with respect to matters of war, if 
ever they were, having become involved in a naval contest, contrary to the 
existing form of their preparation, and this against the Athenians, for whom to not 
attempt a thing always fell short of their expectation that they would accomplish 
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that this demonstrates that Thucydides was not focused on what this episode reveals about Nicias, as a person or as a 




something. And at the same time many matters of fortune having in a short span 
turned out contrary to reason presented them with the greatest consternation, and 
they feared that at some point some disaster would again fall upon them like that 
on the island. And they were less daring with respect to battles on account of this, 
and they thought that whatever they set in motion would fail, on account of their 
having become unsure in their judgment from their earlier inexperience in faring 
badly. They very much kept still while the Athenians ravaged the seaboard …  
 
Thus, as mentioned above, this expedition proves extremely effective in further eroding Spartan 
morale, and is possibly the most thoroughly successful expedition in which Nicias takes part.256 
The Athenian incursion drives the Spartans to give up on their one strength, and the very thing 
they had been trying to force the Athenians into from the very beginning of the war: a decisive 
land battle. 
 Despite the positive effects of this incursion against Cythera (for the Athenians), several 
important observations may be made concerning Nicias’ role in the episode. First, he is 
introduced as sharing command with the generals Nicostratus and Autocles (4.53.1). Yet again, 
as mentioned above, Nicias’ greatest successes come when he is paired with other 
commanders.257 He appears to have something to offer during a military expedition, but, as will 
become clear through an examination of his actions during the Sicilian Expedition, his leadership 
impulses move beyond being a moderating force for Athenian national character, and instead 
need to themselves be countered. 
 In addition, it is important to note the specific contexts in which Thucycides directly 
mentions Nicias. Indeed, the historian mentions him by name three times between 4.53.1 and 
4.57.4: first, as mentioned above, in identifying him as a general (4.53.1); second, as negotiating 
the terms of surrender with the Cytherians (4.54.2); and finally to note the fact that Nicias had 
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previously negotiated with the Cytherians, which in this instance allowed the Athenians to agree 
to terms with them more quickly (4.54.3). 
 While an argument that Thucydides is suppressing Nicias’ role in this passage would be 
difficult to make, given the fact that Nicias is the only general mentioned more than once,258 I 
believe we may surmise that the historian is in fact associating him with a specific set of 
behavioral tendencies. Nicias does not play a direct role in the aggressive, attacking style 
characteristic of Athenian warfare, but instead displays his desire to rapidly end hostilities on 
moderate terms. Thucydides actually breaks from his narrative to state that the terms Nicias 
offered to the Cytherians were better than those which other Athenians would have pursued, 
stating, δι’ ὃ καὶ θᾶσσον καὶ ἐπιτηδειότερον τό τε παραυτίκα καὶ τὸ ἔπειτα τὰ τῆς ὁμολογίας 
ἐπράχθη αὐτοῖς· ἀνέστησαν γὰρ <ἂν> οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Κυθηρίους, Λακεδαιμονίους τε ὄντας καὶ ἐπὶ 
τῇ Λακωνικῇ τῆς νήσου οὕτως ἐπικειμένης (“On account of which, the terms of the agreement, 
with respect to both the present and the future, were made more quickly and more 
advantageously for them. For the Athenians would have removed the Cytherians, both since they 
were Lacedaemonians and because the island lay so close to Laconia” (4.54.3). 
Such aggressive behavior at its most extreme occurs, of course, after the Melians refuse 
to accept Athenian domination (5.1163–4). It seems, then, that Thucydides is informing his 
readers that Nicias’ presence and intervention restrained his countrymen’s treatment of the 
Cytherians.259 Well before the establishment of the peace of Nicias, therefore, the historian 
provides information that allows readers to associate Nicias not with conquest at any cost, but 
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with deal-making and putting a stop to direct hostilities. His individual tendencies are again 
antithetical to those generally associated with Athens. 
The final episode in which Nicias appears before his role in the establishment of the 
peace accord bearing his name—his expedition to recapture Mende and Scione from Brasidas 
and the Peloponnesians—again bears many similarities to these previous episodes. For example, 
despite several setbacks, the expedition is largely successful: the Athenians recapture Mende, and 
successfully wall off Scione after the Peloponnesian garrison departs (4.129.2–131.2). As such, 
Nicias maintains his reputation for success.260 As Luginbill (1999: 149–50) notes, however, a 
hurried attack on a hill outside Mende by Nicias and then Nicostratus nearly results in the 
destruction of the whole army: καὶ ἐς ὀλίγον ἀφίκετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων 
νικηθῆναι (“And the whole army of the Athenians came very close to being defeated”; 4.129.4). 
It is only after the popular party in the city attacks the Peloponnesians there and leaves the gates 
open that Nicias and the Athenians capture Mende (4.130.2–6). Indeed, Thucydides makes it 
clear in his narrative that the opening of the gates had not been arranged beforehand: οἱ δὲ 
Ἀθηναῖοι (ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἐπαναστρέψας πρὸς τῇ πόλει ἦν) ἐσπεσόντες ἐς τὴν Μένδην 
πόλιν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ἀνοιχθεῖσαν, ἁπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ὡς κατὰ κράτος ἑλόντες 
διήρπασαν (“And the Athenians—for Nicias had already turned around and was by the city—
bursting into the city of Mende, because it had not been opened up based on an agreement, with 
their whole army plundered it as if having taken it by force …”; 4.130.6). While the operation 
does ultimately result in the recapture of Mende, Thucydides presents Nicias’ success as a 
reflection of his good fortune.261 
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Additionally, readers may observe that Nicias yet again does not operate alone as general, 
but works alongside Nicostratus (4.129.2). Thus, the trend continues of seeing Nicias’ more 
meaningful successes occurring when he shares the command with another general. This trend 
will be revisited in this chapter’s discussion of the depiction of Nicias’ leadership during the 
Sicilian expedition. 
Before the establishment of the peace, then, despite the fact that Thucydides has spent 
very little time directly discussing Nicias’ character, he has indirectly displayed certain important 
aspects of his personality. The conservatism of the majority of the expeditions he leads is 
apparent when compared with the adventurous, risky undertakings of Demosthenes and Cleon. 
While these last two Athenian generals and politicians look beyond their undertakings to greater 
conquest (at least as Thucydides reports it in his discussion of their internal motivations), when 
left to his own devices Nicias consistently achieves some minimal success, such as the 
devastation of a region’s land (essentially the same strategy which the Spartans employ against 
Athens during the Archidamian War), and returns home to avoid disaster. Indeed, it is only when 
he works with other generals that the military enterprises with which he is associated achieve 
greater, more meaningful successes.  
At the same time, the conservatism of Nicias’ approach to the war is matched by his old-
fashioned view of leadership, at least as viewed against the statements of democratic ideology 
which Thucydides places in the mouth of Pericles.262 Instead of placing the good of the city 
before his own, Nicias clings to the notion that he must defend his own honor and good fortune 
in the face of insult from other politicians, even if it means many other citizens of his polis will 
suffer. 
                                                 




 The result of all of these observations is that, despite the fact that Nicias’ regular 
appearance in the narrative makes it clear that he played a prominent and recurring role in the 
war, readers are left with the impression that this role may not have been particularly 
consequential. As Westlake describes it, “The record of the part played by Nicias in the history 
of the war up to this point is somewhat colourless, even superficial. It suggests that, although no 
other Athenian was so frequently entrusted with duties which offered opportunities to display 
powers of leadership, his contribution did not appear to Thucydides to be particularly important, 
original or instructive … the reader is left with the feeling that his leadership was not such as was 
likely to bring about final victory in the war …” (Westlake 1968: 93).263 While Westlake takes 
his observations to mean that Thucydides’ “colourless” portrayal of Nicias reflects the author’s 
belief that his interventions were not interesting and do not contribute much to a general 
understanding of the larger lessons of the war, I believe all of this contributes to Thucydides’ 
larger portrayal of Nicias. In essence, Nicias is boring because he is supposed to be boring; he is 
a leader who lacks dynamism in the most dynamic of poleis, and thus whose individual character 
differs about as strongly as possible from that of Athens collectively. He is hesitant, extremely 
risk averse, and conservative—essentially, Spartan. At the same time, however, he does very 
occasionally attempt bold strategies, but they prove to be ill-timed or poorly implemented, and 
result in failure. It is on this note that we move on to Thucydides’ depiction of Nicias during the 
establishment of the peace bearing his name and the buildup to the Sicilian Expedition. 
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Nicias and the Peace 
 Just after listing Cleon and Brasidas as the primary opponents to peace during the 
Archidamian war, Thucydides lists those who supported the cessation of hostilities: Pleistoanax 
the Spartan and, of course, Nicias son of Niceratus. The reasoning which Thucydides provides 
for Brasidas and Cleon’s opposition, and what this information tells readers about their character, 
has already been discussed. We now turn to the historian’s explanation for why Nicias (and his 
Spartan counterpart) favored the establishment of peace: 
τότε δὴ ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ πόλει σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν Πλειστοάναξ τε ὁ 
Παυσανίου βασιλεὺς Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου, πλεῖστα τῶν τότε 
εὖ φερόμενος ἐν στρατηγίαις, πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον προυθυμοῦντο, Νικίας μὲν 
βουλόμενος, ἐν ᾧ ἀπαθὴς ἦν καὶ ἠξιοῦτο, διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐτυχίαν, καὶ ἔς τε τὸ 
αὐτίκα πόνων πεπαῦσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ τοὺς πολίτας παῦσαι καὶ τῷ μέλλοντι 
χρόνῳ καταλιπεῖν ὄνομα ὡς οὐδὲν σφήλας τὴν πόλιν διεγένετο, νομίζων ἐκ τοῦ 
ἀκινδύνου τοῦτο ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ὅστις ἐλάχιστα τύχῃ αὑτὸν παραδίδωσι, τὸ δὲ 
ἀκίνδυνον τὴν εἰρήνην παρέχειν … (5.16.1). 
 
In fact at that time in each city, being especially zealous for political supremacy, 
Pleistoanax the son of Pausanius, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias the son 
of Niceratus (who was most successful of his contemporaries in his generalships) 
were much more eager [for peace]; Nicias wishing to preserve his good fortune 
while he was still honored and without suffering, and in the present both to put a 
stop to his toils and to stop them for his citizens, and to leave as his reputation for 
the future that he lived his life having led his city to no error, believing that this 
came about from a lack of danger and for the person who least hands himself 
over to fortune, and that peace offered this lack of danger …264 
 
Thucydides’ description of Nicias’ internal reasoning for supporting peace is crucial in helping 
readers better understand the character that is being assigned to him. First, this passage reinforces 
the importance which Nicias places on his own station and honor in the polis.265 While some 
have read this as a character flaw, I argue, as earlier, that it is instead consistent with Nicias’ 
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larger trend of being “old-fashioned”: while during the Sicilian Expedition Thucydides confronts 
readers with Nicias’ firm belief in the power of omens, in this passage he demonstrates his 
subscription to an earlier idea of political leadership, in which his own honor takes pride of 
place.266  
 In addition to Nicias’ observance of an older, heroic standard of leadership, Thucydides’ 
description also places a great deal of emphasis on his absolute rejection of risk. As has been 
noted, the expeditions over which Nicias exercises sole command often end quickly, taking on 
very limited goals (such as the devastation of enemy territory), and accomplishing little of lasting 
value.267 Again in the present passage, whether or not readers consider the establishment of 
peace to be a good thing, Thucydides describes Nicias’ desire to put a stop to the war as resulting 
from his deep-seated aversion to risk, and his desire to maintain a reputation for never leading 
his polis to disaster.268 This portrayal is completely at odds with the behavioral tendencies which 
have been attributed to the Athenians throughout the work, especially in the Corinthian 
comparison in Book 1. There, in describing the Athenians the Corinthian speaker says, αὖθις δὲ 
οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες 
(“And again they are daring beyond their strength and run risk beyond [good] judgment and are 
hopeful in dire straits”; 1.70.3), and goes on, καὶ ἃ μὲν ἂν ἐπινοήσαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων 
στέρεσθαι ἡγοῦνται (“And if they think of anything but do not carry it out, they believe that they 
are deprived of their own possessions”; 1.70.7). He then informs readers that the Athenians are 
constantly engaged in acquisition, and actively abhor inactivity (ἡσυχία; 1.70.8).269 As 
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mentioned above, Thucydides states that the Spartans have received just this impression from the 
Athenians after events at Pylos/Sphacteria and Cythera. Indeed, the historian identifies the 
Spartans as fearing their present circumstances because they feel unprepared for the war in which 
they find themselves involved, being naval in nature, καὶ τούτῳ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, οἷς τὸ μὴ 
ἐπιχειρούμενον αἰεὶ ἐλλιπὲς ἦν τῆς δοκήσεώς τι πράξειν (“and this against the Athenians, for 
whom the thing not attempted was always lacking their expectation that they would 
accomplish something”; 4.55.2). 
 Nicias, however, shows no such concern for missing opportunities for further acquisition. 
 Instead, Thucydides attributes to him a desire to preserve his good fortune and to avoid 
failure.270 Nicias therefore does not see future action as an opportunity for further 
accomplishment, but as a source of risk to be avoided. To summarize, one might say he wishes to 
preserve what he already has—a position which may be recognized as markedly Spartan.271 As 
we will see, this impulse will not result in Nicias acting as a moderating force for Athens, as was 
the case with Pericles, but will instead—especially when he serves as general alone or acts as the 
dominant commander—turn the Athenian forces serving under him into habitual delayers, often 
with disastrous consequences. 
 Many of the same features of Nicias’ character persist in his other appearances during the 
peace. For example, during the cessation of direct hostilities between Athens and Sparta, there is 
a famous confrontation between Nicias and Alcibiades which puts the contrast in their characters 
in sharp focus. Alcibiades, because he wants to make an alliance with the Argives, Eleans, and 
Mantineans, seeks to discredit Spartan ambassadors who have arrived at Athens. As such, he 
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convinces them to falsely claim in the Assembly that they have not been granted plenipotentiary 
powers, and when they do he publicly attacks them, and in the process turns the Athenian people 
against them (5.45.1–4).  
What this passage tells readers about Alcibiades, his motivations, and his character will 
be discussed in detail in the next chapter; what is of interest at present is Nicias’ reaction to this 
development. The next day, Nicias addresses the assembly and states that postponing the war is 
in the Athenians’ advantage: λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῷ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ τὸν 
πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι (“Saying that delaying the war was in their favor, and unfavorable for 
them [the Spartans]”; 5.46.1). He then goes on to claim that σφίσι μὲν γὰρ εὖ ἑστώτων τῶν 
πραγμάτων ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἄριστον εἶναι διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐπραγίαν, ἐκείνοις δὲ δυστυχοῦσιν 
ὅτι τάχιστα εὕρημα εἶναι διακινδυνεῦσαι (“with matters going well for them [the Athenians] as 
long as possible, it was best to preserve their success, but that for them [the Spartans], since they 
were doing poorly, it was necessary to make a desperate chance attempt as quickly as possible”; 
5.46.1). 
 In these statements attributed to Nicias, Thucydides persists in emphasizing three 
important characteristics: the politician’s recurrent desire to delay action; his related, deep-seated 
desire to avoid risk wherever possible; and his particularly un-Athenian desire (or perhaps one 
should simply say willingness) to preserve the status quo. Just as before when the historian 
discussed Nicias’ internal motives for supporting the establishment of peace, here Thucydides 
has him directly voice many of the same sentiments. As such, he attempts to convince his fellow 
Athenians to eschew their tendency to desire more (a tendency to which Alcibiades’ policy 




Sparta: Sparta seeks risky gain to improve their situation, but we Athenians would be served best 
by simply holding onto what we have. 
 Nicias’ actions following his address to the Athenians also reflect his established 
character. After advising the Athenians to delay war, maintain their friendship with Sparta, and 
preserve their current general good fortune, he proceeds to Sparta as part of an embassy to 
demand that they return Panactum and Amphipolis, and renounce their alliance with the 
Boeotians, unless the latter group accepts the current treaty (5.46.2). This attempt to strengthen 
the fraying peace fails almost completely, however. Thucydides describes the Spartan response, 
and Nicias’ weak attempt to salvage the embassy as follows: 
 
τὴν μὲν ξυμμαχίαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Βοιωτοῖς οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀνήσειν, 
ἐπικρατούντων τῶν περὶ τὸν Ξενάρη τὸν ἔφορον ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι 
τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν, τοὺς δὲ ὅρκους δεομένου Νικίου ἀνενεώσαντο• ἐφοβεῖτο 
γὰρ μὴ πάντα ἀτελῆ ἔχων ἀπέλθῃ καὶ διαβληθῇ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο, αἴτιος δοκῶν 
εἶναι τῶν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους σπονδῶν. ἀναχωρήσαντός τε αὐτοῦ ὡς ἤκουσαν 
οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος πεπραγμένον, εὐθὺς δι’ ὀργῆς εἶχον, καὶ 
νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι (ἔτυχον γὰρ παρόντες οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι) 
παραγαγόντος Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐποιήσαντο σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τήνδε 
(5.46.4–5). 
 
The Lacedaemonians refused to dissolve their alliance with the Boeotians, with 
Xenares the ephor and his partisans bringing about that these things happen, and 
however many others were of the same opinion; but with Nicias requesting it they 
renewed the oaths, for he feared lest he go away having accomplished nothing and 
be slandered (which very thing even happened), seeming to be the cause of the 
treaty with the Lacedaemonians. And so after he returned, when the Athenians 
heard that nothing had had been accomplished in Lacedaemon, immediately they 
were angry with him, and believing that they had been wronged (for the Argives 
and their allies happened to be present), with Alcibiades bringing them forward 





The first thing that may strike readers about this passage is just how thoroughly Alcibiades 
outmaneuvers Nicias in this episode.272 Nicias’ inability to persuade the Athenians to follow his 
advice will, of course, again play a decisive role in their decision to enter upon the Sicilian 
Expedition. Moving beyond the immediate issue of the comparative rhetorical and political skill 
of these two political and military commanders, however, it is also necessary to access what this 
statement tells us about the deeper characterization which Thucydides applies to Nicias. 
 Three familiar observations may be taken from Thucydides’ description of Nicias’ 
internal deliberations and actions while in Sparta. First, just as in his public spat with Cleon in 
Book 4 during the Pylos/Sphacteria episode, and just as he will do in his debate with Alcibiades 
just before the Sicilian expedition, here again Nicias makes the rare (and ill-fated) decision to 
adopt a risky strategy, this time by publicly asking the Athenians to wait while he goes with an 
embassy to Sparta, thus making himself personally responsible for its results. Yet again, his 
attempt at risk backfires, and in this case, Alcibiades gets exactly what he wants: an alliance with 
the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans. As will be argued is the case with Spartan leaders, on the 
rare occasion when a leader whose personality skews strongly toward extreme hesitation 
attempts to be bold or take a risk, such an undertaking almost always ends in failure. Time and 
again it simply seems like Nicias lacks the ability to properly deploy boldness in the way that has 
made Athens so generally successful. 
 Additionally, when Nicias fails to obtain the concessions he hoped from the Spartans, he 
yet again displays his concern for his own position in Athens. This concern, which leads Nicias 
to ask the Spartans to renew their oaths—a move which Mynott describes as a “hollow gesture” 
(2013: 352 n.1)—is part of his antiquated view of Athenian leadership based on older heroic 
                                                 




models. Moreover, as has been demonstrated, it brought about Nicias’ impulse to turn over 
command to Cleon in the above-mentioned Pylos episode, and as will be discussed momentarily, 
plays a major role in preventing him from withdrawing from Sicily after the tide turns against the 
Athenians. 
 Finally, Thucydides yet again displays Nicias’ tendency to do just enough to allow him to 
claim success, or at least that he was not unsuccessful. As mentioned above, in describing 
Nicias’ participation in the war before the peace of Nicias, Westlake says, “the reader is left with 
the feeling that his leadership was not such as was likely to bring about final victory in the war” 
(1968: 93), and that, “while he escaped defeat, his half-successes afforded small compensation 
for the outlay involved” (1941: 59–60). Nicias brings such “success” to his embassy to Sparta, 
although this time it simply is not enough to placate the Athenians, whom Alcibiades has stirred 
up. 
 To summarize, Nicias’ appearances in Book 5 serve to reinforce many of the character 
traits which Thucydides’ narrative attributed to him indirectly and largely piecemeal in Books 3 
and 4. It thus helps readers in their transition from this earlier, sporadic characterization of Nicias 
into Books 6 and 7, in which Thucydides will enter into a much more extended examination of 
his old-fashioned, “Spartan” behavioral tendencies, and their effect on the most acquisitive, risk-
tolerant, and “Athenian” of all undertakings: the Sicilian expedition. 
 
Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition 
 Moving into Books 6 and 7, Nicias’ character becomes of primary importance to the 
development of the narrative. Indeed, his participation in the war becomes a focal point for 




 These speeches have been discussed quite often, reflecting both scholars’ general 
analytical emphasis on the speeches in Thucydides, and, more specifically, their fascination with 
the contrast that the historian creates between Nicias and Alcibiades, and their respective 
relationships with the demos. For the moment, I will focus on what these speeches demonstrate 
about the character of Nicias. I will return to this passage in the next chapter for a more in-depth 
discussion of Alcibiades.273 
 Even before Nicias’ first speech in opposition to the expedition, Thucydides makes his 
position clear to readers. He reports that the Athenians chose Nicias to serve as general for the 
expedition against his will, and describes Nicias’ opinion as follows: νομίζων δὲ τὴν πόλιν οὐκ 
ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ προφάσει βραχείᾳ καὶ εὐπρεπεῖ τῆς Σικελίας ἁπάσης, μεγάλου 
ἔργου, ἐφίεσθαι (“thinking that the city was not counseled rightly, but that it aimed at all of 
Sicily—a great deed—on a slight and convenient pretext”; 6.8.4). At this point in the narrative 
Thucydides has already confirmed that the conquest of Sicily is indeed the true aim of this 
expedition (6.6.1),274 and thus readers will see that Nicias’ judgment is at least partially correct. 
At the same time, however, readers will also recall his oft-established aversion to risk, and see 
this as yet another episode in which he desires to temper Athenian acquisitiveness. Whether one 
believes that the Sicilian Expedition was a good or bad idea,275 Nicias sees it as an unnecessary 
and avoidable risk, and opposes it largely on this basis—a response that is consistent with his 
                                                 
273 Specifically, see pp. 236–48. 
274 τοσαῦτα ἔθνη Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων Σικελίαν ᾤκει, καὶ ἐπὶ τοσήνδε οὖσαν αὐτὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύειν 
ὥρμηντο, ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς 
ἑαυτῶν ξυγγενέσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις ξυμμάχοις (“So many races of Greeks and barbarians inhabited Sicily, 
and against this [island] being of such a size the Athenians rushed to make an expedition, the truest cause being that 
they desired to rule the whole [island], but at the same time speciously wishing to come to the aid of those who were 
related to them and the allies who were attached to them”; 6.6.1). 
275 Thucydides’ own opinion has been remarkably hard to pin down, due to the contrast between his remarks at 
2.65.11–12 and 6.15.4 in which he appears to believe it could have succeeded, and his seeming agreement with 
Nicias’ judgment that the Athenians grossly underestimated the size of Sicily and the amount of resistance they 




established character, and which is clearly at odds with Athenian collective behavioral 
tendencies.276 
 Moving into Nicias’ first speech, readers see him resort to a number of arguments which 
either recall statements he made earlier in the work, or which reflect internal attitudes which 
Thucydides has previously attributed to him. For example, at 6.9.2, in excusing himself for 
opposing the expedition, Nicias claims that a leader may look to his own interests while still 
being a good citizen. In fact, he goes so far as to say that individuals who give thought to their 
own good will be particularly good citizens: καίτοι ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ 
ἧσσον ἑτέρων περὶ τῷ ἐμαυτοῦ σώματι ὀρρωδῶ, νομίζων ὁμοίως ἀγαθὸν πολίτην εἶναι ὃς ἂν καὶ 
τοῦ σώματός τι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας προνοῆται· μάλιστα γὰρ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως δι’ 
ἑαυτὸν βούλοιτο ὀρθοῦσθαι (“And though I am even honored for such a thing, and I shrink from 
things out of concern for my own body less than others, nevertheless I believe that he is equally a 
good citizen, whoever gives some thought to his body and his wealth; for such a person would 
especially wish for the matters of the polis to be set right, on his own account”; 6.9.2).  
 At first glance, this claim appears similar to that which Thucydides attributes to Pericles 
earlier in the work: 
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ καθ’ 
ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἁθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην. καλῶς μὲν γὰρ 
φερόμενος ἀνὴρ τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν διαφθειρομένης τῆς πατρίδος οὐδὲν ἧσσον 
ξυναπόλλυται, κακοτυχῶν δὲ ἐν εὐτυχούσῃ πολλῷ μᾶλλον διασῴζεται. ὁπότε οὖν 
πόλις μὲν τὰς ἰδίας ξυμφορὰς οἵα τε φέρειν, εἷς δ’ ἕκαστος τὰς ἐκείνης ἀδύνατος, 
πῶς οὐ χρὴ πάντας ἀμύνειν αὐτῇ, καὶ μὴ ὃ νῦν ὑμεῖς δρᾶτε (2.60.2–4). 
 
For I believe that the entire polis, when upright, benefits the private citizens more 
than when it prospers according to individual citizens, but suffers as a whole. For 
a man who is doing well in his own matters is no less destroyed if the fatherland 
is ruined, but an unfortunate man in a successful [polis] is preserved to a much 
greater degree. And so since a polis is able to bear private misfortunes, but each 
                                                 




individual is unable [to bear] those [of the polis], how is it not necessary for all to 
guard it, and not [to do] what you are presently doing? 
 
Both Athenian generals prioritize the collective good over that of the individual, but there a few 
key differences between their positions. For Pericles, individual success is meaningless without 
ensuring the success of the state, and so must be the focus of the citizen’s efforts; for Nicias, on 
the other hand, the successful citizen who is also reasonable—and who therefore realizes the 
importance of collective success— will inevitably work hard to ensure that his polis “when 
upright” (ὀρθοῦσθαι; 6.9.2). Thinking of one’s one good is thus completely acceptable, because 
desire to preserve one’s good fortune leads to positive action for the city-state. In fact, this 
position justifying looking to his own good is strangely similar to the claim which Alcibiades 
makes in the speech that follows: that the deeds which he does for himself contribute to the 
greatness of Athens (6.16.2–4). In a certain way, Alcibiades is also claiming that thinking of 
himself leads him to benefit his polis. It seems that Nicias may address this issue (though not 
necessarily intentionally) when he accuses Alcibiades (though not by name) of harming Athens 
by thinking only of himself (6.12.2).277 
 Further consideration of the context in which Pericles and Nicias make these claims, and 
what specifically they are asking from their citizens, will help in understanding what makes them 
different. Pericles, speaking after the Athenians have suffered from the outbreak of the plague in 
430 BCE, is emphasizing the importance of the collective good in relation to the private good to 
convince his fellow citizens to continue to persevere and sacrifice in the cause of the war. In 
Pericles’ speech, then, the polis “being set right” (ὀρθουμένην) is one that is not defeated in an 
active war with the Peloponnesians. 
                                                 





 In Nicias’ case, however, peace has been established between the Athenians and the 
Spartans (however tenuous it may be), and the ultimate goal of his speech is to prevent the 
Athenians from entering upon an expedition which he views as unnecessary and risky. Thus, 
while Pericles encourages continued sacrifice on behalf of the city, Nicias attempts to justify 
asking the Athenians to do nothing; the version of “setting the polis right” (ὀρθοῦσθαι) which 
results from Nicias thinking of his own good—the preservation of his own good fortune and 
safety—involves the Athenians sacrificing nothing other than their own acquisitive desires. 
Therefore, while most readers would agree that Nicias’ judgment concerning the Sicilian 
Expedition is actually prudent, it is nevertheless necessary to recognize that what he asks of the 
Athenians here, and the reasons for which he asks it, differ significantly from the positions 
attributed to Pericles: the latter calls on the Athenians to continue their suffering and action, the 
former calls on them to avoid these things and, in so doing, preserve their present fortune. 
This approach to leadership, in which Nicias publicly claims his right to look to his own 
personal good in decision-making, is highly reminiscent of the internal reasons for supporting 
the establishment of peace which Thucydides attributes to him at 5.16.1. As previously 
discussed,278 these reasons were predominantly personal, and centered on his own honor and 
position in Athens. Here, then, in directly claiming his right to think of his own good in public 
deliberation, Nicias confirms the impression of himself that Thucydides had given readers when 
he claimed to know his reasons for supporting the peace. This position is, as I have claimed 
several times, part of his subscription to an older standard of leadership—a point reflected in the 
fact that he is also depicted as calling on the older generation of Athenians to support him by 
providing the benefit of their forethought, and voting against the expedition (6.13.1). 
                                                 




 In addition to his outdated ideas on leadership, it is worth noting that in this passage 
Nicias yet again effectively calls on the Athenians to preserve what they have—in this case, their 
current position, which he argues is advantageous to them and detrimental to Sparta. It goes 
almost without saying, at this point, that such an approach to international relations is actually 
quite “Spartan,” and reveals yet again Nicias’ risk-aversion.279 This after he directly addresses 
Athenian collective character, staying, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἀσθενὴς ἄν 
μου ὁ λόγος εἴη, εἰ τά τε ὑπάρχοντα σῴζειν παραινοίην καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἑτοίμοις περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν 
καὶ μελλόντων κινδυνεύειν (“And against your ways my speech would be weak, if I should 
advise you both to preserve what you have and not to run risks with things that are already at 
hand for unsure things in the future”; 6.9.3).280 He then promises that he plans simply to 
demonstrate that what the Athenians are zealous to do is neither easy nor coming at an opportune 
moment (6.9.3), but in reality Nicias is in fact doing exactly what he claims would be ineffective: 
he asks them to turn away from risk-taking and to be happy with what they have already 
accomplished. It seems that even Nicias should not be surprised, then, when Alcibiades’ speech 
in response (which directly appeals to the Athenians to be true to their character) is much more 
persuasive.281 
 After Alcibiades’ speech, Thucydides reports that the Athenians were even more 
enamored of the expedition. Nicias, recognizing the present state of affairs, rises and addresses 
his countrymen again. In so doing, he provides what appears to be quite prudent advice, 
informing the Athenians that Sicily is much larger than they believe, and that many of the 
                                                 
279 See 1.70.2, 4, as well as the extended discussion of “preservation” as a Spartan attribute in Chapter 1 of this 
dissertation. 
280 See Chapter 1 (p. 48) for a discussion of this passage’s implications for readers’ understanding of Athenian 
national character. 
281 See Chapter 1 (pp. 49–50) for a specific examination of Alcibiades’ comments on the Athenian character, and 





Sicilians will not come over to their side willingly (6.20.2–4).282 Thucydides reports, however, 
that this is all part of a rhetorical gambit, in which Nicias demands such a large force that he 
believes he will either deter the Athenians from the expedition or ensure its safety (6.24.1).283 
 Yet again, however, Nicias’ decision to take a risk backfires. Indeed, he misjudges his 
Athenian audience, and not only does he further inflame the Athenian desire for conquest in the 
present (6.24.3), but later when the expedition is just about to set out and the magnitude and risk 
of the undertaking begins to hit home for the Athenians, it is its overwhelming size from which 
they draw courage (6.31.1). Thus, Thucydides portrays Nicias, whose opposition to the 
expedition the historian makes clear throughout the beginning of Book 6, as actually causing it to 
be launched. In addition, when the expedition fails, he becomes responsible for its costliness in 
Athenian resources and lives. It seems, then, that whenever Nicias, habitually hesitant and risk-
averse general that he is,284 adopts a bold strategy, readers should expect it to fail.285 
 After Nicias fails to prevent the Sicilian Expedition, he reluctantly accompanies it to its 
destination.286 In the examination that follows, I will divide the expedition into three periods: the 
                                                 
282 A point which turns out to be true. 
283 Nicias also claims that he desires to entrust himself to fortune as little as possible (ὅτι ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοὺς 
ἐμαυτὸν βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν; 6.23.3). One may compare this statement to the belief, attributed to him by Thucydides 
at 5.16.1, that the surest way to preserve his security and reputation is to avoid entrusting himself to fortune. 
284 In fact, Thucydides reports that, after Nicias’ second speech, an unnamed Athenian comes forward and directly 
accuses him of hesitation: καὶ τέλος παρελθών τις τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ παρακαλέσας τὸν Νικίαν οὐκ ἔφη χρῆναι 
προφασίζεσθαι οὐδὲ διαμέλλειν, ἀλλ’ ἐναντίον ἁπάντων ἤδη λέγειν ἥντινα αὐτῷ παρασκευὴν Ἀθηναῖοι ψηφίσωνται 
(“And finally a certain Athenian, having come forward and called upon Nicias, said that it was necessary not to 
make excuses or delay, but in the presence of all to now say what sort of preparation the Athenians should vote for 
him”; 6.25.1). 
285 For more on the failure of Nicias’ bold strategies, see Lateiner 1985: 202. The sole exception I have found to this 
trend occurs at 6.102.2–3, when the Syracusans attack the Round Fort, where Nicias has been left due to illness. In 
order to defend his position, he sets fire to the siege equipment and the wood by the wall, which turns his enemies 
away. In the next section of this chapter I argue that this attribute (incorrect/unsuccessful utilization of risk) is a 
consistent feature of “Spartan” character, as it also holds true for many of the Spartan commanders in the 
Peloponnesian War. Indeed, at times it seems as though Thucydides is demonstrating that some individuals simply 
cannot deploy boldness in a winning way. 
286 Indeed, at 6.23.3 he offers to resign his command. Hermocrates in Syracuse is somehow aware of this fact, as he 
reports the following to his countrymen: ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἐμπειροτάτου τῶν στρατηγῶν, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκούω, ἄκοντος 




first phase (before the death of Lamachus), the second phase (while Nicias commands, before the 
arrival of Demosthenes), and the final phase. In each phase I will point out a few specific 
examples that best demonstrate Nicias’ character, and its effect on the expedition. 
 For the first phase, we may begin with the war council which the generals Nicias, 
Lamachus, and Alcibiades hold at Rhegium before the commencement of hostilities in Sicily. 
Nicias proposes his recommended approach to operations first: he believes that the Athenians 
should sail against Selinus, and if Egesta can produce the money they have promised, the 
generals can then make further plans.287 If the Egestans do not have the money, they will 
provision the 60 ships which they requested, the Athenians will force the Selinuntians to come to 
terms, sail along the coast to demonstrate their power and commitment to their allies, and then go 
home (unless an easy means of helping the Leontines presents itself in the meantime). The report 
of Nicias’ opinion closes with the following: καὶ τῇ πόλει δαπανῶντας τὰ οἰκεῖα μὴ κινδυνεύειν 
(“and not to run a risk, consuming the city’s own resources”; 6.47.1). 
 The strategy which Nicias espouses here reflects numerous elements of his character that 
have already been discussed in this chapter. For example, as noted above, in Thucydides’ 
narrative of the Archidamian War readers have seen Nicias operate in conventional, highly 
limited ways time and again, finding some minimal success that will allow him to return home 
without being accused of accomplishing nothing, but which makes little difference in the overall 
war effort.288 Here again Nicias clearly seeks to limit the goals of the expedition as much as 
possible.289 Moreover, in the reasoning he provides for such a limited approach to the Athenians’ 
                                                 
experienced of their generals, as I hear, is leading [the expedition] unwillingly, and would seize upon a pretext of 
weakness, if something worth reporting should be seen from us”; 6.34.6). 
287 Mynott (2013: 415 n. 2) and Hornblower (2008: 424) both point out that the objectives of the Sicilian Expedition 
are identified inconsistently. For example, cf. 6.20.3 (Selinus and Syracuse) and 7.11.2 (Syracuse). 
288 See above, esp. pp. 172, 178–9. 




undertaking, Nicias calls on the other generals not to risk the Athenians’ resources (6.47.1). His 
risk-aversion (and his desire to preserve what the Athenians already have)290 is the basis which 
has determined his strategy, and remains a consistent feature of his character. 
 The other generals do not, of course, adopt this plan, as Lamachus and Alcibiades each 
propose their own, more aggressive approaches to the expedition, with the former eventually 
lending his support to the latter (6.48–50.1).291 Thus, a more “Athenian” strategy wins out, and, 
as we will see, eventually leave the more “Spartan” Nicias alone in charge of an expedition he is 
ill-equipped to manage. 
 The final point indicative of Nicias’ character during the first phase of the Sicilian 
Expedition is that he is actually mentioned very little during this early, largely successful period. 
Indeed, after providing a brief exhortation to the Athenian forces before their first battle with the 
Syracusans (6.68) and subsequently leading the army into the field (6.69.1), there is a gap in 
which Thucydides refers only to “the Athenians” or “the generals” until 6.101.6, when the 
historian describes the death of Lamachus. After this point, Nicias assumes sole command of 
Athenian forces (6.103.3), and individually takes on a much more prominent position in the 
narrative. 
 Why, then, would Nicias fade to the background for much of the first phase of the 
Sicilian Expedition? As I have discussed above, Nicias’ most successful enterprises during the 
                                                 
290 Cf. 1.70.2,  
291 It is interesting to note that, at 6.63.2, Thucydides reports in his own authorial voice that the Syracusans’ 
confidence grows daily because the Athenians fail to attack right away, which is exactly what Lamachus predicted. 
Scholarly opinion on the merits of each general’s strategy are divided. Lazenby (2004: 139) thinks there is reason to 
believe that Nicias’ opinion was correct. Hornblower, on the other hand, claims, “Surely the only sound conclusion 
from this modern disagreement is that in bk. 6, at least, Th. did not, for the moment, want to tilt his presentation 
obviously in favour of any one of the three” (2008: 424). See also Gomme, Andrews, and Dover 1970: 315 (who 




Archidamian War occur when he works with other, more aggressive generals.292 Based on this 
observation, I believe Thucydides here wishes to portray Nicias as contributing little to the 
expedition’s most successful phase, and instead to show that he is propped up by the presence of 
Lamachus, which is then removed.293  
This leads naturally into a discussion of the second phase, in which Nicias is mentioned 
as commander much more commonly, and thus takes on the blame for the series of mistakes and 
reversals that punctuate it. Indeed, Nicias begins his tenure as sole commander with an 
immediate mistake, as he makes little of Gylippus’ approach (6.104.3), and when he finally 
responds by sending four ships to intercept him, they arrive at Rhegium too late to prevent his 
arrival (7.1.2). This blunder displays Nicias’ often crippling hesitation, but may also reflect the 
earlier, delayed response at Sparta to news that the Athenians were fortifying Pylos (4.5.1).294 
 After this mistake, Nicias’ next major decision is to fortify Plemmyrium and move his 
forces there, a choice he makes because he feels that Gylippus’ arrival has worsened their 
prospects by land, and so wishes to focus more on naval engagements (7.4.4–5). Thucydides 
comments that this decision had the following result: ὥστε καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων οὐχ ἥκιστα τότε 
πρῶτον κάκωσις ἐγένετο· τῷ τε γὰρ ὕδατι σπανίῳ χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύθεν, καὶ ἐπὶ 
φρυγανισμὸν ἅμα ὁπότε ἐξέλθοιεν οἱ ναῦται, ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων τῶν Συρακοσίων κρατούντων τῆς 
γῆς διεφθείροντο· τρίτον γὰρ μέρος τῶν ἱππέων τοῖς Συρακοσίοις διὰ τοὺς ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ, ἵνα 
μὴ κακουργήσοντες ἐξίοιεν, ἐπὶ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιείῳ πολίχνῃ ἐτετάχατο (“With the result that 
then especially the suffering of the crews first came about. For they had water that was both 
                                                 
292 See, for example, my discussion of his operations in northern Greece (pp. 183–4) and around Cythera (pp. 180–
83). 
293 The role of Lamachus in the expedition, and the effect of his removal on its fortunes, have been discussed 
extensively in scholarship. See, e.g. Westlake 1941: 62 and 1968: 184-6. 




scarce and not nearby, and at the same time when the sailors went out to gather firewood, they 
were killed by the Syracusan cavalry, which commanded the land. For a third of the Syracusan 
horsemen had been stationed at the fort in Olympieum on account of those at Plemmyrium, so 
that they not go out and ravage [the country]”; 7.4.6).295 
 After this move, Thucydides reports that Nicias centers his focus on providing for the 
security of the camp, rather than on risky undertakings (7.8.3).296 Realizing that his situation is 
dire, he sees the need to act swiftly, and so sends a letter to Athens requesting advice, a letter 
which Westlake both calls “pathetic” (1941: 62), and identifies as providing the clearest picture 
of Thucydides’ view of Nician leadership (1968: 190).297 
 In this letter, Nicias claims that the expedition was successful until the arrival of 
Gylippus and the Peloponnesians,298 and goes on to admit that he and the Athenians have 
stopped worked on the siege wall, and are now standing idle (ἡσυχάζομεν). Thus, Nicias openly 
admits that his leadership is causing the Athenians to act in a way that is identifiably “Spartan,” 
and which reflects his hesitant, often indecisive leadership style.299 This lull in activity, 
combined with Nicias’ focus on the security of the camp, results (as he openly admits in his 
letter) in a reversal of the original situation: the once besieging Athenian army has now become 
the besieged (7.11.4). The Athenians, who as recently as 6.103 (immediately after the death of 
Lamachus) seemed assured of victory, have rapidly become the reactive party rather than the 
                                                 
295 In describing Demosthenes’ thoughts upon his arrival, Thucydides attributes similar judgments to him (7.42.3). 
296 ὁ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον διὰ φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἤδη ἔχων ἢ δι’ ἑκουσίων κινδύνων ἐπεμέλετο (“And he 
[Nicias] was looking to matters in the camp, keeping more to guarding it than to taking willing risks”; 7.4.6). 
297 Nicias’ decision to request advice via letter merits comment, since he effectively offloads the decision-making 
for the expedition to the Athenian assembly, which seems ill-advised given his reported recognition that his 
circumstances require swift action. For more on this point, see Burns 2012: 227, who claims that Nicias’ use of a 
letter shows him again acting for his own interest, as he is trying to avoid the shame of going home defeated unless 
the assembly itself recalls him. 
298 He neglects that, at least according to Thucydides, he actively failed to prevent Gylippus’ arrival (Westlake 1968: 
193). 




active one, and there is now only one commander to blame.300 In the closing of his letter, Nicias 
again asks to be replaced as general (7.15.2), thus reminding the Athenians—and readers—that 
he never wished to lead the Athenians to Sicily in the first place. The Athenians, however, elect 
not to relieve Nicias, but instead assign Menandrus and Euthydemus to share command, and 
Demosthenes and Eurymedon to lead reinforcements to Sicily (7.16.1–2). 
 This brings us to the third phase of the expedition, after the Syracusan capture of 
Plemmyrium,301 and the arrival of Demosthenes. Before beginning a discussion of this period, 
however, a brief review of the attributes of Nicias which were emphasized in Thucydides’ 
description of each of the first two stages of the invasion of Sicily. In the first phase, while 
Lamachus was still alive, the historian displayed Nicias’ risk-aversion and desire to avoid large 
undertakings. In the second, he displays Nicias’ indecision and hesitancy, and the effects these 
have on an actively acquisitive mission such as the Sicilian Expedition. It becomes clear very 
quickly that Nicias’ character and leadership are ill-suited to the operation with which they have 
been paired. In the final phase of the war, as we will now see, Thucydides’ continues to 
emphasize Nicias’ hesitancy and indecisiveness, attributes which become amplified due to the 
presence of Demosthenes, whose own behavioral tendencies stand in stark juxtaposition to those 
of Nicias.302 In addition, Nicias’ “old-fashioned” views return to the fore, as he allows 
considerations of both religion and honor to shape his tactical decisions. 
                                                 
300 With reference to Nicias’ letter, Westlake says, “It makes even more abundantly clear his [Thucydides’] 
conviction that the leadership of Nicias since the death of Lamachus had lacked vigour and firmness and was a 
major factor in bringing about the transformation of the military position” (1968: 194). 
301 Thucydides describes this event in the following terms: μέγιστόν τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον ἐκάκωσε τὸ στράτευμα τὸ 
τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λῆψις (“the capture of Plemmyrium was among the primary things—and even the 
greatest—which harmed the army of the Athenians”; 7.24.3). 
302 For more on the contrast between Demosthenes and Nicias, especially right after the former’s arrival in Sicily 




 These attributes become clear quickly, as, upon his arrival, Demosthenes pushes for the 
Athenians to take immediate and decisive action to take Epipolae, thinking that he will either win 
and improve the Athenian situation, or lead the army back home if the attempt fails (7.42.4–5). 
Thucydides briefly mentions, however, that Nicias takes no part in this daring attack, and instead 
remains behind within the fortifications (7.43.2). One may presume this was due to the illness 
which has been ascribed to Nicias (6.102.2) and from which he directly claims to suffer (7.15.1), 
but Thucydides here makes no mention of it, and instead leaves readers to infer what they will.303 
 This attack ultimately fails, however, and afterwards Demosthenes expresses his belief 
that the Athenians should withdraw from Sicily. Nicias, however, adamantly opposes the idea, 
claiming special knowledge of Syracusan weakness and of parties in the city who still wish to 
turn it over to the Athenians (7.48–9). Thucydides’ presentation of this passage is fascinating, as 
he switches rapidly back and forth between a report of Nicias’ claims in indirect discourse, and 
his own comments on Nicias’ true thoughts and reasoning. Indeed, after Nicias’ adamant claim at 
7.48.2 concerning the pro-Athenian party in Syracuse, Thucydides turns around and tells readers, 
ἃ ἐπιστάμενος τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ ἔτι ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα ἔχων καὶ διασκοπῶν ἀνεῖχε, τῷ δ’ ἐμφανεῖ τότε 
λόγῳ οὐκ ἔφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν (“knowing which things, he still kept holding and 
examining them from both directions in his mind, but he openly denied that he would lead the 
army away”; 7.48.3). He then returns to reporting Nicias’ arguments in favor of remaining where 
they were. As such, Thucydides actively undermines the apparent strength of Nicias’ convictions 
at the same time as he reports his positions. When the Athenians give in to his claims because of 
his apparent confidence, therefore, readers see instead a combination of “irresolution” and 
“obstinacy” (Westlake 1941: 63). The result of such leadership is, to Demosthenes’ dismay, 
                                                 




another delay: ἀντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου ὄκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο καὶ ἅμα ὑπόνοια μή 
τι καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ Νικίας ἰσχυρίζηται. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ διεμέλλησάν τε 
καὶ κατὰ χώραν ἔμενον (“but with Nicias speaking in opposition, there was both a certain delay 
and at the same time a certain suspicion that, knowing even something more, Nicias persisted. 
And the Athenians in this way both delayed and remained in the place”; 7.49.4).304 
 In addition to the indecisiveness which Thucydides here attributes to Nicias, readers may 
observe the reappearance of another of the features of his character: his willingness, based on 
outmoded heroic models, to put others at risk for the sake of preserving his own position of 
leadership. Indeed, in the comments attributed to him, Nicias directly claims that, based on the 
Athenian character, he knows that his countrymen (and the very soldiers who serve with him and 
now wish to return home) will turn on him if he withdraws from Sicily, and therefore, οὔκουν 
βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε ἐπιστάμενος τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις ἐπ’ αἰσχρᾷ τε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκως ὑπ’ 
Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν ἰδίᾳ (“[He 
said that he] certainly did not wish, himself knowing the natures of the Athenians, to die for a 
shameful reason and unjustly at the hands of the Athenians rather than, if necessary, having run 
the risk, to suffer this privately at the hands of the enemy”; 7.48.4). 
 Here, just as in his competition with Cleon (4.28.1, 5), Nicias is willing to make a 
decision that he finds personally preferable, but which may harm many of the Athenian rank and 
file.305 In the former case, Cleon failing at Sphacteria would not certainly not have resulted in 
only his suffering, and in this case, Nicias will assuredly take many Athenians with him. In 
essence, then, he asks the Athenians to sacrifice for him, rather than offering to sacrifice himself 
for the Athenian benefit. As discussed above, this runs counter to the relationship between 
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individual and polis which Pericles espouses, and which he uses to direct Athenians’ innate 
acquisitiveness to productive ends (Balot 2001: 149). Nicias’ conservative leadership is, then, 
inadequate for his present circumstances, and begins the process which leads to the expedition’s 
near total destruction (a possibility he hoped he had eliminated by requesting such a large force). 
 Shortly after this passage a lunar eclipse occurs, and Nicias’ response reinforces both his 
hesitancy and his “old-fashioned” character. In describing this reaction, Thucydides states:  
καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἵ τε πλείους ἐπισχεῖν ἐκέλευον τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐνθύμιον 
ποιούμενοι, καὶ ὁ Νικίας (ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ 
προσκείμενος) οὐδ’ ἂν διαβουλεύσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη πρίν, ὡς οἱ μάντεις ἐξηγοῦντο, 
τρὶς ἐννέα ἡμέρας μεῖναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινηθείη. καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις 
μελλήσασι διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μονὴ ἐγεγένητο (7.50.4). 
 
And the majority of the Athenians, becoming worried, were bidding the generals 
to hold off, and Nicias (for he was even somewhat excessively inclined to both 
superstition and such things) refused to deliberate until, as the diviners prescribed, 
he waited thrice nine days; there was no way that he would move earlier. And a 
delay occurred for the Athenians having intended [to depart] on account of this. 
 
The damage that this delay caused for the Athenians has long been noted; for example, Hobbes 
says, “he overthrew himself and his army, and indeed the whole dominion and liberty of his 
country, by it” (1975: 12), and Westlake argues that Thucydides feels that the withdrawal could 
have been successful if not for Nicias’ superstition (1968: 200). 
 Indeed, it seems obvious from the wording (especially his use of ἄγαν) that Thucydides 
looks down on this superstition, as argued by Finley (1942: 310–11) and Westlake (1968: 
200).306 Such an act—similar to Nicias’ later discussion of his faith that, because of his virtuous 
life, the gods will now end the Athenians’ suffering and come to their aid (7.77.2–4)—is out of 
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step with the intellectual milieu of Athens, and in which Thucydides himself takes part.307 
Moreover, as has been shown in Chapter 1, the tendency to allow religious observance to dictate 
policy and military decision-making is identifiably Spartan.308 Thus, Nicias again brings Spartan-
style leadership to this most Athenian of undertakings, and yet again he does this at an 
inopportune moment, when the Athenian drive to swift action does not need to be restrained, but 
actually appears as though it would be useful.309 
  
The End of Nicias and Conclusions 
After two subsequent naval defeats for the Athenians, Nicias’ above-mentioned speech 
claiming the likelihood of the support of the gods, and a failed attempt at an overland 
withdrawal, the expedition, of course, ends in disaster. Nicias and his troops are forced to 
surrender, and, despite the urgings of Gylippus, the Syracusans execute Nicias (as well as 
Demosthenes) (7.86.2). In the aftermath of the failure of the expedition, Thucydides does 
something that has surprised many scholars, when considering his portrayal of Nicias’ leadership 
in Sicily: he eulogizes him. In so doing, Thucydides says: καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτῃ ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα 
                                                 
307 Westlake (1968: 203) makes this argument concerning 7.77.2–4. Scholars have discussed in great detail the 
influence of fifth-century intellectual trends—such as sophistic rhetoric, scientific advancements, and even medical 
theory—on Thucydides. For example, Finley (1942: 36–73) provides a detailed discussion of Thucydides’ 
intellectual background, especially p. 70, where he says, “in the latter half of the fifth century, similar tendencies 
appeared at the same time in different fields of investigation and the ideas proper to one subject proved fruitful in 
another.” Parry, meanwhile, specifically discusses Thucydides’ use of medical language (1969: 106–18), as does 
Thomas (2006). On the topic of Thucydides’ rhetorical influences, one may see Macleod, who states that, “It is 
obvious that Thucydides is well-versed in rhetorical theory and practice, and his speeches make use of them in a 
sophisticated and self-conscious way” (1983: 52) Finley (1967: 57), who discusses elements of Pericles’ speeches 
which have been received as “Gorgian,” and Hornblower (1987: 46–8) who cites what he sees as parallels between 
speeches in Thucydides and the Rhetoric to Alexander. While all of these discussions differ in the level of influence 
they claim, it is generally accepted that Thucydides was at least aware of, and to some degree participating in, the 
intellectual revolution that was happening at this time. 
308 See Ch. 1, p. 63 (esp. n. 70). The Spartans abandon military undertakings due to unpropitious border sacrifices on 
multiple occasions in Book 5 (e.g. 5.54.1, 55.3, and 116.1). 
309 Thucydides actually states that the Syracusans learn of the delay which the eclipse causes, and that it makes them 




τούτων αἰτίᾳ ἐτεθνήκει, ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας 
ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν (“And for such a reason, or as 
close as possible to this things, he died, in fact being least worthy of the Greeks in my life to 
arrive at this extremity of misfortune, on account of his entire character having been directed 
toward virtue”; 7.86.5). 
The unexpectedness of this description has led some scholars to argue that it is ironic or 
sarcastic.310 I see no reason, however, to interpret this statement as sarcastic. Indeed, while 
Thucydides does portray Nicias as an ineffective leader, he does not portray him as an evil man, 
nor does he ever hint that he deserves to meet a terrible fate. The historian is much clearer, in 
fact, in displaying his distaste for Cleon, and emphasizes his cowardice in defeat (5.10.9). Nicias, 
on the other hand, appears as much more of a pathetic, tragic character (Rood 1998: 185). I find, 
therefore, that one need not see a conflict in Thucydides both portraying Nicias as not providing 
the type of leadership that Athens needed at this moment in history, and in saying that, as an 
individual, he did not deserve the horrible fate that he met.  
At the same time, one may look at this conclusion from the opposite perspective: the fact 
that Thucydides believes Nicias did not deserve his pitiable death does not necessarily mean that 
he found him to be an effective leader for his fellow Athenians. Indeed, as has been discussed, 
the historian shows time and again that Nicias is hesitant, indecisive, risk-averse, and generally 
old-fashioned in his leadership. He continually wishes to limit the goals applied to military 
undertakings, and appears to exist at the opposite end of the spectrum of character from his polis, 
standing instead much closer to Spartan collective character. 
                                                 
310 The proper interpretation of this passage has been hotly debated. Many scholars, such as Shorey (1893: 87), 
Green (1970: 346), Edmunds (1975: 142), Connor (1984: 205), Bender (1938: 51), and Murray (1961: 35) see 
Thucydides’ comments as either sarcastic or implicitly critical of Nicias, while Rood (1998: 183–5, 198) and 




Such tendencies would not necessarily be negative in the correct context. The problem, 
however, is that Nicias was unable to adapt his behavior as circumstances changed (as I have 
shown that Pericles and Brasidas did),311 and did not draw the Athenians to a moderated middle 
ground. Instead, he maintained his obstinate hesitancy even when it was inappropriate. The 
Sicilian Expedition, for example, as Thucydides depicts it, called for decisive action on a number 
of occasions, but without the help of other generals (a factor which contributed significantly to 
Nicias’ greatest successes), he was unable to provide this leadership. In fact, even when he was 
victorious Thucydides depicts Nicias as contributing little to the Athenian cause due to his 
cautious approach to warfare, and on the rare occasions when he did take risks, he did so at the 
wrong time or in the wrong situation, and thus suffered the opposite result of what he 
intended.312 
In essence, then, Nicias’ character made him ill-suited to provide the leadership that 
Athens needed. Indeed, he was too Spartan to effectively lead the Sicilian Expedition, that most 
ambitious and “Athenian” of undertakings, and to effectively moderate the deliberation or 
behavior of his polis. Instead, Thucydides portrays him as existing so far at the other end of the 
spectrum of character from his home city of Athens that, when left in a leadership position, he 
replaced its traditional combination of strengths and weaknesses with those its adversary, Sparta. 
 
Spartans Leading Sparta  
Thus far this dissertation has largely focused on Thucydides’ characterization of 
Athenians (with the exception of Brasidas). This reflects Thucydides’ own emphasis on, and 
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knowledge of, internal operations in his home polis prior to his exile (5.26.5).313 That is not to 
say, however, that individually identified Spartans do not play an important part in the work; 
several of course do, and this section will address several of those who do: Archidamus, Cnemus, 
Alcidas, and Agis II. 
 This section will be organized somewhat differently from the rest of this dissertation, as it 
will not follow the narrative arcs of each of these leaders individually, but will instead be 
arranged thematically. This is because, as Westlake (1968: 122) argues, Thucydides does little to 
individuate these generals, but instead makes them so similar to one another that they all seem to 
fall into a single character “type”—the ineffective Spartan commander.314 Indeed, the historian’s 
narrative attributes to each of these Spartans largely the same set of behavioral patterns: they are 
all predominantly cautious, hesitant, and risk-averse to the point that the historian sometimes 
directly identifies them as missing opportunities; each of them wages war in similarly limited 
and outmoded ways; and on the rare occasions when they do attempt to seize the initiative or 
take risks, their activities either backfire, or are clearly identified as resulting from the 
intervention of another individual.315 Thus, I will focus on identifying important aspects of this 
generalized characterization, and cite relevant examples from Thucydides’ description of 
Archidamus, Cnemus, Alcidas, Agis II, and Astyochus in order to establish how each of them 
                                                 
313 Cartledge and Debnar (2006: 572–3), for example, discuss where Thucydides received his information on the 
internal motivations of Spartan commanders before he went into exile. See also Gribble (2006: 458) on the 
prevalence of Athenians and Athenian internal disputes in the History, and Raaflaub (2006: 218), who argues that 
Thucydides’ omission of an analysis of the internal political dynamics of Sparta is a weakness of the work. 
314 For more on the identification of these Spartan leaders as non-individuated “types,” see Westlake (1968: 131, 
136). These Spartan commanders have been received largely unfavorably by historians. See, for example, Beloch, 
who references “die Unfähigkeit des lakedaemonischen Admirals” (“the inability of the Lacedaemonain admirals” 
(1897: 73), and Cloché, who describes Thucydides’ take on these generals as, “un jugement méprisant et dur (peut-
être même parfois injuste)” (“a scornful and harsh judgment (perhaps even sometimes unjust)”) (1943: 105). 
315 For example, Thucydides clearly identifies Agis’ fortification of Deceleia, which did so much damage to the 





fits this pattern. In addition, I will demonstrate that, in possessing this generalized character, 
these Spartan commanders share a number of traits in common with the just-discussed Athenian 
general Nicias, such as their inability to properly manage risk-taking for successful results. At 
the same time, however, they bear one striking difference: while, as discussed in the previous 
section of this chapter, Nicias was more successful when he operated with others, these Spartans 
are consistently shown as holding back those with whom they work, such as Brasidas. 
 Through this examination I will demonstrate two things: first, that stereotypical “Spartan” 
behavior is not always risk-averse, but that Thucydides portrays these leaders as consistently 
failing when they attempt more ambitious enterprises, and thus as ill-suited to command 
undertakings of a more aggressive, Athenian nature; second, that by portraying all of these 
Spartan generals as possessing individual characters similar to that of their polis, and as failing to 
accomplish any lasting success for their city, Thucydides demonstrates once again the need 
which both Sparta and Athens had, possessing the flawed political structures and national 
characters which they did, for their leaders to possess individual characters specifically fitted to 
their context, and which allowed them to moderate their more problematic behavioral tendencies.  
(Mention falling back into this pattern, respond to Debnar who argues there is a fundamental 
change in Spartans over the course of the work?) 
 
Hesitation and Risk Aversion 
 I begin my discussion of the character type associated with these ineffective Spartan 
commanders with the most easily identifiable and commonly emphasized behavioral tendency 
which they display: their extreme hesitancy and risk avoidance. From Archidamus’ desire to 




the Piraeus (2.93–4), to the mutinous complaints of Astyochus’ soldiers that he must finally force 
a decisive battle (8.83.3), this trait—originally attributed to the Spartans collectively by the 
Corinthian speaker in Book 1—is consistently displayed by these individual Spartans. 
 In response to the very speeches at Sparta in which the Corinthian speaker originally sets 
out the stark contrast between the Athenian and Spartan collective characters, Archidamus rises 
to give his opinion on the proper course for Sparta and her allies. Thucydides introduces him by 
describing him as intelligent (ξυνετὸς) and prudent (σώφρων), but in the speech which he 
attributes to him it begins to become clear that these traits are not paired with any “Athenian” 
qualities such as daring or enterprise, but instead with thoroughly Spartan risk-aversion and 
conservatism.316 Indeed, while he demonstrates what scholars have deemed a great deal of 
foresight about the difficulties of the war to come (Westlake 1968: 125), he proposes no sea 
change in Spartan tactics or character to counter the Athenian menace (Millender 2017: ), but 
instead simply calls on his fellow Spartans to delay and accumulate resources and allies (1.82.1) 
while they are still at peace (καθ’ ἡσυχίαν; 1.83.3).317 
 Additionally, Archidamus defends his position by calling on his audience not to consider 
a desire not to attack “cowardice” (ἀνανδρία; 1.83.1), and instead proceeds to directly praise 
what he sees as the benefits of conventional Spartan hesitancy, telling his fellow Spartans, καὶ τὸ 
βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον, ὃ μέμφονται μάλιστα ἡμῶν, μὴ αἰσχύνεσθε (“And with respect to the 
slowness and hesitation for which they especially fault us, do not be ashamed”), and calls these 
                                                 
316 Mynott (2013: 48 n. 3) notes that Thucydides directly attributes intelligence only to Theseus (2.15), Themistocles 
(1.138.3), Brasidas (4.81.2), and Phrynichus (8.27.5), while he implicitly identifies Pericles as possessing a 
reputation for being “not unintelligent” (μὴ ἀξύνετος; 2.34.6), and the statesman seems to claim the quality for 
himself at 1.140.1. He goes on to state that Archidamus is the only person described as “prudent” (σώφρων), but 
compares Pericles’ description as governing moderately (μετρίως) at 2.65.5. 
317 The desire for “peace” or “rest” (ἡσυχία) is, as identified in this dissertation (Chapter 1) as a Spartan attribute. In 
addition, ἡσυχία is precisely what the Corinthian ambassador recently claimed the Athenians are able neither to have 




traits examples of Spartan σωφροσύνη ἔμφρων (“rational prudence”; 1.84.1). Archidamus then 
goes on to present his own version of the Athenian/Spartan contrast, emphasizing the Spartans’ 
tendency to remain even-keeled in extreme circumstances, their good judgment, and their 
inability to be swayed by flattery (1.84.2), all of which derives from their “good order” (τὸ 
εὔκοσμον; 1.84.3). Thus, Archidamus demonstrates his conservative risk aversion by calling on 
his countrymen to hesitate to make war, and then singing the virtues of this hesitation, a behavior 
for which the Corinthians had just attacked the Spartans as poor allies.318 
 Two other points from this speech also demonstrate Archidamus’ conventional Spartan 
character. First, at the outset of his speech he alludes to the fact that members of the older 
generation, because of their experience, will not be eager for war (1.80.1). This is somewhat 
reminiscent of Nicias’ repeated appeals to the older generation in his first speech attempting to 
dissuade the Athenians from undertaking the Sicilian Expedition (). In particular, we may 
compare Nicias’ call for the older generation not to fear accusations of seeming cowardly (in this 
case μαλακός) if they vote against making war with Archidamus’ call for the Spartans not to 
consider hesitating to make war an act of ἀνανδρία (1.83.1). Both appeal to the experience of the 
older generation over the excitement of those younger and inexperienced in war, and both feel 
the need to preemptively address possible charges of cowardice (though their vocabulary is 
different). 
 Additionally, Archidamus closes his call for the Spartans to put off war with the 
Athenians in the immediate term by calling on them to be true to their inherited character: ταύτας 
οὖν ἃς οἱ πατέρες τε ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν μελέτας καὶ αὐτοὶ διὰ παντὸς ὠφελούμενοι ἔχομεν μὴ 
παρῶμεν, μηδὲ ἐπειχθέντες ἐν βραχεῖ μορίῳ ἡμέρας περὶ πολλῶν σωμάτων καὶ χρημάτων καὶ 
                                                 




πόλεων καὶ δόξης βουλεύσωμεν, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἡσυχίαν (“And so let us not give up these practices 
which our fathers handed down to us and which we ourselves have and benefit from in every 
matter, nor let us rush to counsel in the brief space of a day concerning many bodies and 
resources and cities and reputations, but [let us counsel] at our leisure”; 1.85.1). In one sentence, 
Thucydides manages to present Archidamus as calling on his countrymen to be true to the 
established Spartan collective character, to hesitate in their decision-making, and manages to 
again use what has been argued is a by-word for Spartan behavior in the work: ἡσυχία.319 
Whether or not his advice may have been useful, Thucydides presents the nature of his advice 
and the terms in which he gives it as unabashedly in line with the Spartan national character that 
his text has just laid out in opposition to Athenian collective behavior. Interestingly, however, his 
approach here is more like that of Alcibiades in Book 6 rather than Nicias, in that he attempts to 
persuade his audience by calling on them not to abandon the national character that has helped 
them be successful thus far (cf. 6.18.7).320 In this speech, therefore, Archidamus is shown as a 
precursor to Nicias in his “Spartan” risk-aversion and hesitation to undertake a large-scale 
military undertaking,321 but not also not unlike Alcibiades in his method of trying to achieve his 
goals: a direct appeal to his polis’ national character.322323 
                                                 
319 For more on the relationship between ἡσυχία and Spartan character, see Ch. 1. 
320 Depending on how one looks at it, Alcibiades is either the exact opposite of the Spartans discussed in this chapter 
(possessing an unrestrained Athenian character in contrast to these generals’ hyper-Spartan tendencies) or the same 
as them (an individual who possesses the same character as his polis, and thus causes it to be unreservedly expressed 
in international affairs). 
321 In his leadership of the first invasions of Attica, Archidamus becomes an even stronger precursor for Nicias as an 
unwilling leader of a military operation he opposes. 
322 Sthenelaidas’ response is also interesting, in that he uses conventionally Laconic speech patterns and an appeal to 
their characteristic distaste for elaborate orations (1.86.1) to argue in favor of what may at first glance appear to be a 
radically un-Spartan position: the need to make war immediately. In his speech, however, he argues for no large-
scale change in Spartan character or tactics, and is, as Millender argues, “mired in the past” (2017: 85), and demands 
conformity with traditional Spartan norms. See also Crane 1998: 216, 220. 
323 In these paired orations, Thucydides appears to present the Spartan deliberative version of the debate of Nicias 
and Alcibiades in Book 6 before the Sicilian expedition. The result is, of course, different, as Archidamus’ appeal to 




 Thucydides also displays Archidamus’ conventionally Spartan attributes in his 
description of the first Peloponnesian incursion into Attica. Indeed, in his speech at the 
invasion’s outset he urges caution (2.11.3, 5), and once he sets out he stops and delays multiple 
times. For example, he and the Peloponnesians spend a great deal of time preparing at Oenoe on 
the border of Attica and Boeotia,324 a deed which Thucydides reports led the Peloponnesians to 
respond as follows:  
αἰτίαν τε οὐκ ἐλαχίστην Ἀρχίδαμος ἔλαβεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, δοκῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ξυναγωγῇ 
τοῦ πολέμου μαλακὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτήδειος, οὐ παραινῶν 
προθύμως πολεμεῖν· ἐπειδή τε ξυνελέγετο ὁ στρατός, ἥ τε ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ἐπιμονὴ 
γενομένη καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην πορείαν ἡ σχολαιότης διέβαλεν αὐτόν, μάλιστα δὲ ἡ 
ἐν τῇ Οἰνόῃ ἐπίσχεσις. οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐσεκομίζοντο ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, καὶ 
ἐδόκουν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπελθόντες ἂν διὰ τάχους πάντα ἔτι ἔξω καταλαβεῖν, 
εἰ μὴ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου μέλλησιν. ἐν τοιαύτῃ μὲν ὀργῇ ὁ στρατὸς τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον ἐν 
τῇ καθέδρᾳ εἶχεν. (2.18.3–5). 
 
And Archidamus received not the least blame from this. He seemed even in the 
assembly for war to be soft and friendly to the Athenians (since he was not 
eagerly recommending war), and after the army was collected, both the delay 
which occurred at the isthmus and his leisureliness on the rest of the march 
discredited him, but especially the stoppage at Oenoe. For the Athenians were 
carrying things in during this time, and the Peloponnesians thought that if they 
had attacked, they would quickly have caught everything still outside, if not for 
that man’s delay. In such anger the army held Archidamus while idle. 
 
While Thucydides does not directly endorse this view, and some scholars have actually come to 
the Eurypontid king’s defense by noting that he seems to have had strategic reasons for his 
behavior,325 the author’s emphasis on the language of delay (ἐπιμονὴ, σχολαιότης, ἐπίσχεσις) 
throughout the narrative is apparent.326 Thucydides need not use his authorial voice to condemn 
                                                 
Athenians’ passions for conquest. For more on the character and position of Alcibiades in Thucydides’ history, see 
Chapter 4, and more specifically on his appeals to Athenian national character, see pp. 247–8. 
324 τάς τε οὖν προσβολὰς ηὐτρεπίζοντο καὶ ἄλλως ἐνδιέτριψαν χρόνον περὶ αὐτήν (“And so they were preparing 
their incursion and were wasting time on other things around there [Oenoe]”; 2.18.2). 
325 He states these reasons at 2.11.6–8, and Thucydides later reiterates that he delayed (ἀνεῖχεν) because he thought 
the Athenians would come to terms when they saw the Peloponnesian army threatening their fields (2.18.5).  





the actions of Archidamus for the narrative to lead readers to interpret his behavior as 
conventionally Spartan. 
 This behavior continues throughout the campaign, as Archidamus encamps his forces at 
Acharnae in the hope that the Athenians, led by the Acharnians, will march out against him in 
outrage (2.20).327 This plan fails, however, and after devastating the countryside he and the 
Peloponnesians withdraw and disperse (2.23). This approach to warfare, as quickly becomes 
apparent to readers of Thucydides, is entirely conventional for Sparta (especially during the first 
half of the war) when confronted by an enemy that refuses to face them in the field.328 Indeed, in 
his speech at the prewar assembly Archidamus assumes this is the method of warfare which his 
fellow citizens are considering utilizing against the Athenians (and directly argues it will be 
ineffective; 1.81.1–2). It is also the Spartan response which Pericles expects, and against which 
his strategy for the war is designed to work (1.142.4, 143.3).329  
Archidamus leads two additional incursions of this sort into Athenian territory (2.47.2, 
3.1.1–3) and an ineffectual attack on Plataea (2.71–5) before he exits the narrative. Archidamus’ 
second and third invasions of Attica receive only the most cursory of descriptions from 
Thucydides, marking them as unremarkable and as having accomplished little worth noting. This 
is, of course, not dissimilar from Thucydides’ presentation of many of Nicias’ campaigns during 
                                                 
327 On this plan and its relative merits, see Debnar and Cartledge (2006: 571), Pelling (1991: 128–9), De Romilly 
(1962) and Bloedow (1983: 28–36). 
328 It is also Nicias’ primary approach to war when left to his own devices. For more on this point, see the previous 
section of this chapter. On the conventionality of the devastation of an opponent’s countryside, see Hanson, who 
points outs that “ravaging of cropland was central to warfare of most societies of the past,” and that “for nearly 300 
years war in Greece was inaugurated and often defined by a struggle to destroy, or protect, grain, vines, and olive 
trees” (1998: 4–5). For a more general discussion of Greek warfare at the time of the Peloponnesian War, see 
Gomme 1959: 10–15. 
329 Hunt describes this invasion as follows: “… when the Spartans did the obvious and attacked the territory of their 




the first half of the Peloponnesian War, and serves to highlight the similarity between this 
Athenian general and Spartans who act according to their established character. 
 After Archidamus’ third invasion of Attica he ceases to play a role in the History, but the 
next Spartan commander who appears, Cnemus, behaves in much the same way, to the point that 
the transition from one Spartan commander to the other in the war appears quite seamless.330 
Indeed, while leading an expedition to assist the Acarnanians and the Chaonians, a setback for 
one portion of his army at the town of Stratus leads him to withdraw his entire force, and he then 
allows it to disperse (2.82.1).331 This action demonstrates Cnemus’ willingness to immediately 
abandon an undertaking at the first sign of adversity, behavior that, as readers may remember, 
stands in direct opposition to the Corinthian description of the Athenian tendency described at 
1.70.5: … νικώμενοι ἐπ’ ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτουσιν (“… when they are defeated they give as little 
ground as possible”). Cnemus’ desire to depart, therefore, marks him as decidedly “un-Athenian” 
and thus “Spartan” in character. 
 Cnemus displays this same fearful hesitancy when the Peloponnesians, with him as 
commander, abandon a planned surprise attack on the Piraeus (2.93–4). This episode has already 
been discussed in this dissertation,332 but two things bear noting again: first that Thucydides 
states that Cnemus and the Peloponnesians sail to Salamis instead of the Piraeus καταδείσαντες 
τὸν κίνδυνον (“because they fear the danger”; 2.93.4), and that Thucydides expresses in his own 
voice his severe judgment for the Peloponnesians’ inability to carry out what was he viewed as a 
bold and likely successful plan, saying ὅπερ ἄν, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν μὴ κατοκνῆσαι, ῥᾳδίως ἐγένετο, 
καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄνεμος ἐκώλυσεν (“Which very thing would easily have happened, if they had been 
                                                 
330 Indeed, his portrayal fits perfectly into the character type, “Spartan general.” 
331 On this episode, see Westlake 1968: 138, who argues that Cnemus demonstrates a lack of perseverance. 




willing not to hesitate, and the wind would not have prevented them; 2.94.1).333 As Thucydides 
presents this episode, then, the Peloponnesians (led by their admiral Cnemus) fall back into their 
established pattern of questioning their own judgment (1.70.3), fearfully focusing on the possible 
negative outcomes of their undertakings, and of hesitation (1.70.4), and the result is a clearly 
identified missed opportunity. 
 Alcidas and Agis share similar patterns of behavior as well. Alcidas, for example, looks 
much like Cnemus in his appearances in the work.334 Sent with a force of 40 ships to support 
Mytilene during its revolt from Athens, Alcidas arrives too late, as the city has already 
capitulated (3.27.1, 29.1–2). Thucydides emphasizes the slowness of this fleet’s approach, 
relating to readers that the fleet “wasted time” (ἐνδιέτριψαν) and was “sailing at a leisurely pace” 
(σχολαῖοι κομισθέντες; 3.29.1). Moreover, when the the Peloponnesians reliably learn that the 
Mytilenean revolt has failed, Alcidas rejects two plans for follow-up action in the area which are 
proposed to him (3.30–31.1). Thucydides then directly describes his reason for doing so: ἀλλὰ τὸ 
πλεῖστον τῆς γνώμης εἶχεν, ἐπειδὴ τῆς Μυτιλήνης ὑστερήκει, ὅτι τάχιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ 
πάλιν προσμεῖξαι (“but he had as the chief concern of his mind, since he had been too late for 
Mytilene, to get back to the Peloponnese as quickly as possible”; 3.31.2).335 Such an attribution 
appears designed to lead readers to recall the earlier established contrast between Athenians who 
spend their time away from home, and Spartans who fear to be away from it (1.70.4).336  
This turn of events results in Brasidas being sent as an advisor (3.69.1), but even he, 
acting as a subordinate to Alcidas, cannot fully check his hesitancy. Indeed, as mentioned earlier 
                                                 
333 Thucydides’ comment on the wind responds to a claim he reports as having been made that the wind held the 
Peloponnesian ships back. It comes off as somewhat biting here. See also Millender 2017: 90. 
334 “As presented in Thucydides, they are almost indistinguishable” (Westlake 1968: 136). Roisman, meanwhile, 
argues that Alcidas’ career likely did much to justify Thucydides’ interpretation of Spartan character (1987: 385). 
335 On his way home Alcidas is spotted by the Salaminia and the Paralus, and flees across the open sea to avoid a 
confrontation (3.33.1). 




in this dissertation,337 after a victory at sea over the Corcyraeans and Athenians during the 
Corcyraean stasis, Alcidas ignores encouragement to follow up his success by sailing against the 
city—an action which Thucydides claims the Corcyraeans greatly fear, and which Brasidas 
supports338—and instead sail to back to the mainland, whence they eventually depart due to 
reports of the imminent arrival of Athenian reinforcements (3.79.1–81.1).339 Just as at the Piraeus 
and at Mytilene, Thucydides portrays the Peloponnesians as missing an opportunity to do 
something that would have a lasting effect on the course of the war because of the hesitancy of 
their commander. 
Agis, too, shows similar avoidance of confrontation on multiple occasions. Aside from 
his cancelation of seemingly necessary military undertakings due to inauspicious border 
sacrifices (which I will discuss in the next section), at 5.57–60 Agis leads a full-scale expedition 
against Argos in which he makes a series of skilled maneuvers to avoid being put in a 
disadvantageous position, only to unilaterally decide to lead his army away after a discussion 
with two Argives (Thrasylus and Alciphron) who claim their polis is ready to submit to 
arbitration. This departure, as Thucydides reports, earns Agis the censure of his allies: οἱ δὲ 
Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι εἵποντο μὲν ὡς ἡγεῖτο διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν αἰτίᾳ δ’ εἶχον κατ’ 
ἀλλήλους πολλῇ τὸν Ἆγιν, νομίζοντες ἐν καλῷ παρατυχὸν σφίσι ξυμβαλεῖν καὶ πανταχόθεν 
αὐτῶν ἀποκεκλῃμένων καὶ ὑπὸ ἱππέων καὶ πεζῶν οὐδὲν δράσαντες ἄξιον τῆς παρασκευῆς 
ἀπιέναι … τὸ μὲν οὖν στρατόπεδον οὕτως ἐν αἰτίᾳ ἔχοντες τὸν Ἆγιν ἀνεχώρουν … (“And the 
Lacedaemonians and their allies followed his lead because of the law, but amongst themselves 
                                                 
337 See the discussion of Brasidas in Chapter 2. 
338 Millender (2017: 91) and Westlake (1968: 122) note that Thucydides repeatedly contrasts Brasidas’ character 
with that of other Spartan commanders. 
339 Thucydides’ description of the Peloponnesian departure appears designed to emphasize their fear of the coming 
Athenian fleet: οἱ μὲν οὖν Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς νυκτὸς εὐθὺς κατὰ τάχος ἐκομίζοντο ἐπ’ οἴκου παρὰ τὴν γῆν (“And 




they very much blamed Agis, thinking that, although it was possible for them to fight in a good 
place, and with [their enemy] shut in on all sides by both cavalry and infantry, they went away 
having done nothing worthy of the armament … and so, blaming Agis in this way the army 
withdrew …”; 5.60.2–4). Agis’ reception does not improve when he reaches Sparta, either. 
Indeed, they censure him and resolve to both fine him and destroy his house, and only after he 
appeals these rulings do they agree to instead send with him a council of ten advisers, whose 
approval he must seek in the future prior to withdrawing an army from enemy territory (5.63.1–
4). 
One might argue that Agis erases this reputation after his victory at Mantinea in 418 
BCE. While Thucydides does report that this military triumph did result in a restoration of 
Sparta’s reputation for military valor (Millender 2017: 83), it must be noted that the narrative 
largely paints the Spartans as winning in the field despite Agis, rather than because of him. First, 
Agis attempts to force a battle when the enemies are on high ground (a detail on which I will 
expand shortly), which his advisers have to dissuade him from doing (5.65.2–3), then later, just 
as the Spartans are about to engage the Argives, Mantineans, and Athenians, he orders his forces 
to shift their position in order to reinforce his left wing (5.71). He orders other polemarchs to 
bring up reserve forces to fill the gap in his line this maneuver produces, but they refuse because 
they receive the command so late (5.72.1). The gap in his line is therefore not filled and his left 
becomes hard pressed, and it is only due to the Spartans’ superior bravery that they eventually 
when the day. As Thucydides reports: ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δὴ κατὰ πάντα τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι 
ἐλασσωθέντες τότε τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἔδειξαν οὐχ ἧσσον περιγενόμενοι (“But in fact the Spartans, 




5.72.2). Thus, the military planning, provided by Agis, is lacking, and the reason the Spartans are 
victorious is instead the bravery (ἀνδρείᾳ) of the Spartan soldiers themselves. 
 
Spartan Conventionality 
 Another prominent aspect of these leaders is the glaring conventionality in their methods 
of pursuing the war with Athens, both with respect to their tactics and their religious observance. 
Most likely related to their just-discussed tendency to avoid risk, the Spartan generals under 
discussion all regularly utilize the devastation of enemy territory as one of their primary tools in 
the field, or when they do enter battle, they settle for limited skirmishes that accomplish little of 
note in the larger war effort. In addition, as discussed in Chapter one of this dissertation, these 
Spartan generals alone (with the exception of Nicias) allow religious considerations to deter 
them from undertaking seemingly important expeditions. 
 For examples of this behavior, one need look no further than Archidamus’ three invasions 
of Attica, all of which make use of the same tactic: devastation of the countryside (which 
Archidamus himself had warned would be ineffective against the Athenians, 1.81.1–2). 
Thucydides’ descriptions of these invasions shorten dramatically after the first, and state simply 
the fact that the Peloponnesians yet again invaded and encamped in Attica. The historian 
identifies the second invasion as being “just like the first time” (ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον; 2.47.2), 
and his description of the third attack, and the Athenians’ response to it, in terms that make it 
sound entirely conventional—especially when he notes, καὶ ἐγκαθεζόμενοι ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν· καὶ 
προσβολαί, ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, ἐγίγνοντο τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἱππέων (“and after encamping they were 
devastating the land, and there were the attacks of the Athenian cavalry, just as they were 




devastate the area around Zacynthus (2.66), and wasting the land on Salamis when he and the 
Peloponnesians abandon their plan to sail into the Piraeus (2.93.4). Agis, too, leads an expedition 
into Attica which focuses on the devastation of the country side (4.2.1, 6.1–2), only departing 
when he hears of the Athenian occupation of Pylos. 
 As a final, but different, example of Spartan conventionality, I take the cancelation of 
Agis’ expedition against Leuctra. In this episode, Agis leads out a full-scale Peloponnesian force, 
but due to unfavorable border sacrifices the Spartans return home and tell their allies that they 
must wait until after the sacred month of Carneius (5.54.1–2).340 Three things are notable about 
this particular episode: the first is that such behavior is largely unique to, but common among, 
the Spartans in the work;341 second, Herodotus gives this same month as the reason the majority 
of the Spartan forces were held back from Thermopylae in 480 BCE (Hdt. 7.206.1);342 the third 
is that the only non-Spartan individual who allows religious considerations to influence his 
actions (and more specifically to stop him from doing something that seems necessary) is 
Nicias.343 Thus, Agis and the Spartans act as a precursor for Nicias’ actions in Sicily. Moreover, 
the Argives use this delay as an opportunity and march against Epidaurus and lay waste to their 
territory (5.54.3). By including this information immediately after describing the Spartan 
abandonment of their expedition, Thucydides makes it clear to readers that delays such as this 
have consequences. 
                                                 
340 See Cartledge and Debnar 2006: 582–3. 
341 Inauspicious border sacrifices turn Peloponnesian expeditions back on two other occasions in Thucydides’ 
History (5.55.3, 116.1). For more on this attribute of Spartan behavior, see Chapter 1, p. 63 (esp. n. 70). 
342 The Carneia is also identified as the reason the Spartans claim to be unable to help the Athenians at Marathon 
(Hdt. 6.106.3). See, e.g., Evans (1993: 301) and Richer (2009: 219). 




 Looking beyond this episode, it becomes clear that Thucydides portrays these Spartan 
leaders as reinforcing stereotypical Spartan conventionality, a fact which continually harms their 
position in the war.  
 
Ineffective Risk-Taking 
 While the above sections have identified these Spartan leaders as generally hesitant, risk-
averse, and conservative leaders for their polis, it must be noted that they do not always avoid 
risk. As discussed in the introduction to this section, however, and as discussed in the context of 
Nicias, what is unique to “Spartan” leadership is that their utilization of risky or bold tactics 
almost always produces adverse results. Indeed, just as Nicias’ bold rhetorical gambits each 
generate the exact opposite of his desired results,344 when the Spartan generals currently under 
discussion attempt to act with boldness, they fail (or, on occasion, lack the fortitude to fully 
implement a bold plan). 
 We may find multiple examples of this fact in the events that Thucydides relates about 
the Spartan leaders under discussion. For example, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other 
Peloponnesian commanders actually wish to force Phormio and the Athenians into a sea battle 
after their previous defeat at Rhium (2.84.1–4, 86.6). When they see that the Athenians do not 
sail out to engage them in the narrows, the Peloponnesians sail toward Naupactus to force them 
to respond. The plan is a good one, and they win the early stages of the engagement, but they 
grow over-confident in their victory, and when an Athenian ship wheels around and rams the 
lead pursuer, the Peloponnesians fall into confusion and are forced to retreat (2.90–2). This act of 
                                                 




Spartan boldness, then, although appearing promising at first, ends with the Peloponnesian fleet 
departing for Corinth, and the Athenians maintaining their control over Naupactus and the gulf. 
 Agis continues the Spartan trend of taking of improperly utilizing risk-taking. Before the 
Battle of Mantinea, Agis and the Peloponnesians face the Argives, who have taken up position 
on steep, difficult ground (5.65.1). Despite the Argives possessing the clear advantage, 
Thucydides states that, καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς αὐτοῖς ἐπῇσαν· καὶ μέχρι μὲν λίθου καὶ 
ἀκοντίου βολῆς ἐχώρησαν, ἔπειτα τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τις Ἄγιδι ἐπεβόησεν, ὁρῶν πρὸς χωρίον 
καρτερὸν ἰόντας σφᾶς, ὅτι διανοεῖται κακὸν κακῷ ἰᾶσθαι, δηλῶν τῆς ἐξ Ἄργους ἐπαιτίου 
ἀναχωρήσεως τὴν παροῦσαν ἄκαιρον προθυμίαν ἀνάληψιν βουλόμενον εἶναι (“And the 
Lacedaemonians immediately moved against them, and advanced as far a stone or javelin’s 
throw, but then one of the older men shouted at Agis (seeing that they were moving against a 
strong position) that he had in mind to cure one evil with another, indicating that he wished to 
make amends for his blameworthy departure from Argos with his present inopportune 
eagerness”; 5.65.2). While Agis turns his troops back at the last second (5.65.2), and so 
ultimately avoids this mistake, Thucydides makes clear that he comes dangerously close to 
making a risky attack for the sake of his own reputation. 
 Agis again make a similar mistake, advancing up to the walls of Athens during the 
revolution of the Four Hundred (even though Thucydides relates that he does not think the 
Athenians will easily give up their liberty) in the hope that his presence will force the Athenians 
to come to terms, or that it will cause such confusion that he will be able to seize the long walls 
(8.71.1). Thucydides reports, however, that his approach caused no confusion, and that the 
Athenians attack and kill the Peloponnesians who advance closest to the walls, forcing Agis to 




 This leads to a possible counter-argument, however. Indeed, one may raise the point that 
it is Agis who presides over the fortification of Deceleia (7.19.1–2), and thus shows some 
successful enterprise and initiative. While Agis does in fact serve as commander of this 
operation, it must be noted that Thucydides directly attributes the plan to fortify Decleia to 
Alcibiades (6.91.6–7). Thus, Agis acts without independent enterprise, instead following up on 
the advice of one of the most “Athenian” individuals in the work. 
 
Conclusion 
 While I do not in this section address every episode in which a Spartan commander not 
named Brasidas appears (far from it),345 this review of their typical behaviors demonstrates that 
the vast majority of Spartan leaders, including Archidamus, Cnemus, Alcidas, and Agis, conform 
in many ways to the characterization attributed to their polis at large. They all consistently 
demonstrate their risk-averse, cautious tendencies, as well as their largely conventional and 
unimaginative approaches to the war.346 When they do take risks, however, they are either ill-
advised (as in the case of Agis), or simply do not turn out as intended (as with Cnemus). In all of 
these traits, they both identify themselves as belonging to a character type that is typically 
“Spartan,” and they closely resemble Nicias (discussed in the previous section). 
 What, then, does extremely “Spartan” leadership accomplish for its polis during the war? 
Very little of consequence, it would seem. Archidamus’ invasions of Attica, while coming close 
                                                 
345 We could, for example, also address Astyochus, whom Westlake describes as possessing “defects of leadership 
similar to those of Cnemus and Alcidas,” and as lacking “enterprise in conducting military operations” (1968: 290), 
and whom Hornblower describes as appearing “mostly rigid, incompetent, arrogant, tactless and short-tempered” 
(2009: 806). Indeed, as mentioned earlier, his behavior is such that, near the end of his time as nauarchos, his troops 
confront him and demand that he force a decisive battle (8.83.3). 
346 Some scholars, such as Debnar (2001: passim, but esp. 2–3), argue that the History shows the antithesis between 
the Athenians and Spartans gradually breaking down. As I hope to have shown, however, this is to mistake the 
intervention of prominent individuals who temporarily alter the behavior of their polis with large-scale, lasting 




to driving the Athenians to come out against him in battle (2.21.2–22.1), ultimately do not 
accomplish this goal; Cnemus and Alcidas operate with limited success, focusing largely on 
avoiding costly defeats rather than on winning meaningful victories; and the greatest 
accomplishment over which Agis presides—his victory at the Battle of Mantinea—is largely 
presented as occurring despite, rather than because of, his leadership. This is because, as I have 
argued, in Thucydides’ conception of positive leadership, all of these individuals are simply too 
“Spartan” for their Spartan context, exacerbating the weaknesses identified as dominating their 
polis’ national character, and providing no moderation. Just as “Athenians” leaders were ill-
suited to lead Athens away from its excesses, Thucydides portrays these commanders as too 
similar to the mold of their polis to alter its behavioral tendencies; while not inherently stupid or 
bad leaders, none of them properly fits the context in which he exists. 
 Additionally, it is important to note that these individuals represent the vast majority of 
Spartan leaders in the work. Again, just as in the case of Athens, it appears that the emergence of 
a leader capable of successfully moderating the behavior of his polis, driving it away from its 
excesses while simultaneously avoiding those of its opponent, is, at best, a once in a generation 
occurrence. As such, the intervention of an individual such as Brasidas cannot safely be 
expected, nor can it be relied upon if change is to occur.  
Finally, since, as argued earlier in this dissertation, Thucydides’ conception of national 
character is inextricably tied up with politic structure,347 one may conclude two things: 1) that 
“oligarchic” Sparta is likely to produce individuals with an “oligarchic” mindset; and 2) that, if 
large-scale, persistent change in behavioral patterns is to occur, it will require more than the 
                                                 




temporary intervention of a leading individual. Instead, it will require a change as fundamental as 







CHAPTER IV.  
Alcibiades: The Form of the Athenian? 
In this chapter I turn to an examination of the extremely important but very complicated 
figure of Alcibiades in Thucydides’ History—important because of his prominent role in some of 
the most important decisions which Athens makes during the war (such as the decision to 
undertake the Sicilian Expedition), and complicated because, depending on where one looks in 
the text, he is either brilliant and persuasive, foolhardy and overambitious, or downright 
traitorous. As Forde notes, these variations in the text allow Alcibiades, despite actively working 
against his home polis for a time, to come off as “… ambiguous rather than simply sinister,” 
(1989: 7), and the impression one receives is that he is simultaneously immensely capable and 
incredibly dangerous.  
In addition, even individual passages have proved difficult to interpret, such as 
Thucydides’ comments on the harm the demos did to itself in turning on Alcibiades due to his 
personal behavior (6.15.4), which immediately follow his discussion of Alcibiades’ self-serving 
reasons for supporting for the Sicilian Expedition (6.15.3). Is this passage meant as a judgment 
on the demos, Alcibiades, or both? This seemingly wide variation in Thucydides’ presentation of 
Alcibiades has led scholars to argue a great deal over what the historian’s actual view of him 
was, and whether he may or may not have changed his mind about him over the course of his 
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compositional process.348 This seemingly inconsistent portrait of Alcibiades is further 
complicated by the incompleteness of Thucydides’ History, which leaves readers to draw 
conclusions from a half-formed portrait; indeed, Thucydides’ narrative does not actually reach 
Alcibiades’ most famous military successes, nor his second ouster from Athens.  
Despite these difficulties, however, the crucial role which Alcibiades plays in events in 
the second half of Thucydides’ text,349 as well as in Thucydides’ ongoing investigation into the 
nature and requirements of leadership (Forde 1989: 1) makes it necessary to address Thucydides’ 
portrait of him, however incomplete it may be. In this chapter, therefore, I argue that, in his 
History, Thucydides presents Alcibiades as a man driven to constant, energetic action by his 
ambitions, which themselves result primarily from private motivations. This relentless and 
unchecked ambition identifies Alcibiades as possessing an individual character that is extremely 
“Athenian,” and thus—in much the same way as Demosthenes and Cleon (discussed in the 
previous chapter)—due to the similarity of his own character to that of his polis, Alcibiades 
proves too unrestrainedly “Athenian” to successfully moderate its collective behavioral 
tendencies—a major failing in Thucydides’ contextually-based construction of positive 
leadership.  
In addition, Alcibiades’ decision to direct his Athenian ambition toward almost entirely 
personal ends proves to be unacceptable to the Athenian demos (despite Pericles’ claims that 
Athenians allow each other to do as they please (2.37.2), and Alcibiades’ own attempts to 
                                                 
348 For a discussion of the difficulty scholars have had in forming their attitudes toward Alcibiades, see Jaffe (2017a: 
401). For a good summary of the scholarly tradition receiving Alcibiades as outstandingly brilliant, see Bloedow 
(1992: 139 n. 2), who cites Holm (1895: 401), Finley (1942: 218, 225), Bengtson (1979: 5), and Kagan (1981: 371). 
See also Connor, who places Alcibiades among “the most brilliant men of their time” (1984b: 165 n. 18). Bloedow 
himself, however, opposes this reception of Alcibiades, arguing that he was not brilliant in the modern meaning of 
intelligent (1992: 139–40, 155). 




reformulate the accepted relationship between public and private pursuits (6.16)), and ultimately 
turns them against him. These developments demonstrate yet another failure of Alcibiades’ 
character: his unwillingness to heed the restraints placed on leaders by the Athenians themselves, 
and his resultant inability to maintain a leadership role. Indeed, Alcibiades cannot provide the 
leadership which his city requires if the city will not allow him to lead. 
This alienation of the Athenian people results in Alcibiades’ exile and flight to Sparta, a 
development which then allows Thucydides to examine the effect of placing such a purely 
“Athenian” leader in a Spartan context. In so doing, he makes it clear that, because of his lack of 
restraint, Alcibiades is too “Athenian” even for Sparta: while his presence does, as one might 
expect, drive the Spartans away from their characteristic hesitancy, he also encourages the 
development of rivalries between the polis’ leaders and, because of his own personal ambitions, 
forms powerful personal enmities which contribute directly to his second removal from power. 
As such, Thucydides ultimately demonstrates that Alcibiades and his hyper-Athenian character 
are not effectively suited to leadership of either of the primary contexts (Athens and Sparta) in 
which he attempts to operate. 
 
Alcibiades in Book 5 
 Alcibiades first enters Thucydides’ narrative in Book 5, during the Peace of Nicias.350 In 
this first appearance, Thucydides immediately presents Alcibiades as being in direct conflict with 
Nicias and his policies, and in so doing provides a description of him and his motivations that 
lays the groundwork for establishing his characterization.351  
                                                 
350 It could be argued that Alcibiades first appears at 2.65.11, but he is not named there. 
351 Rood (1998: 157–8) argues that Thucydides takes his use of characterization to a new level with his portrait of 
Alcibiades (as well as with Nicias). 
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In this first named appearance, Thucydides begins by naming Alcibiades as an opponent 
of the current treaty with Sparta: οἱ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις αὖ βουλόμενοι λῦσαι τὰς σπονδὰς εὐθὺς 
ἐνέκειντο. ἦσαν δὲ ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου (“… those who wished to dissolve the 
treaty immediately began pressing for this. There were others and especially Alcibiades, son of 
Cleinias”; 5.43.1–2). Thucydides’ construction of this introduction immediately sets Alcibiades 
apart as a particularly prominent anti-peace partisan, since the historian elects to name him alone 
among those in opposition. In fact, one may compare this passage with Thucydides’ description 
of the Athenian assembly concerning whether to acquiesce to Sparta’s prewar demands 
(1.139.4), where he begins by stating that “many others” (ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ) spoke, but then 
proceeds to identify Pericles by name, and to report his speech in direct discourse. Both passages 
appear designed to give readers the impression that the named individual (Alcibiades or Pericles) 
occupies a place of particular prominence among his peers.352  
After quickly establishing the prominence of Alcibiades—as well as the unusual nature of 
his position given his youth353—Thucydides goes on to report that his opposition results both 
from his belief that it would be better to side with the Argives, and, moreover, for the following 
reason: οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονικῶν ἠναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ 
Λάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς σπονδάς, ἑαυτὸν κατά τε τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν 
προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες … (“but he also opposed it out of the competitiveness of 
his spirit, because the Lacedaemonians made the treaty with Nicias and Laches, both overlooking 
him on account of his youth and not honoring him in accordance with the old proxenia that there 
                                                 
352 This impression is strengthened by Thucydides’ comment that Alcibiades was held in a place of honor, though 
this is because of his ancestors (ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος; 5.43.2). Westlake argues that Thucydides may 
overstress both the importance of Alcibiades and the intensity of his rivalry with Nicias at this point in the narrative 
because he is looking forward to the young Athenian’s future importance in determining the outcome of the 
Peloponnesian War (1968: 215). For a more in-depth discussion of 1.139.4, see Chapter 2, pp. 80–1. 
353 ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ἔτι τότε ὢν νέος ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει (“A men in his prime, who was at that time still young for 
another city”; 5.43.2). 
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had once been”; 5.43.2). Thus, while Alcibiades’ opposition to the treaty is based in part on what 
he views would be best for Athens, it also derives in no small part from the fact that his pride is 
hurt.354 Thucydides repeats this latter reason for Alcibiades’ opposition in the next section, when 
he reports, πανταχόθεν τε νομίζων ἐλασσοῦσθαι τό τε πρῶτον ἀντεῖπεν (“And believing that he 
was being made little of in every way, he first spoke against it”; 5.43.3). Finally, readers are 
informed that Alcibiades even privately (ἰδίᾳ) sent for the Argives and their allies to come to 
Athens to make a new treaty. 
 As many scholars have noted, this introduction to Alcibiades is extremely personal, both 
in its discussion of Alcibiades’ age and his family background, and in its description of his 
motivations.355 Alcibiades’ position in this important matter is not determined (at least not 
entirely) by prudent planning, but by his emotions and desire for status within the city. At 
readers’ first introduction to this young leader, therefore, they may already begin to place him 
among the successors of Pericles, who are driven by private concerns and focus on their contests 
with other leaders for supremacy at Athens, rather than on sound policy (2.65.7, 11). 
 After this introduction, Thucydides states that both the Argives and Spartans sent 
representatives to Athens, and proceeds to describe Alcibiades’ political machinations. After the 
Spartan envoys initially meet with the Athenian council and announce that they have been 
endowed with full powers, Alcibiades worries they will win over the assembly and cause the 
Athenians to reject his alliance with Argos (5.45.1). As a result, he approaches the Spartans and, 
to convince them not to admit that they have plenipotentiary power, promises to use his personal 
influence to have Pylos returned to them (5.45.2). 
                                                 
354 Hornblower notes, I believe rightly, that, “it is the second and more personal motive which is developed, so we 
feel it weighs more in the balance, on Th.’s estimate” (2008: 101). 
355 See, for example, Westlake 1968: 212–13 and Luginbill 1999: 150. We may note, however, that Alcibiades is not 
entirely dissimilar from Nicias in his concern for his own standing in the polis. See the previous chapter, pp. 175–8. 
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 Thucydides immediately informs readers of Alcibiades’ true intentions, however, stating 
that he simply wished to distance the envoys from his political opponent Nicias, and planned to 
discredit them in the assembly for their dishonesty (5.45.3).356 His plan works almost perfectly, 
as the Athenian assembly grows angry at the Spartan envoys when they deny that they have full 
powers and Alcibiades turns against them, but is prevented from making a new alliance by the 
sudden occurrence of an earthquake (5.45.4). 
 Nicias attempts to restrain the Athenians’ angry impulse, asking them to delay their 
decision so that he can go to Sparta to negotiate. When he accomplishes nothing there apart from 
the renewal of the treaty’s original oaths, however, the Athenians again grow angry and ally 
themselves with the Argives (5.46).357 
 An important inference concerning Alcibiades’ character may be drawn from 
Thucydides’ description of this trick. As presented in the text, he acts privately, without the 
knowledge of his fellow citizens, and is driven largely by personal motivations, as well as his 
conception of his own rightful place in the polis.358 Indeed, Alcibiades clearly thinks he deserves 
to have much more influence than he feels that he currently exerts. Based on this observation, 
readers may be led to conclude that not only is Alcibiades focused on personal, rather than 
public, concerns, he is also highly ambitious. What is more, the fact that he knowingly deceives 
not only the Spartans ambassadors, but also the members his own polis indicates that he is 
willing to do whatever it takes to satisfy this personal ambition. 
                                                 
356 Tsakmakis (2006: 165) finds it noteworthy that readers’ first encounter with Alcibiades is his deceptive trick to 
create a treaty with Argos and undermine Nicias’ talks with Sparta. 
357 The rapid establishment of this alliance is facilitated, as Thucydides notes, by the presence of the Argives in 
Athens: εὔτυχον γὰρ παρόντες οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι (“For the Argives and their allies happened to be present; 
5.46.5). Mynott (2013: 354 n. 2) points out that their presence was most likely not the result of happenstance, as the 
wording of this passage would seem to imply, but was instead probably arranged by Alcibiades. 
358 On this point, see Westlake 1968: 2213 and De Romilly 1963: 196. 
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After this maneuver to establish an alliance with Argos, Alcibiades becomes somewhat 
less prominent in the text until his reappearance in 416, just prior to the Sicilian Expedition 
(Westlake 1968: 215).359 His personality and, more specifically, his grand ambition, however, 
maintain their importance in the episodes in which he does appear, albeit less directly, since 
Thucydides provides no further authorial interventions on Alcibiades until Book 6. 
 For example, when war breaks out between the Epidaurians and the Argives, ostensibly 
due to the Epidaurians’ failure to send a sacrifice for Apollo Pythaeus, Thucydides reports to 
readers: ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῆς αἰτίας τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον τῷ τε Ἀλκιβιάδῃ καὶ τοῖς Ἀργείοις 
προσλαβεῖν, ἢν δύνωνται, τῆς τε Κορίνθου ἕνεκα ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς Αἰγίνης βραχυτέραν 
ἔσεσθαι τὴν βοήθειαν ἢ Σκύλλαιον περιπλεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις (“But, even without this reason, it 
seemed good both to Alcibiades and to the Argives to take Epidaurus, if they were able, both for 
the sake of keeping Corinth quiet and because aid from Aegina would be faster than sailing 
around Scyllaeum for the Athenians”; 5.53.1). 
 Thucydides makes clear that Alcibiades (and his Argive allies) were looking for an 
opportunity to attack Epidaurus, and that this perceived wrong simply served their purposes.360 
Readers would assuredly observe the ambition in Alcibiades’ attempt to extend the power and 
                                                 
359 Westlake (1968: 216–18) devotes a significant amount of time to discussing why this may be the case. He cites 
and then dismisses multiple previously stated theories, such as de Romilly’s idea that Thucydides’ brevity indicates 
his disapproval of Alcibiades’ policy (1963: 195–200), and Brunt’s argument that Alcibiades fading into the 
background is a result of the unrevised state of Book 5, and that it would have been expanded later (1952: 69–70). 
Westlake, however, simply sees brevity as more indicative that Thucydides finds an event less an important than 
others, and, argues that Thucydides seized the opportunity of Alcibiades’ first appearance to give an extended 
introduction to him, since the historian saw his personality as very important to the outcome of later events (1968: 
217–18). 
360 Earlier in 5.53.1, Thucydides describes the situation between Argos and Epidaurus using the term πρόφασις 
rather than αἰτία (as in the text cited above). The two terms, as noted by Mynott (2013: 359 n. 2), are here treated as 
meaning roughly the same thing. Context makes clear, especially after the description of Alcibiades and the 
Argives’ motivations, that they mean more than a simple, precipitating cause for the war, and are instead the 
publicly presented grounds on which it was made, even though Thucydides directly informs readers that its leaders 
were driven by a different set of underlying motivations. One may compare Thucydides’ statement on the causes of 
the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War itself at 1.23.6. For more on the significance of the latter passage, see 
Robinson 2017 (esp. pp. 116–18), as well as the discussions in Hornblower 1991: 65, Wick 1975, and Smith 1941. 
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effectiveness of the new alliance into which he had led the Athenians, and may compare his 
inability to be at rest, even during what is supposed to be a time of established peace, to previous 
descriptions of Athenian character in the text (e.g. 1.70.8–9).361 
 Alcibiades’ interventions in Book 5 continue in this strain, with him continually agitating 
for movement against Sparta. He not only convinces Athens to act against Spartan interests, 
however, but when two private Argive citizens negotiate a truce with Agis during a Spartan 
invasion (5.59–60), he personally addresses the citizens of Argos and convinces them that this 
truce should not have occurred, and calls on the Argives to engage in war (καὶ νῦν … ἅπτεσθαι 
χρῆναι τοῦ πολέμου; 5.61.2). The Argives then join the alliance in besieging Orchomenus and 
bringing it to terms (5.61.3–5).  
Even after the defeat of this alliance at the Battle of Mantinea (5.70–3) Alcibiades does 
not cease agitating against Sparta. Indeed, Thucydides reports that the post-battle treaty which 
the Argives and Spartans sign was hotly debated, in part because of the presence of Alcibiades 
(5.76.3). The historian’s inclusion of this note appears specifically designed to imply to readers 
that Alcibiades actively fought against its establishment, though he failed to prevent it. 
 In each of these Book 5 episodes in which Alcibiades participates, Thucydides portrays 
him as consistently and continually pursuing his ambitious plan to build an anti-Spartan alliance, 
and to expand Athenian influence in the Peloponnese—with little concern for possible negative 
consequences. Thucydides also makes it clear that Alcibiades does this for largely personal 
reasons, and with an eye to his own private benefit. The characterization of Alcibiades as a 
hyper-Athenian politician, but whose energies and ambition are directed primarily toward private 
                                                 
361 Alcibiades also convinces the Athenians to inscribe on the stele of the treaty that the Spartans had not honored 




ends, introduced at his first appearance, then, is strengthened by the events and details which the 
historian chooses to subsequently relate. As we will see, Thucydides maintains—and further 
expands upon—this portrait in the remainder of his History. 
 
Alcibiades in the Speeches before the Sicilian Expedition 
 After Alcibiades’ activities in Book 5, he reappears at the beginning of Book 6 to play his 
most important role in Thucydides’ recorded text: convincing the Athenians to invade Sicily. His 
speech is reported in contest with that of Nicias (in competition with whom he first appeared), 
and the two leaders’ approaches to this ambitious enterprise place their personalities in stark 
contrast (Westlake 1968: 171).362 The oration itself is also preceded by two passages to which it 
more or less directly responds: Nicias’ first address, which is designed to discourage the 
Athenians from undertaking this expedition, and a direct aside from Thucydides on Alcibiades’ 
character and its reception by the Athenians. In each of these passages, the intensely personal 
nature of Alcibiades’ motives is clear, and Alcibiades himself makes no attempt to deny this fact, 
but instead attempts to justify his practice of putting his own interests first. 
 Nicias’ speech not only attacks the wisdom (or lack thereof) of sailing against Sicily, but 
also its supporter Alcibiades (albeit not directly by name), claiming that he simply desires the 
command for his own gain.363 He then goes on to describe the effect which such a commander 
can have on a city: εἴ τέ τις ἄρχειν ἄσμενος αἱρεθεὶς παραινεῖ ὑμῖν ἐκπλεῖν, τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον 
σκοπῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ νεώτερος ὢν ἔτι ἐς τὸ ἄρχειν, ὅπως θαυμασθῇ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἱπποτροφίας, 
διὰ δὲ πολυτέλειαν καὶ ὠφεληθῇ τι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς, μηδὲ τούτῳ ἐμπαράσχητε τῷ τῆς πόλεως 
                                                 
362 See also Tompkins 1972: 181. More generally, on the contrast between these two individuals, see Raaflaub 2006: 
205–7 and Burns 2012: 222. 
363 It is clear that Nicias is referring to Alcibiades not just from context, but also from the fact that, when Alcibiades 
begins his speech, he states that he must defend himself since he has been attacked (6.16.1). 
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κινδύνῳ ἰδίᾳ ἐλλαμπρύνεσθαι, νομίσατε δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους τὰ μὲν δημόσια ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἴδια 
ἀναλοῦν, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μέγα εἶναι καὶ μὴ οἷον νεωτέρῳ βουλεύσασθαί τε καὶ ὀξέως 
μεταχειρίσαι (“And if someone who is glad at being chosen to command advises you to sail out, 
looking only to his own good (especially since he is still rather young for command), so that he 
may be admired because of his breeding of horses, and so that, on account of the great expense, 
he may take some benefit from the command, do not allow this man to gain distinction privately 
by endangering the city, and understand that such men wrong public matters and consume 
private resources …”; 6.12.2). 
 Nicias’ speech places Alcibiades—a leader who he claims benefits at the expense of the 
collective good—in opposition to the position which Thucydides previously attributed to 
Pericles, in which the individual cannot prosper without the success of the polis (2.60.2–4). In 
addition, this accusation would, if true, place him squarely in the company of the leaders whom 
Thucydides describes in his own authorial voice as harming the city: οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς 
τοὐναντίον ἔπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ 
ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἔς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπολίτευσαν, ἃ κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς 
ἰδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μᾶλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο 
(“But they [his successors] did all these things in the opposite way, and in other matters that 
seemed to be extraneous to the war, looking to private ambition and private profit, they managed 
the city badly both for themselves and for their allies. These things, if they were successful, were 
more a source of honor and profit for private citizens, but, if unsuccessful, created harm for the 
city in the war”; 2.65.7). In attempting to discredit Alcibiades by accusing him of personal 
motives, therefore, Nicias also identifies him for readers as a successor of Pericles. 
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One may also note that Nicias’ description of Alcibiades as a leader who desires 
command solely for his private benefit, while willfully endangering the city and its resources, is 
not at all in conflict with Thucydides’ own presentation of Alcibiades up to this point. Indeed, as 
discussed above, Thucydides expressly identifies Alcibiades’ motives for seeking to undermine 
the Peace of Nicias as largely private (5.43.2–3).364 Thus, the comments attributed to Nicias 
build and expand upon what readers have already seen and come to expect from Alcibiades—
ambition based on intensely personal motivations. At the same time, they much more directly 
place his character in line with one that Thucydides has described as doing “the opposite” 
(τοὐναντίον) of Pericles, thinking only of their own good while losing sight of the public 
benefit.365 
 After Nicias’ speech, and before reporting Alcibiades’ response, Thucydides discusses 
Alcibiades’ motivations for supporting the expedition. In so doing, he states that Alcibiades 
supports the expedition because of his political opposition and enmity toward Nicias, καὶ 
μάλιστα στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι’ αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι 
καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν (“and especially because he was 
eager to serve as general, and he hoped that, through him, they would take both Sicily and 
Carthage, and at the same time that if he was successful he would profit privately both in wealth 
and in reputation”; 6.15.2).366 This matter-of-fact statement by Thucydides, providing 
Alcibiades’ internal motivations, appears designed to confirm Nicias’ claim that Alcibiades is 
                                                 
364 On this passage see above, pp. 231–2. 
365 See Balot 2001: 141. I will discuss this point further below. 




focused on his own, private good—a charge which, as previously noted, places him among a 
group of leaders whose rise Thucydides laments.367 
 Thucydides’ description of Alcibiades’ motivations, however, goes further than Nicias’ 
accusation that he operates based on a desire for personal profit, claiming that he is also intent 
upon the conquest of both Sicily and Carthage.368 This intention bears a striking similarity to 
those of several Athenian leaders discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed, in looking past the 
original goal of this expedition (to support the Egestans and Leontines in Sicily; 6.8.2) to other, 
larger conquests, Alcibiades mirrors Demosthenes, who, when invading Aetolia, was already 
planning to conquer Boeotia (3.95.1).369 Thus, this passage not only generally identifies 
Alcibiades as among the Periclean successors described at 2.65.7, but also aligns him with the 
specific leaders of Athenian character whom Thucydides has already introduced, and who lack 
the capacity to restrain their ambitions and urges for continual conquest. 
After this description of Alcibiades’ motivations, Thucydides goes on to comment on the 
lifestyle of Alcibiades, and its effect on his standing among the Athenian demos: 
ὢν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζοσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν 
ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρῆτο ἔς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας· ὅπερ 
καὶ καθεῖλεν ὕστερον τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἥκιστα. φοβηθέντες γὰρ 
αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν 
δίαιταν καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὧν καθ’ ἓν ἕκαστον ἐν ὅτῳ γίγνοιτο ἔπρασσεν, ὡς 
τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμιοι καθέστασαν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ 
τοῦ πολέμου ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις 
ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν (6.15.3–4). 
 
For being [held] in honor by the townspeople, he enjoyed greater zeal than his 
existing wealth afforded for both the raising of horses and for other expenses. And 
not least of all did this very thing later destroy the city of the Athenians. For the 
many, fearing the greatness of both the lawlessness in his way of life (with respect 
                                                 
367 On the role of this passage in confirming Nicias’ claim, see Heath 1990: 160 and Westlake 1968: 172. 
368 Later, in his speech at Sparta, Alcibiades directly claims these were—and continue to be—the goals of the 
Sicilian Expedition, though there he also includes Italy among its targets (6.90.2). 
369 For more on Demosthenes’ ambitious goals, see Ch. 3, pp. 122–51. See also Wylie 1993: 21. 
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to his own body) and of his intentions in the things he did, one by one, in 
whatever happened, became his enemies on the grounds that he was eager for 
tyranny, and although in public he was managing matters of war extremely well, 
everyone grew angry at his private practices, and entrusting [matters] to others, 
destroyed the city after a short time. 
 
This passage brings the dichotomy inherent in Thucydides’ portrayal of Alcibiades to the fore, 
and, when combined with the historian’s other direct comments on his personality and military 
capabilities, has contributed significantly to scholars’ difficulty in clearly identifying 
Thucydides’ opinion of this Athenian leader.370 Is Alcibiades to blame for being motivated by 
personal ambitions to the detriment of the city, and thus alienating the populace, or is the demos 
to blame for not properly utilizing a talented leader? I will address this question below in the 
final section of this chapter, but, suffice it to say for now, the dichotomy which Thucydides 
presents here, in its most basic form, is that he found Alcibiades to be an extremely capable 
commander,371 but saw that his private behavior undermined his political position, and lent 
credibility to his opponents’ accusations that he sought tyranny.372 
 Thus, while in Book 5 Thucydides exposed readers to Alcibiades’ lack of restraint in the 
context of his pursuit of status in the public sphere (though this was often based on private 
motivations), the author now extends this attribute to include Alcibiades’ behavior in his private 
life. Readers may at this point see, then, that Alcibiades acts without reservation on all of his 
                                                 
370 It is the last point in this passage (that, despite his faults, the Athenians harmed themselves by removing 
Alcibiades from office) that has most troubled scholars, giving the impression that he is shifting blame from 
Alcibiades to the Athenian populace (De Romilly 1965: 563). I address this point further below, at pp. 254–8. 
371 Bloedow (1992: 154–5) argues that there is actually no direct evidence of the truth of this statement (Alcibiades’ 
skill in war) in Thucydides’ text. In so doing, he points to 8.86.4, where Thucydides claims, when Alcibiades stops 
the Athenians at Samos from sailing against the Piraeus, that he benefited the polis for the first time. 
372 For more on these points, see Gribble 2006: 463–4. In addition, Westlake (1968: 9–10, 219) argues that here and 
elsewhere readers receive more information about Alcibiades’ private life than with any other leader, and that this is 
because his private life (and its effect on the Athenians) played an influential role in history. Jaffe (2017a: 400), 
meanwhile, comments on the contrast between the description of Athenian distaste for Alcibiades’ private behavior 
and Pericles’ description of Athenian indifference to each other’s private lives (2.37.2, 39.1). 
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desires equally, both public and private.373 This inability to check his own desires, and, 
moreover, this willingness to place private desires on an equal footing with—or even on a higher 
footing than—public pursuits, though Alcibiades attempts to defend them in the speech that 
immediately follows this passage, ultimately cause the Athenians to become suspicious of 
Alcibiades, and to support his removal from Athens.  
 Additionally, as discussed previously in this dissertation (especially in Chapter 2), the 
ability to check the more problematic impulses of a polis’ national character is a crucial part of 
Thucydides’ model of positive leadership. For example, the historian greatly emphasizes 
Pericles’ ability to moderate the Athenians’ characteristic impulses to rash action and conquest 
(e.g., 2.65.1–2, 8–9), and portrays Brasidas as deploying Spartan restraint in his own activities 
when appropriate. Alcibiades, on the other hand, described as managing public matters based on 
private ambitions and living his private life according to his unchecked desires, cannot 
reasonably be expected by readers to provide such restraint to others. Indeed, the speech which 
immediately follows these comments by Thucydides confirms these suspicions, as rather than 
attempting to check Athenian acquisitiveness, Alcibiades fans the flames of his audience’s 
emotions, and calls on them to be true to their established national character.374 
 In addition to these more general problems with Alcibiades’ lack of restraint within 
Thucydides’ larger schema of positive leadership, the author also discusses the result of this 
                                                 
373 As Forde argues, “… he lived in blatant disregard of conventional standards of modesty and self-restraint” (1989: 
7). 
374 This conclusion raises a very interesting parallel, one to which I will return later: the similarity between 
Alcibiades’ behavior, and Plato’s description of the “democratic man” in the Republic (559d–562a). There, Plato 
identifies the man who resembles democracy as spending a great deal of money on unnecessary pleasures, and 
pursuing whatever desire he happens to have (561b), believing all pleasures to be of equal value. Additionally, 
according to Plato’s Socrates, such a man will convince others also to pursue their desires as well, and will invert 
what is bad and good, calling reverence foolish and moderation cowardice. Readers see Alcibiades doing both of 
these things, inflaming the Athenians love (eros) of conquest and reformulating the relationship between the 
individual and the polis, in his speech that follows. For more on Alcibiades’ role in eliciting the desire of the 
populace, see Wohl (2002: 124–70). 
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unchecked ambition in its current, specifically Athenian context. This information may be 
accessed by focusing on Thucydides’ description of the demos’ reaction to Alcibiades’ lifestyle 
at 6.15.4.375 
 While some scholars have seen this passage as shifting blame from Alcibiades to the 
Athenians (as mentioned previously)—and I do not contest that Thucydides clearly identifies this 
Athenian behavior as producing negative result—I believe that it holds yet greater 
significance.376 Indeed, when readers acknowledge that Thucydides is describing Alcibiades as a 
politician operating in the specific context of democratic Athens, we may move beyond the 
question of whether the Athenian response is problematic, and move on to ask what this passage 
says about Alcibiades’ effectiveness as a leader in this context. This inquiry inevitably leads to 
the answer that he cannot be effective, since, of course, any individual who is mistrusted to such 
a degree that he must flee his city cannot (due to his loss of influence and political power) 
provide the leadership necessary to help his city flourish. Thus, Alcibiades’ personal lack of 
restraint, which sours the populace against him, not only prevents him from providing the 
moderation required Athenian national character, but from even having the requisite political 
influence to attempt to do so. In summation, then, since Thucydides’ notion of positive 
leadership is context-specific, and he here describes Alcibiades as unable to operate within 
Athens as it exists, the fault lies both with Athens for mistrusting a useful leader, and with 
Alcibiades for being unable or unwilling to recognize and adapt to this Athenian reality. 
                                                 
375 For the text of this passage, see above, pp. 239–40. 
376 On the main target of criticism for this passage, see, e.g., De Romilly 1965: 563, Orwin 1994: 119, Raaflaub 
2006: 207–8, and Hornblower 2008: 340 (who directly states, “… Th.’s criticism is of the people who suspected 
Alkibiades beyond reason and thus brought about precisely the results they hoped to avoid”). While not referring 
specifically to this passage, Stahl identifies behavior such as this by the Athenian demos, acting out of suspicion and 
fear in order to preserve its own power, as parallel to that of the tyrants whose return it so fears (2003: 7–8, 10). 
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 After this aside reminding readers of Alcibiades’ tendency to act based on personal 
motivations and grand ambitions, Thucydides then reports his speech in support of the Sicilian 
Expedition. This speech relays a great deal of information about the young Athenian politician, 
as it addresses Alcibiades’ views on the proper relationship between private and public concerns, 
the role of ambition in politics, and the management of Athenian collective character. As 
Westlake argues, its rhetoric contrasts sharply with Nicias’ caution, instead showcasing 
Alcibiades’ “youthful ambition,” and representing him as, “… a brilliant and self-assured man 
whose judgement does not match his enthusiasm” (1968: 221), an individual description 
strikingly similar to that of the Athenian national character at 1.70.3 (“… daring beyond their 
strength”).377  
 As we will now see, much of this speech serves to either defend Alcibiades’ personal 
ambition and seeming lack of restraint in the eyes of his Athenian audience (an effort which may 
achieve its goals in the short term, but which readers will already know from 6.15.4 will 
ultimately fail to stop the Athenians from turning on him), or to advance his ambitious agenda, 
sometimes by presenting information of dubious accuracy. 
 Alcibiades begins his speech by responding to the charges which Nicias made against 
him (discussed above). In this defense, he asserts that it is more fitting for him to command than 
others (προσήκει μοι μᾶλλον ἑτέρων … ἄρχειν; 6.16.1) and that he is worthy (ἄξιος) to do so, 
and goes on to claim that the behaviors for which Nicias criticizes him actually reflect well on 
both himself and his city. Alcibiades explains his position by starting from the specific and 
working to more general conclusions. First, he claims that, while the Greeks expected Athens to 
be worn out by war, his entry of seven chariots at Olympia changed this perception, and now 
                                                 
377 “The speech of Alcibiades at the meeting of the assembly, as reported by Thucydides (6.16–18), is largely a study 
of character” (Westlake 1968: 220). 
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causes their fellow Hellenes to overestimate Athenian power (6.16.2). Turning to his activities 
within Athens itself, he goes on to state, καὶ ὅσα αὖ ἐν τῇ πόλει χορηγίαις ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ 
λαμπρύνομαι, τοῖς μὲν ἀστοῖς φθονεῖται φύσει, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ξένους καὶ αὕτη ἰσχὺς φαίνεται 
(“And however much I distinguish myself in the city by paying for choruses or by some other 
means, this is naturally envied by the townspeople, but to foreigners this also comes off as 
strength”; 6.16.3). Alcibiades then closes his defense by stating that it is not wrong for him to be 
treated differently from other Athenians if he deserves it (which he clearly thinks he does; 
6.16.4), and that successful individuals are always resented while alive, but are claimed as 
honored descendants by later generations (6.16.5).  
 In this series of claims, one may first note that, just as Thucydides implied at 6.15.4, 
Alcibiades is shown directly demonstrating his unwillingness to change his behavior, despite the 
negative impact which he perceives it to be having on his fellow citizens. Instead, he attempts to 
use his rhetorical skill to reshape public perception of himself. In so doing, Alcibiades does 
something perhaps even more important: he attempts to reformulate the accepted relationship 
between public and private interests. This shift is particularly striking, as Alcibiades directly 
argues that gratification of his own, private desires and ambitions benefits the state as a whole 
(Pelling 1990: 260; De Bakker 2012: 35). This stance stands in stark contrast with Pericles’ 
previously stated position on the proper relationship between the individual and the polis, in 
which he claimed that the individual could not flourish without ensuring the success of his city: 
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν 
πολιτῶν εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἁθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην (“For I think that the whole city succeeding 
benefits private citizens more than when it does well with respect to individual citizens, but 
  
245 
stumbles as a whole”; 2.60.2).378 Alcibiades here, despite seemingly sharing Pericles’ overall 
persuasive ability, places himself in direct contrast with the content of Pericles’ speeches.379 
Through his own words, then, Alcibiades identifies himself as doing the opposite (τοὐναντίον; 
2.65.7) of Pericles. 
 Alcibiades’ eventual downfall at Athens appears to demonstrate that this position was 
never fully accepted.380 The main focus of this passage, however, and of much of the speech that 
follows, is Alcibiades’ continued defense of individuality. Indeed, he again focuses on his own 
position in the polis (especially at 6.16.4), on his right to do as he pleases, and on his own 
exceptionality. This emphasis on his own worth to the city—and worthiness to be treated 
differently—is actually somewhat reminiscent of Nicias’ approach to leadership, and 
demonstrates that, while Thucydides depicts the two leaders as sharing few other character traits 
in common, both subscribe to a more traditional notion of leadership in which the most important 
thing is one’s position relative to others.381 This observation yet again places him firmly in the 
category of the leaders whom Thucydides describes at 2.65.11, and identifies him as combining 
more traditional ideas of leadership with the newer, incessantly active character of Athens. 
 After this defense of his private life, Alcibiades moves on to attempt to provide another 
example of how he has personally benefitted the polis. In order to do this, he turns to his work on 
the Argive alliance. This may seem a strange place to turn, given that it was soundly defeated by 
                                                 
378 This sentiment continues throughout 2.60.2–4. 
379 On this contrast, see Carter (1986: 99–100), who argues that Alcibiades is turning Pericles’ comments on their 
head. See also Burns 2012: 222 and Nichols 2017: 467. Balot (2006: 45) looks further back to lyric poetry, and 
points out that Solon repeatedly emphasizes the importance of self-restraint and mutual respect among citizens, and 
states that public evil comes to every man (see esp. Solon fr. 4.26–9). 
380 Ober (2006: 152) argues that Alcibiades did not understand the necessary relationship between the individual and 
the community, and Balot (2006: 61) posits that, while Athenian standards for individual behavior were generally 
loose, they did maintain certain normative ideas. 
381 Pelling sees an implicit comparison between Alcibiades and Achilles, as each’s individuality places him in 
conflict with his community. He goes on to note that the worlds of Homer and Thucydides are sometimes “curiously 
close to one another” (Pelling 1990: 260). 
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the Spartans and their allies, but, as Nichols (2017: 467) points out, Alcibiades attempts to turn 
the defeat at Mantinea into a victory. Indeed, he frames his deeds as follows: he formed an 
alliance with two of the greatest powers in the Peloponnese and forced the Spartans to stake 
everything on the outcome of one battle, while the Athenians risked nothing. He closes this 
discussion by claiming that the Spartans have still not recovered from his actions, despite their 
victory (6.16.6). 
 This rhetorical position appears to be specifically contradicted by the narrative, in which 
Thucydides points out that this one victory at Mantinea entirely restored the Spartans’ reputation 
(5.75.3), and eventually lead Argos to: 1) back out of its alliance with Athens, Mantinea, and Elis 
(signing one instead with Sparta; 5.76–9), 2) order the Athenians to depart from Epidaurus 
(5.80.3), and 3) temporarily end its own democracy (5.81.1–2).382 This has led Bloedow to refer 
to this passage as mere “bravado” (1992: 142), Hornblower to call it “almost insolently 
unconvincing” (2008: 347), and Dover to label it “a thin rhetorical guise for failure” (Gomme, 
Andrewes, and Dover 1970: 242). His seemingly dishonest reformulation of events recalls 
Alcibiades’ willingness to deceive to accomplish his own ends (observed before in his trick 
against the Spartan envoys in Book 5), but this time, perhaps more insidiously, he directly 
attempts to mislead his Athenian audience. 
 In the section that follows (6.17), Alcibiades proceeds to malign the strength of the 
Sicilians, claiming, among other things, that they are no great power (6.17.2), that they have 
insufficient arms for their protection (6.17.3), and that they will be unwilling to work together 
(6.17.4). As Tsakmakis argues, Alcibiades is taking advantage of his audience’s ignorance of 
                                                 
382 For a detailed examination (and refuation) of Alcibiades’ claims, see Bloedow 1992: 142–3. See also Gomme, 
Andrewes, and Dover (1970: 248) and Hornblower (2008: 347–8). 
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Sicily, and actively misleads them in order to convince them to attack (2006: 165).383 As such, he 
assuages Athenian concerns by providing a false sense of security, and, as Burns (2012: 222), 
Raaflaub (2006: 203), and Bloedow (1992: 146–7) all argue, inflames the Athenian ἔρως for the 
expedition which Thucydides describes them as experiencing (6.24.3).384 Thus, he encourages 
the Athenians to make their decision on emotional and irrational grounds, based solely on their 
characteristic desire for acquisition (πλεονεξία).385 This is, of course, not the action of a leader 
attempting to provide corrective guidance. 
 The last argument which Alcibiades makes that is worthy of discussion is his appeal to 
the Athenians to live according to their national character (6.18.6–7). I have already discussed 
this passage in this dissertation and, more specifically, the similarities between Alcibiades’ 
language and other descriptions of Athenian collective behavioral tendencies,386 but let us briefly 
review his words before moving on to a discussion of their significance. First, he calls on the 
Athenians not to be still, given their character: καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑμῖν τοῖς 
ἄλλοις τὸ ἥσυχον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐς τὸ ὁμοῖον μεταλήψεσθε (“And you must not 
consider keeping quiet from the same perspective as others, unless you also change your customs 
to be the same”; 6.18.3). Then, he makes a much more direct claim that the Athenians are by 
nature an active people, and must continue to be in order to ensure their safety: παράπαν τε 
                                                 
383 Tsakmakis posits that this willing deception is another difference between Pericles and Alcibiades, as Pericles 
never did this (2006: 165). As an additional difference, we may note that, at 6.17.7, Alcibiades invokes the 
Athenians’ ancestors, saying that they, despite having numerous enemies including the Persians, managed to claim 
their empire. Pericles, meanwhile, invoked the Athenian’s ancestors in order to persuade the current generation to 
abandon the countryside and to preserve their current holdings (1.144.4). For more on the latter passage, see Chapter 
2, pp. 90–1. As a final note, one may also compare Mardonius’ speech downplaying Greek resistance before the 
second Persian invasion in Herodotus (7.9α–γ). 
384 While Alcibiades here inflames the demos’ passion for external acquisition (compare Pericles’ call for his fellow 
citizens to become lovers (ἐραστάς; 2.43.1) of their polis), Victoria Wohl discusses what she sees as a much more 
general Athenian desire (ἔρως) for Alcibiades, based on his charisma and appearance, which contributes directly to 
his political authority (2002: 124–5). 
385 Cf. Cleon’s demand during the Mytilenean debate that the Athenians act while their anger is fresh (3.38.1). 
386 See especially Chapter 1, pp. 49–50. 
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γιγνώσκω πόλιν μὴ ἀπράγμονα τάχιστἀ ἄν μοι δοκεῖν ἀπραγμοσύνης μεταβολῇ διαφθαρῆναι, καὶ 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσφαλέστατα τούτους οἰκεῖν οἳ ἂν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἤθεσι καὶ νόμοις, ἢν καὶ χείρω 
ᾖ, ἥκιστα διαφόρως πολιτεύωσιν (“And I recognize absolutely that a city that is not inactive 
would seem to me most quickly to be ruined by a change to inactivity, and that, of men, they 
live most safely who govern least of all differently from their customs and laws, even if they are 
inferior”; 6.18.7).387 This argument actually runs counter to the position that I argue Thucydides 
is implicitly taking in his History (that the Athenian and Spartan characters are inherently flawed 
and in need of moderation, and that positive leaders are individuals who can provide this 
moderation), and thus yet further strengthens readers’ impression that Alcibiades is uninterested 
in restraining himself or the tendencies of his polis.388 This is the final impression with which 
readers are left of Alcibiades in this episode, as he concludes his speech with this call for the 
Athenians to be true to their character.  
 In his portrayal of the deliberation before the Sicilian expedition, then, Thucydides 
strengthens his presentation of the character traits he has previously attributed to Alcibiades, and 
builds upon them by providing, both directly and implicitly, yet more information about him. 
Readers see Alcibiades continue to be extremely ambitious, to be motivated by private interests 
and feuds, and to be willing to risk Athenian resources and manpower to achieve his ends. At the 
same time, Thucydides makes it much clearer that Alcibiades lacks restraint of any form in any 
aspect of his life, and thus is unable to serve his polis as a moderating force. 
 
 
                                                 
387 On these passages and, more generally, Alcibiades’ call for the Athenians to live up to their character, see Balot 
2004: 90; Carter 1986: 99–100; and Luginbill 1999: 85 and 155. 
388 Luginbill (1999: 99 n. 25) points out that, while Alcibiades claims that the Athenians should not deviate from 
their established character, Thucydides actually praises Pericles for altering Athenian behavioral patterns. 
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Early Sicily, Recall, and Time in Sparta 
 Alcibiades’ active, ambitious nature remains on display after the Sicilian Expedition 
departs from Athens and reaches its target, especially in his proposal during the war congress at 
Rhegium (6.48), and in his subsequent attempts, immediately after this policy is agreed upon, to 
bring Messina and Catana over to the Athenians (6.50–1). It also results however, together with 
the other attributes discussed above, in his recall from Sicily,389 and in his exile and arrival at 
Sparta (6.28–9, 53, 60–1, 88.9).390 
 Alcibiades’ behavior remains unchanged in this new context, and at first it appears that 
his active, acquisitive, and ambitious personality provides much-needed balance to the 
chronically hesitant Spartan character. Indeed, when the Syracusans, Corinthians, and Alcibiades 
arrive to ask the Spartans to send help to the Syracusans, they originally wish only to send 
envoys to encourage Syracuse not to give in, not to send armed assistance (6.88.10). It is at this 
point that Alcibiades rises to speak,391 and the words attributed to him yet again shed a great deal 
of light on his individual character (Westlake 1968: 225–6). As expected, he encourages the 
Spartans to act and, in so doing, provides greatly beneficial advice to them—his insistence that 
they send help to Sicily, for example, and that they take the war to the Athenians by fortifying 
Deceleia (6.91).392 In this same speech, however, he undertakes another lengthy defense of his 
                                                 
389 While it is of little importance the current discussion, it is worth noting that numerous scholars have discussed 
whether Alcibiades’ recall from Sicily represents a significant turning point in the outcome of the expedition. For 
more information on this, see, among others, Bloedow 1992: 149; Connor 1984b: 165; Finley 1942: 203; Kagan 
1991: 371; Bengtson 1979: 14; Ellis 1989: 64; and Kern 1989: 79. 
390 Especially interesting is Thucydides’ aside on Harmodius and Aristogeiton (6.53.3–59), and his statement at 
6.60.1 that this is what the Athenians had in mind when they grew suspicious that the profanation of the mysteries 
was a sign of an oligarchic or tyrannical plot. 
391 Westlake (1968: 225) notes that the Syracusans, Corinthians, and Alcibiades were all present and attempting to 
get the Spartans to act in Sicily, but Thucydides only reports Alcibiades’ speech. It seems that Thucydides found 
Alcibiades’ speech the most instructive. 
392 This call to action in the face of hesitation is, of course, very “Athenian.” Gribble (2006: 465) argues that it is this 
very Athenian-ness that allows Alcibiades to be one of the most effective Spartan leaders. As I argue, however, this 
effectiveness was limited by other aspects of his character which are also identifiably “Athenian.” As an additional 
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fierce individualism, claiming that he was right to work against Sparta previously because of the 
personal dishonor (ἀτιμίαν) which he received from them, that in the present circumstances he is 
well within his rights to act against Athens because it has now wronged him, and that he as a true 
patriot may reclaim his position there by any means at his disposal (6.92.2–4).393 
 Thus, while Alcibiades, bringing his Athenian character with him to Sparta, provides a 
jolt of energy to the wavering Spartans, he also maintains his raw, individualistic ambition, 
unabashedly identifying perceived personal slights as determinants of his policy stances, and 
openly stating his goal of working with his previous enemies to recover his position in Athens.394 
 These dual attributes of Alcibiades’ hyper-Athenian character continue to be on display 
during his time working with the Spartans. He continues to fight against their tendency toward 
hesitation and self-doubt, insisting that the Spartans complete their fortification of Deceleia and 
keep the pressure on Athens (7.18.1), and convincing them not to abandon their naval efforts in 
the Aegean when they grow distraught after a setback at Chios (8.11.3–12.1). At the same time, 
he also continues to act with an eye to his own position (as well as those of his personal allies), 
attempting to reassert himself as a major player in the Greek world (Westlake 1968: 234). For 
example, Thucydides tells readers that Alcibiades wished to add the Milesians as allies before 
the arrival of other Peloponnesian ships because, ἐβούλετο … καὶ τοῖς Χίοις καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ 
Χαλκιδεῖ καὶ τῷ ἀποστείλαντι Ἐνδίῳ, ὥσπερ ὑπέσχετο, τὸ ἀγώνισμα προσθεῖναι (“He wanted … 
to add this achievement, just as he had promised, for the Chians and for himself and for 
                                                 
note, Alcibiades plays off Spartan fear to prod them into action (Luginbill 1999: 121), continuing his trend of 
motivating audiences by means of their emotions. 
393 Ferrario (2012: 185) argues that Alcibiades’ success in Sparta doesn’t make sense, given that he double-crossed 
the Spartan ambassadors at 5.43.1–46.5. It against this very charge that Alcibiades here defends himself. 
394 Funnily enough, at 6.89.5 Alcibiades blames his ouster in part on a lack of temperance (τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχούσης 
ἀκολασίας) in Athens, and claims that he attempted to be more moderate (μετριώτεροι) in political matters than 
others, but was driven out by those focused on baser things (πονηρότερα). While Thucydides does clearly show that 
Alcibiades’ political opponents actively worked to remove him from the scene at Athens, few readers can be 
expected to feel that he has been the temperate, moderate one up to this point. 
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Chalcideus and for Endius who had sent him out”; 8.17.2). In addition, he encourages the 
development of internal disputes and personal competitions between his Spartan colleagues, 
convincing Endius to vie with Agis for honor and status, and involving him in his own dispute 
with the Spartan king (8.12.2).395 As a result, despite the general effectiveness of Spartan naval 
operations during Alcibiades’ presence,396 by 8.45.1 he is a personal enemy (ἐχθρός) of King 
Agis, and the Spartans have grown suspicious of his trustworthiness to such a degree that they 
send a letter to Astyochus with instructions that he kill Alcibiades. Due to this development, he is 
forced to take refuge with Tissaphernes. 
 To conclude our discussion of Alcibiades’ time in Sparta, then, we may note that, while 
his energetic Athenian character does benefit Sparta, counter-balancing the polis’ traditional 
hesitancy, the limited good he does is not enough to declare him a fully effective leader. This is 
because, in Thucydides’ presentation, such a leader must be able both to check the flaws 
characteristic of the polis in which he operates while maintaining its strengths, and to 
consistently provide this guidance. The fact that Alcibiades encourages the sort of individualistic 
competition which Thucydides decries at 2.65.11 among Sparta’s leaders, however, demonstrates 
that he is pulling Sparta too far to the other end of the spectrum of national character, and in so 
doing introducing new flaws. In addition, his forced flight from Sparta makes it clear that his 
own unrestrained Athenian ambition continues to prevent him from maintaining his position as a 
leader. Much like Nicias was too Spartan for the Athenians, Alcibiades proves to be simply too 
Athenian for the Spartans. 
  
                                                 
395 On this point, see Cartledge and Debnar 2006: 568. 
396 “The success of Alcibiades and Chalcideus in instigating revolt at Chios, and soon afterwards at Erythrae and 
Clazomenae, must be counted a remarkable achievement …” (Westlake 1968: 235). Luginbill (1999: 124) also notes 
that, as long as the Spartans had an Athenian leader, they were successful in their naval operations. 
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Alcibiades with Tissaphernes and Reunited with the Athenians 
 I turn next to Alcibiades’ appearances in the remainder of the History. He plays a 
prominent, yet surprisingly indecisive role in Book 8 (in that he fails to accomplish much in his 
many meetings and negotiations with Tissaphernes). The vast majority of his actions reinforce, 
in one way or another, his previously established characterization, as he spends much of the 
remainder of the work looking after himself and his own position in the Greek world, and locked 
in competitions with other leaders for influence among the Athenians. 
 A few examples should suffice to demonstrate this point. As evidence of his continued 
self-interest over any communal concern, one may cite Alcibiades’ immediate shift to actively 
harming the Peloponnesian cause as soon as he perceives himself to have been wronged by them 
(8.45.1),397 and in his advice to Tissaphernes not to allow either Athens or Sparta to obtain the 
upper hand, but instead to continually pit them against one another (8.46.1). Here he continues to 
show no semblance of civic concern, thinking instead only of his own position, and of what is 
expedient for himself in the current circumstances. In fact, even when Alcibiades begins to try to 
bring Tissaphernes over to the Athenian side in the war, Thucydides is explicit that he does so 
only because he wishes to return to Athens, and believes that they will receive him back if he 
appears to have influence with Tissaphernes (8.47.1).  
 Additionally, after he rejoins the Athenians at Samos, Alcibiades continues to claim more 
sway with the satrap than he actually appears to have, going so far as to claim that he stopped 
Tissaphernes from providing a Phoenician fleet to the Peloponnesians which Thucydides states 
he had no intention of actually sending (8.88).398 Alcibiades thus maintains his willingness to 
                                                 
397 As Johnson Bagby argues, Alcibiades appears to be free of any firm ideology (2011: 124). 
398 This is the position taken by Westlake (1968: 255–6). 
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deceive even a friendly audience for his own benefit, and status, it seems, is more important to 
him than truth. 
 The consistency in Alcibiades’ behavior does not end there, however. Indeed, now 
lacking Agis as a personal enemy, Alcibiades replaces him with Phrynichus, who attempts to 
prevent his return to the fleet at Samos by sending a series of letters to Astyochus warning him 
that Alcibiades is actively working against Peloponnesian interests (8.50–1). Astyochus turns 
over the letters to Alcibiades, however, who in turn notifies the Athenians that Phrynichus is 
communicating with the enemy.399 Each of these two commanders, however, participates not on 
behalf of his community at large, but rather for his own sake. Indeed, Phrynichus opposes the 
return of Alcibiades because he fears he will do him harm (8.50.1), and his claim that Alcibiades 
cares only about securing his return—and not about whether the Athenians live under an 
oligarchy or democracy (8.48.4)—rings true given that Thucydides’ narrative shows him 
expressing support for both supporters of the oligarchic coup (8.47.2) and democrats at Samos 
(8.76.7, 81–82.1).400 Alcibiades thus focuses again on his own position relative to other Athenian 
leaders, rather than on the communal good of the polis. 
 These episodes demonstrate that Alcibiades maintains his overwhelming ambition and 
desire to play a prominent role in events in the Greek world. He does not seek this power, 
however, because of what he thinks he can accomplish for Athens or Sparta, but rather because 
he thinks he personally deserves it. As such, he uses any means necessary, including deception, 
                                                 
399 As Westlake describes, “The episode is presented as a battle of wits between two practised intriguers playing for 
high stakes and pursuing their private interests with relentless determination and infinite subtlety” (1968: 244). He 
goes on, however, to argue that Thucydides is most likely stressing the contrast between these leaders to the point 
that he is creating a slightly misleading impression of them (1968: 247). 
400 Westlake (1968: 244) and Delebecque (1965: 86–8, 96–8) take the position that Phrynichus is driven by personal 
motivations to a lesser extent than Alcibiades. 
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to demonstrate his value and claim influence, and ends up at loggerheads with anyone who 
stands in his way. 
 With all that said, however, one passage stands as an outlier. This is when, after the 
Athenians at Samos grow angry at envoys from the government of the Four Hundred currently in 
power in Athens and declare their intention to sail into the Piraeus and retake the city, 
Thucydides reports that Alcibiades holds them back (8.86.4–5). He is not described as doing this 
for selfish reasons, however, as readers might expect at this point, but instead Thucydides goes 
out of his way to state that, for the first time, Alcibiades benefits his city, and that no one else 
could have accomplished this feat. What are readers to make of this sudden change in 
Alcibiades’ behavior? I take up the possible implications of this passage, as well as several 
others that have caused scholars consternation in interpreting Thucydides’ presentation of 
Alcibiades, in the next section. 
 
Inconsistency in the Portrayal of Alcibiades? 
 As noted above, certain episodes in Thucydides’ History have led scholars to question 
just how the historian views Alcibiades. Their concerns and arguments have centered largely on 
two passages: Thucydides’ description of Alcibiades as a capable military commander (6.15.4) 
and the Sicilian Expedition as capable of ending in success (2.65.11), and Alcibiades’ sudden 
display of what appears to be civic-mindedness at 8.86.4–5 (mentioned just above). I will 
address these difficulties one a time, beginning with the former. 
 As scholars have noted, many readers of Thucydides have found Nicias’ arguments 
against the Sicilian Expedition extremely persuasive (Brunt 1952: 59), and have seen the 
narrative of Books 6 and 7 as confirming that the entire undertaking was a grave mistake 
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(Bloedow 1992: 144). At the same time, however, Thucydides’ statements at 2.65.11 and 6.15.4 
(discussed previously) seem to insinuate quite strongly that the historian believed that the 
expedition was not doomed to failure, but rather could have succeeded (Orwin 1994: 118–19). 
Rhodes refers to this problem as, “the most serious inconsistency in Thucydides’ history” (1988: 
245). What is one to do with this seemingly unresolvable incongruity? Various readings have 
been proposed. 
 Orwin, for example, takes the position that Thucydides truly believes that the expedition 
only fails because of the recall of Alcibiades (1994: 119), and Burns largely agrees, positing that 
the insufficient support for the expedition mentioned at 2.65.11 refers to the poor leadership it 
experienced in Alcibiades’ absence (2012: 230). Gomme, on the other hand, argues that the 
narrative of Books 6 and 7 does not bear out Thucydides’ claims (1956: 195–6), and Brunt feels 
that Thucydides’ position that the removal of Alcibiades was a greater blunder than the 
expedition itself is an exaggeration, and calls the decision to invade Sicily “an irremediable 
error” (1952: 95–6). Rhodes, meanwhile, attempts to resolve the issue by reminding us that 
Thucydides’ history was not written as “the result of a single spell of thinking,” and goes on to 
say that it is not unreasonable to think that Thucydides had different ideas about why the Sicilian 
Expedition failed at different moments of composition (1988: 245). Finally, Bloedow maintains 
that we can only guess at what Thucydides truly thought, but in examining the narrative of 
Books 6 and 7 determines that the invasion was ultimately a mistake (1992: 145).401 
 A few points must be made in response to these difficulties. First, as Westlake (1968: 
257–8) and Bloedow (1992: 154–5) posit, Thucydides’ comments at 6.15.4, in which he claims 
that Alcibiades was extremely capable in war, and that his removal “swiftly ruined the city” (οὐ 
                                                 
401 Bloedow also claims that the judgment at 2.65.11 likely results from Thucydides reflecting later on events after 
413 (1992: 145). For more perspectives on this issue, see Westlake (1941: 61) and Raaflaub (2006: 205). 
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διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν), most likely refers to later events, such as those between 411 and 
407.402 This is because, as Bloedow notes, Thucydides does not actually report any of 
Alcibiades’ military victories that act as evidence for his outstanding marshal ability, and so 
must be looking forward to later events which he had yet to record when he died (1992: 154–5). 
In addition, this statement is unlikely to refer to the removal of Alcibiades from command of the 
Sicilian expedition, since his ouster did not, in fact, cause the swift downfall of the city, which 
held out until its final defeat in 404. 
 Be that as it may, for the purposes of the argument under consideration in this chapter 
(does Alcibiades’ character permit him to provide leadership that Thucydides would identify as 
effective for Athens?), whether or not the Sicilian Expedition itself could have succeeded 
actually makes little difference. This is because, while the reason for the expedition’s failure 
appears largely to be the absence of Alcibiades (perhaps indicating that the Athenians did not 
need to be restrained from undertaking it), the reason for Alcibiades’ absence is the mistrust 
which his character instills in the Athenians, and their resultant rejection of his leadership. As I 
argued previously, based on Thucydides’ schema of positive leadership, 6.15.4 is an indictment 
of both the demos’ reaction to Alcibiades and of the politician’s inability—or unwillingness—to 
adjust to the reality of the context in which he found himself, and thus to restrain his personal 
behavior and ambition. Unless Alcibiades changed his character, therefore (exactly what he 
argues Athens itself must not do in his speech in support of the Sicilian Expedition; 6.18.3, 7), 
the expedition would always have failed, because Alcibiades would always have alienated the 
populace to such an extent that he would not have been in a position to utilize his martial skill to 
its benefit. To summarize, the conceptual possibility for success of this ambitious enterprise 
                                                 
402 See also Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1970: 242–5. 
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changes neither the character of Alcibiades, nor the requirements of his specific Athenian 
context. Thus, while the success of the Sicilian Expedition would, of course, have been a great 
boon for Athens in the war, Thucydides demonstrates that Alcibiades is incapable of maintaining 
the leadership role required to intervene in Athenian politics or military matters. More remains to 
be said on these points, but I will revisit this discussion after first turning to the next passage in 
question. 
 The one seemingly great exception to this chapter’s argument that Alcibiades lacks 
personal restraint, and therefore the ability to provide restraint to either Athens or Sparta, is 
Thucydides’ description of the Athenian general’s behavior at 8.86.4–5. There, after mentioning 
that Alcibiades prevented his democratic compatriots from sailing against the Piraeus, the 
historian provides the following commentary: καὶ δοκεῖ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρῶτον τότε καὶ οὐδενὸς 
ἔλασσον τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῆσαι· ὡρμημένων γὰρ τῶν ἐν Σάμῳ Ἀθηναίων πλεῖν ἐπὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς, 
ἐν ᾧ σαφέστατα Ἰωνίαν καὶ Ἑλλήσποντον εὐθὺς εἶχον οἱ πολέμιοι, κωλυτὴς γενέσθαι (“And 
Alcibiades seems at that time first (and less than no man) to have benefited the city. For with the 
Athenians in Samos eager to sail against their own countrymen, in which circumstance their 
enemies would clearly have immediately seized Ionia and the Hellespont, he was the one 
preventing them”; 8.86.4). He then continues by claiming that Alcibiades was, at that time, the 
only one capable of holding down the mob (κατασχεῖν τὸν ὄχλον; 8.86.5). 
 Thucydides clearly marks this behavior as exceptional, and several scholars have 
interpreted this passage as demonstrating a new and previously unseen side to Alcibiades: a man 
who looks to the communal good rather than constantly seeking to advance his own, personal 
ambitions.403 These actions, as well as the terms in which Thucydides describes them, very 
                                                 
403 See Westlake 1968: 253 and Finley 1967: 158 on the exceptionality of Alcibiades’ behavior in this passage. 
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closely mirror those of Pericles (Saïd 2012: 223), who κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως (“held down 
the mass freely”; 2.65.8).404 Thus, an argument could be made that Alcibiades here displays 
change or growth.  
 At the same time, however, the fact that Alcibiades’ actions benefitted the polis does not 
necessarily mean he was acting altruistically—it could simply be the case that, acting for 
personal reasons, he just so happened to benefit his city as well. Thucydides actually gives no 
direct indication of Alcibiades’ motivation, and this omission leaves readers to form their own 
suppositions. Previous encounters with Alcibiades in the text will undoubtedly play a large role 
in shaping these hypotheses, and all other evidence portrays Alcibiades as thinking first and 
foremost of himself and his status. Thus, I argue that it is not unreasonable to conclude that in 
this instance as well, Alcibiades likely acted at least partly out of personal motivations. The 
incompleteness of the work unfortunately makes drawing a firm conclusion impossible, since 
Thucydides does not have a chance report his version of Alcibiades’ later interventions in the 
war before the History abruptly ends.405 Be that as it may, however, while this passage does 
demonstrate that Alcibiades was capable of performing great acts of public service (Westlake 
1968: 254), his long-established behavioral patterns, characterized as they were by uncontrolled 
self-interest, make it unlikely for readers to conclude that he suddenly changed his character. 
 
                                                 
404 Forsdyke argues that the verb κατέχειν had a specifically tyrannical connotation in democratic ideology, “… used 
by the Athenians to describe the forceful subjection of a people by a tyrant” (2001: 331). For example, Herodotus 
uses this verb on multiple occasions (such as 1.59.1, 5.78, and 5.91.1) to describes the control of Peisistratids (or 
tyrants more generally) over the Athenian populace (Forsdyke 2001: 332–5). In fact, at 5.91.1 Herodotus claims that 
there was a stark difference between the success of the Athenians after they were freed (ἐλευθερωθέντων) and when 
they were held down (κατεχόμενοι) by tyranny, demonstrating the fine line that Thucydides depicts Pericles as 
walking when he says that he κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως (“held down the mass freely”; 2.65.8). More generally 
on the conception of the tyrant in Greek antiquity, see Forsdyke 2009 (especially relevant to this dissertation are pp. 
236–41). 





 Thucydides’ Alcibiades is, in many ways, an extremely complicated character, not least 
because of the seemingly simultaneous presence of both praise- and blameworthy traits within 
him, and because of the incompleteness of the text itself, which leaves readers unable to fully 
access Thucydides’ final verdict on him (if in fact he ever fully developed one). Indeed, it must 
be recognized that Thucydides does present Alcibiades as possessing remarkable persuasive 
ability, and as a highly capable military commander (even if the incomplete narrative does not 
fully confirm this latter point, and readers are left instead primarily with his defeat at Mantinea). 
The historian also depicts him as acting with relentless ambition and unchecked desire for gain 
(πλεονεξία), and thus identifies him as possessing an individual character very similar to that of 
his home polis. In determining the policies which he will pursue, however, Alcibiades 
consistently acts on private motivations and for personal gain, and makes no differentiation 
between his private and public ambitions. Instead, he pursues each in an equally unrestrained 
manner, and even goes so far as to claim that by pursuing his personal desires he has benefited 
the state (6.16). This behavior has two consequences: first, it reveals that the character attributed 
to Alcibiades makes him ill-suited to moderate the Athenian national character, since he is 
unable to restrain even his own ambition and greed; second, it alienates the Athenian populace, 
which Thucydides depicts as expecting its leaders to (at least ostensibly and to a baseline extent) 
subordinate their public desires to the public good. This alienation proves to be Alcibiades’ 
downfall, and leads to his removal from Athens. 
 As I have demonstrated, however, when Alcibiades changes his context to Sparta, he 
brings his character with him, complete with all of the same strengths and weaknesses it 
exhibited at Athens. Thus, he introduces what appears to be much-needed energy to the 
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chronically slow Spartans, encouraging them to, among other things, send support to Sicily and 
fortify Deceleia (6.91), but he also competes for status with prominent Spartans in a such a way 
that he creates powerful personal enemies for himself (8.12.2, 17.2), and thus alienates them to 
such an extent that they order his execution and he is forced yet again to flee (8.45.1). Similar to 
how Nicias was, in many ways, too Spartan for Athens, Alcibiades is too Athenian for Sparta, 
drawing its behavior too far toward the side usually occupied by Athens. As such, he again fails 
to act as a force of moderation. 
 Again, all of this is not to say that Thucydides presents Alcibiades as an incompetent 
leader—the historian very clearly states that he was extremely persuasive and had a great 
capacity for military undertakings. What is more, in his comments at 2.65.11 and 6.15.4 
Thucydides is open about his belief that Alcibiades, with his ambitious and energetic character, 
was capable of achieving great heights of success in the war. Readers may note, however, that 
the same may be said of the Athenian national character, which led the city to establish an 
empire, and to win great victories such as that at Sphacteria. These highs, however, cannot be 
viewed in isolation, but must be examined next to the lows that accompany them, which 
demonstrate the weaknesses inherent in Athenian national character, and in Alcibiades’ 
individual behavioral patterns. In essence, despite Alcibiades’ numerous skills and his ability to 
achieve great feats, his relentless ambition and lack of restraint, and especially his emphasis on 
personal desires and motivations, demonstrate his inability to serve as a moderating force in 






Conclusions and Political Thought 
 
 In this dissertation, I have covered a great deal of ground. I began with a discussion of 
Thucydides’ use of national character, in which I argued that he applies it consistently to both 
Athens and Sparta at the collective level. In addition, I examined what Thucydides identifies as 
the source of this national character, and concluded that, much like Herodotus and Hippocrates, 
he portrays political organization as a primary factor in determining behavioral patterns. I closed 
this chapter by then pointing out that the collective characterizations which Thucydides attributes 
to Athens and Sparta are both flawed, though each in its own, unique way. Additionally, because 
he presents national character as inextricably connected to political form, one may by extension 
conclude that Thucydides also implicitly demonstrates that the types of governance which he 
associates with Athens and Sparta represent—democracy and oligarchy, respectively—are 
themselves flawed, and, just like the characters of the two poleis, exist at opposite ends of a 
spectrum from one another. 
This situation, then, leaves room for the intervention of powerful individuals, who must 
contend with leadership requirements that are highly context-specific, determined as they are by 
each city-state’s unique combination of strengths and weaknesses. Thucydides’ description of 
these individuals then allows readers to observe how their individual characters interact with and 
affect the collective characters of their poleis. Generally speaking, this interaction has three 
possible results: the leaders will either correct their polis’ weaknesses while maintaining its 
strengths, maintain or even exacerbate its flaws, or temporarily drive their city-state’s behavior 
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so far to the other end of the spectrum that one set of flaws is replaced with another. It is thus the 
interplay of the individual characters of these leaders with the collective character of their polis 
which allows readers to judge their effectiveness.406 
Based on these observations, I then moved to a discussion of effective leadership in 
Thucydides, and more specifically of Pericles and Brasidas. There I demonstrated that, while 
these two leaders are portrayed as very different from one another, Thucydides shows each as 
managing to provide the type of leadership which his city needs. Indeed, Thucydides directly 
portrays Pericles as able, when necessary, to restrain his polis, or to encourage it to action 
(2.65.9), and Brasidas as consistently driving his traditionally hesitant fellow-Spartans to action, 
but also as, when appropriate, able to restrain his soldiers and himself, rather than rushing 
headlong into unduly risky battles (4.124.4, e.g.) as many Athenian commanders do. I thus 
argued that Thucydides builds for readers a portrait of effective leadership based on much more 
than a fixed set of trained skills (such as rhetorical ability) or moral virtues (such as 
incorruptibility; though these are certainly helpful), but which is instead composed of context-
specific requirements, in which a leader’s character makes him particularly fitted (or not) to lead 
a specific city-state. These extremely specific requirements, however, led to a new problem: can 
these flawed poleis actually rely on the emergence of such leaders, who possess an individual 
character that is perfectly complementary to that of the collective?407 
In Chapter 3 I undertook an examination of this question, discussing Thucydides’ 
treatment of several Athenian and Spartan leaders whom I have argued he portrays as ineffective. 
As I noted there, by calling these leaders “ineffective” I do not mean that Thucydides presents 
them as incompetent or as universal failures, but rather that he shows each ultimately failing to 
                                                 
406 On these points, see Ch. 1. 
407 For more information on these points, see Ch. 2. 
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provide the sort of corrective, moderating leadership which his polis, due to its behavioral 
tendencies, required. Indeed, all of these leaders’ individual characters are too similar to that of 
one polis or the other, and their intervention produces one of the two undesirable results 
mentioned above: they either unleash their city’s existing weaknesses, or they temporarily 
replace one set of problematic behavioral tendencies with another. Thus, in contrast to the 
singular personalities of Pericles and Brasidas, Thucydides presents the vast majority of leaders 
as failing to live up to their example, and in so doing answers the question introduced in the 
previous chapter: the emergence of effective leaders is the exception, not the rule.408 
Finally, before moving on to examine whether Thucydides provides a solution to this 
problem, in which Athens and Sparta possess problematic characters, but cannot rely on the 
appearance of leaders capable of moderating their poleis’ behavior, I addressed the difficult case 
of Alcibiades, a leader whom Thucydides paradoxically portrays as both extremely capable and 
extremely problematic. There, I argued that the historian portrays Alcibiades as, in almost all 
ways, too Athenian for either his Athenian context, or for his adopted Spartan context after he is 
forced to flee Athens. Indeed, Thucydides presents Alcibiades as possessing greed and ambition 
to rival that of his home city-state, and as pursuing these in such an unrestrained way that he 
could not possibly be expected to serve as a moderating. In addition, the historian also repeatedly 
reports that Alcibiades had personal motivations for his actions, and that he hoped to personally 
profit from them. In fact, Thucydides shows Alcibiades going so far as to attempt to reformulate 
the proper relationship between personal and private interests in his speech before the Sicilian 
Expedition (6.16), and in so doing largely inverting the Periclean perspective on the issue which 
was presented earlier in the work (2.60.1). This added personal concern served to alienate both 
                                                 
408 See Ch. 3. 
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the Athenians and the Spartans, and Thucydides’ emphasis on this point further demonstrates 
why Alcibiades is ultimately an ineffective leader: his personality—and the distrust it 
engendered—made it impossible for him to maintain a leadership position.409 
This discussion brings us to the present point in this dissertation, in which we have been 
left with a seemingly irresolvable situation: Athens and Sparta, due to the weaknesses in their 
political institutions, stand in need of strong leadership of a highly specific type, but cannot 
reasonably expect such leaders to emerge with any regularity. Does Thucydides stop here, 
content to simply point out the tragic flaws of the governmental systems of his time, or does he 
attempt to provide a solution to this problem? I argue that he does, briefly and indirectly, hint at a 
solution: the establishment of a government that is neither democracy nor oligarchy, but 
something in between, and which combines the interests of the few and the many. 
 
Thucydides’ Solution: A Government Outside Traditional Classifications   
 The key to understanding this Thucydidean solution, I argue, lies in his description of the 
government of the Five Thousand: 
καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ 
πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἥ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις 
ἐγένετο καὶ ἐκ πονήρων τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν 
πόλιν (8.97.2).  
 
And especially, in fact, for the first time in my life the Athenians clearly managed 
the polis well. For the blending for the few and the many was moderate and, 
although matters had been grievous, this first lifted up the state. 
 
Before discussing the implications of this passage, however, I must justify my reading of it. 
Indeed, the correct interpretation of this passage has received a great deal of scholarly debate, 
                                                 
409 See Ch. 4. 
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and the strength of the statement which Thucydides makes here depends largely on how one 
takes its meaning. 
The crux of the disagreement lies primarily in the first few words of this sentence, in how 
one should translate οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ. In Gomme, Andrewes, and 
Dover, for example, though it is admitted that in using the verb πολιτεύω Thucydides is most 
likely discussing constitutional form (1981: 331), a number of arguments are provided for why 
scholars should accept a weaker reading of this passage.410 For example, it is argued that οὐχ 
ἥκιστα does not necessarily mean “best,” and thus that this passage is not necessarily saying that 
the government of the Five Thousand managed the state the best of any in the work, just well 
(though it is eventually admitted that the phrase means something like “exceptionally”; 1981: 
332, 338).  
This is a relatively common phrase in Thucydides, appearing 34 times in his history 
(present passage included). In almost every one of these appearances, this combination of words 
is used in three types of ways: in providing the chief reason something was either done or turned 
out a certain way (such as at 1.60.2, when Thucydides explains why the Corinthians volunteered 
to serve with Aristeus), in identifying a piece of evidence as extremely important to a point 
Thucydides is making (such as at 1.3.1, when he presents his chief argument in favor of the 
weakness of the ancients in previous wars), or in noting an event that was, for better or worse, 
particularly impactful (such as at 1.23.3, for instance, when, while discussing the evil things that 
occurred during the war such as earthquakes and famines, Thucydides introduces the plague with 
οὐχ ἥκιστα). Thus, while these words may not directly translate as “best,” and do seem to mean 
something like “particularly,” “especially,” or “exceptionally,” they nonetheless represent a very 
                                                 
410 Gomme (1962: 164) actually identifies this passage as an exaggeration that Thucydides surely would have edited, 
a point with which Grant (1974: 85) disagrees. 
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strong turn of phrase. Indeed, in each of the cases noted above, Thucydides is identifying reasons 
or arguments that he finds of primary importance. If the government of the Five Thousand 
managed the polis “exceptionally” well in the same way that the plague was “exceptionally” 
harmful to Athens, then, its significance is hardly weakened. 
Next, the phrase τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ has also presented scholars with a 
number of difficulties.411 This wording is discussed at length in Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, 
who eventually conclude that τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον must mean “during the first phase,” though 
they admit that this interpretation largely leaves ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ “out on a branch” (1981: 334–9).412 
In coming to this conclusion they examine a number of the linguistic arguments that have been 
made in favor of this reading (and, to their credit, note the problems with each), but they 
ultimately argue for this interpretation by turning to their perception of Thucydides’ opinion on 
Athens’ governmental history. The argument, in short, is as follows: Thucydides cannot have 
concluded that the government of the Five Thousand was the best governmental system which he 
witnessed, because his admiration for Periclean Athens is so clear; these two stances would be in 
conflict with one another, and he must therefore prefer the latter governmental arrangement. 
(1981: 334–8). 
I find this argument to possess a key weakness, however.413 This is because, as I have 
argued, Thucydides makes clear that Athenian democracy was flawed precisely because it relied 
on the intervention of Pericles or someone like him. Athens may have been managed well at the 
time of his leadership, but this situation was, as Thucydides demonstrates, fleeting. It is 
significant, I believe, that the historian states that, under the government of the Five Thousand, it 
                                                 
411 For an extended discussion of the arguments scholars have made on the proper interpretation of this phrase, see 
Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover (1981: 332–9) and Hornblower (2008: 1033). 
412 Hornblower (2008: 1033) calls this complication “fatal” to the argument of Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover. 
413 As do Connor (1984a: 234) and Hornblower (2008: 1033). 
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was the Athenians (Ἀθηναῖοι) who managed the polis well. They did not rely on a leader to 
check their impulses, but instead were able to govern themselves. There is no conflict, therefore, 
if Thucydides recognizes that Pericles provided Athens with effective leadership, and that, in 
Athens under the Five Thousand, the Athenians governed themselves well.414 
I return now to the linguistic arguments that scholars have made concerning τὸν πρῶτον 
χρόνον. The two primary interpretations of this phrase are that it means either “during the first 
period,” or “for the first time” (Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981: 332).415 Arguments in favor 
of the former interpretation center on the notion that this combination of words does not appear 
elsewhere in Greek literature meaning “for the first time,” with πρῶτον without the article 
generally used for this meaning instead (Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981: 332–3). 
Additionally, a similarity has been posited between this line and τῷ μὲν οὖν πρώτῳ χρόνῳ from 
Xenophon (Hell. 2.3.15) (Hornblower 2008: 1033). Such interpretations, however, left scholars 
such as Donini (1969: 99f) doing rhetorical backflips to attempt to account for the significance of 
the phrase ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ, positing, for example, that it meant something along the lines of “in my 
working life,” and thus referred to the years 431 on.416  
The phrase τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον does show up a number of times in the extant body of 
Greek literature, and it often does appear to refer to a “first period” or “first phase.” The 
problem, however, is that it almost always occurs in this context in ancient medical, 
                                                 
414 Connor proposes this perspective as an alternative way to read this passage, though he does not specifically 
endorse it: “Could it be, for example, that Thucydides is now leading his reader beyond the role of personalities in 
politics toward an analysis of political structure (not mere constitutional form), and that he is alluding in this passage 
to the contrast between Pericles’ personal leadership and the structure of civic affairs under the Five Thousand 
which reconciled tensions between rich and poor, oligarch and democrat? From this point of view the Athenians 
might appear to have arranged their civic life well for the first time in Thucydides’ life” (1984a: 234). 
415 These competing readings have persisted, with scholars such as Raaflaub (2006: 189), Johnson Bagby (2011: 
132), and Hahm (2009: 179) maintaining the phrase “during the first period,” while Connor (1984b: 227–8), 
Hornblower (2008: 1033), and Jaffe (2017: 393, 404) choose “for the first time in my life.” 
416 Hornblower points out that it is unclear how this would exclude Pericles from the comparison (2008: 1033). 
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philosophical, or scientific works (such as Hippocrates, Aristotle, or Galen), in which one would 
expect an author to be discussing such phases. These words also appear, however, in Polybius, 
where he describes a group of mercenaries at Carthage: προθύμως δὲ συνυπακουσάντων πρὸς 
τὴν ἔξοδον καὶ βουλομένων αὐτοῦ καταλιπεῖν τὰς ἀποσκευάς, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον 
ὑπῆρχον (“And they were eagerly obeying with regards to departing, and they wished to leave 
their baggage there, just as the first time”; 1.66.7). It thus appears that Polybius uses the phrase 
here to mean something along the lines of “the first time” or “in the first instance.” While this 
usage is admittedly not precisely the same as “for the first time,” it does provide evidence for 
treating χρόνος more like the French fois,417 and, when combined with ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ, which is 
otherwise extremely difficult to account for, invites readers to translate this phrase in the most 
straightforward and natural way, “for the first time in my life.” 
We may, therefore, conclude that we have reached a safe conclusion as to what this 
sentence means in translation, but what type of government is this? This point is also contested. 
Depending on which scholar one reads, it is either a slightly altered democracy, an oligarchy, or 
a mixed constitution. For example, de Ste. Croix (1959) argues (largely negatively, as he admits) 
that there is no evidence to indicate that the government of the Five Thousand was not basically 
a slightly altered democracy. McGregor (1956: 102), however, claims that Thucydides’ 
discussion of the regime of the Five Thousand makes clear that he was an oligarch.418 Rhodes, 
meanwhile, directly disputes de Ste. Croix, but comes to the conclusion that this new systems of 
                                                 
417 On this point see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981: 333, where it is argued that χρόνος cannot mean fois, but 
only temps. 
418 This sentiment is echoed in Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover: “This constitution must formally be classes as an 
oligarchy, though of an unusual kind,” and Thucydides “must be counted as that much of an oligarch” (1981: 338). 
Connor faults this commentary, however, for forcing this constitution to be identified as either democracy or 
oligarchy (1984a: 234), while Kirkwood notes the complexity of the government of the Five Thousand by saying, “It 
can be reasonably maintained that the government can as well be called a limited democracy as a moderate 
oligarchy” (1972: 95). 
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government was defined by the dominance of the hoplite class: “it is surely credible that the 
constitution … should have been one in which membership of the assembly was restricted to 
hoplites, and that the thetes acquiesced in this because they were not consulted and still lacked 
the confidence to demand that they should be consulted” (1972: 124). Hornblower echoes this 
sentiment, and argues that the Five Thousand surely excluded the thetes, and thus was a “hoplite 
constitution” (2008: 1034). Other scholars, meanwhile, have identified this government as either 
a “middle of the road” approach to governmental structure (von Fritz 1975: 77, 417), or, more 
recently, as a type of mixed constitution.419 I agree with this latter description, but only inasmuch 
as it reflects a moderate enfranchisement, rather than a system of checks and balances.420 
One may note, however, that many of these discussions are primarily concerned with 
identifying historical reality: who actually was enfranchised under the government of the Five 
Thousand, and how would we identify it. While this is certainly a valid line of inquiry, it is not 
the primary focus of this dissertation. Instead, I would like to focus on how Thucydides presents 
this government for his readers. The historian makes two crucial points at 8.97.1 that will help 
with better understanding this presentation: the Five Thousand consisted of all Athenians able to 
supply hoplite armor, and pay for serving in a public office was ended. Both of these decisions 
appear to be oligarchic in nature,421 but we must also remember that the Five Thousand was an 
expansion from the more restrictive oligarchy of the Four Hundred, and the inclusion of more 
citizens in the process of governing is, of course, identifiably democratic.422 Thucydides also 
                                                 
419 Hahm (2009: 179), Johnson Bagby (2011: 132), Roy (2012: 298), and Jaffe (2017: 393) all identify this regime 
as mixed. Raaflaub (2006: 189) agrees that Thucydides is describing a mixed constitution at 8.97.2, but argues that 
he does not directly endorse it. For the reasons I have made clear in this chapter and in this dissertation as a whole 
(primarily due to the fact that it provides an answer—albeit a brief one—to a problem that Thucydides has spent 
such a great deal of time constructing in his work), I disagree. 
420 On this, see von Fritz 1975: 417. 
421 On this point see my discussion of Aristotle below. 
422 Indeed, Johnson Bagby argues the Five Thousand cannot be identified as a true oligarchy, since it is putting an 
end to one (2011: 132). 
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makes clear, however, that this does not represent a return to full democracy; instead, he 
describes this system of governance as a “moderate blending” (μετρία … ξύγκρασις), occupying 
the middle ground between the interests of the few (τοὺς ὀλίγους; representative of oligarchy) 
and of the many (τοὺς πολλοὺς; representative of democracy). This blending was based, it 
seems, on restricting enfranchisement by means of property requirements, and on a change in 
institutional practice (namely the suspension of pay for public office).  
Thus, Thucydides presents readers with a political structure that is not easily identifiable 
as either of the pure forms of government he spends much of his work discussing, and the faults 
of which he consistently makes clear. Indeed, while in the rest of the text Thucydides focused on 
a massive conflict between states representative of oligarchy and democracy, as well as the 
development of violence within city-states (such as at Corcyra) between factions supporting 
these two types of government, and thus appeared to present his audience with a bipolar choice 
between two flawed systems in competition with one another, he here offers a new possibility: 
the establishment of independently effective governance, without the need for interventions by 
prominent leaders, by combining elements of oligarchy and democracy. 
The concept of finding a middle road between conflicting interests in a polis, however, 
was not new to Thucydides, nor did it end with him. Indeed, as Balot argues, there was a 
“longstanding ‘middling’ ideology promoted by Hesiod, Solon, Phocylides, and other archaic 
poets” (2006: 258).423 For example, when discussing the role of the middle class in the form of 
government which he calls “polity” in his Politics, Aristotle quotes the poet Phocylides: πολλὰ 
μέσοισιν ἄριστα· μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει εἶναι (“Many things are the best for those in the middle. I 
want to be the middle in the polis”).424 
                                                 
423 See also Roy 2012: 298. 
424 See Balot 2006: 258. 
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The poetry of Solon is particularly relevant to the present discussion, as he directly 
discusses managing the conflicting interests of the few and the many. Indeed, in fragment 4, lines 
30–3 he laments the dangers of dysnomia for a city-state, and praises the benefits of eunomia (a 
point which Szegedy-Mazsak compares to Th. 1.18.1, where the historian states that eunomia put 
an end to stasis in Sparta). Moreover, in fragment 5 discusses his efforts to effect change in 
Athens: 
δήμωι μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἐπαρκεῖν, 
τιμῆς οὔτ’ ἀφελὼν οὔτ’ ἐπορεξάμενος· 
οἳ δ’ εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί, 
καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν· 
ἔστην δ’ ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι, 
 νικᾶν δ’ οὐκ εἴασ’ οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως. (fr. 5.1–6) 
 
For on the one hand I gave to the demos as much honor as was sufficient, 
Neither depriving it of honor nor giving it more. 
And those who had power and were outstanding in wealth, 
I also saw to it that these men have nothing shameful. 
I stood covering both with a strong shield, 
And I allowed neither side to be victorious unjustly. 
 
In this poem, Solon presents himself as moderating between the interests of the masess and of 
the wealthy, and thus as refusing to take a side in their conflict (Szegedy-Maszak 1993: 207).425 
As such, he portrays himself as establishing a new government that favors neither faction. Von 
Fritz (1975: 77) and Balot (2006: 43) see this poem as specifically describing a constitution that 
combines oligarchic and democratic interests, with Von Fritz calling it a “middle road.” Thus, 
Solon’s description of his own reformulation of Athenian politics is very similar to Thucydides’ 
of the government of the Five Thousand. While we cannot know how familiar Thucydides was 
with Solon’s poetry, we may justly conclude that he appears at least to have been aware of and 
addressing a set of ideas that already existed at the time of his writing. 
                                                 
425 At fr. 36.20–2 he also claims that no one else could have held down (κατέσχε) the demos as he did, language that 
is reminiscent of both Pericles (2.65.8) and Alcibiades (8.86.5). 
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 Let us now move to the Greeks most often cited when one discusses ancient Greek 
political theory: Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, while Greek political thought exists well before 
these fourth century philosophers, as I and many others have demonstrated,426 these two are the 
first to systematically theorize about politics (at least in extant form). Despite this seeming 
exceptionality, they each discuss many points that, while not necessarily made in direct response 
to Thucydides, certainly appear to be part of the same conversation.427 I begin with a discussion 
of Plato. 
 As both Balot (2006: 177–8) and Hahm (2009: 180) observe, early fourth century 
thinkers were heavily influenced by the political upheaval that dominated the end of the fifth 
century BCE, and of the Peloponnesian War. Plato was no exception to this, having seen the rise 
of the Thirty Tyrants, as well as the trial and execution of his teacher Socrates at the hands of the 
reestablished democracy in 399 BCE. As such, a number of his works discuss proper governance 
at length, and his Socrates is commonly shown criticizing the faults of democracy.428 For the 
purpose of comparing his political thought with that of Thucydides, I will focus primarily on the 
Statesman and the Laws. 
 One may wonder why I do not intend to address what is arguably Plato’s most famous 
political work, the Republic. This is because, while he does there discuss the political health of 
the community (as well of the soul) on an in-depth basis, the work’s conclusions bear little in 
common with those which I have argued Thucydides reaches in his text. There is, admittedly, 
extensive discussion of who should be allowed to govern in the Republic, but Plato’s Socrates 
                                                 
426 See, for example, Lewis (2006: 8), who argues concerning Solon that although he is not carrying out systematic 
analysis of politics, this does not mean he is not engaging in political thought. On Thucydides as engaging in 
political philosophy, see Balot (2017: 320). More generally, see also Balot (2006).  
427 Stauss directly argues that the ideas of Thucydides and Plato may complement one another (1964: 140). 
428 Kamtekar references “the leitmotif of Socrates’ political thought – the criticism of democracy as rule by the 
ignorant (Pl. Cri. 44d; Prt. 319b–d; Grg. 454e–455a, 459a–461c) in the pursuit of desire gratification (Grg. 502e–
503d, 521e–522a) resulting in the corruption of the citizens (Grg. 515d–517c)” (2009: 339) 
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places his emphasis on knowledge as the grounds for governance, leaving little room for a role 
for the many as anything other than workers. Instead, Socrates comes to the famous conclusion 
that, in his rigidly class-divided city (each group being representative of a part of the human 
soul), a philosopher-king (representing the rational faculties) must rule (R. 473c11–d3). 
Although he does mention two concerns that Thucydides would certainly have shared—the 
possibility for internal conflict, and for rulers to abuse their power for their own profit, his 
solutions to these possible problems, however, are quite different from those of Thucydides. 
With respect to the former concern, Socrates proposes the adoption of the “noble lie,” in which 
citizens are identified as imbued with gold, silver, or bronze at birth, thus giving a reason for 
their station in society, rather than proposing a system of government which purports to represent 
their interests equally. In response to the latter worry, he proposes a strict system of education 
and property control to remove the temptation for the auxiliaries to prey on those they are meant 
to protect (R. 416a–417b). This issue of corruption, however, persists in Plato’s works, and his 
interlocutors’ proposed solutions to this problem are not entirely consistent. 
 I turn now to the Statesman, in which, as the title suggests, a young Socrates and an 
Eliatic stranger attempt to identify what defines the true statesman (Balot 2006: 211). This 
treatise on politicians inevitably also includes an examination of political systems, and at Plt. 
291c–292a there is a discussion of regime types, where monarchy (μοναρχία; 291d1), oligarchy 
(τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστείαν; 291d3–4), and democracy (ἡ τοῦ πλήθους ἀρχή, δημοκρατία 
τοὔνομα κληθεῖσα; 291d6–7) are identified as the primary three. The first two are then further 
subdivided, monarchy into kingship and tyranny (τυραννίδι, τὸ δὲ βασιλικῇ; 291e5), and 
oligarchy into itself and aristocracy (ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ; 291e8), while democracy is 
argued to have only one name. 
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 After discussing these subdivisions, however, the Eleatic stranger maintains that the only 
true constitution is the one in which the leaders possess expert knowledge (292c). In response to 
a question from young Socrates about what this means, he explains as follows: 
ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε πλῆθος οὐδ’ ὡντινωνοῦν τὴν τοιαύτην λαβὸν ἐπιστήμην οἷόν τ’ 
ἂν γένοιτο μετὰ νοῦ διοικεῖν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ σμικρόν τι καὶ ὀλίγον καὶ τὸ ἕν ἐστι 
ζητητέον τὴν μίαν ἐκείνην πολιτείαν τὴν ὀρθήν, τὰς δ’ ἄλλας μιμήματα θετέον, 
ὥσπερ καὶ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐρρήθη, τὰς μὲν μιμήματα θετέον, ὥσπερ καὶ ὀλίγον 
πρότερον ἐρρήθη, τὰς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίονα, τὰς δ’ ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίω μιμουμένας 
ταύτην (Plt. 297b7–c4). 
 
That any mass, after receiving such knowledge, would never become able to 
administer a city intelligently, but we must seek that one constitution which is 
correct in a somewhat small [number], or few, or even one, and the other 
[constitutions] must be considered imitations, just as was also said a little earlier, 
some mimicking this [correct constitution] better, others more shamefully. 
 
Just as in the Republic, the primary interlocutor turns to a small group, or even an individual, 
with expert knowledge to benevolently guide the polis and resolve its internal factional disputes. 
Indeed, as Balot (2004: 97) points out, this point appears explicitly at Plt. 311b7–c2, where the 
Eliatic stranger concludes that the true statesman will weave together the character of brave and 
prudent men (τὸ τῶν ἀνδρείων καὶ σωφρόνων ἀνθρώπων ἦθος).  
It appears, then, that a middle ground is here proposed (similar to both Solon and 
Thucydides), but the means of arriving there are markedly different: the rule of a dominant, 
enlightened small group or individual. At the same time, however, the Eliatic stranger, just like 
Socrates in the Republic, acknowledges that it is difficult to find incorruptible people, and that 
leaders are often corrupted by power (von Fritz 1975: 79). Thus, while Plato’s primary 
interlocutor yet again places power in the hands of a small group, the possibility for abuse of this 
power yet again arises. 
It is in Plato’s final work—the Laws—that a Platonic speaker finally turns from the ideal 
to the practical. Indeed, in this work the Athenian stranger proposes that the legislator should 
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ponder the ideal, but then to consider what is practically possible (Leg. 745e7–746d2, esp. 
746a9–c2). Moreover, he goes so far as to argue that the perfect city could only be inhabited by 
gods and children of gods (Leg. 739d6–7). Thus, as Balot puts it, the Athenian stranger sees 
perfection as outside the reach of humans, and instead focuses on what is second best (2006: 
224). Part of the reason for the Athenian stranger’s view that the perfect state is unattainable is 
the greed and corruptibility of individuals (870a1–6), and thus Plato yet again broaches the 
possible negative effects of corruption on a constitution. In the Laws, however, his speaker does 
not attempt to explain it away by appealing to a knowledgeable, benevolent leader, but instead 
adjusts the type of constitution he recommends in an attempt to compensate for this reality.429 
 The solution he proposes to this problem is mixture. Indeed, the concept receives a great 
deal of emphasis in the Laws, with Sparta receiving a lengthy description as the first example of 
a mixed constitution (691c–701d).430 The type of mixture which the Athenian stranger proposes 
for the city he is founding, however, is different. He begins with a discussion of the two “mother 
constitutions” which produce all others: εἰσὶν πολιτειῶν οἷον μητέρες δύο τινές, ἐξ ὧν τὰς ἄλλας 
γεγονέναι λέγων ἄν τις ὀρθῶς λέγοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν προσαγορεύειν μοναρχίαν ὀρθόν, τὴν δ’ αὖ 
δημοκρατίαν (“Of the constitutions, a certain two are like the mothers from which someone 
could rightly say the others were born, and the correct name for the one is monarchy, and the 
other democracy”; 693d2–5). He then identifies Persia as the exemplar of pure monarchy, and 
Athens as representative of pure democracy (693e), and proposes that the best practicable 
solution for humans is to combine their governmental forms: δεῖ δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον 
                                                 
429 It is also worth noting that in the Statesman the Eleatic stranger argues that laws are too specific to cover all 
circumstances (294a–295a, 295e–296a; though he does admit that lawful societies are superior to unlawful ones), 
and uses this as an argument in support for the establishment of a statesman who can provide judgment to difficult 
situations. In the Laws, however, the emphasis obviously shifts. 
430 Von Fritz identifies this as the first true appearance of the concept of the mixed constitution (1975: v). 
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μεταλαβεῖν ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν, εἴπερ ἐλευθερία τ’ ἔσται καὶ φιλία μετὰ φρονήσεως (“And so it is 
also absolutely necessary to have a share of both of these, if in fact there is to be both freedom 
and friendship together with wisdom”; 693d7–e1). 
 What, exactly, does this mean? Hahm answers this question as follows: “What Plato is 
talking about in this mixture of monarchy and democracy in both Persia and Athens is a 
compromise in which the ruler … voluntarily surrenders a degree of autonomy to the other part 
of the state to gain the benefit of the intelligence in the other …” (2009: 184). This system, then, 
in which office-holders exercise restricted rule, and refer matters to the other inhabitants of the 
state for deliberation, certainly represents a mixture of different interests. It is, however, quite 
different from the mixture which Thucydides describes at 8.97.2 (at least in the terms Plato’s 
Athenian stranger uses to describe it).431 Indeed, it appears much closer to Thucydides’ analysis 
of Athens under Pericles at 2.65.8, in which he “held down the demos freely” (κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος 
ἐλευθέρως), and in which he led rather than being led (οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε; 
2.65.8). Thus, while Plato’s Laws does finally broach the topic of mixture as a solution to the 
problem of poor leadership, it proposes a very different type of mixture, one that Thucydides 
presented as temporarily beneficial, but as unable to resolve the weaknesses inherent in 
democracy in any lasting way. 
 Finally, I conclude my discussion of fourth century philosophers with an examination of 
the relationship between Thucydides’ concept of a moderate government and Aristotle’s 
discussion of a mixed constitution in the Politics. 
                                                 
431 Aristotle both attacks this type of mixture as inferior, since it is composed of the two constitutions which he 
identifies as the worst (tyranny and democracy; 1265b29–1266a5), and disputes Plato’s very description, arguing 
instead that what he is describing is actually a combination of oligarchy and democracy (1266a5–22). For more on 
these points, see Hahm 2009: 186–7. 
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As discussed above, Thucydides describes the “blending” of the Five Thousand as 
accomplished through two changes: the adoption of a property requirement (those capable of 
providing their own arms), and the abolition of pay for serving in office (8.97.1). These changes 
naturally lend themselves to a comparison with Aristotle, who proposes “polity” (πολιτεία), often 
translated as “constitutional government,”432 as the most practical positive form of government 
in the most places (1265b26–30, 1295a25–31).433 This political structure, as Aristotle tells his 
readers, is a “mixture” (μίξις; 1293b34) of oligarchy and democracy. In explaining what he 
means by this, Aristotle focuses on the adoption or abandonment of elements from each type of 
regime, including property requirements (which he identifies as inherently oligarchic), and pay 
for official service (a markedly democratic practice) (1294a35–1294b1).434 These considerations 
are remarkably similar to the devices by which Athens temporarily alters its regime under the 
government of the Five Thousand, and thus Aristotle seems to be thinking about mixture in much 
the same way as Thucydides was. 
An additional similarity may be noted when Aristotle describes the true blending of 
constitutions as occurring when one cannot fully determine how to categorize it: τοῦ δ᾽ εὖ 
μεμεῖχθαι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν ὅρος, ὅταν ἐνδέχηται λέγειν τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτείαν 
δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν (“And the definition of democracy and oligarchy being mixed well, 
is when it is possible to call the same constitution democracy and oligarchy”; 1294b14–16). With 
this notion in mind, one may recall the very different interpretations which scholar have 
proposed for the government of the Five Thousand (mentioned above), in which they attempted 
                                                 
432 See Balot 2006: 258. 
433 Johnson Bagby (2011: 132) argues that Thucydides’ description of the government of the Five Thousand 
prefigures Aristotle’s endorsement of the mixed regime. 
434 Aristotle goes on to differentiate between the various types of mixture, stating that when such a blending leans 
toward democracy it is called a polity, and when it leans toward oligarchy it is called an aristocracy (1293b31–8). 
On this point, see Hahm 2009: 188. 
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to identify it as either a slightly modified democracy, an oligarchy, a “hoplite constitution,” or a 
mixed constitution.435 Moreover, Kirkwood’s judgment on this constitution again comes to mind: 
“It can be reasonably maintained that the government can as well be called a limited democracy 
as a moderate oligarchy” (1972: 95). Based on these observations, we may argue that the 
difficulty which readers have had in definitively identifying the form of the Five Thousand 
directly contributes to its similarity to Aristotle’s model of the mixed constitution. 
 There are, however, also some differences between Aristotle’s discussion of the “polity” 
(or “constitutional government”) and Thucydides’ brief discussion of the government of the Five 
Thousand. Chief among these is the former’s emphasis on the importance of the middle class. 
Aristotle is emphatic that a strong middling group of citizens is key to the stability and 
maintenance of a polis, basing this largely on his theory of the mean from his Ethics (Pol. 
1295a35–1295b5). While the property requirement Thucydides mentions possibly included those 
possessing moderate wealth, the historian still frames the government of the Five Thousand as 
resolving the conflict between the interests of the few and the many, and makes no direct 
mention of a group occupying the middle. Despite this difference, however, the fact remains that 
both authors find their solution to the problems of oligarchy and democracy in a regime 
occupying the middle ground between them. 
   
Conclusion 
As has been noted, Thucydides’ description of a blended state, occupying a place 
between democracy and oligarchy, but identifiable as neither, bears its strongest similarities to 
Aristotle’s description of blended government (“polity”) from the Politics. This is, of course, not 
                                                 
435 See above. 
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to argue that Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War is a work of systematic political 
theory—he certainly does not provide readers with an extended political treatise dedicated to the 
direct discussion of governmental systems. At the same time, however, as I have shown, politics, 
leadership, and international relations play such an important role in his history (especially in his 
portrayal of democratic Athens) that he may reasonably be identified as engaging in political 
thought.436 Indeed, Thucydides is certainly interested in regime, insofar as it relates to the ability 
of the polis to deliberate and act in a moderate way. For example, he spends a great deal of time 
demonstrating to readers the inner workings of the Athenian democracy, and in so doing makes 
its faults clear.  
At the same time, however, he never undertakes an in-depth excursus like Plato or 
Aristotle do on issues such as the source of different factions’ claims to participation in 
government, and the relative justice of these claims. Moreover, there are several key differences 
between Thucydides’ discussion of politics and those of fourth-century philosophers. For 
example, Thucydides shows no interest in establishing a polis that would help its inhabitants 
develop intellectual and moral virtue, as Plato and Aristotle did, but instead searches for a 
political system which will allow a city to enjoy lasting stability and moderate governance. 
Furthermore, when Thucydides discusses democracy and oligarchy, he does so in terms of how 
great a portion of the populace exercises rule: the many or the few (3.82.1, 8.97.2). Both Plato 
and Aristotle, on the other hand, and to some extent Solon before them, portray the distinction as 
existing between the rich and the poor, with Aristotle going so far as to say that, if there were a 
state in which the rich were the many and the poor were the few, rule by the rich would still be 
oligarchy (1279b17–19). 
                                                 
436 See Ober 2006 and Balot 2017. 
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 Other important differences exist as well, such as Thucydides’ seemingly strict division 
of tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy, while Aristotle discusses many versions of each in his 
Politics (1289a8–12, 1291b31–1292b10). All the same, an analysis of Thucydides’ approach to 
typifying regimes, his implicitly supplied judgments of them, and his proposed ideal political 
structure demonstrates that Thucydides was addressing and considering solutions to many of the 
same problems as both earlier poets and later philosophers. While I do not argue that he is either 
directly responding to his predecessors, or being responded to by his philosophical successors, I 
do maintain that, in Thucydides’ text, we may observe that these issues were “in the air,” so to 
speak, at the time of his writing, and that Thucydides was, among his many other tasks, engaging 
with them. Indeed, his History is a work that does many things, and I hope to have given readers 
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